On Black, White, and the Possibility of Beauty in Locke

Abstract

Locke claims that man makes a mistake by linking the perception of authentic beauty to nature, because beauty is argued to constitute a deliberate man-made fabrication. Specifically, man is said to emotionally wrap the ugliness, and brutishness, of a parsimonious nature within an extreme understanding of perception, where even apparent qualitative distinctions, between tone and hue, form one aspect of this fabrication. By becoming a slave to this emotional fabrication of beauty, Locke argues that the mind liberates reason, by freeing it from the debilitating influence caused by the overwhelming ugliness of nature. Being liberated in this manner, man can then secure the acquisition of property. Trusting the senses, so as to deliver an authentic rendering of external natural beauty, to the mind of man, as once presumed by older philosophy, therefore, becomes impossible. Hence, the prospect modern man ever experiencing authentic beauty, as provided by nature, is lost.

Notes

1 ‘Nature’ refers to all that is external to man, which is largely out of his deliberate control. In general, the definition of ‘beauty’ refers to older philosophy which understands ‘beauty’ to be authentic, and reliable, perceptions of nature, by man, which point toward knowledge of the good, as discussed later. Perceptions that do not point to knowledge of the good, are not beautiful, in this understanding (Lucas 1965, 1977).

2 Hobbes ([1651] 1950), Locke bases his argument on a universal qualitative equality in man, as well as a fundamental freedom from nature (Nash, Nash, and Rybak 2016, 2018). Some argue that Locke makes colour, and the discussion of beauty, are ‘subjective’, and others argue the opposite (Stuart 2003, p. 57). This work argues that the distinction between subjective and objective represents a problematic diversion from more important issues in Locke, especially on the issue of beauty. In general, the aspect of beauty discussed herein is visual in nature, and, therefore, the discussion excludes beauty as evident in other senses, such as beauty in music, in taste, in smell, in sound, and in touch.

3 One does not have to look far for an adequate description of the pursuit of property. Specifically, the ‘science’ of economics is an able representation of this pursuit, and the depiction of beauty is also apparent in modern societies like the United States. (Lukes, 2011, p. 24; Cropsey [1955] 1977, ([1963] 1987). A metaphor for the science of economics, might be the T-1000 terminator, made of liquid metal, in the film Terminator 2, Judgement Day (Terminator 2). Specifically, the T-1000 cannot be killed. Instead of stopping, with the force of any critique, even of the force and quality provided by eminent commentators such as Cropsey, the science of economics just reforms itself, as the liquid metal terminator does in the popular film, Terminator 2. After pulling itself back together economics then just keeps pursuing the one objective that is primarily launched by the destruction of the idea of natural beauty, by Locke (Frakes, Wisher, and Cameron, 1991). See also, Smith ([1759] 1976, [1776] 1939).

4 (Bentham [1789] 2007). Pre-modern philosophy often refers to knowledge of the ‘good’. The question, ‘what is the good’ appears to dominate much in pre-modern philosophy. More specifically, pre-modern philosophy accepts the existence of uncertainty, the overpowering force of nature, and, therefore, the dependence of man upon a largely benevolent nature.

5 Since man learns by metaphors, and beauty may be seen as an ‘uber-metaphor’, or an overwhelming, yet unreliable, representation of the good, it may be logical to see beauty as a direct visual representation of the good. References to an ‘uber-metaphor’ may have some remnants of resemblance to the ‘Übermensch’ of Nietzsche (1910). Instead of man being able to overcome nature, to be a ‘super’ or ‘over’ man, it may be that the ideas of man need to be made larger; more powerful. Instead of throwing out the older philosophers, we may need, as Nietzsche did, with much humour, to understand them better. It is only with such an understanding that one might hope to humbly assist with the problematic issue of understanding of prudential decision-making.

6 Kovach (1971), Aquinas (1981), Aristotle (1893, 1885), Plato ([1968] 1991, 2012), Xenophon (1994).

7 Even though the ‘sublime’ might have hastily been cobbled together, as the surrogate of beauty, as some suggest, partly due to the damage caused by Locke, as suggested herein, the damage has been done. In fact, the ‘sublime’ now remains a black and white simulacrum of the essential hues that nature presents to man each day; hues that Locke blocks from the modern world and the modern social scientist. Lukes ably describes the role of the sublime, as follows,

The unbalanced resolution of their encounter is a circumscribed concept of beauty the tendentiousness of which facilitates the elevation of the concept of the sublime, a project undertaken more vigorously by Edmund Burke who, like Shaftesbury, reinforces liberalism as he critiques it. In the end, the effort to describe systematically the components of beauty proves to isolate and weaken the concept, and attempts to revive a more ambitious beauty, including recent American ventures, might do well to take this into account. Beauty, especially in the American context with its focus on women, wilderness and automobiles, cannot be fully appreciated without careful attention to political philosophy (Lukes 2011, p. 3).

