U.S. Military Perceptions of Victories in Iraq, the “Long War” Against Terrorism, and the Enduring Rhetorical Power of the 2006 Counterinsurgency Manual

Abstract

This essay undertakes a rhetorical analysis of the 2006 U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual. The COIN manual, which was produced by a team of military experts and scholars led by General David Petraeus and General James Amos, reflects a significant departure from conventional warfighting doctrines. Shifting away from doctrines grounded in aggressive, preemptive, and overwhelming military force, the COIN doctrine focuses on counterinsurgency principles and on “winning the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi population. The essay concludes with a discussion of how the COIN doctrine will influence the way we think about decade-long irregular wars.

Keywords:

• COIN Manual
• Counterinsurgency
• General David Petraeus
• Hearts and Minds
• Iraq War

I would like to thank both Professor Ott and the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Robert Goldberg of the University of Utah's Tanner Humanities Center for allowing me to present a work-in-progress talk that helped me reflect on a few of these arguments. I have also profited immensely from many general conversations that I have had with colleague Sean Lawson.

Notes

The Green Zone is now called the International Zone and it can be found in the central portion of Baghdad.

With perhaps some hyperbole, Myerson (2009) has called this a manual for the “cradle of civilization.” For an excellent overview of some of the military risks that attend the adoption of the manual, see Kahl (2007).

Another key author who needs to be acknowledged was Marine General James Mattis, who was replaced by General Amos.

Even though the authors of this 2006 COIN manual do not use consecutive pagination in their number of the pages of this text, they do use their own system that I have chosen to follow so that readers can easily find the quotations or passages that I cite. The first number that I use refers to the section number, and there are eight major sections (not including appendices) in the COIN manual. The second number refers to the page within that section.

The authors define an insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (Section I, p. 1). For more on the role that COIN plays in these types of conflicts, see Cassidy (2008).

There are several portions of the manual that apparently preserve many of the traditional baseline rules of engagement. Note, for example, this summary of one of the key principles of ethical warfare:

• Limiting the misery caused by war requires combatants to consider certain rules, principles, and consequences that restrain the amount of force they may apply. At the same time, combatants are not required to take so much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives. As long as their use of force is proportional to the gain to be achieved and discriminates in distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, Soldiers and Marines may take actions where they knowingly risk, but do not intend, harm to non-combatants. (Section 7, p. 5)

All of Chapter 7 of the COIN manual is devoted to a discussion of the ethical character of successful leaders during insurgencies. This particular portion of the text provides rules of engagement guidelines and other principles for both generals and their subalterns.

The authors of the COIN manual contend that there are simply times when the Coalition forces have to “eliminate the extremists without alienating the population” (pp. 1–15).

The crafters of this manual contend that T. E. Lawrence and the Arab forces waged a successful counterinsurgency campaign that involved the usage of guerrilla tactics as they overcame the Ottoman Turks (pp. 1–3).

Commentators who write about the COIN manual, Petraeus, or the “surge” have not always been that charitable when they have written about the members of the Iraqi central government. Dehghanpisheh and Thomas (2008), for example, contend that one of the reasons that Americans need “this new way of war” and tens of thousands of new warriors stems from the fact that they have to take the place of “ineffective” Iraqi officials. These journalists go on to explain that the new insurgency fighters have to act as mayors, mediators, police officers, and even civil engineers. For related critiques of the generals who were in charge at this time, see Baum (2005).

As one of the reviewers for this manuscript pointed out, the COIN manual's position on negotiating with terrorists or other enemies was not that much of a radical departure from some of the histories that swirl around U.S. foreign policy decision-making. This reviewer noted, for example, President Reagan's negotiations to obtain the release of hostages in Iraq or the negotiations in North Korea for the Pueblo captives. However, I would respond in two ways. First, these are pre-9/11 examples of negotiations that took place before the vilification of extremist Jihadist enemies. Second, when the authors of the COIN manual are writing about the social agents and counterinsurgency negotiation, they are focusing primary attention on the mundane day-to-day negotiations that take place between Coalition soldiers and local tribal leaders in Iraq or Afghanistan. This empowers military subalterns but disempowers the diplomats.

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Notes on contributors

Marouf Hasian

Marouf Hasian is a Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah.