A Cybernetic Theory of Psychopathology

Abstract

Cybernetics, the study of principles governing goal-directed, self-regulating systems, offers a useful approach to understanding psychopathology or psychological dysfunction, overcoming limitations of other naturalistic approaches. Whereas influential theories of psychopathology have relied on definitions of dysfunction rooted in evolution and fitness, we define psychopathology in terms of cybernetic dysfunction, failure to make progress toward important goals. Cybernetic function in organisms is not identical to evolutionary function, despite their causal phylogenetic relationship. We define psychopathology as persistent failure to move toward one’s goals, due to failure to generate effective new goals, interpretations, or strategies when existing ones prove unsuccessful. This definition allows a thorough integration of dimensional approaches to psychopathology and personality and provides a new perspective on the nosology of mental disorder. We review evidence that the major dimensions of psychopathology correspond to major trait dimensions of personality, but we assert that extremity on these dimensions is neither necessary nor sufficient for psychopathology, which requires cybernetic dysfunction. Drawing from psychological and neurobiological research on personality and psychopathology, we present a theory of the mechanisms underlying the five major dimensions of psychopathology, some of their subdimensions, and the general risk factor for psychopathology. We conclude by discussing implications of our theory for research, diagnosis, and mental health interventions.

KEYWORDS:

• Characteristic adaptations
• cybernetics
• goals
• mental disorder
• psychopathology
• personality
• traits

Notes

1 Feedforward regulation, in which the system uses information regarding the current state of the world to predict a likely future state and guides action according to that prediction, is also common in complex cybernetic systems, including many organisms (Bechhoefer, 2005). It is certainly involved in most human behavior, in conjunction with feedback processes (Del Giudice, 2015). However, feedforward is not part of the minimal necessary definition of a cybernetic system, whereas feedback is.

2 Another relevant critique is that reliance on evolutionary function to define psychopathology has the consequence that the validity of any mental disorder will depend on a theoretical claim that is extremely difficult to prove, namely, the reasons for the evolution of whatever psychological features of the organism are relevant to the disorder (Bolton, 2008). Our theory of psychopathology as cybernetic dysfunction circumvents this problem because identifying disruption of an individual’s goal pursuit is considerably more tractable than determining evolutionary forces.

3 Goals for which the system acts to move away from the value or out of the range of values are avoidance goals. An important asymmetry exists between approach and avoidance goals because, except in moments of sheer panic, avoidance goals are unlikely to govern behavior without a simultaneously operative approach goal. This is because wanting not to do something or to avoid something does not specify what to do or where to go instead (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Mansell, 2005). Formally, activation of approach goals tends to reduce the entropy of the cybernetic system, whereas activation of avoidance goals tends to increase it.

4 Boorse’s account suffers not only from the confusion of evolutionary and cybernetic function but also from an unacknowledged appeal to value. Boorse described his account as value-free, yet his primary criterion for disorder is deviation from statistical normality. Even ignoring the difficulty of establishing a population norm (Boorse acknowledged that different norms are necessary at different ages and for different sexes), this account cannot be value free because of the fact that individual variation is the norm. Indeed, evolution cannot occur without variation in characteristics that have consequences for fitness. This means that one cannot identify disorder with any deviation from the norm (even if, like Boorse, one limits the criterion to deviation in the direction of reduced function) because every individual will vary from the norm in vastly many ways. Thus, Boorse’s account requires identifying how much distance from the norm in any given variable is required for identifying disorder, and he himself acknowledged that this distance is arbitrary. Any such arbitrary decision entails a socioculturally negotiated value judgment. Hence, Boorse’s account is value-laden and, thus, hybrid (cf. Bolton, 2008).

5 Note that the invocation of “disorder” suggests that “mental disorder” could reasonably be interpreted abstractly in terms of entropy. For the purposes of the present discussion, however, we choose to retain the more typical meaning of “mental disorder” as an official diagnostic entity.

6 Although the serotonergic system is the most common target of pharmacological treatments for anxiety and depression, which are the major components of Withdrawal, we note that its causal action in treatment is poorly understood, so much so that debate remains regarding whether serotonergic function is typically reduced or elevated in most cases of depression (Andrews, Bharwani, Lee, Fox, & Thomson, 2015). Acute serotonin administration often increases anxiety in animal models, and one study found that a week-long course of a serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) increased, rather than decreased, neural reactivity to emotionally negative stimuli in people high in Neuroticism (Di Simplicio, Norbury, Reinecke, & Harmer, 2014).