Empire Stories: Imperious Objects and the Necessity of Fools

Abstract

In this article, I examine and depict the attributes of empire narratives and discourse, arguing that these dominant narratives quietly shape and represent shared motivations of U.S. citizens in their active or tacit support of national hegemonic policies. Using an amended version of Winnicott's notion of transitional objects, I describe how these narratives may be understood as imperious objects. The psychological defenses of weak dissociation, rationalization, and denial are used to explain, in part, why many U.S. citizens overlook perspectives and questions that would challenge empire stories and ignore the destructive consequences of deeply and long held expansionist policies and actions. In addition, the psychosocial functions of the role of the fool, in conjunction with psychological defenses, help explain the public perpetuation of expansionist policies.

Notes

¹Dominant narrative refers to those stories that are tacitly shared by most members of a group. In being dominant they shape the discourse and crowd out or marginalize stories and ideas that threaten to contradict the values, claims, and motivations associated with the dominant narratives. In this paper, I make the claim that popular ideas are embedded in stories. So, an idea like Manifest Destiny and corresponding discourse are part of the story or stories citizens told and tell about the U.S.

²A. Samuels (1993, 2004), Sloan (1996), Walls (2004), and Botticelli (2004) have argued that there is a relation between the individual psyche and the political realm and that this is worthy of analytic attention. They noted further that there is a correlation between the larger social-cultural systems and stories and a person's individual identity, stories, motivations, and behaviors. Sloan argued that overemphasis on the individual's neurosis and its source in childhood is naïve, because it diverts attention from societal sources of the patient's suffering. Cushman (1995) echoed this, stating that therapists need to “entertain the realistic possibility that political structures can be the causes of personal, psychological distress” (p. 337).

³There are a few possible reasons for this absence. It may be that the confrontation of the “other,” either in terms of the patient's different experiences relating to gender or race, heightens the possibility of recognizing how sexist and racist systemic ideologies infect transference and countertransference dynamics. It is difficult, I hope, for a white middle-class male analyst to ignore the obvious differences in experiences and perspectives of a working-class African American female patient. Thus one explanation for the absence may be that most U.S. analysts have few patients who come from countries that that have suffered from U.S. expansionist actions and, therefore, analysts are not confronted with experiences and perspectives that might challenge their own unstated or unconscious expectations and beliefs. In short, without confrontation, the question about the relation between couch and culture does not arise. A second reason for the silence is that both analyst and patient are immersed in the same dominant stories. If most U.S. analysts work with U.S. citizens, it would be difficult to be aware of how unspoken shared stories and beliefs are present and shaping the interaction. In other words, each might be unconsciously colluding in maintaining the dominant narratives of the group. A third reason may be how one this issue comes up for discussion with a patient. How, in other words, would this issue be of any help to the patient? There are, no doubt, other reasons for the poverty of analytic attention, but my hope is to initiate conversations about the U.S. Empire.

⁴What do we mean by empire? One definition, which hearkens back to imperialistic powers of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, refers to empire as “the formal political control of one state over another's external and internal policy” (Lundestad, 1990, p. 37). This perspective did not fit well with the current expressions of U.S. power and control. Given Western political and economic changes of the 20th century, it seemed that a broader definition was needed to replace the earlier conventional view of imperialistic states. Lundestad, for example, argued that an empire is “a hierarchical system of political relationships with one power clearly being much stronger than any other” (p. 37). As Lundestad and others (Bacevich, 2002, 2003, 2005; Chomsky, 2004, 2005; Johnson, 1999) have pointed out, unparalleled American economic and military powers have been used to coerce many sovereign countries to alter their foreign and domestic policies, even though the U.S. did not occupy these countries. In addition, Johnson (2004) pointed to the fact that there are approximately 725 known American military bases in more than 38 foreign countries and more than 254,000 military personnel in 153 countries (p. 154). The U.S. is not an occupying force in these countries, save two. Rhodes (2005) made a similar point, writing, “The new world order is possible because America's global military power allows it to dictate the rules of international discourse and the means by which political actors can adjudicate their differences” (p. 230). In brief, the use of “proconsuls” (Bacevich, 2005; Johnson, 2004) and economic power (see Young, 2005, p. 40) to alter the policies and actions of foreign countries are signifiers of the presence of an American Empire. Thus, the definition of empire is a country that uses economic, military, and political power to dominate the rules of international discourse and to influence—directly and indirectly—the domestic policies of foreign nations to maintain and further its economic and political hegemony.

⁵The beliefs and values associated with the U.S.'s special role in history are not simply linked to narratives or speeches. Civil rituals (e.g., press conferences, inaugurals, congressional sessions, Fourth of July), cultural rites (e.g., sports events), and social entertainment (e.g., movies) are other means by which values and beliefs associated with American expansionism are internalized and maintained.

⁶Interestingly, those who dissent are often labeled as isolationists.

⁷There are examples of groups that do mourn cherished STOs (Lear, 2005), but these are usually groups that are defeated and undergoing assimilation. Nevertheless, people within the group will seek to maintain those objects they believe that they could not exist without them.

⁸There are other analysts who have sought to understand, analytically, fools. Alexander and Isaacs (1968) rejected Bonhoeffer's view of the sociological aspects of the fool and address the psychological dynamics and etiology of the fool. While I agree with their view that the actions of fools are “usually under the guise of decent or even lofty ideals” (p. 419), I disagree with the notion that fools are secretly guilty about their hostility and “will waver and be undecided on important issues such as the grave crises of politics and war” (p. 421). The absence of guilt in the current Bush administration's prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan does not mean that government leaders or those who support them are secretly guilty. Moreover, there is little wavering and indecision. Finally, the link between sadomasochism and fools, while appropriate in some settings, appears too reductionistic when applied to all those in the administration and the significant number of their supporters. Finally, Bollas (1995) addressed folly, though in relation to the role and function of the comic or court jester. Bollas's (1992) discussion of the fascist state of mind, though, is closer to my rendering of the imperious object and the role of the fool.