Instead of calming man, the attempt to solve the problems that Locke primarily brings to the door of man, may have now comprehensively backfired; it now hovers in front of man and taunts him. See also (Brady 2005a, 2005b).

8 Lisowska, U. (2017), Sen (1999, 2009).

9 (Lukes 2011, p.20; Burke 1958, p. 44). On the subject of simulacrum, the recent works of Rawls (1972) and Sen (1966, 1970, 1979a, 1979b, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2009) provide the modern reader with good examples of what a simulacrum of philosophy now looks like. For an authentic idea of philosophy, one needs to turn to Aristotle (1893, 1885) and Plato ([1968] 1991, 2012). See also competent commentators, such as Bloom ([1963] 1987, 1964, [1968] 1991, 1975, 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1993, [1993] 2000).

10 See also Locke ([1689] 2010, 1978). As will be noted later, the idea of the good is elusive and while it is flattened by the bulldozer of logic provided by Locke in the modern world; it remains a difficult and complex issue that fascinated and drove men, at least in in the pre-modern world, towards action. Beauty is, at once, a promise and a difficulty, where beauty helps man glimpse, through the application of reason, aspects of the good, or the ‘truth’. Indications of the poverty that Locke asserts nature provides man, including the provision of beauty itself, are not difficult to find in Locke, For example, land, as provided, from nature, to man, is asserted to be virtually worthless; being worth, ‘little more than nothing’ (Locke [1689] 1988, Book 2, ch. 5, sec. 42). See also (Vaughn 1978).

11 Nash, Nash, and Rybak (2014, 2016).

12 (Locke [1689] 1824, Book 2, Ch. 8, para. 10, p. 101).

13 (Locke [1689] 1824, Book 2, Ch. 8, para. 13, p. 102).

14 (Locke [1689] 1824, Book 2, Ch. 8, para. 3, p. 100).

15 (Locke [1689] 1824, Book 2, Ch. 3, para. 1, p. 90).

16 (Locke [1689] 1824, Book 2, Ch. 8, para. 19, p. 104; Bolton 1983; Alexander 1985; Woozley 1964).

17 Locke expresses his ‘colour’ preference is many ways, but one way to measure the preference of Locke, as the social sciences and Locke argue, might be to count his mentions of various colours within ECHU. First, white is the favourite ‘colour’ of Locke, as it is mentioned, as a whole word, 43 times in volume one of ECHU, and 29 times in volume two, while whiteness is mentioned 23 times in volume one, and 16 times in volume 2, for a total of 111 mentions. Second, yellow is mentioned, as a whole word, 26 times in volume one of ECHU and 31 times in volume two, while yellowness is mentioned 6 times in volume one, and 1 time in volume two, for a total of 64 mentions. Third, red is mentioned 22 times in volume one and 10 times in volume two, as a whole word, and redness is mentioned 1 time in volume one, for a total of 33 mentions. Fourth, black is mentioned, as a whole word, 12 times in volume one of ECHU, and 17 times in volume two, while blackness is mentioned 2 times in volume two for a total of 31 mentions. Fifth, blue is mentioned, as a whole word, 14 times in volume one of ECHU, and 10 times in volume two, and blueness is mentioned once in volume one, for a total 25 mentions. Sixth, scarlet is mentioned 14 times in volume one of ECHU, and 2 times in volume two, for a total of 16 mentions. Seventh, green is mentioned 4 times in volume one of ECHU, and 6 times in volume two, for a total of 10 mentions. Purple and sea-green are each mentioned once in total. Locke uses the comparative form of ‘colour’ in different proportions, with whiteness used 28% of the time in both volumes of ECHU, yellowness being used 12% of the time for both volumes, 3% in the case of redness, 7% in the case of blackness, and 4% in the case of blueness. In total white and back are mentioned, both in whole form, and the comparative form, 142 times in both volumes, when compared to 150 times for other hues in total. The authors apologize for any hues that are not mentioned.

