Community-based policing of natural disasters in Vietnam: analysing the ‘four-on-the-spot’ model

ABSTRACT

Vietnam, one of the few remaining communist countries in the world, is a unique and under-researched context for exploring the governance and provision of security before, during and after natural disasters. Its geographical location means that it is extremely vulnerable to the environmental impacts of climate change, particularly hydrometeorological disasters such as typhoons and floods. For this reason, policing scholars worldwide are increasingly interested in how Vietnam’s police agencies manage natural disasters. Up to now, most of the existing literature has centred on the experiences of Western countries. The lack of empirical research in countries like Vietnam accounts for our lesser knowledge of how communist approaches to community-based policing support disaster management, recovery, and resilience-building. In this study, we use a combination of desktop research, case studies, and interviews with police officers to describe how Vietnam’s ‘four-on-the-spot’ (FOTS) community-policing model aligns with the country’s disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities. We consider the strengths and limitations of a FOTS-based approach to ‘resilience policing’ noted in the wider literature on adaptive governance and present some practical recommendations for enhancing the adaptability of Vietnamese police in disaster-prone regions. These lessons may potentially be applied to other climate-affected regions in Vietnam.

KEYWORDS:

• Natural disaster
• resilience policing
• four-on-the-spot (FOTS)
• community-based policing
• Vietnam

Introduction

Vietnam lies in a tropical climate zone. Climate change is the main cause of extreme weather phenomena, and Vietnam is one of the countries forecasted to suffer the heaviest and most far-reaching impacts; all areas of the country’s economic and social life will be profoundly affected (Luong 2021, Perwaiz et al. 2021, Tran et al. 2022). The country experiences dozens of storms and tropical depressions annually, particularly from July to December, which bring heavy rainfall. Over the last twenty years, extreme weather events have caused more than 13,000 deaths, at least $6.4 billion in property damage (Government of Vietnam 2017), and economic losses equivalent to 1.0–1.5% of the country’s GDP (Perwaiz et al. 2021).¹ Accordingly, it is estimated that over the coming decades, climate-related disasters will directly impact 70% of Vietnam’s population as the intensity and frequency of hydrogeological events such as typhoons, floods, and droughts increase.

As the country’s leading body in the political system, Vietnam’s Communist State (VCS) has focused since 1986 (during the Renovation Period or Đổi Mới in Vietnamese) on strengthening natural disaster prevention and control by maintaining and developing ‘four-on-the-spot’ strategies (FOTS, Bốn Tại Chỗ in Vietnamese). The FOTS motto can be understood to mean that each household needs to prepare itself fully with what is most necessary to prevent and respond to natural disasters occurring in its locality (Luong 2021). At the same time as meeting the relief requirements for their own family or locality, households must be ready to support other families and localities.

In the original order, FOTS is divided into four main parts: (1) leadership on the spot (FOTS-1), (2) human resources on the spot (FOTS-2), (3) supplies and vehicles on the spot (FOTS-3), and (4) logistics on the spot (FOTS-4). The four elements must be implemented simultaneously to promote efficiency at the highest level, and they must be bound and linked. To detail the FOTS, the VCS has established multiple policy frameworks for disaster risk management and climate change in its laws and programs, including for law enforcement agencies (To and Kato 2018, Luong 2021, Tran et al. 2022). As part of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the People’s Police Force (PPF) is one of the core agencies tasked with responding to climate change, preventing natural disasters, and undertaking search-and-rescue operations (Luong 2018, To and Kato 2018). While all PPFs may be requested to control natural disasters under the power of the VCS, the Police Force on Fire Fighting and Prevention and Search and Rescue (FFF) is considered the leader in disaster management. It covers all mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery steps.

Community-based approaches to policing have long been used to promote community safety by reducing local vulnerabilities and building capacities to manage complex sources of risk and insecurity (Bonkiewicz and Ruback 2010, Varano and Schafer 2012). Almost all models, including community policing (Stenning 1984 Oliver and Bartgis 1998), community-oriented policing (Goldstein 1987), problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 1979), and third-party policing (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006), have a preventative orientation that emphasises local engagement and working in partnership. These models have been adopted to create ‘new obligations on the police to cooperate in the development and implementation of local crime prevention and security strategies’ (Virta 2002, p. 191, emphasis added) in Western society since the 1980s (Goldstein 1979, Stenning 1984, Oliver and Bartgis 1998). However, changes in climate and the increased incidence of natural disasters have brought police into contact with emerging forms of risk alongside their crime prevention duties. As a result, some scholars have theorised that police are finding themselves contributing more and more to collaborative communities that are involved in promoting resilience to the hazards associated with climate change and have dubbed this a ‘scientific revolution’ in policing (Mutongwizo et al. 2021, 2022). In demonstrating the essential role of policing in responding to emergent situations and chaotic crises such as natural disasters, such scholars have also called for further engagement and reshaping of community policing to contribute to combating uncertain landscapes – dubbed ‘harmscapes’ (Mutongwizo et al. 2021, 2022). Although these significant assessments are based on and applicable to the Global North context, they can also apply to the Global South, including developing countries like Vietnam that operate under authoritarian leaders. For example, to build up and maintain resilience in policing to deal with natural disasters, Western countries prefer to ‘engage and/or might engage in the governance of safety with communities’ (Mutongwizo et al 2022 , p. 606) to enhance the role of the police force to collaborate and cooperate with local populations. On the other hand, Western scholars are curious about how Vietnamese policing involves the State and supports local handling of natural disasters (Luong 2018, 2021). This paper does not assess the transferability of a ‘resilience policing’ model from the Global North to the Global South (or vice versa). However, any similar approaches, distinguishing principles, or effective experiences from non-Western countries could be called on to look for potential strengths and lessons from outside that might improve the resilience of policing in Vietnam. Therefore, our primary purpose is to analyse the approaches of Vietnamese police, in their unique context, to establishing and deploying ‘resilience policing’ to handle natural disasters, thus contributing to the global policing literature. We also identify a knowledge gap concerning empirical research into how police implement FOTS in anticipation of, during, and after disasters in Vietnam. To do this, we focus on three main research questions (RQs), as follows:

• RQ1: How is the FOTS related to community-based policing when responding to natural disasters in Vietnam?

