What has changed and why: the transformation and (de)legitimisation of post-COVID policing in Hong Kong and Taiwan

ABSTRACT

This paper conducts a comparative analysis of the governance and policing frameworks in Hong Kong and Taiwan, examining their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic’s public health crisis and the resulting shifts in policing contexts. Hong Kong experienced significant changes in police-citizen relations before the pandemic, notably during the 2019 protests that garnered global media attention and eroded public trust in the government. With the advent of COVID-19, Hong Kong introduced stringent anti-pandemic legislation aimed at achieving ‘zero-COVID’, further empowering the police for law enforcement. In contrast, Taiwan effectively managed the epidemic from 2020, keeping mass infections at bay until mid-2022, without significant social conflicts. This study delves into the academic implications of these divergent outcomes, seeking to explain what and why changes occurred (or did not) in these two places. Hong Kong’s response to the global health crisis, including the introduction of the National Security Law, fundamentally transformed its policing context, dismantling autonomous civil societies and reshaping public trust in the government and its police. In comparison, Taiwan’s policing exhibited limited post-crisis transformation, maintaining high public trust even amid stringent quarantine and lockdown regulations. This divergence reflects varying pathways of the legitimisation of police influenced by geopolitics, underscoring the importance of comparative studies in comprehending transformations of policing in different contexts following the global public health crisis.

KEYWORDS:

• Hong Kong
• Taiwan
• COVID
• policing

Introduction

The protracted civil unrest during the latter half of 2019 garnered international media attention for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. Reports and commentaries on policing incidents in Hong Kong featured prominently in the headlines of widely circulated international newspapers. Hong Kong found itself in an extraordinary phase marked by widespread social turmoil, clashes between law enforcement and civil society, and a substantial decline in public trust in the government (Lee et al. 2019). Three critical issues frequently addressed in studies of policing: legitimacy and accountability, protest management, and criminal procedural justice: became subjects of extensive discussion both locally and globally (Ho 2020). In early 2020, the Beijing authorities restructured the political landscape of the Special Administrative Region by reorganising its party leadership in Hong Kong. Most notably, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, commonly referred to as the ‘National Security Law’ (NSL hereafter), was promulgated, incorporated into the Hong Kong Basic Law, and came into effect on 1 July 2020. Consequently, the policing context in Hong Kong underwent significant transformation.¹

Hong Kong’s ‘abnormality’ was further compounded by the sudden outbreak of a public health crisis in January 2020. The initial strategy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government aimed to contain COVID-19 through a partial ‘lockdown’ of the city. Public services were suspended, facilities were closed, returning residents were subjected to quarantine, and individuals identified as ‘high-risk’ due to prior contact with confirmed patients were transported to centralised quarantine facilities for medical observation and virus testing during the incubation period. Subsequently, a social distancing order was enacted following a substantial rise in infections, prohibiting gatherings of more than four people in public areas. Violations would result in a fixed penalty, prosecution for more significant fines, and even immediate imprisonment.² The police were assigned and further empowered by the authorities to enforce anti-pandemic laws (Ho and Chan 2021). In a society where scepticism towards the government and police had grown, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the situation by integrating law enforcement within the mechanisms of public health regulations (Ho et al. 2021). However, as we shall demonstrate in this study, the people of Hong Kong have, by and large, adhered to most government-mandated anti-pandemic measures enforced by law enforcement, resulting in low infection rates during the initial two years of the pandemic in the region.

Taiwan presents another remarkable success story on the opposite side of the strait, with minimal infection numbers (Chen et al. 2020, Huang 2020, Yeh and Cheng 2020, Hsieh 2021, Xu 2021, Chen et al. 2023, Kuo 2023). The island experienced only a single local infection, with no citywide lockdowns or street confrontations between citizens and the government until May 2021. Throughout the public health crisis, Taiwan earned the moniker ‘abnormally normal’ due to its effective anti-pandemic legislation and its collaborative enforcement with the community, which piqued the interest of both researchers and policymakers (Asia Society Policy Institute 2020). The police, bolstered by legislative authority and aided by civil service counterparts and private entities, were responsible for executing these measures. Nevertheless, what truly stood out was the spontaneous mobilisation and proactive compliance of citizens at the neighbourhood, village, district, and even city levels, all of which facilitated policy implementation. Notably, mutual trust and cooperation between the police and citizens prevailed throughout the initial 1.5 years of the battle against the virus, resulting in a remarkable zero-infection record, a feat that may be considered unimaginable when compared to their Western counterparts (Chen et al. 2023).

Our study aims to compare and elucidate the post-crisis transformations of policing in these two territories, both of which have been influenced by the legacy of colonial administration in peripheral China. Taiwan was under Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945, while Hong Kong was under British administration from 1842 to 1997. We have observed significant changes in the Hong Kong policing landscape, spanning from institutional shifts, policy alterations, to enforcement methods following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. How can we comprehend the influence of historical and contemporary geopolitics on these transformations? Both cities weathered the initial onslaught of the COVID-19 virus and impressively managed to stave off widespread infections for two years until 2021. In terms of policing, many ‘stringent’ and ‘coercive’ quarantine and lockdown measures were introduced and enforced in both locales, and the public exhibited surprising compliance, whether willingly or reluctantly. However, while there was substantial transformation in the policing context of Hong Kong, this did not occur in Taiwan. How can we interpret these divergent scenarios to provide fresh insights into the existing literature on police legitimacy from historical and institutional perspectives?

Studies on post-COVID transformations of policing

The existing academic literature has primarily focused on four key aspects related to policing during the public health crisis. The first area of investigation pertains to the roles of governments and their respective policing authorities in responding to the pandemic. Researchers have examined the distinct ‘models’ adopted by various authorities, exploring their characteristics and the underlying rationale. They have also delved into how the crisis has shaped the policing landscape and subsequently led to changes in police institutions and their operations. Chen et al. (2023) have explored a ‘pluralisation’ trend in policing, where ‘non-core’ policing tasks are outsourced to private agencies in Western democracies, while authoritarian regimes have witnessed a contradictory trend of ‘centralisation’ or ‘expansion’ of law enforcement authority.

The second focus of academic inquiry revolves around the evolving dynamics between the police and citizens in the face of uncertainty. In electoral regimes, practitioners are concerned with maintaining public trust while enforcing ‘unwelcome’ policing tasks during the unprecedented COVID-19 crisis. Researchers have sought to understand how different policing contexts account for public compliance with anti-pandemic legislation. Moreover, they have examined how authorities work to secure compliance with government lockdown measures for pandemic control. A significant concern in Western democracies is the balance between effectively controlling the pandemic and the perceived infringement on civil liberties. This has raised questions about why some policing regimes experience a substantial decline in public satisfaction while others manage to avoid public backlash. Additionally, researchers have considered how different population groups, such as ethnic minorities, young people, and elderly individuals affected by the digital divide, have reacted to COVID-19 and its implications on policing. Studies by scholars in the field have highlighted the risk of potential police-community confrontations resulting from prolonged implementation of anti-epidemic measures (Jones 2020, Perry and Jonathan-Zamir 2020, Sibley 2020, Stott et al. 2020, Mazerolle and Ransley 2021, Perry et al. 2022, Stott 2022). The pandemic has the potential to erode public trust in the police as it raises questions about the boundaries of the policing mandate (Farrow 2020). Jones (2020) has suggested that the police’s response to the pandemic may lead to increased militarisation and deeper divisions between the police and communities.³ The legal powers employed by governments have necessitated citizen compliance but have also led to inevi5conflicts due to the infringement of civil rights and personal freedoms. These new public health policing powers have challenged the core functions of the police (Alcadipani et al. 2020), particularly within democratic policing regimes (Kyprianides et al. 2022). There have been calls to reconsider the legitimate boundaries of public police powers (Farrow 2020), including a potential alteration of traditional law enforcement methods (Brooks and Lopez 2020). Public compliance with anti-pandemic legislation has emerged as a pressing concern, with a focus on how to secure cooperation from citizens and why citizens have complied with suddenly imposed regulations.

Another aspect under consideration is the dynamics within law enforcement agencies, encompassing institutional and operational changes. This includes the emergence of new types of crime, the enactment of new laws, the creation of new units, concerns about occupational health, legal authorities, and the morale of police personnel. Within policing organisations, questions revolve around how senior police officers can ensure procedural fairness and transparency when assigning ‘additional and unpleasant’ duties to their junior counterparts (Gau and Burnson 2010).

The final dimension of this study involves the increasing popularity of comparative studies on policing. Researchers aim to observe and understand the diverse transformations in policing across different jurisdictions, with a particular focus on the Asian and East Asian experience, which initially achieved notable success in controlling infections with limited societal confrontations under stringent anti-pandemic laws. In Asian contexts, relatively restrictive policing responses to COVID-19 have been observed (Jiang and Xie 2020, Mao 2020). Recent research has also elucidated variations in crime and responses within Asia (Liu et al. 2021).⁴ However, limited commentary has assessed cross-national disparities in policing responses to COVID-19, particularly when comparing democratic and more authoritarian-based policing systems. The ongoing pandemic has highlighted a complex ‘trade-off’ between public health and personal liberty, including the rapid implementation of measures to restrict movement and economic activities. These enforcement actions during COVID-19 have resulted in disparities between nations in terms of ‘policing’ and ‘over-policing’, prompting inquiries into the reasons behind these differences.

Among the four domains explored, the public accountability of the police has garnered the greatest concern among criminal justice researchers. Many anti-pandemic policies have been vaguely defined, allowing for flexible interpretations and empowering law enforcement officers to exercise their enforcement authority with discretion. While this flexibility might potentially lead to power abuses, it is also considered necessary in the face of the unprecedented threat posed by the public health crisis (Boon-Kuo et al. 2020, Jones 2020, Parker et al. 2020, Mazerolle and Ransley 2021, Okech et al. 2021, Stott 2022, Russell 2024). Additionally, debates and controversies have emerged regarding the introduction of laws aimed at curbing the spread of ‘fake news and disinformation’ concerning COVID-19. Various models of epidemic management have been identified during the three years of the public health crisis, with some emphasising top-down government leadership and others highlighting bottom-up civil society mobilisation. In policing, a contradictory trend has emerged, characterised by the centralisation of policing, leading to an expansion in the size of public police authorities, their budgets, and their authority.

Methods

This thematic comparative study examines publicly accessible archives and documents. The major archival sources on the history and evolution of policing systems are the officially uploaded information and databases. Policy details, changes, and relevant figures are derived from press releases and statistical information from the publicly accessible websites and databases of two official units coordinating anti-pandemic policy implementation: The Centre for Health Protection, Department of Health, Hong Kong (The Government of the Hong Kong Administrative Region 2023), and the Central Epidemic Command Centre of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Taiwan (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2023). We also examined three major categories of disciplinary academic analysis: public health, public policy and administration, and policing, to gather key scholarly viewpoints to facilitate the comparison conducted in this study. Our initial analysis focused on examining the evolution of regulatory and implementation guidelines related to COVID-19 control, then concentrated on the key changes in their police agencies as reported in the media and official press of both places. Special attention was paid to the justifications of the policy actions from the government, and how they influenced the overarching logic, organisation, and operation of police departments. To deepen our analysis, we also scrutinised official deliberation reports from the Taiwanese central government and the Hong Kong Legislative Council, as well as an extensive array of news articles from reputable sources in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Comparing Hong Kong and Taiwan: police operation, empowerment and legitimacy

The discussion surrounding the successful management of the COVID-19 pandemic has focused on governance capacity, which includes factors such as information transparency and timely responses to potential threats. Taiwan and Hong Kong have been lauded as exemplary cases in containing the deadly virus, with low numbers of confirmed cases and deaths. Taiwan’s success is attributed to its robust governance capacity, while Hong Kong’s achievement is attributed to civic society and social mobilisation (Wan 2020, Hsieh 2021, Wong 2022).

In Hong Kong, the government initiated measures to contain the virus following the declaration of a virus emergency on 25 January 2020. These measures included a partial lockdown of the city, closure of public sports and leisure facilities, suspension of schooling, restrictions on travellers from Hubei Wuhan, and the lockdown of most borders to limit human mobility between Hong Kong and mainland China. Individuals considered ‘high-risk’ due to close contact with confirmed patients were placed in centralised quarantine estates for observation and virus testing during the incubation period. In February 2020, the measures were expanded to block all non-resident travellers, impose a mandatory 14-day home quarantine on Hong Kong resident returnees, and conduct on-site virus testing at the airport. Further restrictive measures were introduced under the Prevention and Control of Diseases Ordinance (Cap. 599) in March 2020, prompted by a significant increase in infection figures. In January 2021, the administration escalated its pandemic control measures with the subsidiary legislation of Cap. 599J, which included compulsory testing. The government also adopted more proactive and sudden measures, including lockdowns of specific districts or residential buildings, under a restriction-testing declaration (Ho and Chan 2021).⁵

In Taiwan, the government implemented a series of anti-epidemic measures in response to information about the COVID-19 outbreak in mainland China. One key step was drawing from the experience of managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and establishing a Central Epidemics Command Centre (CECC) to coordinate all policy actions related to public health (Taiwan Centre for Disease Control 2020). The CECC, reporting to the President, had the authority to integrate medical resources across agencies during infectious disease outbreaks. Emergency legislation, known as ‘The Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalisation Measures for Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens’, was passed and enacted in February 2020, granting CECC the necessary powers to combat COVID-19. The National Police Agency, under the Ministry of the Interior, was mandated to collaborate with health, social welfare, and other agencies to monitor mask-wearing in public places, supervise social gatherings in public and private settings, and enforce social distancing on various occasions. The government introduced ‘Guidelines on Social Distancing’ in April 2020 and later promulgated ‘Guidelines for Real-name Registration Measures for COVID-19’. Moreover, in April 2020, it became mandatory for all citizens to wear face masks on public transport, including the high-speed rail network, city metro systems, buses, and taxis. Border control measures limited human mobility, including suspending tourist visas and imposing strict quarantine requirements for returning residents/nationals. Starting in March 2020, a 14-day home quarantine order was applied to all incoming travellers. Electronic tracking through smartphone apps was employed to monitor home quarantine and isolation compliance, and big data on human mobility was integrated into the National Health Insurance MediCloud System. The first virus outbreak occurred on 15 May 2021, prompting a business lockdown, school closures, and community-wide virus testing.⁶

Both Hong Kong and Taiwan successfully isolated themselves from the rest of the world through these stringent anti-pandemic policies. Inbound travellers were restricted to resident returnees, and local mobility of citizens was significantly reduced. As a result, both cities managed to maintain zero or very low infection figures in the first four waves of the mass outbreak until the end of 2021 (see Table 1 and Table 2). After experiencing waves of mass infection, all anti-epidemic measures were lifted in spring 2023.⁷

Table 1. Confirmed COVID-19 cases in multiple countries and places as of 31 December 2021.

Country/ Place	Cumulative COVID-19 cases as of 31 December 2021	Confirmed cases per 100 population
Taiwan	17,029	0.07
Hong Kong	12,650	0.17
South Korea	635,253	1.24
Japan	1,733,307	1.37
Germany	7,109,182	8.55
United States	54,907,717	16.67
United Kingdom	13,010,853	19.17

Sources: The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2021), Census and Statistics Department (2021), Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (2021), Statistical Bureau (2023), Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (2023).

Table 2. Comparison of anti-pandemic policies in Hong Kong and Taiwan during the COVID-19 crisis.

