A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas

ABSTRACT

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research.

KEYWORDS:

• Motivation
• punishment
• public goods game
• social dilemma

Notes

¹ We also note that in the field of negative sanctions another game-theoretical paradigm is often used to assess costly punishment: The ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). This game consists of two players, one who proposes a way to divide a specific amount of money between the two players, and a second player who decides whether or not to accept this proposal. If the proposal is accepted, both players earn the money in accordance with the proposal. If the proposal is rejected, both players earn nothing. Such a rejection is often considered to reflect costly punishment because the (potential) income of the first player is reduced by the rejection, and the second player has to bear opportunity costs (Henrich et al., 2006; Marlowe et al., 2008). Because behaviour in an ultimatum game is qualitatively different from behaviour in a public goods game, we focus our review on punishment that occurs in the public goods game.