• RQ2: Why does the PPF prefer to apply FOTS?

• RQ3: What are the challenges for the PPF in mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters using the FOTS model?

Methods

In Vietnam, public security services often pose a barrier to researchers’ gaining ethical approval, particularly international scholars (Jardine 2022). To deal with the ‘sensitive political environment’, an ‘appreciative inquiry’ approach is usually adopted to persuade the MPS to approve the study (Jardine 2022, pp. 18–20). Yet, to ensure confidentiality and anonymity, some foreign researchers decide not to use unique identifiers for the interview participants (e.g. ranking police officers) (Jardine 2022). Conversely, Vietnamese criminologists – including our team, which works closely with police institutions – find it easier to access data as part of the insider-outsider positionalities in Vietnam (Jardine and Luong 2024). Besides, we can set up a research team – in this case (senior) police officers – by requesting an internal dispatch to help us connect with participants.

This study reviews the relevant grey literature by conducting desk reviews, selecting case studies, and interviewing key informants. We conducted desk reviews of relevant policies, legislation, and publications on Vietnam’s natural disaster management policies. Further, we retrieved the legal and regulatory documents from Vietnam’s legal database (thuvienphapluat.vn) and MPS websites (Vietnamese). We selected only some typical cases to reflect the role of the PPF in natural disasters between 2010 and 2020 due to ‘the disaggregated data on indicators for the period 1989–2010’ (Luong et al. 2011, p. 2). These cases were collected from various resources from the United Nations and non-profit organisations in Vietnam. Brief descriptions of them are provided in Table 1.

Table 1. Listing natural disaster cases in Vietnam used in the article.

No.	Time	Natural disasters	Situation overview
1	2012	Super typhoon Son Tinh (No.8)	On the night of 29 October, Typhoon Son-Tinh moved northeast and became a tropical depression in Mong Cai district, Quang Ninh province. A total of 11 people were killed or are missing because of the typhoon; a further 90 people were injured; 55,680 houses were damaged; more than 95,000ha of paddy rice and cash crops were damaged. An initial estimate of total damage is nearly USD 2 billion. Electricity and communication systems are being restored in Hai Phong, Thai Binh, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh provinces. The latest damage reports show that Nam Dinh and Thai Binh are the worst affected provinces. The Government started responding quickly in the aftermath of the storm and has not requested any additional assistance.
2	2013	Super Typhoon Haiyan	Super Typhoon Haiyan, locally named Storm Number 13, is expected to hit Central Vietnam on Sunday, 10 November, after hitting the Philippines on Friday as a category-5 storm and wind strength of 230 kilometres per hour. Within the first two weeks of October, Central Vietnam was hit by two category-1 storms, Typhoon Wutip (storm number 10) on 30 September and Nari (storm number 11) on 15 October, leaving behind significant damages in nine provinces of Thanhhoa, Nghean, Hatinh, Quangbinh, Quangtri, Thuathienhue, Danang, Quangnam and Quangngai. Among these, Nghean, Hatinh, Quangbinh, Quangtri and Thuathienhue suffer from both storms’ dual impacts. It is estimated that 6.5 million people will be affected by the storm, while the total economic loss due to Nari is estimated to be VND 1.5 trillion (USD 71 million), on top of the VND 13.5 trillion (USD 663.23 million) economic loss earlier caused by Wutip.
4	2017	Super typhoon/storm	Typhoon Damrey, or Storm No.12, landed in Vietnam on 4 November 2017 with winds of up to 135 km/hour. The typhoon and continued heavy rainfall affected more than 4.33 million people in 15 Central Regions of Vietnam provinces. Three thousand five hundred fifty houses were destroyed in the typhoon, and 134,000 houses were partially damaged. In Khanhhoa province alone, 114,000 homes have been partially or fully damaged. One month after the typhoon struck, food security, livelihood, shelter, water, hygiene, and food and livelihood needs remain. The Government of Vietnam estimates the economic loss due to the typhoon around VND 22,680 billion (USD 996.9 million). On 4 December 2017, the UN in Vietnam launched a Flooding Response Plan, identifying financial needs of US 54 million to cover humanitarian needs. As of 13 December, the Response Plan is 30 per cent funded. Early recovery funding needs, as estimated by the Government of Vietnam, add up to a total of USD 142 million.
5	2017		Typhoon Doksuri tore a destructive path across Central Vietnam on Friday, 15 September 2017, as a Category 1 typhoon with maximum sustained winds of 135 kph (wind gusts up to 185 kph), flooding hundreds of thousands of homes, whipping off roofs and knocking out power in the six provinces of Thanhhoa, Nghean, Hatinh, Quangbinh, Quangtri and Thuathienhue. According to the Central Steering Committee for Natural Disaster Prevention and Control (CSCNDPC), at least 14 people were killed, 112 injured, and four others missing after Doksuri swept through Vietnam during the weekend of the typhoon. This typhoon is the tenth to hit Vietnam this year and caused widespread rainfall of between 100 and 250 mm in provinces from Thanhhoa to Thuathienhue, leaving 1.3 million people without power. The typhoon has caused severe damage to civil properties and community infrastructure such as schools, public buildings, and river and sea dikes, among others.
6	2017	Landslides and flash floods in the Northern region	Landslides occur in the Nam-Ho Dienbien districts of Laichau Province, Mu Chang Chai districts of Yenbai Province, and Muong La districts of Sonla Province. Total damage estimated at 538.2 billion VND, or approximately 24 million USD. Latest reports indicated the following casualties: 9 deaths, 24 missing, 12 injured, and 196 houses washed away or collapsed. Additionally, 75 houses were affected by landslides, and 125 houses were unroofed. In order to assist the victims, the local authority has mobilized personnel and resources to repair the damage to infrastructure and properties. A damage assessment is currently being conducted.
7	2020	Super flooding in the Central region	On 6 October 2020, the central region of Vietnam experienced prolonged, heavy rains that caused severe and widespread flooding and landslides in eight provinces. This was due to the combination of numerous weather systems – the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone combined with cold air and tropical storms LINFA and NANGKA. Nine cyclonic storms also hit this part of the country, the final one being Typhoon Vamco, which caused landfall on 15 November 2020. People suffered heavy losses caused by natural disasters in 2020, including damage to people, shelters and properties. Three hundred fifty-seven were dead or missing (291 fatalities, 66 missing people), and 876 were injured. Five hundred eleven thousand one hundred seventy-two submerged houses, 3,429 collapsed houses, 333,084 damaged houses/ roofs blown away. These storms and floods that happened in a row are considered the most terrible disasters that hit Central Vietnam in the past 100 years. Floods wreaked havoc on infrastructure, including highways, schools, health institutions, and community centres. According to reports, over 360 schools were flooded or destroyed, over two million cattle lives were lost, and 30,000 hectares of agricultural productivity were devastated. The distribution of aid in the aftermath of the floods was hampered by substantial damage to public transit systems. More than 165 kilometres of national highway, 801 kilometres of local roads, and three bridges were severely damaged, according to VNDMA. Due to the loss of electricity in many impacted areas, communication was restricted, with 3,125 electric poles collapsing or breaking (VNDMA). The total loss was estimated at around VND 35,180,997,000 (approximately USD 1.4 million), reported on 15 November 2020.