Key anti-epidemic measures	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Border closure	Closure of the majority of boundary control points, cancellation of most passenger flights, and cessation of transit passengers.	Cancellation of flights, cessation of inbound visitors, with entry permitted only for Taiwan residents.
Lockdown	Suspension of schooling, shift to online lessons, closure of public amenity facilities, prohibition of mass gatherings.	Suspension of schooling and shift to online lessons.
Social distancing	Mandatory mask-wearing, tightening/relaxing of social distancing measures, limitation of business hours, and restrictions on dine-in patrons at restaurants, accompanied by fluctuations in case numbers.	Mandatory mask-wearing, but no lockdown arrangements for dining and public facilities due to zero/scattered infections.
Home/ hotel/ centralised camp quarantine	Imposed 7–21 days mandatory quarantine on all inbound passengers from mainland China and overseas.	For all inbound returning residents.
Vaccine pass	Gradually introduced compulsory full 3-dose vaccination with apps tracking for all dine-in patrons.	None.
Returning to normalcy	December 2022: Quarantine relaxed to 0 + 3 days in September 2022, with all requirements cancelled in January 2023 following the Beijing authorities’ decision to lift quarantine measures entirely.	January 2023.

Sources: The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2023), Ministry of Health and Welfare (2023).

The COVID-19 public health crisis sent immediate shocks across society. However, in terms of policing and police organisation, it displayed remarkable differences between the two places. These differences can be observed in three major aspects: (1) changes in police organisation and operation; (2) legislation and its enforcement; and (3) legitimisation: public trust in the police after the crisis.

Hong Kong: legislation & empowerment of police

The National Security Law’s Enforcement and the role of the National Security Department in the Hong Kong Police Force

The emergence of COVID-19 in early 2020 coincided with an ongoing period of social unrest in Hong Kong, which had persisted for over six months. This confluence of events provided a strong rationale for the leaders of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to de-escalate street confrontations by imposing stringent control over public gatherings, citing public health concerns. Concurrently, authorities in Beijing seized the opportunity to draft and promulgate the NSL, effectively criminalising most sanctioned protest activities organised by civil societies.⁸ The NSL introduced four distinct categories of criminal offences: secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign organisations. This legislation conferred extensive powers upon the police authorities, enabling them to surveil, detain, and search individuals and organisations suspected of violating its provisions. The NSL was formally incorporated into Annex III of the Hong Kong Basic Law, thereby granting it superior legal authority over existing ordinances. Furthermore, the law asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction over all non-Chinese residents, affecting the behaviour of non-Hong Kong residents both within and outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In May 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress introduced the draft of the NSL for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which was subsequently approved by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and included in Annex III of the Hong Kong Basic Law on 30 June 2020. The law was officially gazetted and came into force at 23:00 on the same day (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2020c).

Following the enactment of the NSL on 1 July 2020, the Hong Kong Police Force established a dedicated National Security Department. Notably, details regarding the department’s size, personnel, and budget allocation were not required to be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of the NSL. It has been reported that the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force comprises approximately 4,000 personnel and operates under the leadership of a newly appointed deputy commissioner who is answerable to the Committee for Safeguarding the National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Additionally, the police established two hotlines and accompanying websites to encourage members of the public to report any information pertaining to suspicious activities that may jeopardise national security. The ‘Counter-terrorism Reporting Hotline’ was created to investigate more than 3,800 reports related to alleged acts of terrorism or violence (Hong Kong Free Press 2021). Furthermore, the ‘National Security Department Reporting Hotline’ was launched on 5 November 2020 to facilitate the provision and reporting of information pertaining to national security by members of the public (Hong Kong Police Force 2020a, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2020b). It has been reported that the hotline received over 200,000 messages during its first year of operation, averaging almost 550 reports per day (Hong Kong Free Press 2021).

By August 2022, a total of 10,279 individuals had been arrested in connection with the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) protests that took place between 2019 and 2020. Of these arrests, 2,893 individuals faced charges related to a range of offences, including ‘organising and inciting others to take part in unauthorised assemblies’, ‘committing acts endangering national security’, ‘obstructing police officers’, ‘attempting to escape from legal custody’, ‘doxxing police officers’⁹, ‘rioting’¹⁰, ‘possession of offensive weapons’, and ‘assault on the police’. Notably, 1,754 of those arrested were below the age of 18. Among those charged, 1,631 individuals were convicted, with the most severe sentences reaching 5.5 years of imprisonment. Over the first two years following the enactment of the NSL on 30 June, 2020, the Hong Kong police arrested a total of 201 individuals on allegations of committing acts that endangered national security. More than half of these arrestees were subsequently prosecuted. By the end of 2022, the Department of Justice had brought forth 85 charges related to NSL offences, which encompassed secession, subversion, collusion with foreign forces, and terrorist acts. Of these, 64 individuals had already received sentences (Lee 2023).

The resourceful yet understaffed Hong Kong Police Force

The evolving political and policing landscape in Hong Kong has given rise to a set of critical micro-management challenges, each carrying both immediate and enduring implications for the Hong Kong Police and its operations. Perhaps the most pressing and prominent among these challenges is the issue of manpower in a post-conflict society. Despite an increasing budget allocation to the Hong Kong Police following the events of 2019 and the impact of COVID-19, the force embarked on a strengthening of its operational capacity, which included the acquisition of new supplies of anti-riot gear, munitions, and armoured vehicles (Lee 2022).

The police authorities openly acknowledged encountering staffing issues following the events of 2019, with fewer young individuals expressing interest in applying for constable and probationary inspector positions. This decline in applicants was evident despite year-round recruitment efforts and continuous advertising campaigns. Police statistics highlighted a significant decrease in eligible candidates for police positions, along with a noticeable drop in the academic qualifications of recruits. Consequently, management made the decision to lift the seven-year residency requirement for Hong Kong permanent citizen applicants (Leung 2022b).

Despite the continuous expansion of the police establishment to accommodate more than 30,000 disciplinary and civilian personnel and an increase in the policing budget to HKD 18.4 billion in 2022 (excluding the undisclosed National Security reserve, estimated to be around HKD 8 billion annually), as detailed in the budget appropriation bill announced by the financial secretary (Ng and Lam 2021; please refer to Table 3 for the latest vacancy percentages in the Hong Kong Police), thousands of vacancies remained unfilled. To address this, the police have proactively engaged in public outreach efforts to promote the various roles within the force, moving away from a strategy that primarily targeted fresh university graduates and instead focusing on Hong Kong permanent citizens studying in mainland China and overseas institutions. In parallel, a bill was passed to formally extend the official retirement age from 55 to 60. Retirees were also reappointed on a contractual basis to handle special duties such as compulsory testing in designated areas, the management of quarantine and treatment facilities, and the enforcement of certain social distancing regulations (Hong Kong Police Force 2020b).

Table 3. Establishment and actual strength of the Hong Kong Police in December 2017 and 2022.

Establishment (actual strength)	2017	2022	Vacancies in 2022
Superintendents or above	446 (464)	479 (443)	36 (7.5%)
Inspectors	2569 (2387)	2842 (2395)	447 (15.72%)
Junior police officers	26837 (26487)	29888 (24452)	5436 (18.1%)
Civilian officers	4563 (4312)	4737 (4082)	655 (13%)
Auxiliary	4501 (3124)	4501 (3117)	1324 (29.4%)
Total strength	38416 (36774)	42047 (34689)
Annual expenditure in HKD million	17855	23330

Sources: Hong Kong Police Force (2023), Civil Service Bureau (2023).

Campaign to combat ‘disinformation’

The Hong Kong Police also embarked on a series of propaganda campaigns to enhance their public image. In mid-2019, they adopted a new motto, ‘Serving Hong Kong with honour, duty, and loyalty’, replacing the previous slogan ‘Serve with pride and care’. The police contended that the public had been misled by ‘irresponsible and unsubstantiated reports’ that tarnished their reputation, necessitating counterpropaganda in the media and advocating legal measures against fake news and disinformation. Both the leaders of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the police believed that the tension between the police and the public stemmed from the spread of ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, ‘baseless allegations against the police’, and ‘irresponsible comments by internet users’ circulating online (Leung and Cheng 2021).

The police made several high-profile arrests, including charges of conspiring to publish seditious publications under Cap. 200 Sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes Ordinance in late 2021 and early 2022 for internet users who posted, responded to, and forwarded messages on social media alleged to incite hatred against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government and its leaders (Lo and Cheung 2021, Lo 2022, Radio Television Hong Kong 2022). The Secretary of Security also announced the active preparation of a bill on cybersecurity law and the introduction of the long-shelved Basic Law Article 23, which criminalises treason, secession, and seditious activities (Leung 2022a). Arrests and prosecutions followed a propaganda campaign. In January 2021, the Hong Kong Police released a promotional video titled ‘Guarding Our City’ and a theme song titled ‘Defending Hong Kong’, aimed at promoting their capabilities and professional image. Disseminating official messages and countering fake news were essential efforts by the police on their official social media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, Weibo, and YouTube (Hong Kong Police Force 2021).

Media and external oversight

Several well-established public opinion polls that were regularly conducted by tertiary institutions are still ongoing; however, some ‘sensitive figures’ identified by the investigators have ceased to be released publicly on the grounds that they could potentially risk NSL or incite offences. There are no more publicly released figures from public opinion polls on satisfaction with the police and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region leaders. Several print and online media outlets were labelled by pro-Beijing platforms as ‘subversive’ and some announced cessation of operations in the years following the activation of NSL in Hong Kong in July 2020. Notably, the government-appointed external police oversight body, the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC), underwent restructuring. The Chairperson of this complaints review board publicly criticised complainants’ abuse, and government authorities de-emphasised external oversight in favour of internal supervision for police misconduct (Radio Free Asia 2023).

Continuity and stability: policing in Taiwan post-COVID-19

The above discussion addressed the evolving policing context in Hong Kong after the 2019 disturbances and the COVID crisis. The imposition of NSL brought about organisational realignment and operational changes within the Hong Kong Police. Missions and propaganda strategies were adapted accordingly. In Taiwan, there was no significant transformation of the policing context and police agencies. The insulation strategy ultimately failed, leading to a mass infection in the summer of 2022. Despite criticism from opposition parties and media, the government managed to maintain a high level of public satisfaction throughout the pandemic. Public satisfaction with the government’s handling of the pandemic exceeded 60%.¹¹ Police-citizen confrontations were notably absent, and general satisfaction with the police remained exceptionally high (73.1% of respondents expressed satisfaction with ‘police maintenance of public safety’, with 83.1% considering ‘the security situation near their homes to be good’ in 2022) (National Chung Cheng University Crime Research Centre 2023). There were no major reshuffles in police organisations or operations. Several thematic and empirical scholarly studies have explored the relatively little transformation of the policing context in Taiwan despite the public health crisis. Despite the additional powers granted to the police during the crisis, they maintained their legitimacy through transparent and fair enforcement practices (Chen et al. 2023, Kuo et al. 2023). These studies argue that effective coordination by the central government and securing collaboration with civil society were key to implementing anti-epidemic measures (Cheng et al. 2020, Wang et al. 2020, Yeh and Cheng 2020, Hong 2022). There was also close cooperation among public officers, including village chiefs and police constables, in enforcing quarantine orders and managing the pandemic at the community level. The dilemmas experienced by leaders in several Western democracies, such as public resistance and non-compliance with some anti-epidemic measures, did not apparently take place in Taiwan.

Yeh (2021) conducted a time series analysis, revealing a similar pattern of crime trend development in Taipei city as in other major developed cities in America and Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic. There was a decline in incidents of drunk driving, drug possession and trafficking, and residential burglary following a substantial reduction in human mobility, with an immediate rebound in cases reported after the relaxation of anti-pandemic regulations. Similarly, Taiwan also experienced an increase in online and cyber fraud cases coinciding with social distancing measures. However, these immediate changes in crime patterns did not fundamentally alter the institutional structure or police powers (Table 4).

Table 4. Establishment and strength of the Taiwan Police in 2017 and 2022.

Strength	2017	2022
Superintendents	300	331
Inspectors	38130	38075
Junior Police Officers	24860	30706
Civilian officers	636	429
Total Strength	63926	69541

Source: National Police Agency, Ministry of the Interior (2024).

This contrasts sharply with Hong Kong, where institutional and operational changes were observed after 2019. In Taiwan, police legitimisation continued to be grounded in democratic policing principles, including community partnership, external oversight, and public accountability (Table 5).

Table 5. Comparison of policing approaches in Hong Kong and Taiwan during the COVID crisis.

	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Organisation and operation	The newly established Commission of National Security in Hong Kong, chaired by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The National Security Division in the Hong Kong Police, comprising 4,000 personnel, has been reported. Additionally, efforts to strengthen police publicity through platforms like Facebook, Weibo, and YouTube channels have been noted. The relaxation of academic and language requirements, as well as the length of residence requirements for recruit police constables. Recentralisation and coordination of police propaganda.	The police department was part of a task force affiliated with the centre, consisting of multiple units that coordinated anti-pandemic efforts. The centre ceased to operate after the cancellation of all anti-pandemic policies. There were no organisational or operational changes after the public health crisis.
Legislation and enforcement	Enactment of National Security Law promulgated by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee on 1 July 2020. Reactivated several ordinances for the prosecution of alleged offenses under the National Security Law, including the Crime Ordinance, Money Laundering Ordinance, and perverting the course of justice. Initiating the Basic Law Article 23 local legislation work. Regulation of crowdfunding and disinformation laws are in draft.	Debates over the introduction of legislation governing disinformation in social media remain unresolved. Emerging policing issues include the professionalism of policing, policing transparency, and accountability, as well as challenges related to cross-border telephone fraud, illegal immigrants, and workers.
Legitimisation	Low levels of public trust in the government and police persisted throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Emphasising safeguarding national security and restoring social stability. New mission: ‘Serving Hong Kong with Honour, Duty and Loyalty’. Established Government Caring Units in districts after the ‘perfection of local governance and election systems’. Restructuring and empowerment of policing authorities with new leadership. Shifting towards internal oversight following the dissolution of autonomous civil societies.	Public satisfaction with the government and police remained at a high level (about 80%) before May 2022. General compliance with the anti-pandemic policies. Continuing to emphasise democratic policing after the crisis, including public accountability, civil society partnerships, and external oversight in policing.

Sources: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Program (2019), National Chung Cheng University Crime Research Center (2023).

Explaining the differences: pathways to legitimisation

Within Western democracies, there has been a notable shift towards the delegation of policing responsibilities to private service providers, sparking debates surrounding issues of public accountability. The transformations of policing have raised fundamental questions in the post-COVID era: What structural changes occurred within policing institutions following the civil disturbances? How did the authorities in Hong Kong and Taiwan implement anti-epidemic measures? What evolution took place in policing in both places after the public health crisis? The policing landscape in Hong Kong underwent substantial changes post-COVID. New legislation became embedded in the mini-constitution known as the Hong Kong Basic Law. The police underwent organisational modifications, and their mission statement saw a reorientation. Furthermore, there was an expansion of police powers in Hong Kong after the crisis, in alignment with developments on the Chinese mainland and reflecting a major global trend in policing – the centralisation and empowerment of police authorities (Chan et al. 2023). We posit that the ‘actions’ and ‘inactions’ of the two governments, along with the passive and proactive compliance of their citizens, can be understood as outcomes of distinct legacies and pathways of police legitimation, influenced by geopolitical factors in these two places.

The compliance of Hong Kong citizens with the stringent lockdown and social distancing orders can be viewed through several lenses – the collective memory of the traumatic SARS experience in 2003, a declining trust and increasing scepticism towards the leaders of the Special Administrative Region, and the heavy penalties imposed by the NSL, as well as the reactivation of Hong Kong’s own legislations (Wan et al. 2020, Wong et al. 2022). On the other side of the Taiwan Straits, public scepticism towards Beijing, the lingering impact of the unpleasant 2003 experience, and, most importantly, the deep-rooted community policing mechanisms inherited and evolved from the colonial Japanese era and the militarised dictatorship era, all contributed to the effective implementation of a ‘whole-nation’ approach to countering the pandemic (Hsieh et al. 2021, Chen et al. 2023). Geopolitical considerations have also played a pivotal role in justifying these differences: the ‘highly autonomous’ leadership of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region actively sought to align its policy goals and internal administration with mainland China under the ‘One Country’ principle, while the Taiwanese government adopted a more passive stance, emphasising institutional differences with the Beijing administration amidst their political and economic interactions (Table 6).

