Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

Abstract

This article examines the coercive and deterrent utility of targeting the leaders of violent, non-state organizations with precision force. Building on the literatures on targeted killings and deterrence theory, this article provides a case study analysis of targeted killings in Afghanistan. Relying on publicly available and semi-private sources, the article presents a comparative analysis of four targeted killings conducted against Taliban leaders. Findings suggest that the eliminations degraded Taliban professionalism, diminished the group's success rates, influenced their selection of targets, and weakened morale. These findings speak to the efficacy of targeted killings in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and to their value as both counter-capability and counter-motivation operations.

For their comments on this and related work, the author is indebted to Frank Harvey, Denis Stairs, Danford Middlemiss, T.V. Paul, Major-General E. S. Fitch, Andreas Wenger, Victor Mauer, and two anonymous reviewers. For their continued and generous support, the author thanks the Security and Defence Forum at the Canadian Department of National Defence and the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich, Switzerland.

Notes

1. The others included Ustad Yasir and Mufti Latifullah Hamkimi, both one-time Taliban spokespersons, and two regional commanders, believed to have been Hafiz Hamdullad and Abdul Ghaffar.

2. Richard Owen and Tim Albone, “Protests over Taliban Exchange for Journalist,” The Times, 21 March 2007.

3. Declan Walsh, “Afghans Admit Doing Deal with Taliban to Free Italian Hostage,” The Guardian, 21 March 2007.

4. The Australian, “Anger at Taliban Exchange for Journalist,” 22 March 2007.

5. Michael Smith, “SBS behind Taliban Leader's Death,” The Sunday Times, 27 May 2007; “Special Boat Service Operations—Hunting Mullah Dadullah,” Special Boat Services, 12 May 2007; “Raid Kills Taliban Exchanged for Italian,” Reuters, 16 May 2007; and Matthias Gebauer, “Taliban Leader Mullah Dadullah: The Star of Afghanistan's Jihad,” Der Spiegel Online, 1 March 2007.

6. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Press Release # 2007–370, “Mullah Dadullah Lang Killed in Security Operation,” 13 May 2007.

7. Taimoor Shah and Carlotta Gall, “Key Taliban Leader is Killed in Afghanistan in Joint Operation,” New York Times, 14 May 2007.

8. Associated Press, “Taliban Military Commander Mullah Dadullah Killed,” 13 May 2007.

9. Eric Schmitt and Davaid Sanger, “US Sees New Turf for Qaeda Fighters,” New York Times, 12 June 2009; Alisa Tang, “Gen.: Attacks Down Sharply in E. Afghanistan,” Associated Press, 24 February 2008; Graham Turbiville, “Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations: Selected Perspectives and Experience,” Joint Special Operations University, Report 07–6 (June 2007), pp. 52–73; Peter Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign against Terror,” Joint Force Quarterly, 48 (2008).

10. Terrorism, for the purpose of this article, is the use of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants by non-state actors with the purpose of generating fear in order to “signal,” communicate, and advance particular sociopolitical objectives. This definition implies that terrorism, as Bruce Hoffman notes, creates “psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim.” Non-state terrorist organizations act independently from states and lack sovereign territorial control. Concise definitions are muddied due to the considerable overlap that exists between terrorism and other forms of political violence, like insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and civil war. Daniel Byman, for instance, finds parallels between “insurgency” and “terrorism,” noting that nearly all insurgent groups rely on terrorism at some point. Austin Long divides “regional armed groups” (militias, guerrillas, and civil-war belligerents) from “transnational” groups and “spontaneous terror cells.” And John Arquilla, among others, utilizes the concept of “networks” to describe some, but not all, of these violent non-state groups. Recent research even equates the Global War on Terrorism as a “global counterinsurgency” against an international assemblage of like-minded, jihad-inspired groups and individuals. Furthermore, violent non-state organizations diverge greatly in terms of coercive strength, decision-making structures, financing mechanisms, ideological constructions, and state association. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia, 2006), p. 40; Daniel Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31(2) (2008), pp. 167–170; Frank Douglas, “Waging the Inchoate War: Defining, Fighting, and Second-Guessing the ‘Long War,’” Journal of Strategic Studies 30(3) (2007); Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004), pp. 248–251; Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); John Arquilla, “The End of War as We Knew it?” Third World Quarterly 28(2) (2007); and David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28(4) (2005).

11. See Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield, “Do Targeted Killings Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006); Edward Kaplan et al., “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005); Or Honig, “Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30 (2007); Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman, “Assassinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using Stock Market Data,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2) (2006); Hillel Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Violence,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies no. 70 (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies) (2006); Sergio Catignani, “The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics During the al-Aqsa Intifada,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28(1) (2005); and Isaac Ben-Israel et al., “R & D and the War on Terrorism: Generalizing the Israeli Experience,” in A. James, ed., Science and Technology Policies for the Anti-Terrorism Era (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006).

