Islamism in Azerbaijan: How Potent?

Abstract

Azerbaijan is deemed to be the most secular of all post-Soviet Muslim counties. Nevertheless, growing independent Islamic activism, inspired by the international Islamic discourse and helped by foreign Islamic actors, and combined with a repressive regime response to this activity carried out under the banner of antiterrorism may contribute to make Islamism a potent factor in Azerbaijan. This article maps out independent Shi’a and Sunni activism and regime response in Azerbaijan. By assessing the dynamics between these two factors the article draws conclusions on the potential for politicization and radicalization of Islam in Azerbaijan.

Notes

1. For a discussion on the definition of the terms see Martin Kramer, “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2003).

2. Azerbaijan was among the first countries to offer the United States unconditional support in the war against terrorism, providing its airspace and the use of its airports for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Azerbaijani troops are serving under the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul and Azerbaijan was the first Muslim country to send its troops to serve in Iraq (for more on Azerbaijan as a staunch ally in the Global War on Terrorism see the website of the Embassy of Azerbaijan at http://www.azembassy.com/new/pages.php?name = az_us_relations

3. This argument has been expanded on by the author in the analysis Russia's new assertive foreign policy. See Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, “Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS,” European Security 14(3), pp. 387–417.

4. For a discussion of the Azerbaijani regime see Farid Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization,” Democratizatsiya (Summer 2005).

5. Edward W. Walker, “Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs 56 (2) (2003).

6. Walker takes as his point of departure the argument that it is difficult to distinguish between different kinds of conflicts (e.g., ethnic, religious, clan), because structural factors like modernization, poverty, or inequality typically adduced as causes of ethnic conflict appear equally applicable to other forms of political violence. He suggests that, when trying to explain why certain forms of collective violence are prevalent at particular moments in history, one should consider ideational dynamics. Thus, the appeal of Islamism is seen as having little to do with structurally rooted grievances or relational factors. What appears to be more important is Islamism's competitive success in the marketplace of ideas. Islamism has not yet had the opportunity to discredit itself in practice. (Edward W. Walker, “Ethnic War, Holy War, War O’War: Does the Adjective Matter in Explaining Collective Political Violence,” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series (Spring 2006)).

7. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was dissolved in 1920 when Soviet Russia invaded.

8. Heidar Aliev served as president from June 1993 until October 2003, when his son Ilham Aliev succeeded him. Ilham Aliev is Azerbaijan's president today.

9. Arif S. Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan (Baku: Zaman 2004), p. 195.

10. Bayram Balci, “Betweeen Sunnism and Shiism: Islam in the Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” Central Asian Survey 23(2) (June 2004), pp. 205–217; Raoul Motika, “Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 115 (July–September 2001), p. 114.

11. See reports from various regions in The Far Centre, “The Final Report on the Programme ‘State of Religion, Religion and State in Azerbaijan after September 11’” (Baku: Far Centre, 25 May 2005).

12. In conformity with the regulations of the SCRA the state committee is responsible for creating the conditions for freedom of religion; ensuring control over the implementation of legislation in this sphere; deciding on the registration of religious structures; and organizing pilgrimages to foreign countries. The committee also controls the publication of religious literature, carries out inspections of religious facilities, and has the right to petition for the suspension of the activities of religious structures in court should there be any violation of legislation, promotion of religious dissent, or religious and political sabotage running counter to national security.

13. Anar Valiyev and Yusuf Valiyev, “Islam in Azerbaijan,” Caspian Brief, 30 April 2003.

14. Forum 18, “Religious Freedom Survey September 2008.” Available at http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1192 and Felix Corley, “If Communities Don't Complain They will be Suppressed even More,” Forum 18 News Service, 3 November 2005.

15. See reported problems on assembling discussion groups on religious freedom in the regions of Azerbaijan (The Far Centre, “The Final Report…,”).

16. Azeri Turks of the Twelver Shiite branch. The Twelver Shiite branch recognizes 12 historical Imams including Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, and is the largest of three main subdivisions in Shi’a Islam. Twelver Shiism is the state religion of Iran.

17. Motika, “Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan.”

18. Balci, “Betweeen Sunnism and Shiism.”

19. Anar Valiyev, “Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan,” Problems of Post-Communism 53(3) (May/June 2006), pp. 17–35.