18 (Locke [1689] 1824, Book 3, Ch. 4, para. 16, pp. 304-5).

19 However, qualitative distinctions do not have a place in the work of Locke, or in modern analyses, such as economics, which is made feasible by Locke. Economics has recently become a branch of mathematics under the leadership of Arrow and others, like the mathematician Nash and Samuelson (Arrow 1948, 1950, [1951a] 1963, [1951b] 1971, 1963, 1970; Nash 1951; Samuelson 1947), despite the attempts of some philosophically competent (Knight 1913a, 1913b, 1915, 1916, 1920a, 1920b, [1921] 1985, 1926, 1932, [1933] 1951, 1935a, 1935b, 1937, 1940, 1943; Keynes 1921, [1936] 1983). Some discussion of Knight and the direction of economics, is apparent in the literature (Breit and Ransom 1982; Champernowne 1969; Coates 1990; Coase 1994; Cropsey [1955] 1977, [1963] 1987; Dewey 1990, Duhs 2006, 2008; Friedman 1953; Groenewegen 1990; Greer 2001; Hicks 1931; Le Roy and Singell 1987; Mill [1861] 1985, [1874] 1985; Nash 2003; Nash and Rybak 2009, 2010, 2014; O’Donnell 1989; Platt (1908, 1909), Rockefeller (1991), Smith [1759] 1976, [1776] 1939; Shils (1981); Summers 2012; Weber [1927] 1950, [1948] 1968; Wick 1973)

20 (Cooper [1737] 2001, 1999; Lukes 2011, p.14).

21 (Lukes 2011, p. 15).

22 (Locke ([1689] 1824, vol. 1, book 2, ch. 11, para.3, pp. 117-8).

23 (Locke ([1689] 1824, vol. 1, book 2, ch. 11, para.3, pp. 117-8).

24 Essentially, Locke transforms the fauna he fails to mention in TTOG, ‘TTOG’ refers to Two Treatises of Government (Locke [1689] 1988), the serpent, into his conception of beauty; something that has a significant capability to deceive rational faculties (Lukes 2011).

25 (Locke ([1689] 1824, Book 2, Ch. 8, para. 2, p. 100). Locke makes many apparent ‘mistakes’, as Lukes notes, with reference to the failure of Locke to mention the serpent in his Two Treatises (Locke ([1689] 1988), despite his close attention to the bible (Lukes 2011). A selective, as opposed to accurate, account of the bible, is what Locke uses to promote his premise about man, and the source of virtually all value. In attending to, and thinking about these apparent ‘mistakes’, on might come to a better appreciation of Locke.

26 If all men are equal, apart from the degree to which they desire property, then there is no logical position for differences in the natural ability of any man to perceive beauty, either more, or less, than other men. Because nature is barren to man, and provides virtually nothing of value to man, it is logical to expect that man, not nature, must create, must ‘conjure up’ beauty, as nature cannot, at least according to Locke. Subsequently, modern philosophy then logically develops the idea, that nature is barren, and that the emotions fabricate ideas of beauty, and then these fabrications are woven into the theoretical proposition that the perception of beauty is subjective. Here, beauty is not apparent, in the external world, but remains the invention of man.

Man makes virtually all value, so man makes valuable things that have beauty, so that all beauty, without exception, must be synthetic. Accordingly, beauty is just another example of a valuable item, which hovers before the eyes of men solely because of the labour of man, both in laboring to make it, and in laboring to perceive it. Accordingly, Locke stablishes the groundwork for subsequent philosophers like Hume, who suddenly ‘discovers’ the subjectivity of beauty, as follows,

Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others. To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter (Hume [1757] 1894, p. 136).

For similar, but not equivalent, reasons, Kant indicates that beauty is also subjective in nature,

The judgment of taste is therefore not a judgment of cognition, and is consequently not logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose determining ground can be no other than subjective. Every reference of representations, even that of sensations, may be objective (and then it signifies the real [element] of an empirical representation), save only the reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in the object is signified, but through which there is a feeling in the subject as it is affected by the representation. (Kant [1790] 1997, section 1). See also Kant ([1787] 1929; Hassner [1963a] 1987, [1963b] 1987; Heidegger (1971); Hegel [1821] 1967, [1837] 1956).

