Ten seasons of the football banning order: police officer narratives on the operation of banning orders and the impact on the behaviour of ‘risk supporters’

Abstract

The football banning order was implemented under the Football (Disorder) Act (2000) to target ‘risk supporters’ where the supporter had: (a) previously been involved in football-related disorder; and (b) was likely to be involved in future disorder. Although viewed by the government of the day as a necessary tool to tackle football hooliganism, it was criticised by opponents as draconian due to the restrictive conditions that could be imposed via civil process (on complaint) where no criminal conviction needed to be secured. Despite these ethical concerns, little research has considered how those responsible for the operation of the orders identify and target risk supporters or the impact orders have on the behaviour of risk supporters. This paper aims to redress this gap in the research by presenting the findings of a number of interviews with police officers responsible for the operation of banning orders. The findings show police officers construct narratives that emphasise the need to control risk supporters and suggest banning orders have worked to serve this function. However, closer analysis of the data suggests that the number of banning orders implemented is partially generated by pressure to deliver targets and a desire of officers to justify and preserve their roles. This raises questions about the extent to which pressures to ensure banning orders are issued outweigh any ethical concerns over the use of the legislation.

Keywords:

• football banning orders
• football hooliganism
• risk supporters

Notes

1. Throughout this paper the terms ‘disorder’ and ‘violence’ are used interchangeably.

2. ‘Risk supporter’ is the official label given to football hooligans (see NPIA, 2010). Please see the discussion of the term presented later in this paper.

3. Under section 14c of the Football Disorder Act, violence and disorder includes ‘threatening violence’, and using racist, abusive words or ‘displaying writing or any other thing which is threatening, abusive or insulting’.

4. Other examples of such orders include both the anti-social behaviour order (Asbo) and control orders for terrorist suspects.

5. Police intelligence suggested Gough and Smith were part of the Derby County hooligan firm ‘The Derby Lunatic Fringe’.

6. Interviews were originally conducted in four areas as part of an evaluation of the implementation of Banning Orders in Scotland (see Hamilton-Smith et al., 2011). In order to increase the sample size, additional interviews were conducted in three areas after the evaluation was completed.

7. The interviews were conducted between October 2010 and June 2011.

8. Here ‘areas’ refers to either a Basic Command Unit (BCU) or force area. In some areas (i.e. 3, 4 & 5) the officers were responsible for policing clubs in a force area, in some larger forces, officers policed specific clubs in a BCU (i.e. 1,2, 6 and 7).

9. The UKFPU is managed by the Home Office.

10. For an overview of similar approaches please see Stott et al. (2012).

11. ACPO guidance (2010) defines a risk supporter as ‘a person posing a risk to public order and anti-social behaviour … in connection with a football event’ (NPIA, 2010, p10).

12. Automatic bans can be made through the courts on those convicted of a football-related offence (14a applications). Therefore intelligence gathering is not required in relation those convicted.

13. This covers all arrests designated in law under schedule 1 of the Football Spectators Act 1989 (as amended) reported by police to the FBOs Authority. This includes football specific offences (e.g. throwing missiles in a stadium, pitch encroachment) and a wide range of generic criminal offences committed in connection with a football match.

14. The data here is for all arrests as arrest data for violence and disorder are not available prior to 2000/01. Therefore, this includes violence and public disorder, missile throwing, racist chanting, pitch incursion, alcohol offences, ticket touting, carrying offensive weapons and property offences.

15. This has also been widely recognised in the research. See for example, Armstrong (1998), Ayres and Treadwell (2012).