(Source: combining and summarising from (1) ReliefWeb; (2) the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); and (3) United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in Vietnam).

The key informants (KIs) were identified and recruited using a sample frame of key agencies suggested by our focus group experts at the police training’s institutions.² We invited the KIs based on four main criteria. Firstly, regarding experience in the field, participants had to be experts who had worked for at least five years. Secondly, we selected an official from each of the six socio-economic regions to ensure geographical representation. Thirdly, regarding leadership, some of the KIs at least had to be responsible for monitoring and implementing the FOTS motto from headquarters to the local level. Finally, to encompass police rankings, KIs from different levels were selected, either senior or junior officers.

From October to December 2021, 23 officials were invited by phone or through class lectures. Due to COVID-19 restrictions in Vietnam, 12 participants chose a written questionnaire rather than a face-to-face interview. Only six of the participants interviewed via phone held senior management positions (one at headquarters, two in the provinces, and three in the districts). The remaining participants (five) refused to participate due to struggles with health conditions or changing employment positions. This made a final total of 18 participants.

While the average experience working in search and rescue was over 6.5 years, participants’ ranks ranged from junior officers to lieutenant colonel of police. They came from different zones in Vietnam: Metropolitans (Ha Noi and Hai Phong), the Red River Delta region (Thai Binh and Hoa Binh), the Northeastern region (Lao Cai and Yen Bai), and the North-Central region (Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Quang Binh). The numbers and organisations of participating interviewees are specified in Table 2. Their responses were written in Vietnamese for translation into English and then transcribed for analysis.

Table 2. Information of the key informant's participants

No.	Affiliation	Position	Rank	Interview
1	MPS (headquarter), Hanoi	Deputy head	Lieutenant colonel	Phone
2	MPS (headquarter), Hanoi	Office	Major colonel	Written
3	Hai Phong	Office	Second lieutenant	Written
4	Nghe An	Deputy head	Lieutenant colonel	Phone
5	Nghe An	Office	Lieutenant	Phone
6	Ha Tinh	Office	Senior lieutenant	Written
7	Ha Tinh	Office	Lieutenant	Written
8	Hoa Binh	Office	Captain	Written
9	Quang Binh	Office	Senior lieutenant	Written
10	Quang Binh	Office	Lieutenant	Written
11	Quang Binh	Office	Captain	Written
12	Ha Tinh	Office	Lieutenant	Phone
13	Yen Bai	Office	Lieutenant	Written
14	Yen Bai	Deputy head	Captain	Written
15	Nghe An	Office	Second lieutenant	Written
16	Lao Cai	Deputy head	Captain	Phone
17	Thai Binh	Office	Second lieutenant	Written
18	Thai Binh	Deputy head	Major colonel	Phone

In addition to the written questionnaires (collected during in-service police classes at the UFFP), semi-structured interviews of 45–60 min were conducted. The interviews were not recorded but noted in a notebook, as the interviewees requested. The interview questions, which allowed participants to share their roles in FOTS policing, were similarly worded to the questionnaire. All interviews were conducted in Vietnamese (the participants’ mother tongue) and translated into English. NVivo version 12 was used for data coding and key theme categorisation based on the four pillars of the FOTS policing approach (Luong 2021).

Findings

This section describes the nature of FOTS in community-based policing approaches to the People’s Police Force when responding to natural disasters. It acknowledges previous studies (Luong 2021) and aligns with the recent guidelines of the Ministry of Public Security for policing disasters (Nguyen et al. 2021a, 2021b, Tran 2022). To analyse how Vietnamese police carry out their functions in anticipation of a natural disaster, during a disaster, and in response to a disaster, the current findings are presented in three main stages: before, during, and after.