The Pragmatists, though each were very different, generally have little to say on the subject, with the notable exception of Dewey ([1932] 2005). In general, the focus of the Pragmatists was with the focus seeming to be on the relative accuracy of perception, as opposed to the adequate recognition of nature (Dewey [1882-1887] 1967, 1891, [1895-1898a] 1967, [1895-1898b] 1967, [1903-1906] 1976, 1929; James, [1890] 1981, 1897, 1909; Peirce 1868a, 1868b, 1958). Nietzsche, on the other hand wrestles with the idea of beauty, and concedes that beauty is needed, yet he cannot integrate that need with modern philosophy, possibly because of how influential Locke had become (Nietzsche [1884] 1956, 290; Dannhauser [1963] 1987). See also, Nietzsche ([1882] 1974, [1886] 1993, [1887] 1996, 1910).

27 Kivy (1992) argues that the idea of beauty, within the context of Locke is a ‘simple’ idea in the work of Hutcheson ([1726] 2013), ‘because a special sense is required to produce it’ (Kivy 1992, p. 243). Hutcheson bases his theory of beauty on Locke, and develops a theory of perception in the first treatise, while applying that theory in the second treatise, when exploring an apparently shocking clash; between the political system aimed at benevolence, and one aimed at selfishness. One wonders what is shocking about such a clash, as Locke leaves no room for benevolence; the matter had been decided by Locke, and further discussion is simply otiose. See also Stolnitz (1963).

28 Importantly, Locke indicates that he is using the word ‘mode’ in a new way, and this draws our attention to what Locke is intimating here, as philosophers typically create new ideas in ways that are not, initially obvious; ways that require our attention and our ability to craft interpretations, be they useful or not (Locke ([1689] 1824, vol. 1, book 2, ch. 12, para.5, p. 124). See also Filmer ([1652] 2000).

29 Beauty and theft are given as examples of ‘mixed modes’, where theft is described as the ‘concealed change’ of possession. Paradoxically, one wonders if Locke is indicating that he, through his philosophy, is conducting a monumental act of theft, where he is not being exactly explicit with his intentions. Specifically, Locke appears to be concealing what he is doing with the idea of beauty. Here, the ‘before and after’ explanation is probably the best way of describing this potential act of theft. Before Locke, in the older understanding, beauty was thought to be the most important thing given to man by nature, as it served as a guide to the aspirations of man, where beauty was perceived differentially, according to large variations in natural talent. Here, nature possess beauty, and man naturally aspires towards beauty, but with very different ‘equipment’ as Aristotle would term it. After Locke, beauty is effectively made worthless, with the extremely important exception, regarding the way fabricated beauty facilitates the rational acquisition of property, and is thought to be made by man. For Locke, beauty is a means of allowing reason to acquire property in an otherwise ugly world of brutishness, as largely described by Hobbes, and is perceived by everyone equally (Hobbes [1651] 1950). Here, man possesses the possibility of making and interpreting beauty, equally, since every man needs to be able to participate in the activity of property acquisition. Locke can be said to ‘steal’ the idea of beauty, as he effectively conceals the change of possession, from nature to man, without the free consent of the proprietor, in this case, modern man. While this change has occurred, the quality of beauty perceived in the older understanding is very different from what it is conceived as in the modern conception. For example, Bail (1981) gives an account of the modern artist as a figure of isolation, and this is the logical position of the artist in modern philosophy. While the artist, in this case Fairweather, seeks beauty as an end in itself, he must be mistaken according to Locke. Hence, like the philosopher, in older philosophy, the artist must be isolated for such a logical error. In contrast to the understanding of the artist, Locke understands the expression of beauty, not as an end in itself, but something that facilitates another end; the acquisition of property.

30 Bearing in mind that Locke has warned his reader that he has changed the meaning of the word ‘mode’, then this example of theft, which is made with the other mixed mode of beauty, could symbolize something much more important. Specifically, it could be reasonably argued that Locke sees himself as a thief, not of physical things, but of ideas. Here, it could be argued that Locke replaces the ownership of the idea of beauty. Not only does man, according to Locke, remain not only the owner of beauty, he is also the creator of a new mode of beauty, which attaches to the emotions; not to reason. Moreover, concealment of this possible theft by Locke, this change in possession, of beauty, from nature, to man, is extremely controversial. By concealing the change of ownership Locke also conceals the almost insurmountable difficulty that beauty poses for Locke, not to mention his axiomatic premise that nature provides virtually nothing of value. The need to deliberately suppress recognition of this difficulty, may partially explain why Locke is so dismissive of beauty, and all who supposedly perceive it, so easily, and so instantaneously. Locke liberates man form nature, in much the same way that Machiavelli had suggested some time earlier, as Mansfield explains,

Thus, the new prince has virtue that enables him to overcome his dependence on inheritance in the widest sense, including custom, nature, and fortune, and that shows him how to arrange it that others depend on him and his virtue (Chapters 9, 24), (Machiavelli [1513] 1985, xvi; Roe 2002).

