Administrative learning or political blaming? Public servants, parliamentary committees and the drama of public accountability

Abstract

In theory, within Westminster systems the buck stops with the minister. Ministers are responsible for the actions of their departments and accountable for policy outcomes. In practice, it is often senior public servants rather than their ministerial masters who face the fierce questions of parliamentary committees when things go wrong. This article uses dramaturgy theory and blame theory to assess whether the nature of the parliamentary committee setting encourages or inhibits opportunities for a ‘learning’ type of accountability. Through a comparative study of committee appearances by public servants in the UK and Australia, the article argues that the adversarial nature of committee hearings encourages ‘blame games’ that do little to guarantee better decision-making in the future.

从理论上讲，西敏制下的大臣再不能推脱责任。大臣需要对其部门的行动、对政策结果负责。但在实践中，出了问题，通常是高级官员而非各部大臣面对议会专门委员会的激烈质询。本文借用演剧理论及责备理论评估议会内委员会的设置是有利于还是不利于学习型的问责。通过比较英澳两国议会委员会的样态，作者认为委员会听证的对抗性质只是鼓励“责备”，并不利于未来的正确决策。

Keywords:

• Westminster
• accountability
• public service