Table 6. Pathway of institutionalisation: Hong Kong and Taiwan.

	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Colonial legacy	British, Royal Irish Constabulary. Highly centralised, multi-ethnic paramilitary.	Inherited from Japan’s policing model during the colonial administration from 1895 to 1945, evolving further when the Republic of China resettled from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. Highly centralised under the Ministry of the Interior.
Evolution and legitimisation	Police-citizen segregation persisted until the 1970s. Anti-corruption efforts were initiated with the establishment of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Policing became performance-driven and procedurally transparent. Check and balance mechanisms were introduced, including internal and external oversight. After 1997, authorities from the Chief Executive and its cabinet, appointed by the Central People’s Government in Beijing, gained prominence. Emphasis was placed on professionalism, effectiveness, and efficiency, leading to transparent operations and a low crime rate. Policing was supervised by autonomous civil societies and media, with oversight from the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) and court rulings. Key controversies revolved around democratic participation in policing.	The policing system evolved from colonial and authoritarian regimes. It was characterised by a coercive and control-oriented approach until the abandonment of Martial Law and the democratisation process in the 1980s. The emphasis shifted towards democratic policing after the introduction of universal suffrage in the government. Policing performance was linked to social security and included elements of democratic participation. Independent oversight was provided by autonomous civil societies and a constitutionally empowered independent oversight body. Key concerns revolved around police professionalism and neutrality.
Community policing	Segregation between the police and citizens persisted until the 1970s. In the 1970s, an anti-corruption campaign was launched, leading to the establishment of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The Police Public Relations Bureau underwent reforms to enhance communication with citizens. Community policing practices, steered by the Police headquarters, involved collaboration with District Councils, schools, and civil societies. The mission became ‘Serving the Community with Pride and Care’. Significant changes occurred after the National Security Law (NSL), and the transformation is ongoing.	Elected personnel (i.e. village chiefs) at local levels. Front-line police conduct household visits and registrations. Autonomous civil societies play a significant role.
Public satisfaction	80% or higher before 2014. Dropped to about 20% in 2019. No publicly announced figures have been available since 2020.	Remained at 70% or higher both before and after the COVID-19 pandemic.
Major controversies in policing	Policing responses to emerging social movements and protests. Cross-border policing challenges and issues. Debates surrounding legal authorities under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. Assessment of police professionalism and neutrality.	Scrutiny of police professionalism and neutrality. Examination of social movements emerging from the integration of Hong Kong and China’s mainland economy. Controversies surrounding protest policing, particularly in balancing civil and political rights with the need for public order.

Sources: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Program (2019), National Chung Cheng University Crime Research Center (2023).

Hong Kong: professionalisation and efficiency

Hong Kong operates within the common law system, a legacy inherited from its colonial British past. This system places strong emphasis on principles such as due process, independent investigations, and checks and balances, which are explicitly enshrined in Hong Kong’s legal framework. In addition to statutory laws (codes) and ordinances, the common law doctrine of precedent plays a significant role in shaping the legal landscape. The Hong Kong Police is responsible for internal security management, criminal investigations, and the presentation of cases to the Secretary of Justice (formerly the Attorney General before 1997), who initiates public prosecutions.

The Hong Kong Police was established under a colonial policing model and underwent a transformation during the final decades of British rule, particularly from the 1970s onwards. This transformation involved combating corruption and introducing community policing practices and professionalisation reforms, with an aim to position the police force as a service dedicated to ‘serving the community’. This reform process continued during the postcolonial transition. Notably, one of the key successes of policing reforms in colonial Hong Kong was the eradication of syndicated corruption within the police force (Yep 2008, 2013, Yep and Lui 2010, Ho and Chu 2012). In its early days, the colonial Hong Kong Police Force faced severe criticism and was described by a governor of Hong Kong as ‘the most corrupt and incompetent police force in the world’.¹² Up until the 1960s, the force was disconnected from the local Cantonese community, marred by doubts about personnel integrity, and suffered from limited public trust. The commendations from overseas counterparts since the 1960s were a result of the successful structural reforms, often characterised as missionary, initiated by British leaders following two territory-wide disturbances. These reforms aimed to eliminate syndicated corruption within the police force and improve relations between the government, the police, and the wider society. The Commissioner of Police and the Governor jointly devised and implemented strategies for restructuring the police force and introducing missionary reforms.

In theory, the Hong Kong police were not legitimised through public consent but rather as a dominant and essential tool for dealing with public disorder. Paradoxically, this ‘conflict-oriented policing method’ enjoyed surprisingly high public support. Public trust in the police was historically low but gradually increased since the 1967 riots, primarily due to the government’s introduction of a series of restructuring and missionary reforms focused on police professionalisation and institutionalisation in the 1970s. In the absence of a democratic governance structure, a ‘community-oriented’ philosophy was adopted to reshape police-community relations. However, it remains debatable whether these initiatives align with the principles of ‘community policing’. The core focus of policing in Hong Kong appears to be on maintaining border security, managing disorder, rather than prioritising crime prevention and social services, as is common in other Western democracies that practice the community policing model (Hui 2001).

Following the sovereignty transfer to China in 1997, the criminal justice system in Hong Kong continued to operate within the framework of Beijing’s promise of ‘One Country, Two Systems’. In the first decade after the sovereignty retrocession, there were no major changes made to the organisation and operation of the Hong Kong Police. Public satisfaction with the police remained at a high level until the outbreak of government-citizen confrontations, which eroded public confidence in the Hong Kong Police Force (Hong Kong University Public Opinion Program 2019, Ho 2020).¹³ As of December 2022, the Hong Kong Police, the largest disciplinary service under the Security Bureau of the Hong Kong Government, comprised 27,290 disciplinary personnel employed as civil servants, 3,117 auxiliary personnel, and 4,082 civilian officers (Hong Kong Police Force 2023). The force operates within the constabulary concept, with the primary mission of ensuring a safe and stable society through the maintenance of law and order, upholding the rule of law, preventing crime, and safeguarding life and property (Hong Kong Police Force 2022).

While paramilitary policing has been employed in Hong Kong, it is not accurate to characterise policing in Hong Kong as purely conflict-oriented. The Chinese population in Hong Kong had limited interaction with the British colonial force, and everyday policing typically did not involve extreme measures. On a few occasions, actions taken by the Hong Kong Police and their paramilitary tactics came under public scrutiny. However, citizens who were not politicised in the relatively calm society generally had little grievance and criticism towards the Hong Kong Police. Moreover, citizens considered social stability, economic prosperity, and even concerns about potential restrictions on freedoms as essential for their safety and security. The relatively low crime rate, despite high social inequality and concerns about freedom limitations, played a significant role in fostering public trust in the police. In essence, the Hong Kong Police effectively marketed themselves as an institution that ‘served the community’, a perception strengthened by the public’s expectations of ‘law and order’ and cost-effective governance.

The legitimacy of the police force has evolved alongside changes in the nature and format of dialogues between the police and the public. Shifts in the policing context altered public expectations and perceptions of fairness, casting doubts on the justice process and ultimately eroding police legitimacy. Changes in Beijing’s policy towards Hong Kong since 2008 have ignited vigorous debates over the Special Administrative Region’s autonomy within the asymmetrical One Country Two Systems constitutional framework. The conditional legitimacy of the Hong Kong Police, derived from successful police marketing (emphasising professionalism and social stability), minimal public expectations (focused on cost-effectiveness and a smooth transition), and the ambiguous political landscape (caught between Beijing and London), has been consistently scrutinised since social and street confrontations emerged in the 2010s.