12. For theoretical research on deterring terrorism, see, among others: Alex S. Wilner, “Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism,” Journal of Strategic Studies (Forthcoming, 2010). Robert R. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It can be Done,” International Security 30(3) (2005/2006); Doron Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” Parameters 34 (2004/5); Steve Simon and Jeff Martini, “Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda its Popular Support,” Washington Quarterly 28(1) (2004); Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002); Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, “A System Approach to Deterring and Influencing Terrorists,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21(1) (2004); Jeffrey Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research: An Appraisal,” APSA 2008 (Boston, USA); Jeffrey Knopf, “Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy after 9/11,” Contemporary Security Policy 29(2) (2008); Wyn Q. Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism,” Contemporary Security Policy 25(1) (2004); Lewis Dunn, “Influencing Terrorists’ Acquisition and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Workshop on NATO and 21st Century Deterrence, NATO Defence College (2008); Lewis Dunn, “Deterrence Today: Roles, Challenges, and Responses,” Proliferation Papers, IFRI (Summer 2007); Ian Shapiro, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Elbridge Colby, “Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation,” Policy Review 149 (2008); Colin S. Gray, “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” Parameters 32 (2002); James Smith and Brent Talbot, “Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial,” in Paul Viotti, Michael Opheim, and Nicholas Bown, eds., Terrorism and Homeland Security (New York: CRC Press, 2008); Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle against Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005); and Emmanuel Adler, “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era,” in T. V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, James Wirtz, eds., Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2009). For the literature testing deterrence in counterterrorism, see Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah,” Comparative Strategy 26(5) (2007); Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Terrorists: What Israel has Learned,” Policy Review no. 149 (June/July 2008); Robert Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorist,” Document D-2802 (IDA) (2003); Amos Malka, “Israel and Asymmetrical Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy 27(1) (2008); Gary Geipel, “Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe after 1970: Implications for Deterrence and Defeat of Violent Nonstate Actors,” Comparative Strategy 26(5) (2007); and Alexandre S. Wilner, Deterring the Undeterrable: The Theory and Practice of Coercing Terrorists, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, Canada, December 2008.

13. David, “Fatal Choices,” p. 2.

14. Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 3–6.

15. David, “Fatal Choices,” p. 2.

16. Casper Weinberger, quoted in David, “Fatal Choices,” pp. 15–16.

17. Jenkins does conclude, however, that “being at war … would make a difference.” See, Brian Jenkins, “Assassination: Should We Stay the Good Guys?” Los Angeles Times, 16 November 1986 (emphasis added).

18. David Silverstein, “Reviving the Assassination Option,” The American Enterprise, December 2002, p. 36.

19. Honig contends otherwise, suggesting that targeted individuals may have political aspirations that might help foster future negotiation. See Honig, “Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations,” pp. 564–565.

20. Samantha Shapiro, “The Year in Ideas: A to Z; Announced Assassinations,” The New York Times Magazine, 9 December 2001.

21. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protracted Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, United Nations Treaty, 14 December 1973, p. 168.

22. Bruce Berkowtiz, “Is Assassination an Option?” Hoover Digest no. 1 (2002).

23. Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing,” The Middle East Quarterly 10(1) (2003) and George Stephanopoulos, “Why We Should Kill Saddam,” Newsweek, 1 December 1999.

24. Tim Weiner, “The Nation: Terminator; Making Rules in the World Between War and Peace,” The New York Times, 19 August 2001.

25. Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions: Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 (13 January 2003), p. 16.

26. Daniel Byman, “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism,” Survival 47(4) (2005/6), p. 118.

27. Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945), Chapter VII, Article 51.

28. John Tinetti, “Lawful Targeted Killing or Assassination: A Roadmap for Operators in the Global War on Terror,” Naval War College, 2004.

29. Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Department of National Defence, Government of Canada (2001), Sections 6–4, 6–5.

30. Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 9–11; and David Tucker, “Fighting Barbarians,” Parameters 28 (1998).

31. John Norton Moore, quoted in David, “Israel's policy of Targeted Killing.”

32. Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 120.

33. Quoted in Uri Blau, “License to Kill,” Haaretz, 27 November 2008.

34. Naomi Chazan, “Assassinations as Weapons of War,” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 2(2) (2008), p. 87.

35. For research on the normative and philosophical aspects concerning targeted killings, see Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, “Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: Principles,” Philosophia 34 (2006); Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, “Assassination and Preventive Killing,” SAIS Review 25(1) (2005); Paul Robinson, “The Ethics of the Strong against the Tactics of the Weak,” Philosophia 36 (2008); Yael Stein, “By Any Name Illegal and Immoral: Response to ‘Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing,’” Ethics and International Affairs 17(1) (2003); Nina Tannenwald, “Targeted Killings: The Decline of the Norm Against Assassination?” Watson Institute for International Studies (Unpublished Draft Paper, 2008).

36. It is important to note that targeted captures are also effective. Indeed, many states are quick to point out that they would rather capture than eliminate individual terrorist adversaries. The apprehension of leaders provides the state with invaluable operational, tactical, and strategic intelligence that can lead to further detentions and other successes. Pictures and videos of captured leaders also retain propaganda value. Think of the unflattering pictures associated with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's (KSM) 2003 capture (see George Tenet's enlightening account in At the Center of the Storm, pp. 250–253) or the embarrassing tirade Abimael Guzman, onetime leader of Peru's Shining Path, shouted from his prison cell. Captured leaders can also be put on trial, providing their victims with some form of justice. The obvious drawback is that targeted captures are difficult to carry out successfully. As Tamil Tiger leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran recently illustrated in his desperate bid to escape encroaching Sri Lankan forces, few leaders willingly give themselves up. That they often fight to the death suggests that targeted captures place military personnel in positions of unwarranted danger. Finally, there is the related risk of operational failure; a wanted individual is more likely to elude his/her captors than survive a pinpoint precision strike.

37. See Alex Wilner, “The Best Defence is a Terrific Offence: Four Approaches to Countering Modern Terrorism,” AIMS Commentary (2007), pp. 5–7; Silverstein, “Reviving the Assassination Option” (2002); Peter Cullen, “The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign against Terror,” Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008).

38. Ari Shavit, “Sharon is Sharon is Sharon,” Haaretz, 12 April 2001.

39. Consider the regression of the Shinning Path following the 1992 capture of Guzman, the PKK's demise, from a 30,000 strong army under Abdullah Ocalan to today's much less formidable organization after his arrest in Kenya in 1999, the decade long setback for Palestinian Islamic Jihad following Israel's 1995 strike against its leader, Fathi Shikaki, in Malta, and the complete collapse of a-Saika, a Syrian controlled faction of the PLO, after the mysterious death of its leader Zuheir Mohsein in France in 1979. See Harmon, “The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist” and Yossi Melman, “Targeted Killings—A Retro Fashion very much in Vogue,” Haaretz, 24 March 2004.

40. Ben-Israel et al., “R & D and the War on Terrorism.” For counterarguments, see Honig, “Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations,” pp. 571–572.

41. Ariel Merari, for instance, portrays terrorism as an “organizational phenomenon.” Ariel Merari, “Terrorism and Threats to U.S. Interests in the Middle East,” Testimony, U.S. House of Representatives, 13 July 2000.

42. See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004), pp. 137–139; Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly 27(3) (2004), pp. 92–94; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), esp. chapter II; and Seth Jones, “Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups: Lessons from Israel,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (2007), pp. 282–283, 294–298.

43. Davis and Jenkins, “A System Approach to Deterring and Influencing Terrorists,” 7.

44. National Review Online, “Zarkawi's Cry,” 12 February 2004.

45. For a discussion of the Taliban's use of “mentally unsound” and physically disabled individuals, drug addicts, and children in suicide operations, see Brian Glyn Williams, “Mullah Omar's Missiles: A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy 15(4) (2008), pp. 38–42.

46. Catherine Lotrionte, “When to Target Leaders,” The Washington Quarterly 26(3) (2003), p. 81.

47. The Japanese Red Army in the 1970s, the Abu Nidal Organization in the 1980s, and the Tamil Tigers today are but a few examples. See Harmon, “The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist.”

48. BBC, “Pakistan Rebel Clash ‘Kills 100,’” 21 March 2007.

49. Syed Saleem Shahzad (Trans. Donald Hounam), “Al-Qaida: The Unwanted Guests,” Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2007.

50. Ibid.

51. National Intelligence Estimate, Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (September 2006), pp. 2–4 (emphasis added).

52. For overviews of deterrence theory, see Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), chapters 5 and 7; Derek Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapter 2; and T. V. Paul, “Complex Deterrence: An Introduction,” in T. V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, James Wirtz, eds., Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2009).

53. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 11–13.

54. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36(4) (1984), p. 499.

55. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 9.

56. Thomas Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” International Security 6(4) (1982), p. 72.

57. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” World Politics 42 (July 1990), p. 471.

58. See Frank Harvey, “Practicing Coercion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(6), (December 1999), pp. 840–843; and Frank P. Harvey, “Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Test: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence,” International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998).

59. See Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977) and Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

60. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?” pp. 497–499; David Johnson, Karl Mueller, and William Taft, Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum of Conventional Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p. 12.

61. Glen Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 13–19 and Smith and Talbot, “Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial,” 54–59.