Before a natural disaster

There are at least four main steps when preparing to deal with a disaster: (1) setting up a leader’s role on the spot, (2) issuing an urgent dispatch to call for further forces, (3) balancing the budget and logistics to meet needs and supply equipment, and (4) approaching the local scene to help citizens set up a protective plan.

Firstly, in any circumstance, the priority is to set up a leadership apparatus to prepare for a natural disaster (FOTS-1). Typically, the core members of the apparatus are the local authorities, agencies, and political organisations or political-society organisations. FFF and other police teams on site are core human resources and the first-hand groups at the preparation stage. Establishing the on-the-spot apparatus and appointing a leader ensures that all activities are done promptly and efficiently. A colonel at FFF headquarters described how preparations were begun before super-typhoon Damrey struck Vietnam in 2017:

We used a top-down model. Thus, whenever the highest level [headquarters] orders detailed plans, we would interpret these requirements immediately from our current level [province] to the lower level [district and commune]. It was an order! Nothing more, nothing less! (Interviewee #1)

In Vietnam, apparatuses at all levels generally perform their tasks and function well in coordinating the execution of disaster prevention plans. Although the Chairman of the People’s Committee is the most senior leader in this apparatus, the commander of the FFF will coordinate directly with related sectors and institutions and regularly check the progress of plans. A second lieutenant in Haiphong shared his preparations for dealing with super typhoon Haiyan in 2013:

Our leader advised on developing long-term and short-term plans before the typhoon came. This involved advising on the formulation, implementation, urging and inspection of the implementation of climate change response plans, natural disaster prevention and control, accident and injury prevention and control, and search and rescue at police units and localities. (Interviewee #3)

Secondly, before the typhoon and/or flooding comes and based on the latest authorised updates, police leaders will order a statement of emergency via internal dispatches directly to their colleagues and mobilise all resources on the spot to respond to the event (FOTS-2). For example, in the lead-up to the super typhoons Damrey and Doksuri in 2017, the Minister of the MPS sent an urgent dispatch (Công điện khẩn in Vietnamese) directly to all policing systems at headquarters and to the executive director of 63 provinces and cities to obey all guidelines strictly when responding to these serious storms. The senior leader of the MPS explained the context of the leadership role to order their lower level:

It [the urgent dispatch] includes (1) the temporary situation of the storm, based on official information from the government, (2) detailed forecasts of their related consequences (e.g. time, location, and level of the storm), (3) immediate actions to deal with this storm. (Interviewee #2)

Whenever the lower-ranking PPF units in the local areas get this urgent dispatch, they must deploy immediately without hesitation before the typhoon strikes. The Deputy Chief of Nghe An’s PFFFPSR explained:

By doing this, we want to ensure all forces and local communities fully understand the roles and functions of each scenario that we structured and designed. (Interviewer #4)

Also, police are required to prepare at least two formal and informal plans to gather human resources.

We create a list of core police agencies [traffic, task force, fire, and rescue] that will participate in flood prevention and rescue, along with a reserve list of backup agencies [local police stations] that can be deployed whenever necessary. (Interviewer #5)

As most local households are of temporary construction with corrugated iron roofs, the police show residents how to reinforce their houses and doors using aids such as sand sacks and fastening ropes. The MPS requires those officials or reserve groups to train and practise regularly at the scene. A Ha Tinh police officer described their tactical actions to deal with the super flooding of 2020:

Each team member is required to frequently practise skills for natural disaster prevention, especially necessary rescue skills, to familiarise themselves with specific tasks such as recognising the area where they are in charge, the team members, and the necessary equipment and materials. (Interviewee #6)

In other words, the FOTS-2 also means actively organising training courses and rehearsals to raise awareness and capacity to respond to natural disasters, incidents and search and rescue for FFF at all levels. In 2017, for example, to deal with the season of floods and storms across the northern areas (Hoa Binh province), the MPS requested training courses to improve the capacity and qualifications of officials in response to floods, landslides, and storms:

They fostered skills with all vehicles in their units and localities, such as lifeboats, motorcycles, canoes, ships, and other equipment. (Interviewee #8)

Thirdly, the leader of the local PPF also directs adequate budget allocation and related logistics to the disaster prevention plan (FOTS-3). The Captain of Police in Hoa Binh province pointed out:

Following the FOTS motto – proactively prevent, respond promptly, and overcome quickly and effectively – at our station, we focused on stockpiling gasoline, oil, food, drinking water, medicine, and necessities … to meet the demand. (Interviewee #8)

Depending on the type of disaster, the FFF’s leader may issue specific measures to all the police forces and communicate appropriate strategies to the community before the disaster. For example, ten days before the super flooding in the Central Region in 2020, police collaborated with commune staff to meet with heads of villages to develop alternative arrangements for flood and storm prevention. Being near the incident meant that police could (re)adjust their teamwork, making it as flexible and dynamic as possible. A lieutenant of Ha Tinh police shared:

At this time [five days before the flood], we divided into two: half at our station for maintaining communications and the other half at the scene for preparing the residents. (Interviewer #7)

To do this, they develop, review, or offer instructions about evacuation plans – including means, time, and logistics – to prepare for potential emergencies based on different scenarios. They also advised households to stockpile food, cassava, potatoes, rice, instant noodles, flashlights, oil (which could be used within 5–7 days) and charge mobile phones. They provided direction and support to 28 households located near the riverbank and vulnerable to landslides, encouraging them to evacuate to higher ground. Many houses within the commune were also protected from collapse by cutting down trees, trimming branches, and using sandbags, as the police in Quang Binh shared:

Unified command and close coordination among the forces involved in disaster response and search and rescue to ensure the safety of people and vehicles participating in incident response, natural disasters, and search and rescue, and to contribute to minimising the damage caused by natural disasters. (Interviewee #9)

Finally, the FFF and colleagues support local people by establishing specific plans with appropriate materials/equipment to respond to the disaster (FOTS-4).