Taiwan police: ‘Sentiment’ and ‘reason’ and community engagement

Taiwan’s policing context has a unique historical background, having experienced Japanese colonial rule and authoritarian governance prior to the lifting of Martial Law in 1987. Policing in Taiwan evolved from a coercive model focused on social control, distinct from the service-oriented and community partnership emphasis of community policing practices seen in liberal democracies. The transition from non-democratic policing to a democratic framework significantly influenced the Taiwanese policing system, leading to consistently high public satisfaction rates, often exceeding 80% over the past decade. While elements of Western community policing are evident in Taiwan’s model, certain features deviate from the prevailing practices and debates in Anglo-Saxon contexts (Chen et al. 2023).

The foundation of Taiwan’s policing system inherits historical legacies from both the Republic of China regime in mainland China (1911-1949) and the Japanese colonial administration (1895-1945). Codes, particularly civil law codes, constitute the primary legal framework. Following its establishment in 1912, the Nationalist government gradually codified key laws, including the Criminal Code, Civil Code, Administrative Laws, and the Constitution (Chiu and Fa 1994). These codes eventually became the legal foundation for Taiwan after the ROC regime relocated to the island. The Taiwanese police system has roots in the policing model established by the Chinese National Party (Kuomintang) on the mainland. Additionally, it exhibits influences inherited from the Japanese colonial era, during which Japan ruled Taiwan for five decades (1895-1945), and features stemming from the German civil law system (Judicial Yuan 2020). The National Police Agency of Taiwan comprises 18 internal units responsible for planning, supervision, and evaluation of national police functions, along with 20 subordinate agencies handling various specialised police tasks (National Police Agency, Ministry of the Interior 2019, 2020, 2024).¹⁴

Taiwan boasts two main law enforcement agencies: the National Police Agency under the Ministry of Interior and the Investigation Bureau under the Ministry of Justice. Both agencies operate as centralised forces within the central government’s executive branch.¹⁵ In daily operations, the frontline policing unit is referred to as ‘Police Operations Districts’ (Jin Chin Chu). Each Operational District is responsible for administering a specific population segment, typically encompassing 500 households or 2,000 residents, as of 1999. The smallest and most local policing unit is the ‘Police Station’ (Pai Chu Suo). Duty officers stationed at field stations are assigned various tasks, including ‘household visits’, ‘backup’, and ‘communication’, in addition to regular territorial patrols. One of their primary obligations is to establish regular contact with residents, with the aim of fostering strong police-community partnerships to enhance crime prevention and investigation effectiveness (Yeh 1999). This approach to policing inherits elements from the Japanese colonial legacy (1895-1945), which featured the ‘Koban’ (police box) system. Police beat officers at a Koban were consistently assigned to serve a specific police constituency and were required to be intimately familiar with the community and informed about recent developments among residents. Beat officers not only conducted patrols but also conducted routine household visits, received reports from citizens at the police station’s front desk, and were deeply involved in their local communities on a long-term basis (Yeh 1999, Chang 2000, Cao et al. 2016). The practice of assigning household visits to police officers was renamed ‘Police Beat Duties’ in 2018, with revisions to operational procedures and details related to on-site household visits. Nevertheless, the core mission of proactive communication with residents within the police district remained unchanged (Ministry of Justice 2018, Chen et al. 2023).

The democratisation process ushered in a shift from the traditional culture of an all-powerful police force to a new democratic ethos of ‘consensus of the governed’ (Martin 2013). Notably, studies conducted by Kuo and Shih (2018) have identified three major empirical studies on community policing practices in Taiwan following the lifting of Martial Law in 1987. Yeh (1999) explained that public satisfaction with local police was relatively high due to citizens’ perceptions of individual and community safety, largely attributed to their trust in and familiarity with beat officers who frequently interacted with them. Studies by Lin et al. (2000) and Chang (2000) underscored the effectiveness of proactive police intervention and partnerships with Taipei residents, resulting in a decline in crime rates and increased public trust in the police. More recent studies by Sun et al. (2016), Chu et al. (2021), and Chen (2021) have examined the ongoing development and operation of the community policing model, highlighting consistently high levels of public satisfaction with the police over the past decade.

The ‘uniqueness’ of Taiwan’s policing system is characterised by its combination of both colonial and continental policing models, with remnants of authoritarian control features still operating despite the full democratisation of the territories before the millennium. Taiwanese policing is still influenced by Confucian values, which shape its community-oriented approach, even on top of formal legality (Manning 2010, Martin 2013, 2019, Cao et al. 2014, 2016). Police legitimisation heavily emphasises the integration of democratic values such as accountability and transparency. Recent scholarship on Taiwanese policing has highlighted the distinctive behavioural patterns of Taiwanese police personnel compared to their counterparts in Asia, where there is a general misconception that they are the same due to geographical proximity. They exhibit an unconscious drive to strike a balance among ‘sentiment’, ‘reason’, and ‘legislation’ in their daily policing operations, with ‘sentiment’ often taking precedence. Policing in Taiwan is characterised by a bottom-up and spontaneous mobilisation approach within district-level bureaucracy, rather than following the normative path guided by autonomous civil societies, a feature commonly observed in Anglo-Saxon liberal democracies. Scholarship on Taiwanese policing studies in the last decade has further explored the unique pattern of police and citizen relations evolving from colonial, authoritarian to democratic regimes. Empirical data were solicited from serving police personnel in different parts of Taiwan regarding their perceptions (Wang and Sun 2020, Wu et al. 2023). Comparisons with other Asian jurisdictions were made (Hsieh and Boateng 2015, Sun 2021), and some discussions extended to the speciality of the Taiwanese criminal justice system (Yeh 1999, Wang et al. 2020, 2024, Chen et al. 2021).

Rethinking community policing and the legitimisation of police

This comparison between Hong Kong and Taiwan policing systems prompts a reconsideration of the legitimisation of policing in different contexts, under varying regimes, and in response to diverse policy circumstances. An ‘expectation gap’ has emerged in Western democracies, where citizens expected the police to assume ‘extraordinary duties’ to serve the public during an unprecedented public health crisis, while law enforcement agencies wondered if they had adequate resources for such hygiene protection tasks. The situation in some Asian jurisdictions, on the other hand, is quite the opposite, with governments emphasising a ‘whole nation’ approach, deploying abundant resources, and significantly involving law enforcement personnel in the emergency response. Taiwan demonstrates a unique approach that falls between laissez-faire and ‘state mobilisation’, yielding satisfactory outcomes. Notably, in both Hong Kong and Taiwan, citizens have displayed a high level of self-regulation and compliance with lockdown measures, which runs counter to the initial reactions of citizens in Western countries who challenged government restrictions on their freedoms and rights as unjustified and unnecessary (Farrow 2020, Jones 2020). Interestingly, citizens in both places demanded more stringent lockdown measures at the early stages of the outbreak.¹⁶

In Hong Kong, a significant portion of the population, especially after experiencing the Anti-ELAB movement in 2019, has lost trust in the government and law enforcement authorities. In February 2020, a record-low 75.9% of respondents expressed distrust in the government, marking the lowest level since 1992 (Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute 2020). This sentiment of distrust can be traced back to the unpleasant experience during the SARS outbreak in 2003, when the response of the Hong Kong government was slow, and the Chinese government failed to disclose critical pandemic information at the outbreak’s early stages, resulting in 299 deaths in the city (Wan et al. 2020). These historical grievances have contributed to a persistent sense of distrust, which was further exacerbated by the government's handling of the COVID-19 crisis.

Conventional wisdom suggests that if authorities exercise power in ways perceived as legitimate, citizens will voluntarily adhere to government-imposed measures through self-regulation (Stott et al. 2020). Tyler’s (1990, 2006) works suggest that citizens’ trust and confidence in legal institutions, and their willingness to comply with the laws, are based on judgments about the fairness and transparency of legal proceedings. He assumed that citizens comply with laws either due to instrumental rationality based on individual cost–benefit analysis or normative compliance, where people feel a sense of obligation after judging procedural fairness and legitimacy. He further identified four major attributes for achieving police legitimacy through procedural justice: respect, dignity, neutrality, and participation (Radburn and Stott 2019). During encounters with the police, citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy are shaped by their experiences of the process and the extent to which they are allowed to state their cases. Tyler suggested that higher levels of trust and confidence in the police, as well as greater compliance with legal procedures and laws, can be attained if ‘procedurally fair and legitimate measures’ are followed. They also acknowledged that legitimacy is not in a fixed state but is constantly in a state of flux and fluidity. What constitutes ruling or governance is adaptive. Legitimacy can also be manipulated by those in power who can alter how people understand authorities and indeed what authorities do, whether for good or bad incentives.