20. Clare Doyle, “Villagers Prepare for Fresh Confrontation,” Eurasianet.org, 30 July 2002.

21. The Far Centre, “The Final Report…”

22. Mina Muradova and Rufat Abbasov, “Protesting for the Prophet,” Eurasianet.org, 17 February 2006.

23. RFE/RL Newsline, 7 and 8 August 2006.

24. International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State” (Baku/Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG Europe Report No. 191, 25 March 2008, p. 15).

25. For more details on the Juma community see Sofie Bedford, “Muslimsk Activism I Azerbajdzjan,” Nordisk Østforum 3 (2007).

26. Quoted at www.kavkaz-uzel.ru 21 July 2005 (accessed 10 December 2006).

27. Felix Corley, “Juma Mosque Stolen by Police, Community Refused Access for Worship, and New Imam Imposed,” Forum 18 News Service, 2 July 2004; Felix Corley, “Twenty Seven Juma Mosque Members Detained, Many Fined, Four Beaten,” Forum 18 News Service, 7 July 2004.

28. Felix Corley, “As Arrests Continue, Muslims Fail to Regain Their Mosque,” Forum 18 News Service, 12 August 2004.

29. Muradova and Abbasov, “Protesting for the Prophet.”

30. Referred by the Information Agency Trend on 13 June 2007. Available at http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/en/print.pl?printid=941149 (accessed 27 June 2007).

31. Anar Valiyev, “Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9(4) (December 2005), p. 8.

32. From an interview with Rafiq Aliev (2002), ANS TV, 21 January and referred to in Svante E. Cornell, “The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan,” Silk Road Paper (October 2006), p. 44.

33. Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan, pp. 211–213.

34. Ibid., chapter 7.

35. The Far Centre, “The Final Report…,” pp. 42–43.

36. Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan, p. 225.

37. “Azerbaijan; Islamist Trial Sets Stage for Confrontation with Tehran,” RFE/RL Newsline, 9 October 2007 and “Azerbaijan is Expecting Explanations from Iran,” Day.az, 24 December 2007.

38. Ibid., chapter 7.

39. The Far Centre, “The Final Report…,” p. 33.

40. “Azerbaijan Bans ‘Illegal’ Broadcasts of Iranian TV Channel,” on Radio Netherlands Media Network Blog, 25 December 2003. Available at http://blogs.rnw.nl/medianetwork/?m=200312&paged=2 (accessed 28 June 2007).

41. In the Sabirabad region there are 59 working Mosques and in the Salyan region there are 54 (see The Far Centre, “The Final Report…,” p. 34).

42. Cornell, “The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan,” p. 46.

43. Salafism originates in Saudi Arabia and can be termed a fundamentalist version of Islam in the sense that it teaches a return to the fundamental values and rituals of Islam from the time of Muhammad. Salafism thus opposes many religious innovations, such as the veneration of saints. Within the Salafi movement some aim to change society by da’wa (preaching) whereas others aim to change society through violence. The word Wahhabism is often used interchangeably with Salafism, but has become a derogatory word and is rejected by the Salafis themselves.

44. Anar Valiyev, “The Rise of Salafi Islam in Azerbaijan,” Terrorism Monitor 3(13) (1 July 2005).

45. The Lezgins make up 2.2 percent of Azerbaijan's population.

46. “Wahhabis Based in Azerbaijan's Northern Districts,” Zerkalo, 4 January 2002.

47. The Far Centre, “The Final Report…,” p. 37.

48. The Avars make up 0.6 percent of Azerbaijan's population.

49. International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Lea” (Baku/Brussels: ICG Europe Report No. 156, 13 May 2004, p. 25).

50. Chairman of the Azerbaijani State Committee for Work with Religious Structures in interview with Azerbaijani Space TV on 16 November 2003.

51. Valiyev, “The Rise of Salafi Islam in Azerbaijan.”

52. The Far Centre, “The Final Report…,” p. 37.

53. International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf.”

54. Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,” Europe-Asia Studies 57(1) (January 2005), pp. 35–61.