See also Machiavelli ([1517] 1996; Mansfield [1991] 1993, 2006, 2007). Shakespeare addresses, and questions, many of the issues considered by Machiavelli in a fictional format, from the perspective of older philosophy, such as Aristotle, especially on subjects like prudence in action (Shakespeare [1597] 2000, [1603] 2002, [1606] 2005; Strier 2004).

31 Visual sensation can be perception of hue, and of tone, as well as arrangements thereof, among other things. Visual sensations are mainly derived from nature, but can also be produced by man, in the form of art, or other fabrications, and these sensations are representations, made by men, about what is the ‘good’ is. A concentration on the visual expression of beauty is contained herein, which is not a denial of other important forms of beauty. Rather, the use of visual beauty is, at all times metaphorical; it is about the idea of beauty, not the visual representation of beauty.

32 However, Locke steals that experience away from modern man by blocking that engagement, even though one must not become too enamoured by beauty as one needs to overcome the charm of beauty to concentrate on, ‘… the often ugly detail’ which is the work of the philosopher in Plato’s Socrates The Republic (Bloom ([1968] 1991, p. xx). Alluring as it is, beauty remains an inexact field of human endeavour, much like prudence, which has aspirations to attain exact knowledge of the good. Beauty is concerned with the interaction between men, and between man and nature, hence beauty comes under the second classification of knowledge made by Aristotle, yet insights gained in the field of practice, give one insights to the eternal subject-matter of what is good; the first classification of knowledge. Making things, or the third classification of knowledge for Aristotle, involves a faculty of assessing a made object, in a practical sense, against the eternal theoretical benchmark of knowledge of the good (Marshall 1953, 228). Man is both good and beautiful, and the beautiful leads man towards an appreciation of what is good (Mirus 2012). It does not ‘engineer’ knowledge of the good and man must be careful in the use of the beautiful.

33 While ‘kalon’ takes assumes a prominent in Aristotle, and while there are several translations of the word in English, there remains a dispute about what the specific applications of the idea within Aristotle, and the authors have no specific guidance here, except to say that the theoretical ideas of the good, and the practical apparition of the beautiful are linked; the practical informs the theoretical (Donohue 2016, p. 26).

34 See also Gay (1988); Gosepath (2011); Dziob 1993; Faure 2013; Fortin 1996; Koziak 1999; Lukes 2011; Minowitz (1993); Olters 2012; Sophocles [441 b.c.] 1994; Strauss [1936] 1963, 1952, 1953, 1958, [1959a] 1988, [1959b] 1989, 1964, 1970, Xenophon 1994).

35 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle provides an illustration of phronesis, known in ancient Greek as ϕρονησιϛ (Aristotle 1893). Phronesis is usually translated as the term ‘prudence’, although the work of Locke, and others, has guaranteed that there is currently scant reason to use the word. As a result, the word has now, as an inevitable result of the work of modern philosophers, such as Locke, necessarily fallen out of popular, or common, usage. If those who frame all debate, such as Locke, deliberately seek to exclude prudence, then it should come as no shock that the word has little meaning of even vague relevance to the men and women of today.

36 As Bloom observes,

If the perfection of the city cannot comprehend the perfection of the soul, the city will look ugly in comparison to the soul's beauty and be a proper subject of comedy; its pretensions will be ludicrous. Such a comedy will be a divine comedy, one calling for a more divine laughter. Only philosophy could produce it, for, as Socrates will explain, only philosophy has the true standard of beauty (Bloom, [1968] 1991, p. 381).