62. Johnson et al., Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum of Conventional Operations, p. 17.

63. See Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities?” pp. 10–12; Zussman and Zussman, “Assassinations,” p. 196; Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” pp. 364–366; Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?”; Luft, “The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing”; Eisenstadt, “Pre-Emptive Targeted Killings as a Counter-Terror Tool”; Harmon, “The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist.”

64. Roberts, “Deterrence and WMD Terrorism,” p. 13.

65. Luft, “The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing.”

66. William Casebeer and Troy Thomas, “Deterring Violent Non-State Actors in the New Millennium,” Strategic Insight 2(12) (2003), p. 4. Melman argues instead that overusing targeted killings “dissipates” the mystery and fear they produce if used sparingly. See Melman, “Targeted Killings,” 2004.

67. Bar, “Israeli Experience in Deterring Terrorist Organizations,” pp. 11–16.

68. Avi Issacharoff, “In the West Bank, Wanted Militants are Made to Feel Unwanted,” Haaretz, 13 November 2007. See also, James Bennett, “Key Militia Leader Dies in Bomb Blast in the West Bank,” New York Times, 15 January 2002.

69. See, Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “While Pakistan Burns,” Newsweek, 9 November 2007; Radio Free Europe, “Top Taliban Commander Killed In Southern Afghanistan,” 30 August 2007; The News International, “Taliban Commander Says Reports of Death Premature,” 14 September 2007.

70. Patrick Cockburn, “Mullah Omar's Son ‘was Killed in First Air Strike,’” The Independent, 22 October 2001; BBC, “US Strike kills Taleban Leader,” 27 October 2008.

71. Associated Press, “U.S. Offers $200,000 to Catch “Most Wanted” Taliban,” 1 October 2007.

72. BBC, “US Issues Afghan Most Wanted List,” 1 October 2007; Syed Shahzad, “Revolution in the Mountains (Part III): Through the Eyes of the Taliban,” Asia Times, 5 May 2004; Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban Welcome Back an Old Friend,” Asia Times, 4 April 2008; Bill Roggio, “Report: Strike Targets Baitullah Mehsud's Hideout in Pakistan,” The Long War Journal, 15 June 2008; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Press Release # 2008-020, 12 January 2008; Bill Roggio, “US Captures Senior al Qaeda Leader Mohammad Rahim,” The Long War Journal, 14 March 2008; U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release 205–08, “Defense Department Takes Custody of a High-Value Detainee,” 14 March 2008; Bill Roggio “Siraj Haqqani's Deputy Killed in Afghanistan,” The Weekly Standard, 14 December 2007; Combined Joint Task Force—101, Press Release, “Coalition Forces Confirm Darim Sedgai Death,” 26 January 2008.

73. These reports are “semi” private in that they are not usually made available to the general public, although the author was able, with a little cajoling and academic pleading, to acquire them, free of charge, for the periods under review.

74. Sudden increases in violence immediately following the eliminations might be based on the Pashtun tribal code of badal (revenge). Badal is the “means of enforcement by which an individual seeks personal justice for wrongs done against him or his kin group.” Although a complicated social institution, retaliation does play a prominent role in Afghan society. Other custumary laws related to dispute resolution, like nanwati (forgiveness), melmastia (hospitality), and jirga (consensus building), are also inherent to Pashtun society. The author is indebted to an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions. See Thomas Barfield, Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institutions, United States Institute for Peace (Washington, DC), 26 June 2003.

75. See Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work?” pp. 361–363, 367–377.

76. Hafez and Hatfield label a shift in activity the “substitution effect,” where less costly activities are carried out in response to counterterrorism campaigns. Ibid., p. 365.

77. Three separate suicide bombers attacked members of the GoA. On 17 May, a suicide bomber wounded cultural minister Karim Khurram. On 18 May, a bomber attempted to assassinate Asadullah Khalid, the governor of Kandahar by ramming his explosive-laden car into the governor's SUV. And on 26 May, a bomber attacked the governor's official residency.

78. Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban a Step Ahead of US assault,” Asia Times, 11 August 2007.

79. Ibid.

80. Rahimullah Yusufzai “Spies in Their Ranks Worry Taliban,” The News International, 18 May 2007.

81. Ibid.

82. BBC, “Taliban Sack Military Commander,” 29 December 2007; Bill Roggio, “Mullah Omar Confirms Firing of Mullah Mansoor Dadullah,” The Long War Journal, 2 January 2008; Bill Roggio, “Taliban Dismisses Senior Afghan Commander [Update],” The Long War Journal, 29 December 2007.

83. BBC, “Taliban Sack Military Commander,” 2007.

84. Separating or isolating terrorist leaders from their followers and the broader community is an important facet of counterinsurgency doctrine. Sardar Ahmad, “Forces in Afghanistan Shift Focus to Taliban Leaders,” Agence France-Presse, 2 January 2007.

85. Ibid.