The Immutable Likeness of “Being”: Experiencing the Self as Timeless

Abstract

Three studies explored the structure and correlates of the Immutable Self (IS) scale, intended to measure individual differences in the propensity for experiences typified by a sense that the conscious self is timeless, predating conception and surviving death, and therefore not contingent upon being incarnate. IS was linked to aversion to the spatial and temporal limitations of physical existence, a propensity for self-transcendence, and interest in activities framed as facilitating the latter. Higher versus lower IS scorers perceived death to be mysterious but rejected the idea that it heralds complete annihilation of the self. Higher IS was linked to a greater willingness to self-identify with a religious group and to embrace a spiritual/religious motivation to transcend boundaries (immanence orientation). When the salience of the body was increased via incidental mirror exposure, higher IS scores predicted less condemnation of an individual who made a decision that shortened his life. A propensity for IS experiences may therefore have a profound impact on how people deal with the limitations inherent in physical existence.

Notes

*p < .05.

**p < .01.

***p < .001.

*p < .05.

**p < .01.

***p < .001.

*p < .05.

**p < .01.

***p < .001.

¹Two unpublished data sets are relevant to this point. First, 39 undergraduates (28 women) completed the standard IS scale (M = 3.27, SD = 1.30, α = .86). They were also presented with three statements (“Even before I was physically conceived, I existed”; “I have always, and will always, exist as a conscious being”; and “Death simply cannot be the end of my conscious existence”) and rated each (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) using two different response prompts (“I have felt this way sometimes, but I don't necessarily believe this to be true”: M = 3.34, SD = 1.37, α = .68; and “I have felt this way sometimes, and I believe this to be true”: M = 3.13, SD = 1.57, α = .82). Suggesting that IS experiences may be construed as providing subjective “evidence” for metaphysical beliefs concerning the immutability of the self, the standard IS scale was not significantly correlated with the former, r(37) = .25, p = .13, but was significantly and rather strongly correlated with the latter, r(37) = .73,p < .001.

In a separate sample, 140 undergraduates (101 women) completed the same “just an experience” (M = 3.19, SD = 1.56, α = .72) and “evidential validity” (M = 3.21, SD = 1.66, α = .80) measures, as well as Hood's (1975) 32-item Mysticism scale (e.g., “I have had an experience in which all things seemed to be unified into a single whole”; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; M = 4.20, SD = 1.00, α = .91). The Mysticism scale was not significantly correlated with the “just an experience” measure, r(138) = .02, p = .79, but was significantly positively correlated with the “evidential validity” measure, r(138) = .34,p < .001. These results suggest that IS experiences that are deemed to have evidential validity with respect to metaphysical understandings of the self are linked to the broader superset of unitive (mystical) experiences, but the moderate nature of this relationship clearly suggests that the constructs are not redundant.

²Because incidental exposure to one's mirror image has been linked to intensified feelings of inadequacy and self-consciousness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1978), one may question whether it is the increased salience of the incarnate state or a sense of inadequacy that is responsible for the effect observed in Study 3. In an unpublished study, 40 University of Dundee undergraduates completed the IS scale several days in advance of a lab session wherein they were randomly assigned to spend 5 min focusing on either their mirror image or a blank wall. They were subsequently asked to list the thoughts that occurred to them during the gazing task. Blind to IS scores, we coded each thought in terms of whether it (a) made reference to physical appearance and/or physical sensations (e.g., tired, thirsty, eyes watering) or (b) implied a negative self-evaluation (e.g., “my skin looked bad”; “maybe I'm not the person I should be”). These two categories co-occurred in the mirror condition, r(18) = .73,p < .001, but not in the no-mirror condition, r(18) = −.06, p = .79.

As expected, participants in the mirror condition listed significantly more body-related thoughts (M = 3.55, SD = 2.67) compared to those in the no-mirror condition (M = .70, SD = .92), t(38) = 4.52,p < .001. Likewise, mirror participants reported more negative self-evaluations (M = 2.30, SD = 2.23) than did no-mirror participants (M = .25, SD = .44), t(38) = 4.04,p < .001. It is important to note that mirror exposure produced significantly more body-related thoughts than negative self-evaluations, t(19) = 3.05, p = .007, however; moreover, the effect of the mirror manipulation on body-related thoughts remained at the threshold of significance (p = .05) when controlling for negative self-evaluations, but its effect on negative self-evaluations became nonsignificant (p = .30) when controlling for body-related thoughts. Finally, intriguingly, higher pretest IS scores predicted significantly fewer body-related thoughts in the mirror condition, r(18) = −.45,p < .05, but not in the no-mirror condition, r(18) = .00, p = .99; the corresponding IS/negative self-evaluation correlations were −.32 (p = .17) and .00 (p = .99), respectively.

Of course, the “mega-dose” of mirror exposure in that study differs from Study 3's incidental mirror presentation. Nevertheless, it does suggest that mirror exposure may make physicality per se more salient than inadequacy. Moreover, it once again demonstrates the apparent tension between IS experiences and awareness/acknowledgment of the incarnate state—which is a recurring theme in the present research.