This notion has been commonly acknowledged in Western democracies; however, it is suspected in two domains. Firstly, the model apparently overlooks the dynamic nature of people’s judgments and their inter-relationships with identity and social context. Secondly, it has not undergone empirical examination in different situations and contexts. In the context of Asia, where the legal procedures, history, and culture do not strictly correspond to the hypotheses in his model, there are notable limitations. Radburn and Stott (2019) highlighted some conceptual limitations of the theory, noting that most previous studies derived their data from cross-sectional surveys, which failed to incorporate the ‘lived experiences’ of the audience and their dynamic interactions with the ‘power holders’. They proposed that a ‘process-based’ model is necessary, investigating the historical social relationships and contextual changes that shape identity, perceptions of procedural fairness, police legitimacy, and self-regulation. They raised a number of propositions about how the Procedural Justice Theory can be developed through fuller recognition of the dialogic nature of encounters between the police and the citizens (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012). The policing contexts in Hong Kong and Taiwan also display remarkable differences from the context in which Tyler’s Procedural Justice Theory discourse was established.

In the COVID-19 Hong Kong, despite a high level of distrust in the government and scepticism about its motives, citizens share the rationale behind lockdown measures to contain the pandemic. Thus, even when government and police legitimacy is lacking, people may comply with specific directives that they perceive as morally appropriate or serving their interests. However, this form of compliance is passive since individuals are being governed. Consequently, their compliance with the government is contingent on the specific nature of the directives, particularly those related to public health in the context of the COVID-19 threat. It is reasonable to suspect that citizens may cease compliance once they believe the specific directives no longer serve their interests or in areas where their interests do not align, particularly when there is no coercion involved.

Concluding remarks: the future of policing in Hong Kong and Taiwan

The primary aim of comparative policing is to analyse and highlight the similarities and differences in policing practices across countries (Roché and Fleming 2022). Roché and Fleming (2022) argue that for comparative policing to establish itself in the field of policing studies, careful attention must be given to four key areas: ‘police, politics, and statehood’, ‘institutional framework and the power to organise police’, ‘the accountability and regulation of policing’, and ‘the attitudes of the public towards police organisations’ (p. 259). It is crucial to assess which concepts are transferable for such comparisons, particularly considering that many conceptual frameworks have been developed and applied in Western contexts. Additionally, it is important to examine how these concepts can be effectively utilised to understand police systems in the Asian context. Through a comparative analysis of the Hong Kong Police and Taiwan Police in the post-COVID-19 context, this study demonstrates the dynamics of governance and the distribution of police powers, as well as how police organisations respond to societal shocks across different contexts. Importantly, this study aligns with Roché and Fleming’s (2022) call for a viable comparative approach to policing studies, as it contributes to updating our understanding of policing and its relationship to society and government.

The application of path dependency theory in policing studies is well-established (Marnoch et al. 2014, Topping 2022). This concept can be traced back to the notion of ‘increasing returns’ found in earlier economics literature (Pierson 2000). According to Pierson (2000), increasing returns dynamics highlight two crucial factors: the higher cost associated with switching to an alternative path compared to staying on the current path, and the significance of timing and sequence in distinguishing formative conjunctures that shape divergent paths. In the context of policing, the path dependency theory enables us to comprehend the reasons behind the selection, adoption, omission, or rejection of police organisational trajectories.

Mahoney (2006) argues that path-dependent sequences are both contingent and deterministic, stating that:

“Path dependent sequences simultaneously embody claims that could be seen as highly contingent and highly deterministic. On the one hand, these sequences assign a key role to small events, accidents, or other contingent occurrences. On the other hand, the sequences assume that path dependent may lock-in outcomes in quite deterministic ways.” (p. 132–133)

In other words, critical junctures or shocks do not challenge the existing trajectory but are absorbed by the prevailing arrangements, reinforcing them over time. As Topping (2022) suggests, these critical junctures evolve into accepted conventions or policies at operational levels, further solidifying the path dependency. Hence, while contingent critical junctures and shocks may not lead to a shift in organisational trajectories, they demonstrate the influence of the past on the present and continue to shape current outcomes despite the occurrence of shocks.

This study has explored the significant changes in the landscape of policing in Hong Kong following two key disruptions: the civil unrest since June 2019 and the outbreak of COVID-19 in February 2020. In comparison, we examined Taiwan, where police agencies have seen limited changes in organisation and operation during three years of COVID-19 management, with public satisfaction with the police remaining remarkably high. Furthermore, we sought to emphasise an often-overlooked aspect in cross-jurisdictional comparative studies on policing – the critical role of contextual and cultural variations in shaping policing contexts.

Hong Kong, a decolonised region of China, inherited the policing framework established by British governors. However, the policing context in the past two decades of Special Administrative Region governance has undergone substantial and transformative changes. In addition to the influence of Beijing on institutional and policy adjustments in the health management regime, as previously discussed, significant historical events have played a role. These include the traumatic experience of the SARS outbreak in 2003, marked by 299 deaths and several months of pandemic and lockdown, and the significant government and societal confrontations in 2014 and 2016. The widespread social unrest since the summer of 2019 further eroded public trust in the regime, emphasising the need for strong policing capacity to maintain control and stability. Despite their limited trust in the government, citizens have displayed a high level of ‘passive’ compliance with health management regulations. This phenomenon may appear intriguing to sociologists in Western democracies, where issues of ‘civil disobedience’ in response to lockdown, quarantine, and vaccination policies have arisen since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (Wan 2020, Ho and Chan 2021). In Taiwan, Hsieh et al. (2021) also argued that the rigorous measures were largely influenced by the traumatic experience of the SARS outbreak in 2003, which resulted in casualties. The escalating tensions between Taiwan and mainland China further deepened residents’ concerns on the island, leading to overwhelming societal support for stringent hygiene management measures (Hsieh et al. 2021).

Looking ahead to the future of policing in both places, several key questions emerge. Who are the police agencies in Hong Kong ultimately accountable to? What role should the Hong Kong Police play in the integration of mainland China and Hong Kong under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework? In Taiwan, while there were no significant changes during the COVID-19 crisis and the policing mechanism appeared to function effectively in curbing the spread of infection, a paradox arises. The police are primarily responsible for internal security management, but the evolving geopolitical landscape across the Taiwan Strait could introduce sudden and substantial dynamics into the policing context. Leaders in Taipei have emphasised a democratic, publicly accountable, bottom-up ‘whole of nation’ approach in managing the pandemic, a stark contrast to Beijing’s ‘dynamic zero’ coercive lockdown approach. Will the leaders of Taiwan continue to emphasise their distinction from mainland China in the face of consistent pressure for unification from Beijing? Additionally, the potential resurgence of policing issues, including cross-border fraud and tourism-related crime, may arise as economic and social interactions resume and expand. These challenges may necessitate specific operational adjustments for the Taiwan police, although immediate restructuring of the system is unlikely.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill protests captured international attention during the autumn and winter of 2019. Foreign media outlets swiftly descended upon Hong Kong, resulting in an abundance of news reports, featured stories, and analytical pieces available online. However, these protest activities waned with the onset of COVID-19 in Hong Kong in January 2020, coinciding with the implementation of stringent social distancing orders that prohibited public gatherings. The situation took a significant turn when the National People’s Congress in Beijing imposed the NSL on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on 18 June 2020. The law was subsequently passed on 30 June 2020 and enforced on 1 July 2020, effectively criminalising activities related to ‘secession of Hong Kong’, ‘subversion against the Chinese government’, terrorism, and colluding with foreign forces. Many civil society organisations that had been active during the 2019 protests, as well as audio-visual news materials uploaded by local media to the internet, were deemed to have a ‘seditious nature’ and were consequently removed from online platforms. Our analysis is based on publicly accessible information that remained available up to September 2023.

