Degrowth: Tools for a Complex Analysis of the Multidimensional Crisis

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Notes

¹The term “real degrowth” is used here to refer to “economic crisis,” “recession,” or “negative growth.” On the other hand, according to the Paris Declaration, we can define “degrowth” as “a voluntary transition towards a just, participatory, and ecologically sustainable society.” See http://www.degrowth.org/Paris-2008-Declaration.

²Using Maddison's data (2005), population has increased 2.9 times in Europe in the same period (from 133 to 392 million inhabitants), 30.9 times in North America (from 11 to 340 million), and globally 6.1 times from 1 to 6.1 billion (six years later, global population is now at 7 billion). Despite the great increase in the population, income per capita has grown on average 1.2 times per year since 1820 and 24 times more quickly compared to the estimates between the period from 1000 to 1820 (Maddison 2005).

³More recent models on endogenous growth (Romer 1986) have tried to remedy this major drawback, taking into consideration the role human capital and knowledge play in explaining growth. However, these models also avoid considering the structural change that arises from the fact that neither human beings nor artefacts are “homogeneous substances” (in Georgescu-Roegen's sense), and their interaction, therefore, is frequently the cause of discontinuous changes and the emergence of new properties.

⁴There are now quite a few studies on Georgescu-Roegen. Among the most significant, the monographs by M. Bonaiuti (2011, 2001); K. Mayumi (2001); G. Lozada and R. Beard (1999); K. Mayumi and J. Gowdy (1999); J.C. Dragan and M.C. Demetrescu (1986); The Contribution of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, the Special Issue of Ecological Economics 22 (3) 1997; the collection of essays published after the EABS conferences (Roma 1991; Palma de Mallorca 1994), as well as several articles that have appeared, in particular, in Ecological Economics.

⁵Georgescu-Roegen included in the notion of standard economics both the neoclassical theories and those deriving from Keynes—i.e., practically everything that constituted 20^th century mainstream economic thought. The relationships between Georgescu-Roegen and Marx are more complex. Briefly we can say that Georgescu-Roegen appreciated Marx as a comprehensive social scientist and shared his idea of the evolutionary nature of the economic process. He further accepted his theory of capitalist accumulation, with its circular nature and consequent unfair distribution of wealth. Partly similar, but partly distinct, are their notions of dialectics, which Marx in his turn had derived from Hegel. Georgescu-Roegen definitely did not accept the Marxist doctrine of a revolutionary class, in the sense that he was well aware that the abolition of private property, and the replacement of one class with another in wielding power, would not solve the problem of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. (Cf. the Paragraph The evolution of Bioeconomics, and the essay, Inequality, Limits and Growth (Bonaiuti, 2011). Above all, Georgescu-Roegen rejects the emancipatory vision of growth and progress found in Marx and Marxism.

⁶According to ASPO researchers following fifteen different models (Bakhtiari, Smith, Staniford, Loglets, Shock model, GBM, ASPO, Robelius Low/High, HSM, Duncan & Youngquist), 95 percent of the predictions see a production peak between 2008 and 2010 at 77.5-85.0 million barrels per day. See http://www.theoildrum.com.

⁷At the same time, the advanced countries are capable of controlling the strategic markets in which these structures operate, in conditions that are far from perfect competition. This has increased the inequality of the exchange (Amin, 2002).

⁸On the contrary, it seems to be valid in both the short and the very long terms. In general, in fact, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the simplest and safest investment projects, hence of high expected returns, will be tackled first, followed at a later stage by those that are more complex and risky, hence of low expected returns. In the very long run it can be explained also by the limitation of “natural capital.” This fundamental point requires further extensive research.

⁹This type of explanation, which undoubtedly requires further research, must be considered complementary to the traditional explanation based on the material conditions of the population. Certainly, in a rough comparison with the crisis in the 1930s, the conditions of the lower class in Western countries—while having significantly worsened in relative terms during the last 30 years—are still much better if compared to those in the first decades of the 20^th century. This does not mean that the dissolution of social ties, together with the transformations in the social imaginary, does not play an important role in explaining the diminished social reactions to the present crisis.

¹⁰D. Lane, et al. (2009) speak in this regard of exaptive bootstrapping, Ch. 1.

¹¹Autonomy is essentially taken to mean making one's own laws (both on institutional and economic levels), self-determination and explicit self-establishment. Ivan Illich (1973), who had a significant role in Latouche's thought, as in many other degrowth thinkers, preferred the term conviviality, but the basic idea is the same: a convivial society is one that maintains control over its own tools, in other words, one that decides how and what to produce without delegating decisions to experts or representatives.

¹²To consider these points, even briefly, would initiate a very lengthy debate that goes far beyond the scope of the present work.