ABSTRACT
To understand why quality of government (QoG) varies, scholars have drawn on two theoretical approaches: principal-agent and collective action theories. The literature tends to bifurcate these two theories, and focuses on the national scale and the structural conditions under which collective action and principal-agent problems arise. This article highlights how principal-agent relationships and collective action problems shape the implementation of decentralisation policy in two subnational governments in Papua New Guinea. It is argued that pathways to QoG are contextual, and determined by both principal-agent and collective action relationships. In the case of PNG, these relations are shaped by history, culture and the agency of elites and citizens.
研究政府的质量,学者们有两套思路,一是委托-代理,一是集体行动。文献因此一分为二,聚焦于集体行动以及委托代理问题据以发生的 国家规模及结构条件。本文主要研究了委托-代理关系以及集体行动问题在巴布亚新几内亚的两个次国家级政府如何造成了分权政策的实施。作者指出,实现政府质量的路径要看语境,委托-代理以及集体行动关系都起作用。就巴新个案而言,上述关系是由历史、文化以及精英和公民的代理方共同打造的。
Acknowledgements
The Australian aid program funded fieldwork informing this article . I thank the following individuals for their involvement: Denise Lokinap, Peter Kanaparo, Taita Currie Tara Davda, and Colin Wiltshire. I thank Michael Cookson and Husnia Hushang for managing funding and logistical support. Thanks also for comments from Jong-Sung You, Bo Rothstein and Yoonkyung Lee on the version of this paper presented at the American Political Science Association 2016 annual meeting. Special thanks to Ainsley Jones for research assistance and inputs into early drafts, and to Susan Sell, the anonymous referees and to Editor Renee Jeffery for valuable feedback.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Grant W. Walton is a Fellow at the Development Policy Centre, Crawford School, Australian National University. He is the author of Anti-Corruption and its Discontents: Local, National and International Perspectives on Corruption in Papua New Guinea (Routledge).