37 Marshall ([1890] 1961, [1919] 1920).

38 As Bloom observes,

Socrates, however, takes it as proven that the city, which cannot philosophize, will accept philosophy, and he now turns to the problem of training the philosophers. But this means that he must treat of philosophy itself and no longer of philosophy as it affects the city. As a result, a whole new world of incredible beauty emerges; Glaucon and Adeimantus are shown an unexpected realm, from the standpoint of which everything looks different. If the Republic can be understood as a gradual ascent, we have reached the peak. Now everything must be accomplished by means of images, for Socrates' students have no personal experience of philosophy, but they must respect it in order to have the proper perspective on the whole political question (Bloom, [1968] 1991, p. 401).

39 Murray (2004), Marks 2002, Rousseau ([1754] 1913, [1762a] 1968, [1762b] 1991), [1770] 1964; Bloom ([1963] 1987); Marks (2002). At this intersection point, of natural talent and natural beauty, the influence of man and his labour has very little impact. Indeed, man has no impact, and one might be so bold as to say that nature directly connects with itself. All the labour, and all the man-made effort in the entire world, can be argued to have virtually no influence on the act of appreciation of beauty by those with the natural capability for appreciating it; the few. It is the few, without effort, without training, without incentive to acquire valuable property, who perceive the beauty provided by nature, who can escape the corruptive influence of man so as to consider what is good, as well as the modern philosophy of those such as Locke. In a similar way, those who have the natural capability for philosophy, can, without effort, connect with nature and interpret the problems of philosophy. By considering with the problems of philosophy, as presented by nature, the few can also connect with nature, without the intersection of man and modern philosophy. Some of these types of issues, as discussed by modern philosophy, are now regarded as largely impossible ideas (Sartre 1956, Schopenhauer [1819] 1969, [1844] 1969).

40 Although the authors are aware of the problems with Pragmatic philosophy, who comprise some of the most extreme developers of Locke, emphasize the role of intention in terms of classifying types, or ‘qualities’ of knowledge (Dewey [1882-1888] 1967, 1891, [1895-1898a] 1967, [1895-1898b] 1967, [1903-1906] 1976, 1929; James, [1890] 1981, 1897, 1909; Peirce 1868a, 1868b, 1958). See also, Nietzsche (Nietzsche [1884] 1956, 290; Dannhauser [1963] 1987).

41 Here, in the tonal landscape of Locke, the desperately untalented are asserted to huddle together in a group, because the group better facilitates the acquisition of, and preservation of, value, when compared to the acquisition of such property in the state of nature, where groups are not apparent and where the law, as developed by man, does not guarantee title to property. As Hutcheson indicates,

But as to the universal Agreement of Mankind in their Sense of Beauty from Uniformity amidst Variety, we must consult Experience: and as we allow all Men Reason, since all Men are capable of understanding simple Arguments, tho few are capable of complex Demonstrations; so in this Case it must be sufficient to prove this Sense of Beauty universal, “if all Men are better pleas’d with Uniformity in the simpler Instances than the contrary, even when there is no Advantage observ’d attending it; and likewise if all Men, according as their Capacity enlarges, so as to receive and compare more complex Ideas, … Delight in Uniformity, and are pleas’d with its more complex Kinds, both Original and Relative (Hutcheson ([1726] 2013), Treatise 1, sec. 6, 16-18, p.66; Carey 2006; Korsmeyer, 1975; Kivy 1992).

For someone applying the philosophy of Locke to the subject of beauty, Hutcheson has little option but to take this line of argument, because Locke argues that man must be qualitatively uniform. However, if beauty is something valuable and independent of man, then the problem for Locke, and for modern philosophy, becomes that man then begins to depend on nature, for something of value. By recognizing beauty in nature, as a significant source of value to man, man becomes the prisoner of nature, as opposed to the master. If one accepts this position of pre-modern political philosophy, then beauty, and the differentiated appreciation of it, by man, functions, among other things, as a way to forge a bridge, between man and nature; not just to point him to the place from where he emerges from, but to guide him to the place where he might aspire to go (Korsmeyer 1975; Nash, Nash, and Rybak 2018).

42 (Lukes 2011, p. 2; Carey 2006, p.102; Locke 1978, vol. 3, p. 667).

43 If the older philosophical account of talent is that the many, the ‘demos’, show no courtesy to the gifted, then ancient philosophy gives no courtesy. As the saying goes, ‘no courtesy shown; none given’. Modern philosophy effectively avoids the question of befriending, or not, the ungifted, as no one is provided naturally distinct capabilities, according to Locke. Rather, modern philosophy befriends effort, or labour, as opposed to natural gifts.