Abstract
The 5 papers in this special section examine the hypothesis that organism and environment constitute a single system.
Timo Järvilehto and Barry Smith focus on the status of the hypothesis from the perspectives of experimental psychology and philosophy. Järvilehto addresses the precursors of the hypothesis and the reasons for adopting its implied methodology. Smith addresses the epistemological and ontological issues, historical and contemporary, surrounding the core notion of an organism-relative definition of environment.
David Miller and Robert Lickliter focus on the status of the hypothesis from the perspectives of development and evolution. Miller addresses the limits on understanding development when organism-environment system and its implied (transactional) methodology are ignored. Likliter addresses the successes of the “epigenetic revolution” in relation to the traditionally dominant gene-centered view as confirmation of the hypothesis.
Susan Oyama focuses on the nexus of ideas that define Developmental Systems Theory (DST), a primary conceptual embodiment of the one-system hypothesis. She addresses conceptual differences among proponents of DST and with proponents of related viewpoints that are seemingly accommodating of some version of the hypothesis—differences that are tied to the use, emphasis, and interpretation of “cause,” “information,” and “environment.”
In this introduction I take the opportunity to present a personal overview of the conceptual landscape that embeds the one-system hypothesis. My goal is to frame the issues addressed by the 5 authors and to set the stage for future deliberations.