Memories of Movement in a Postfeminist Context: Conservative Fusion in the Rhetoric of Tammy Bruce and “Dr. Laura” Schlessinger

Abstract

Feminist rhetorical critics have located the right's efforts to attract female voters through the allure of “conservative feminism.” Missing from this discussion, however, is a richer understanding of the ideologies from which “conservative feminism” emerges. We reveal a key rhetorical strategy for the right: memories of feminism. Fragments from two prominent conservative women—Tammy Bruce and “Dr. Laura” Schlessinger—reveal how meanings about social movement are always subject to change via social struggle. We consider the implications of Schlessinger's and Bruce's memories of liberal feminism as a radical movement, and their fostering of identification through subjects reminiscent of classical liberalism.

Keywords:

• Collective Memory
• Conservatism
• Feminism
• Identification
• Social Movement

Notes

In the 2010 midterm election, a number of Democrats described a “war on women,” referencing the GOP agenda which they argued included policies that would restrict reproductive rights and equal pay initiatives.

Rosen apologized publicly, and attempted to steer the conversation back to “substance”—namely, “Romney's ability to relate to financial struggles of women who have little choice but to work full time while they raise children” (Shear, 2012, p. 7). Romney's performance in the second presidential debate months later would reveal for many his “true” perspective on women as he recalled “women's groups” returning “binders full of women” following his efforts to recruit qualified females for his cabinet as Massachusetts governor (Basset & Cherkis, 2012, p. 2).

Conservative groups (the Independent Women's Forum and Conservative Political Action Conference) hosted prominent panel discussions concerning ways to integrate women (as a voting demographic, if not as activists) in conservatism (see Levy, 2013).

McGee (1980) believed that the history of philosophy demonstrated that “movements” were ascriptions of meaning designed to “organize curious behaviors into a scenario which could be used politically both to oppose and to tolerate the activity of fringe social groups” (p. 238). McGee was most critical of a positivist treatment of movements, which reduced the “rhetoric of social movements” to being “passive, reactive, a facilitator of change, subordinate to and determined by an objective phenomenon” (p. 242). Methodologically, the main consequences of McGee's position in studying social movement rhetoric have been to forego “a focus on large collectivities in favor of specific texts, performative acts, or discursive interventions”; and to widen the possible “audience(s) and/or objectives of oppositional rhetorics, recognizing the multiple intentions or constitutive forces at work” (Cox & Foust, 2008, p. 620). The latter include traditional movement goals (such as redistribution of resources and expansion of state-sanctioned rights) and outcomes affiliated with new social movements (e.g., the disruption of authority or articulation of new identities).

Relatedly, Watts (2001) argues that Reaganite conservatives spread power throughout the 1980s–2000s, in large part by remembering 1960s activism as a naïve playground of freedom, which nonetheless inspired postindustrial capitalism. Likewise, Dyson (2001) argues that conservative framing of Martin Luther King Jr.'s legacy—a “color-blind,” egalitarian society—bolsters rightist efforts to dismantle affirmative action and other social programs that civil rights leaders would have arguably supported. Finally, Dow (2003) suggests that rhetorical action intrinsic to the documentary “Women's Liberation” fixes—that is to say, “stabiliz[es] and repair[s]” (p. 54)—meanings of second wave feminism, in part by comparing second wave feminism to a palatable, liberal memory of the civil rights movement.

Strengthening their ethos as authentic feminists, both Schlessinger and Bruce share personal testimonies of being lured by radical feminism. As Schlessinger (2009) writes: “In the 1960s, I was seduced by the feminist anger that proclaimed that husbands and kids were in the way of getting power and respect” (p. 4). Likewise, Bruce's “years as a feminist activist taught [her] many things, including the fact that the essential ingredients of social change—freedom of expression and personal liberty—have suffered extraordinary damage in the name of ‘social equality,’ ‘feminism,’ and ‘civil rights’” (2003, pp. xiii–xiv). Their unique vantage point as self-identified conservatives who “lived through” the radical takeover of feminism strengthens their credibility. Further, they adopt a feminine style by supporting their claims via experiential knowledge (Blankenship & Robson, 1995; Dow & Tonn, 1993) when speaking on feminism's transition from authenticity to radicalism.

What many scholars identify as radical feminism grew out of the struggle for civil rights, and the social outrage over the Vietnam War. Finding little reprieve from patriarchal oppression in social activist groups, radical feminists splintered and sought reform at all levels. Radical feminists argued that the oppression of women was the foundation for all forms of oppression. Their tactics were revolutionary in that they refused to accept traditional forms of communication. Instead, radical feminists developed what has come to be known as “consciousness-raising,” forming leaderless groups with no set agendas and engaging in theatrical public displays (Campbell, 1973; O'Kelly, 1985; Sowards & Renegar, 2006).

The two variants of conservative ideology thus nuance recent treatments of “socially conservative feminism” (McCarver, 2012) à la Palin, which would resemble more the libertarian thread promoted by Bruce than Schlessinger's New True Woman.

Lucas (1980) originally criticized McGee (1980) for establishing a false dichotomy between movements as meaning and phenomenon. As Lucas argued, movements “exist in the phenomenal world, but they are phenomena about which we form perceptions, interpretations, and judgments. They are in this respect no different from most other phenomena” (p. 258). Unfortunately, though, Lucas's rebuttal of McGee rests upon affirming that movements are phenomena that preexist rhetoric. He concludes that scholars should devote themselves to classifying rhetoric based upon different types of movements and countermovements. In contrast, we believe that McGee's alternative, as polemical as it was, sought to advance rhetoric while placing the “social movement” figure in the background. In other words, though his essay's title made clean distinctions between “objective” movements in the world and the discourse of or about them, the spirit of his argument did not.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christina R. Foust

Christina R. Foust is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Denver.

Jenni Marie Simon

Jenni Marie Simon is a Lecturer in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro.