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ABSTRACT
The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (PACA) aims to promote integrity within policing via a reformed police complaints and discipline process that focuses on lesson learning. Integrity and lesson learning are virtuous aspirations, but this paper queries the degree to which the reforms deliver them. Importantly, the analysis here provides a novel contribution to debates about lesson learning within the police by distinguishing lesson learning directed towards street-level officers from the accountability of police professional standards departments (PSDs) for how that is delivered. Focusing on the latter and drawing on the findings of the Chapman Review and a detailed analysis of police complaints statistics, it concludes that true lesson learning (from which increased integrity within forces can develop) requires increased external scrutiny of PSDs. In contrast, the analysis demonstrates that the PACA significantly increases PSDs’ de facto autonomy over the police complaints and discipline process and incorporates a shift in how independent oversight of police complaints is conceived. The paper borrows from Valverde’s suggested analytical framework to probe the underlying logic of the reforms, considering also the techniques they employ and the scale at which they operate. This reveals that the lesson learning agenda reframes expressions by citizens of mistreatment at the hands of the police as data upon which future policy might be based. In doing so, far from working to improve integrity, it may instead be ushering in a concerning biopolitical conception of policing which has the potential to exacerbate the worst features of police operational culture.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 This article focuses on the PACA reforms (defined below) and therefore centres on the police complaints and discipline system in England and Wales. However, the literature review in Section 2 includes academic studies from other jurisdictions (where appropriate) and the arguments made have broader application.
2 ‘Improving police integrity: reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems’ (Cmnd. 8976 2014).
3 The PACA extends beyond the police complaints and discipline system, but in this paper the ‘PACA Reforms’ refer to the elements of the PACA that relate to police complaints and discipline.
4 ‘Democratic policing’ is discussed in Section 3.4.
5 The Chapman Review is a Home Office commissioned review of the police discipline system which preceded the consultation process for the PACA.
6 See Torrible (Citation2018) for a discussion of ambiguity surrounding ‘public confidence’ in this context.
7 Police Act 1976.
8 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Act.
9 Police Reform Act 2002.
10 PACA s 33.
11 This included recruitment of 323 additional operational staff. The IPCC increased the number of investigations started from 109 in 2013/14 to 519 in 2015/16.
12 Despite, for example, the introduction of the Director General and the change of name, occurring earlier.
13 These include incidents which result in death or serious injury, allegations of serious assault, serious sexual assault and serious corruption. Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 paras 4–7.
14 S17-20 PACA.
15 Not all IPCC/IOPC investigations stem from complaints and maybe referred by forces themselves. In 2017/18, there were 31,097 complaints (incorporating 58,478 allegations) and the IOPC commenced 687 investigations. The IOPC Citation2019/10 Impact Report indicates that they started 508 new investigations (IOPC Citation2019/10: 19/10:9).
16 Chief constables were the appeal body for the least serious complaints – See IPCC SG Citation2015:103. Under the PACA reforms, these will be the duty of PCCs.
17 S1 Police Reforms and Social Responsibility Act 2011.
18 The role of PCC’s and the implications of the PACA reforms are discussed in Section 3.4.
19 See in particular 15 March 2016 Hansard Vol 607 Col 18.
20 Throughout this paper, ‘police’ refers the public police (i.e. the 43 forces in England and Wales) in contrast to private security personnel etc.
21 College of Policing (Citation2014, p. 3).
22 PRA 2002 s6(3)(a). These include incivility but see the discussion below regarding classification of complaints where this may easily overlap with ‘lack of fairness and impartiality’ and ‘oppressive conduct or harassment’ (see IPCC Citation2016/17, p. 3).
23 See footnote 17 above re lower level appeals. Appeals regarding outcome of complaints are discussed in Section 3.3.
24 Para 3(3) Sched 3 PRA 2002.
25 For the level of complaints with which this paper is concerned this is the Chief Constable (who delegates to PSDs) s29 of the Police Reform Act 2002.
26 See new Para’s 2(6A – 26D) of Sched 3 of the PRA inserted by para 2(3) of Sched 5 of the PACA.
27 Para 2(3) Sched 5 PACA.
28 Para 3 of Sched 5 of PACA.
29 Para 6(3) of Sched 5 PACA.
30 For the period discussed, the number of appeals received varies between 1497 and 1370 (IPCC Citation2017/18, p. 14, Citation2016/17: 9) (IOPC219/10: 14). It is not valuable to compare this to the number of recorded complaints since there are no data on the percentage of people who if unhappy about non-recording would appeal.
31 Reasons appeals were upheld are not given.
32 The numbers of such appeals are low ranging from 70 to 112 over the period discussed. However, lower level appeals are handled by Chief Constables and it is unlikely appeals to the IPCC are representative of the true picture because it is the decision letter from PSDs that informs complainants whether their right of appeal is to the IPCC/IOPC or the Chief Constable (See IPCC SG Citation2015).
33 Young et al.’s study also found one force where local resolution that incorporated well-implemented restorative justice techniques could operate positively.
34 See discussion of the new role(s) for PCCs in Section 3.4.
35 See Sections 3.4 and 4.2.
36 Para 6(3) of Schedule 5 PACA inserts a new paragraph 6(2A) of Schedule 3 PRA.
37 In 2018/19, forces finalised 54,987 allegations of which 21,764 were subject to local investigation. In the same year 1987 local investigation appeals were received and 1310 were finalised of which 492 were upheld (IOPC Citation2018/19).
38 PACA Sched 5 para 31.
39 PACA Sched 5, para 31 and 34.
40 PACA Sched 5 para 31 6(a)(5).
41 See S 22.
42 See S13 PACA.
43 S10(1)(d) PRA2002.
44 S10(1)(c) PRA2002.
45 The IOPC statutory Guidance 2020 invites the more minimal approach (IOPC Citation2020, p. 21).
46 A term coined by Reiner for ‘low status, powerless groups whom the dominant majority see as problematic or distasteful’ (Citation2010, p. 123).