2 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government introduced the Anti-pandemic Legislation under Cap. 599, encompassing measures such as mandatory home and hotel quarantine, social distancing directives, and quasi lockdowns affecting catering and amusement establishments (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2020a).

3 The enforcement of social distancing and lockdown orders heavily relied on the subjective judgement of police officers. This involved a ‘high-discretion, low guidance activity’ that pushed officers into unfamiliar professional territories (Farrow 2020). Complicating matters further was the fact that citizens themselves struggled to understand the rules and expectations governing their behaviour. Legal terms like 'exceptional circumstances' and 'reasonable excuse' remained vague and open to multiple interpretations, which meant that it was not uncommon for the police and individuals to have differing views on their application. This divergence in interpretation could lead to perceptions of unlawful or biassed arrests and prosecutions. The lack of clear definitions and the challenge of assessing the appropriateness of these stipulations further exacerbated the situation (Farrow 2020).

4 For instance, Liu et al. (2021) examined a range of criminological inquiries that have arisen amidst the pandemic crisis, particularly focusing on their applicability in an Asian context. Their research identified four significant policing concerns that have emerged as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Firstly, they explored how the pandemic has influenced the patterns of crime and victimisation. Secondly, they examined the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated discrimination against vulnerable groups, particularly in cases where the spread and control of the virus have been deeply politicised. Thirdly, they delved into the distinctive responses of Asian countries, such as China, to the COVID-19 crisis in comparison to their Western counterparts. Finally, they analysed how the pandemic has affected the operation of the criminal justice system, shedding light on the unique challenges and adjustments faced by the justice system in the face of a global health crisis.

5 The motivation behind the implementation of sudden or ‘ambush’ lockdowns can be partially attributed to the Hong Kong government's drive to align itself with China’s zero-COVID strategy. This strategy has the objective of achieving quarantine-free travel with other regions within China before extending such arrangements to the international community (Tan 2021, Davidson 2021).

6 Numerous academic studies have undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the actions taken by the Taiwanese government in its battle against COVID-19. Researchers such as Huang (2020), Chen et al. (2020), Yeh and Cheng (2020), Hsieh (2021), and Xu (2021) have consistently highlighted the importance of strong and centralised leadership, governmental accountability to the public, highly disciplined citizens, and active societal participation as pivotal factors contributing to Taiwan’s initial success in managing the pandemic. Notably, one plausible explanation for Taiwan’s achievements lies in its adept application of community policing practices, which enabled the swift and effective implementation of anti-epidemic measures, including mandatory quarantine for inbound citizens, targeted virus testing in high-risk infection clusters, and the enforcement of business lockdowns (Chen et al. 2023).

7 A significant surge of COVID-19 cases occurred within the Hong Kong community during the spring of 2022. Meanwhile, Taiwan, which had effectively insulated itself from the outbreak for more than two years, encountered a similar surge in the summer of the same year following the mass infection caused by the Omicron variant.

8 Beijing perceived the protests that unfolded since 2019 as a disruptive force, paralysing the governance system in Hong Kong and posing a direct challenge to the authority of the Central People’s Government in the city. Moreover, these protests had the potential to spread not only to other regions but also to Beijing’s own directly governed citizens. This perspective aligned with Beijing’s ongoing efforts, which began in 2014, to assert its unwavering dominance over Hong Kong, encapsulated by the term 'comprehensive jurisdiction'. This approach reinterpreted the 'one country, two systems' framework established in the Sino–British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Hong Kong Basic Law of 1990. In August 2019, Zhang Xiaoming, the Secretary of the Central People’s Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong, characterised the anti-extradition movement as a clear manifestation of a ‘colour revolution’ (Chung and Cheung 2019).

9 In September 2021, Hong Kong made amendments to the privacy ordinance, making it a criminal offence to disclose personal data without consent, particularly when there is an intent to cause harassment, physical or psychological harm, intimidation, or other forms of 'specified harm' to the person involved or their family members. Individuals found guilty of this offence can be subject to penalties that include up to five years in prison and a fine of HK$1 million (Ho 2022).

10 The Public Order Ordinance of Hong Kong stipulates that an assembly may be deemed unlawful if a group consisting of three or more individuals conducts themselves in a manner that is 'disorderly, intimidating, insulting, or provocative', with the intent or likelihood of causing fear that they will breach the peace or provoke disturbances. While the common law doctrine of 'joint enterprise' cannot be applied to cases involving rioting and unlawful assembly, individuals involved in such activities can still be subject to legal consequences if they are found to have participated in the violence or threat of violence either as a principal, accessory, or party to a joint enterprise. In specific cases, the court has convicted 25 individuals of rioting even in the absence of direct evidence of their involvement in acts or threats of violence, but rather based on their presence at rioting scenes with a shared 'common purpose' with other wrongdoers. The court has also provided clarification on how one can be considered to have 'taken part' in a riot, which includes committing a breach of the peace or engaging in activities that further such prohibited conduct by facilitating, assisting, or encouraging those participating in the criminal assembly (Lee 2023).

11 Several public opinion polls examining public satisfaction with the government’s performance have been conducted during the three years of the pandemic in Taiwan. While there were slight variations among the polls conducted by different institutes and media outlets with varying political orientations, which include those favouring the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and the opposition Kuomintang, the overall trend indicated very high levels of satisfaction. These satisfaction levels reached between 80% to 90% in 2020 and 2021 when Taiwan had successfully maintained a zero outbreak. However, after experiencing a mass infection in the summer of 2022, satisfaction levels fluctuated and ranged from 50% to 70% in various releases. It’s important to note that even during these fluctuations, the satisfaction levels remained considerably higher than those typically observed in most liberal democratic countries (Rich 2023).

12 In 1879, the police chief, Henry May, personally investigated cases of corruption within the police force. Governor McDonald expressed his astonishment, stating, “I had never seen nor heard of any colonial police force that could be as corrupt, useless, unreliable, and inefficient as the Hong Kong Police” (Ng 1999).

13 From 1997 to 2007, the level of public dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong Police Force remained consistently low, staying below 10%. However, between 2013 and 2015, there was a significant and rapid decline, amounting to a 10% drop, reaching the lowest level of public satisfaction at 51.4%. By August 2019, the satisfaction rate had plummeted to below 20%. As one author, a former British Hong Kong police officer, aptly summarised, “The Hong Kong Police transitioned from a state of widespread public acceptance and support to one characterised by public distrust and even hatred. This constitutes a legitimacy crisis for the Police” (Purbrick 2019).

14 As of the end of 2019, the police agency of Taiwan comprised a total of 73,405 employees. Among them, approximately 70,000 served as police officers, while the remaining individuals held roles in general administration and technical positions (National Police Agency, Ministry of the Interior 2019). The Taiwan police force operates under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and is tasked with the responsibility to “maintain public order, protect social security, prevent all hazards, and promote welfare according to applicable laws” (Ministry of the Interior ROC 2002). The police headquarters in Taipei holds authority over the leadership appointments in other cities and counties, even though these departments are considered agencies of their respective local governments. This hierarchical structure forms a robust chain of command that extends from the central authority to local departments.

15 Before 1988, Taiwan had various categories of police, including entities like the secret police or special police. This period saw the presence of “close to a dozen secret police organisations” (Cao et al. 2016). Notably, the Provisional Amendment for the Period of Mobilisation of the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, often referred to as the Temporary Provisions, was enacted by the Republic of China (ROC) while it was still on the mainland, on 10 May 1948. These laws and executive decrees led to the establishment of two influential institutions – the National Security Council and the Taiwan Garrison Command. These entities operated entirely outside the framework of the 1947 Constitution, granting them virtually unrestricted authority under the Office of the President.

16 For instance, medical staff in Hong Kong went on strike in early February 2020 to demand the government to close the border with mainland China to prevent the inflow of the coronavirus (Barron 2020). In Taiwan, many people proactively wore face masks even before the government mandated it (BBC 2020).