55. “Vydvoreniye chechenskikh bezhentsev iz Azerbaidzhana,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 March 2005.

56. “Ne lishaite nam prava zhit,” Obshchaya Gazeta, 17–23 May 2001 and articles on Chechen refugees in Zerkalo, 4 May 2001 and Turan News Agency, 5 March 2006.

57. Valiyev, “The Rise of Salafi Islam in Azerbaijan.”

58. Referred to in “Wahhabis are Planning to Participate in Parliament Elections,” Zerkalo, 17 May 2005.

59. This is the figure given by Suleymanov himself; see “Popular Imam Rules Out Islamic Revolution in Azerbaijan,” Eurasia Insight, 26 July 2007.

60. In interview on ANS TV, 28 December 2004, referred to in “Secular Nationalism versus Political Islam in Azerbaijan,” Terrorism Monitor, 10 February 2005.

61. Felix Corley, “Family and Mosque Appeal for Imam's Freedom,” Forum 18 News Service, 25 October 2005; Felix Corley, “Mosque Unable to Invite Back Freed Imam,” Forum 18 News Service, 10 March 2006.

62. Felix Corley, “State Still Deprives Muslims of Mosque,” Forum 18 News Service, 17 October 2008.

63. Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan, chapter 7.

64. Figure from “V Azerbajdzhane poyavlyaiotsya shakhidki,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 April 2006.

65. International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State” (Baku/Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG Europe Report No. 191, 25 March 2008, p. 10).

66. Grant Ter-Abraamyan, “Islamistskii faktor v Azerbaidzhane,” 13 December 2004, posted at www.panarmenian.net (accessed 20 May 2007).

67. International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State,” p. 10.

68. Anar Valiyev, “Two Faces of Salafism in Azerbaijan,” Terrorism Focus, 5 December 2007.

69. Turan News Agency. Available at www.turaninfo.com, referred to in Valiyev, “The Rise of Salafi Islam in Azerbaijan.”

70. Turan News Agency, 10 January 2002.

71. Today. Az, 19 March 2005.

72. Turan News Agency, 18 April 2006.

73. Terrorism Focus 3(16), 25 April 2006, and “Al-Kaida dobralas do Baku,” NeGa, 24 April 2006.

74. “Vakhabity pod nadzorom,” Eurasianet, 19 July 2006.

75. Press release from the Ministry of National Security in Azerbaijan.

76. “Azerbaijan: Terror Attack Foiled in Baku,” Eurasia Insight, 29 October 2007 and Day.az 30 October 2007.

77. Rovshan Ismayilov “Azerbaijan: Evaluating the Radical Islamic threat” Eurasianet 30 November 2007.

78. International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State,” p. 4.

79. Quoted on Day.az, 29 October 2007.

80. R. Gabiboglu, “Reputatsiiu sheikha spasli talyshi i turki-meskhetintsy. Itogi sotsiologicheskovo opprosa,” Zerkalo, 12 July 2003.

81. The poll “Islam in Azerbaijan,” published 6 May 2006, was conducted by the Centre for Religious Research and was posted at www.islam.az (accessed 20 June 2007).

82. Poll referred in Ismailzad Fariz, “The Rise of Islam in Azerbaijan,” Energy Security, 28 March 2005.

83. The poll was conducted by the Centre for Social Research ADAM in spring 2006 and referred to in www.regnum.ru 14 June 2006 (accessed 20 June 2007).

84. The poll was conducted by the Centre for Social Research ADAM in spring 2006 and referred to in www.regnum.ru 14 June 2006.

85. For a discussion of the Azerbaijani regime see Guliyev, “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan.”

86. Ibrahimoglu was prohibited from running for parliament in the 2005 elections, as were members of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan and other candidates representing opposition parties, the pretext being that they were classified as “religious figures.” See “Religion Emerges as an Issue for some Parliamentary Candidates in Azerbaijan,” Euraisa Insight, 11 February 2005.

87. Anar Valiyev, ‘“Al-Qaeda in Azerbaijan,” Terrorism Monitor 4(10) (18 May 2006).

88. The poll was conducted by the Centre for Social Research ADAM in spring 2006 and referred to in www.regnum.ru 14 June 2006 (accessed 10 December 2006).