We are the people’s police – policing of the people, policing by the people, and policing for the people; thus, we must serve them. (Interviewee #11)

Depending on the type of landscape – sea, land, or remote area – police implement different forms of help. On the sea, for example, they inform and approach fishermen on boats to protect the safety of people and property. A lieutenant of police at Quang Binh analysed:

We [police patrol on the sea] coordinate with departments, branches, and mass organisations to review and keep a list of the number of vehicles and fishermen operating at sea and guide them to safe shelters. (Interviewee #10)

On the land, police deploy their resources and equipment to organise and assist disaster prevention activities in local communities, as the FFF’s team 4 of the Ha Tinh PPF remembered while preparing to deal with super typhoon Doksuri in 2017:

We set up four teams of 12–15 officers to go to each household to strengthen the house, cut down trees, trim branches and evacuate affected people. (Interviewee # 12)

However, in mountainous areas with rugged terrain, including rough hills and slopes, police established and maintained emergent teams with mobilised equipment and instructed them to stick strictly with military forces and others. A lieutenant at the Van Slope, Viet Hong commune, Tran Yen district, reflected on their preparations for the 2017 landslide:

We patrol this location 24/7 to check on the dangerous and prohibited areas that often suffer heavy damage by flash floods and landslides, and we ban all vehicle entry. (Interviewee #13)

During a natural disaster

When disasters occur, the fastest and most effective way to provide rescue and support is to use available forces. Accordingly, police perform a role comparable to night-watchmen alongside armed forces, local military standing units, and Youth Union members. It comprises four main contributions: (1) monitoring the movement of the storm, (2) ensuring traffic safety, (3) setting up the search team, and 4) maintaining order.

Firstly, regarding monitoring the scene, police play a significant role in controlling the chaos of a disaster. The local PPF is mobilised to ensure security and order when storms and floods occur in emergent disasters (FOTS-2, 3, 4). A deputy head of Yen Bai’s police analysed:

Many of my colleagues from different districts volunteered to come. We mobilised nearly 1,000 cadres and many special vehicles and equipment to the flooded area to evacuate people and relocate assets to safe places. (Interviewee #14)

In many cases, police officers must go house to house to search for the injured or those who need help. Police use professional tools and skills to find out who are struggling on their properties and have not yet evacuated (Interviewees #3, 7, 9). For example, due to the direct impact of the 2020 super flooding in the Central Northern region of Vietnam, dozens of buildings in the Ky Son district, Nghe An province, were flooded, and the strong cyclones led to some roads from the central town to other communes also suffering severe traffic jams and landslides. Immediately after the incident, Ky Son district leaders mobilised the local police, while other on-site forces presented at the scene to move locals to safe shelters or find the best safety situations for them. Despite the heavy rain and flooding, the PPF still conscientiously stayed in the area to protect the lives and property of the people, mainly ethnic minorities. Such action makes locals more confident in natural disasters and floods. Nghe An’s second lieutenant confirmed:

Many valuable assets of the local minorities, with our unlimited assistance, have been transported to safe areas. (Interviewee #15)

Secondly, police lead, instruct and guide the traffic during a disaster (FOTS-1). Casualty injuries, property damages, or destruction of gardens cause serious traffic congestion and stagnation, which requires police to deliver a 24/7 response. The strong and cyclonic winds cut power lines and create holes, making the area unsafe for traffic and pedestrians.

We plan to present immediately at these ‘hot spot’ areas of downed wires and/or broken trees to control and contribute to traffic divergence to make travel safer. (Interviewee 8)

A police lieutenant of Yen Bai province shared his experience of joining a task force to direct the traffic during the landslide of 2017:

Under our leader, we created four dynamic teams and gave each clear duties. I was in the first group, which directed citizens through non-working traffic lights. The rest of my colleagues focused on (1) putting roadblocks in the areas where the crisis was underway, (2) rerouting random traffic to safer roads and trying to keep out all unnecessary traffic, and (3) moving out everything that obstructed the traffic on the roads. (Interviewee #13)

Thirdly, the police organise the search teams (FOTS-1, 2, 3). Most super typhoons and serious storms in Vietnam often lead to family members being separated from one another without communication. Vulnerable groups, including disabled people, elders, and children, are particularly at risk if they have no one to check on them. Without careful instructions and authorised warnings, their safety and health could be threatened. To respond, the PPF always sets up one group (4–7 staff, depending on the specific situation) that prioritises contacting and supporting these vulnerable groups. For example, in dealing with the super flooding of 2017, 100% of the forces of the FFF, Task Forces, and Traffic Patrol, as well as the district police at Sa Pa, Bat Xat and Lao Cai City, mobilised more than 600 officers per location to create the Operation Search and Rescue Teams (OSRT). OSRT comprises large, middle, and small units involved in searching for and rescuing injured cases. One captain of the FFF in Lao Cai illustrated:

As part of OSRT, my team was ordered to contact only vulnerable groups [mentally ill, children, and elderly] and transport them out of the danger zones. Our group was provided with special equipment to search for victims in floods and storms, such as rescue lifeboats, canoes, and trucks, and health supplements for those residents during rescues. (Interviewee #16)

Relevant strategies are deployed and applied to search and rescue, based on the specific circumstances at the disaster scene. For instance, in the flash flooding in Ha Tinh in 2020, a remote and rocky commune, the OSRT divided into several rounds with different staff/groups at each point to deploy their relevant duties. Interviewee #6 described the strategy as ‘the onion layer model’. It combined multiple forces (as in Lao Cai’s above case) to create close networks between participants so that they could cooperate in deploying each round. By doing this, the police could set up search teams and create systems where loved ones could check on one another. As well, they could move any dead bodies or injured cases out of the scene.

Fourthly, maintaining social order in a disaster is a compulsory duty for the PPF (FOTS-1). When people are evacuated from homes or neighbourhoods, houses are left unsupervised, and opportunities to commit crimes may be rampant. Police presence may help to deter looting. If looting does occur, the police are ready to apprehend suspects. For example, in referring to the super typhoon Doksuri of 2017, which resulted in severe property losses, the Captain of Quang Binh province shared his experience:

I instructed and requested our colleagues to regularly use loudspeakers to inform people about the tricks of thieves in the storm, especially warning people in low-lying and flooded areas. We advised that before leaving their houses to move to a safe place, they should store valuable assets in a safe place and lock the door firmly. Also, if they saw anyone acting suspiciously, to contact their nearest police station immediately. (Interviewee #11)

After a natural disaster

The post-disaster phase covers activities in the fields of recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. It also allows the development of disaster risk-reduction measures, which can be applied during the next pre-disaster phase (that is, Phase 1 – before the disaster).

Firstly, the police guide the recovery of essential services to ensure the safety and well-being of residents (FOTS-1, 2). They are involved in restoring, repairing, and providing the basic services to enable life to return to normalcy. Accordingly, they prioritise clean water, power, roads, schools and (re)arranging properties. As Deputy Chief of the Department of FFF in Nghe An analysed regarding post-flooding in 2020:

When the flood level fell, I ordered 60 officers to divide into three groups and go to localities to help people clean up and cut down fallen trees on many roads. In addition, they dredged mud and cleaned and sanitised more than 25 tons of waste on the inner roads of Quy Chau mountain town, with a total length of nearly 4 km, before cleaning six kindergartens, primary schools, and village cultural locations. (Interviewee #4)

After the super flooding in Quang Binh in 2020, small and middle-level police officer groups (each comprising five to ten officers) handed out hoes and shovels to collect mud in each street section. The others quickly loaded all fallen trees onto trucks to be transported to the landfill for processing. They also helped people rebuild their houses and overcome threats to environmental sanitation and disease prevention so that they could quickly stabilise their lives and activities.

We nominated many medical doctors of police teams to offer free examinations, distribute free medicine, and support environmental treatments at all flood-affected places to help our locals. (Interviewee #9)

Secondly, police continue their obligations to maintain social order, regulate traffic, and organise search-and-rescue teams (FOTS-1). After a disaster, some unscrupulous people may take advantage of the chaos to commit property crimes. Interviewees commented along the lines:

They act from a mercenary motive while their neighbours are facing difficulties; we are police and do not allow them the freedom to do this. (Interviewees #2, 6, 8).

Also, police might be requested to join a patrol on the road or in river areas to support drowning victims. A FFF officer of the Ha Tinh province recalled that in the 2020 super flooding:

We used scuba diving equipment combined with special canoes to search for and rescue three missing persons at the Ngan Sau River after the flood waters dropped. (Interviewee #6).

Thirdly, police are involved in donations and charity to support the post-disaster recovery (FOTS-3, 4). Their activities focus on enabling communities, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable, by donating one day’s salary as the minimum contribution. A young official of FFF in Quang Binh clarified:

Following the guidance of our leadership [MPS], we encourage all units to mobilise cadres and soldiers to uphold the spirit of ‘good leaves cover torn leaves’ and support people in areas affected by storms and floods. As a ranking-based classification, based on voluntary attitudes, we usually contribute less than our higher senior officials. (Interviewee #10)

Alongside resident assistance, the MPS also allocates funds, equipment, and logistics to FFF’s local units and agencies seriously affected by natural disasters to improve and enhance their endurant capacities (FOTS-1, 2, 3, 4).

Finally, (re)reviewing and (re)assessing all sides post-disaster is one of the core requirements for police in Vietnam. There are two main purposes: (1) to evaluate their specific activities before and during the disaster and (2) to (re)build their plans based on current lessons for the next disaster seasons. Based on the four fundamental principles of FOTS, the PPF reviews, supplements, and adjusts its completed plans immediately after a disaster. As the Deputy Head of FFF of Thai Binh stated:

It is a compulsory regulation for our forces! Whenever our recovery and support process in the local areas is done, we will gather all staff, including officials at the scene and others at the station on duty, to evaluate, exchange, and discuss what did or did not work and how we will look towards the next season. (Interviewee #18)

Discussion

This section discusses the three research questions (RQs) in order. Combining the above findings with previous studies, from either a Global North or Global South policing context, it analyses the nature of FOTS in policing to respond to natural disasters in Vietnam. It will not confirm or promote the FOTS model as the best pathway to apply in a crisis. Instead, our findings examine why and how Vietnamese police select FOTS as part of community-based policing strategies to mobilise the powerful resources in the community to implement policing tactics before, during, and after a disaster.

The symbiotic relations between FOTS and CBP in responding to natural disasters (RQ1)

While police in Western societies create ‘social capital and build community resilience’ (Mutongwizo et al. 2022, p. 4), Vietnam’s pre-disaster preparations rely on the central ideology of the communist state. The first response to an emergent disaster is always to call for consolidated powers from local communities (Luong 2018, 2021, Nguyen et al. 2021a, Nguyen 2022). In other words, policing in FOTS specialises in building up the police’s professional powers and specific tactics by collaborating with local citizens to respond to disasters. It is quite similar to the concept of resilience policing, whereby ‘police act as facilitators/enablers in community capacity-building; there is a mutual dependency between the police and community’ to deal with ‘new and uncertain harms’ (Mutongwizo et al. 2021, p. 611). In essence, police cannot do everything or be everywhere and must look to the locals to help them maintain social order (Quarantelli 1997). A high-ranking official at FFF headquarters highlighted:

We have to rely on support, collaboration, and cooperation from our local communities to deploy our preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery tactics in a disaster. (Interviewee #1)

