Public Perceptions of Traumatic Events and Policy Preferences during the George W. Bush Administration: A Portrait of America in Turbulent Times

Abstract

The American policy landscape during the George W. Bush administration was shaped by a series of traumatic events that confronted the nation and people of the United States. These included the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the threat of a flu pandemic in 2005 and 2006, the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, and the financial collapse of 2008. The results of the 2008 presidential election appear to be a rejection of the Bush administration's major policy responses to these events, but the variation in type and level of public support among different groups suggests a much more varied and dynamic portrait of America in turbulent times. Using a multiyear panel survey, an interdisciplinary team of political scientists and psychologists analyzed the behavior and political responses to the events by the American public. The findings suggest that even seven years after the events of 11 September 2001, people with higher levels of post-traumatic stress symptomatology related to 9/11 have significantly different interpretations of the threat of terrorism and the appropriate policy responses to it than do others. Perceptions of threat, the political salience of terrorism and other traumatic events, the level of support for political leaders and assessments of the government's actions vary over time and across different groups within society based on the psychological, political and social, and personal characteristics of the respondent. These results help to open the black box of aggregate public opinion by providing a detailed portrait of how psychological, social, political, and personal factors affected perceptions and political behavior during the George W. Bush administration.

Notes

1. See for example, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav, “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Anti-terrorism Policies,” American Political Science Review 49(3) (July 2005), pp. 610–625; Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1974); Alex Schmid, “Terrorism as Psychological Warfare,” Democracy and Security 1(2) (July 2005), pp. 137–146.

2. This project was funded by National Science Foundation Human and Social Dynamics Grant CMS-0624165, Roxane Silver, PI, Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh (co-PIs). The research team also includes Scott Blum, Paloma Gonzalez, Bryan McDonald, and Michael Poulin.

3. For more information about the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI or BSI-18), see http://www.pearsonassessments.com/tests/generaldistress18.htm

4. For more information about the Post-traumatic stress Check List (PCL-17), see: http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/ncdocs/assmnts/ptsd_checklist_pcl.html. Because the respondents were not directly exposed to the 9/11 attacks and the authors did not assess functional impairment, individuals are not assumed to have post-traumatic stress disorder. For further discussion, see Roxane Silver, “Nationwide Longitudinal Study of Psychological Responses to September 11,” Journal of the American Medical Association 288 (September 2002), pp. 1235–1244.

5. The study used the self-selected designation of Baptist of any denomination to reflect the so-called Religious Right in American politics. It is recognized that this is an imperfect proxy, as not all Baptists are members of the Religious Right, and not all members of the Religious Right are Baptists.

6. The sample of respondents surveyed reflect the adult population living throughout the United States. The study examines whether the subset of those living in the mid-Atlantic and New England regions behave differently than others as a means of evaluating whether those who live in close proximity to the 9/11 attacks respond differently than others.

7. This is consistent with studies finding individuals to be unrealistically optimistic about future events. See Neil D. Weinstein, “Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39(5) (1980), pp. 806–810. It may also be a function of either ignorance about the “real” risk of a terrorist incident, or prudence based on the recognition based on the small odds that any one person would be affected by an attack against the United States.

8. None of the other coefficients change significantly over time.

9. Questions about the 2008 election were not asked in 2007, so change over time is not assessed.

10. PEW Research Center, “Inside Obama's Sweeping Victory” (5 November 2008). Available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1023/exit-poll-analysis-2008

11. Respondents are asked to gage the intensity of government responses to security and environmental threats on a scale ranging from “too aggressive” to “too passive.” Given the varying contexts of security and environmental threats, the respondents are not given specific definitions of aggressive or passive. In the context of Hurricane Katrina, examples of actions considered to be “too aggressive” may include circumstances in which the government's response constrained individual rights and liberties by unnecessarily or unevenly forcing people to evacuate or stay in designated areas (such as the New Orleans Superdome). In contrast, “too passive” may refer to a lack of timely, sufficient, or ongoing response to the hurricane by the national government.

12. This question was asked only in the 2007 survey.

13. Questions about trust in government related to 9/11 were not asked in 2008.

14. Questions about Iraq and the local media were not asked in 2007.

15. To maintain consistency with similar questions regarding 9/11 Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, the term “exploiting” is not defined. In the context of Hurricane Katrina, the perception of political exploitation was widespread and varied. For example, some have expressed concern that the George W. Bush administration was used as a scapegoat by national Democratic politicians and by local and state-level politicians for a complex situation that involved dysfunction at multiple levels of government. Others have argued that government failures in response to the hurricane precipitated and accelerated the decline in the public's assessment of the administration. See: Pew Research Center for People and the Press, “Two in Three Critical of Bush's Relief Efforts” (September 8, 2005). Available at http://people-press.org/report/255/two-in-three-critical-of-bushs-relief-efforts

16. This question was asked only in the 2008 survey.

17. This question was not asked in 2007.

18. p < .075.

19. p = .085.