This explains the name of Vietnam’s police force – policing of the People, by the People, and for the People (Luong et al. 2020). Vietnamese police might not yet deploy Western-style policing responses in disasters; however, by relying on, encouraging, and supporting the community, they often implement a community-policing-based framework in FOTS to respond before, during, and after a disaster. For example, to set up their leading role on the spot (FOTS-1), police use their legal powers to call for local citizens (FOTS-2) to support them in deploying the team to search for and rescue the victims of a super flood. Also, to maintain traffic safety and order in a chaotic situation, police apply special tactics to direct traffic, and they arrest flagrant or major violators or criminals that pose serious threats to a community. Besides that, by applying FOTS in the community, police build local capacity to cope with disaster risks by providing necessary materials (FOTS-3) and supporting timely logistics (FOTS-4), which builds cooperation and collaboration between the police and the public. To some extent, policing activities in Vietnam involving disaster resilience appear similar to Western approaches to developing the CBP framework. However, FOTS is a compulsory principle of the Communist Party and as such is integral to the design of the community policing model to ‘enhance the capacity of local communities and governments [police] to … mobilise the power and resources of local forces in times of disasters’ (To and Kato 2018, pp. 734–735). It reflects how policing is conceptualised within this particular ideological system under the leadership of the VCS (Luu et al. 2018, To and Kato 2018, Luong 2021).

Preferring FOTS in Vietnam: A different perspective to policing natural disasters? (RQ2)

As the case of Vietnam’s police explains (see Findings section), the FOTS approach emphasises communities’ active involvement in all disaster risk management phases. Depending on residents’ resources, police also design and conduct relevant strategies to mitigate the risks and harms of disasters (Luong 2021). Therefore, community-based disaster risk management in policing is a process whereby police engage at-risk communities in identifying, analysing, treating, monitoring, and evaluating disaster risks to reduce their vulnerabilities and enhance their capacities (Nguyen 2022, Tran 2022). The decision-making process is typically structured as a hierarchal top-down approach to policing, calling for all citizens to deploy the FOTS in Vietnam (Luong 2021). It is consistent with the latest systematic literature review of best practices for police, which includes the need to communicate effectively during major crises (Hine and Bragias 2021). From 15 final publications (out of 11,532), Hine and Bragias (2021, p. 1504) recommended that ‘in a crisis event [natural disaster], it is important to have a non-hierarchal decentralised structure of communication and decision-making’. Accordingly, Vietnam’s police structures operate under the one communist-led model that requires policing in FOTS to follow the hierarchal top-down flow by relying on residents (Luong 2021, Nguyen et al. 2021a, Tran 2022, Tran et al. 2022). It means that people are at the heart of the decision-making and implementation of disaster risk management activities. The capacities of local people are enhanced to help them assess the situation, identify risk-reduction measures, and implement them (Nguyen et al. 2021a, 2021b). As a lieutenant colonel of Nghe An police confirmed:

… preferring and encouraging our officials [police] to rely on residents to respond to the disaster is not new in CBP’s model of Vietnam, and even, we always do it.

Furthermore, as Ho Chi Minh (2011, p. 270), the founder of Vietnam’s public security forces, pointed out, ‘we [police] have only thousands of hands and eyes, we need more, millions of hands and eyes … when people help much we will achieve much and vice versa’.

In Vietnam, the role of commanders in implementing their orders, instructions, and related duties plays an essential part in steering their police units to respond to disasters (Luu et al. 2018, Nguyen 2022, Tran 2022). By maintaining leadership on the spot (FOTS-1), those chiefs will understand the needs of human resources (FOTS-2), the quotas of logistic requirements (FOTS-3), and the volume of equipment (FOTS-4) for (re)adjusting their strategies to ensure that policing operations are more achievable (Nguyen 2021, Nguyen 2022). Moreover, establishing leadership on the spot contributes to deploying resilient policing strategies and creating a trust-building matrix between police and the local community (Luong et al. 2020, Luong 2021, Nguyen et al. 2021b). Furthermore, FOTS policing in Vietnam has not received complaints from or aroused distrust in local communities in most selected cases in this study (Luu et al. 2018, Nguyen 2022, Tran et al. 2022).

Responding to natural disasters through implementing FOTS policing (RQ3)

Almost all disasters draw crowds. Some people hope for a glimpse of the unfolding drama, while others are family members and friends of the victims who show up in the hope of gleaning information about their loved ones as soon as possible (Quarantelli 1997). The people involved in the situation also have uncontrolled behaviours owing to the unpredictability and impacts of disasters, especially if injured or in shock (Bonkiewicz and Ruback 2010). This leads to several challenges for police in disaster management. Police agencies are ‘ubiquitous in disasters … to facilitate evacuations, conduct search and rescue operations, render aid to victims, control traffic and crowds, patrol for looters, and assist in inspecting damaged dwellings’ (Bonkiewicz and Ruback 2010, p. 374). Yet, the lack of research on how police prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from a disaster may cause them to neglect their duties when disaster strikes. Some important studies point out these concerns for policing activities (Bonkiewicz and Ruback 2010, Varano and Schafer 2012, Hine and Bragias 2021, Mutongwizo et al. 2021). However, most of these studies come from a Western policing background. From Vietnam’s perspective, based on the mixed resources in this first study, we highlight some specific challenges in police deploying FOTS.

Firstly, for FOTS-1 (leadership), practical barriers still hamper collaboration and cooperation between the FFF and PPF agencies, particularly in the leadership, which can diminish the effectiveness of operations. Information about the strategies and operations involved in these forces preparing for, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from a disaster is inconsistently conveyed to residents. Whenever extremely serious uncertainties and complicated scenarios call for large search-and-rescue operations, the police leadership is ‘limited to mobilising human resources and equipment’, according to the deputy minister of the MPS (Tran 2022, pp. 19–20).

Secondly, for FOTS-2 (human resources), all PPF officials in natural disaster management hold parallel positions rather than forming a special task force. Their professional activities also do not occur frequently enough to enable them to train and educate others regarding search and rescue. Apart from the FFF staff trained under the standard UFPF curriculum, PPF staff are inexperienced at deploying certain practices on the scene. The Captain of Quangbinh shared:

We only practise the hypothesised plans sometimes or whenever the headquartered guidelines require it. (Interviewee #11)

Although the Ministry of Public Security contributes considerably to the overall outcomes in the preparedness step, one of the necessary concerns of these training courses is that they should build long-term assessments in disaster management for all PPF units.

Thirdly, for FOTS-3 (material), almost all PPF agencies at the local level lack a specialised disaster warning system to monitor and supervise areas at high risk of natural disasters. They must depend on special agencies from different sectors to update guidelines before planning and conducting their professional strategies. An MPS colonel assumed:

We are the central office to support the leader to control and manage the disaster; however, all specific forecasts will have to wait for the government. (Interviewee #2)

Similarly, many places have not yet established a specialised system for forecasting and warning about natural disaster prevention and control. For example, many of our interviewees’ locations still lack a system to monitor large natural disasters such as storms, floods, landslides, and flash floods, which leads to poor responses at the preparation stage.

Fourthly, for FOTS-4 (logistics), the scaling of the national budget to invest and develop for the FFF is still limited. Personal protection equipment and its special tools and vehicles in responding to storms, landslides, and floodings are irrelevant to the on-the-ground requirements. Particularly in vulnerable regions, such as a remote commune with limited access, the proactive storage of essential materials and fundamental resources to serve FOTS is unsuitable due to limited finances. A senior lieutenant of Hatinh police expressed the concern:

Well, responding to the disaster is part of the emergent issues in our budgets … as you may know, our team is facing transnational crimes from the neighbouring country [Laos]. (Interviewee #6)

Conclusions

Given its geophysics, topography, and climatology, Vietnam is a disaster-prone country. Each type of disaster has a relatively high frequency, different characteristics, a broad scope in impact depending on the situation, and often causes substantial damage. Any evaluation of disaster management, including the police force’s responses, must operate in the real world, not the ideal world (Quarantelli 1997). Recently, the resilience-policing framework called for ‘enrolling resources from other actors’ in community resources to deal with emerging ‘harmscapes’ in Western society (Mutongwizo et al. 2021, pp. 611–612). In Vietnam, collaborating, encouraging, and relying on residents are compulsory to deploy policing in FOTS. Based on our empirical approach, the police’s contributions in Vietnam to FOTS before, during, and after disasters play a pivotal role in emergency management work. In particular, as part of the resilience-policing reforms, ‘police act as facilitators and enablers who identify, and build the capacities required for communities to effectively anticipate and respond’ (Mutongwizo et al. 2021, p. 607) in the model of FOTS policing (either FOTS-1 for leadership or FOTS-2 for human resources). Yet, to some extent, resilience policing in Vietnam is also an extension of a command-and-control approach (Pearce and Fortune 1995, Bordua and Reiss 1996), and the FOTS approach demonstrates governmental capacity as opposed to signifying an attempt to compensate for the lack of governmental capacity through the strategies of enlisting and enrolling other actors (either FOTS-3 for supplies or FOTS-4 for logistics).

However, whenever police involve mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery to support residents in a disaster, they often face practical challenges at the scene. Besides, police are directly or indirectly impacted by ‘uncertain, unpredictable, and catastrophic harmscapes’ (Mutongwizo et al. 2021, p. 610). This requires Vietnamese authorities to focus more on investing in police to solve the above four difficulties. Our evidence does not confirm whether the most effective FOTS contributions applying in the Global North are transferable from Vietnam. The different state-citizen relations and ideology in Vietnam and the West may limit their transfer.

Future research should consider whether and how Vietnam should perform a large-scale needs assessment analysis on training in all PPF agencies and units responding to disasters. Along with exercises, other indispensable factors to maintain robust preparedness are drills and regular rehearsals. Focusing on these in their ordinary campaigns will not only help local units reduce the prevailing tendency to use untrained troops in disaster response but also ensure the effectiveness of the response operations conducted during the disaster. Also, taking care of the health and well-being of police officers should be recognised as a core strategy.

Based on our findings, the Ministry of Public Security should propose a national program with specific regulations to educate and train police officers in mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The design and evaluation of these programs should be referred to regional contexts and local situations in Vietnam because the specific framework for resilience policing in new and uncertain harms may fit with some but not others. This would yield more precise and useful learning opportunities for online and offline design to help police gain professional knowledge before confronting a real disaster.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the voluntary participants for sharing their perspectives during the interviews. The first author thanks for introducing this special issue from A/Prof Cao Ngoc Anh, the People's Public Security Academy of Vietnam. We are also grateful for the helpful feedback from the editors and other contributors when discussing this special issue at virtual meetings.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In Vietnam, there currently is no systemized methodology, single tool, or specific software for the analysis of disaster data. Disaster damage data are collected by government agencies through a parallel data collection and collation system operated by the Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (renamed in 2017 as the Central Steering Committee for Natural Disaster Prevention and Control, CSCNDPC) and by the General Statistics Office (GSO) under the Ministry for Planning and Investment (MPI). The data collected through the CSCNDPC system are commonly referred to as the Damage and Needs Assessment System (DANA). Under DANA, data are collected through one template containing more than 150 indicators. The data are collected and collated from the commune up to the middle level. At the intermediate level, data are stored by the CSCNDPC in a central DANA database.

2 The PPA and the UFPF approved the study and provided an official permission letter to contact KIs. The study received ethics approval from both the PPA and the UFPF.