How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals

Abstract

This article deals with the role of government in encouraging the decline of radical movements. The question posed is: “Which story can the government tell to encourage the decline of radical groups and the disengagement of their members?” The article makes use of the survey of factors promoting decline and disengagement drawn up by Demant, Slootman, Buijs (†) and Tillie in 2008, as well as the factor “official policy strategies” based on concepts taken from discourse analysis, adapted to counterterrorism and deradicalization strategies by De Graaf in 2009. The article will therefore not address the different practical measures in this field, but focus instead on the perception of these official measures by the radicals. It will illustrate this with two case studies: the deradicalization of South Moluccan youths in the 1970s and of jihadist radicals after 2001, both in the Netherlands.

^†Deceased.

Notes

^†Deceased.

1. Cf. P. Waldmann, Terrorismus: Provokation der Macht (Hamburg: Murmann Verlag, 2005); L. Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006).

2. Cf. F. Furedi, Invitation to Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown (New York/London: Continuum, 2007).

3. “Blair Says ‘Terror will not Win,’” BBC News, 7 July 2005.

4. “Osama bin Laden rains on Obama's Parade,” New York Daily News, 4 June 2009.

5. W. D. Casebeer and J. A. Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘Counter-Narrative Strategy,’” Strategic Insights 4(3) (2005), pp. 1–16.

6. F. Demant, M. Slootman, F. Buijs, and J. Tillie, Teruggang en uittreding: Processen van deradicalisering ontleed (Amsterdam: IMES, 2008); English translation: Decline and Disengagement. An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation. Amsterdam: IMES. Available at http://www.imes.uva.nl/about/documents/IMESReportDeclineandDisengagement-layoutKKenFD.pdf

7. B. De Graaf, De strijd tegen terrorisme. In Nederland, Duitsland, Amerika en Italië [Counterterrorism in the Netherlands, Germany, the United States and Italy, in the 1970s] (Amsterdam: Boom, forthcoming in October 2009); English translation in preparation. See also B. De Graaf, “Wanneer stoppen terroristen? Het historisch referentiekader als aanknopingspunt voor (contra-) terrorisme,” in Idem and I. Duyvesteijn, ed., Terroristen en hun bestrijders, vroeger en nu (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), pp. 105–119.

8. Demant et al.'s analytical framework for their study of deradicalization of radical groups is partly based on insights from among others: T. Bjorgo and Y. Carlsson, Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth Groups (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affaires, 2005); B. Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). Cf. the introduction and conclusion in T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (Oxford/New York: Routledge, 2008); J. Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005), especially chapter 6.

9. B. De Graaf, De strijd tegen terrorisme.

10. For example, see Horgan and Bjorgo, Leaving Terrorism Behind, but also the Ph.D. Thesis by A. Linden, Besmet: Levenslopen en motieven van extreem-rechtse activisten in Nederland (Ph.D. Thesis, Free University Amsterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2009). These works deal with radicalization mainly on the level of individual activists.

11. For example, R. D. Crelinsten “The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1 September 1998.

12. D. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 195.

13. Cf. for the role of enemy images and image-formation in the debate on terrorism for example: H. Balz, Von Terroristen, Sympathisanten und dem starken Staat. Die öffentliche Debatte um die RAF in den 70er Jahren (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 2008).

14. Cf. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State, pp. 60–61.

15. De Graaf, De strijd tegen terrorisme, chapter 10. See also De Graaf, “Counternarratives and the Unrehearsed Stories Counterterrorists Unwittingly Produce,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 3(2), pp. 5–11.

16. In social-constructivist discourse analysis, “signifiers” are empty shells or concepts that have to be filled with meaning before they constitute a discourse. See Louise J. Phillips and Marianne J⊘rgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London/New Delhi: SAGE, 2002), pp. 50–51. Here, this concept is used not in a strictly social constructivist sense, but in an empirical-historical manner. “Signifiers” are not mere words or concepts, but can also be incidents or historical occurrences. These subsequently have to be interpreted and filled with meaning as well.

17. See U. Soukup, Wie starb Benno Ohnesorg? Der 2. Juni 1967 (Berlin: Verlag 1990, 2007).

18. In May 2009 the BStU exposed Kurras as an Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (an informal employee, i.e., an informer) of the East German Ministry of State Security, the so-called Stasi. He thus appeared to have been a communist, rather than a fascist. It is not clear whether Kurras also acted as an agent provocateur, under orders of the Stasi to destabilize the young Republic. There is no evidence of that in the files. German experts on the matter, such as Aust, Kraushaar, or Uwe Timm leave that possibility open, but are cautious. From Stasi-files, it appears that the Stasi itself considered Ohnesorg's death to be an accident. Kurras was depicted as “very much in love with guns.” Cf. also “Vielleicht war es nicht die NS-Vergangenheit,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 May 2009; “Kurras gesteht IM-Tätigkeit,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 May 2009; “Der Schuss, der die Republik veränderte,” FAZ, 24 May 2009; “Es wäre trotzdem zur Protestbewegung gekommen,” FAZ, 27 May 2009; “Spy Fired Shot That Changed West Germany,” New York Times, 26 May 2009.

19. R. Reinders and R. Fritzsch, Die Bewegung 2. Juni. Gespräche über Haschrebellen, Lorenz-Entführung, Knast (Berlin/Amsterdam: ID Verlag, 1995), p. 39; see also B. Baumann, Wie alles anfing (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 2007 [1975]), p. 109.

20. Cf. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State, pp. 60–61.

21. E. Bakker, Jihadi terrorists in Europe. Clingendael Security Paper No. 2 (The Hague: Clingendael, 2006). In the Netherlands, about 5.8 percent of the population is Muslim (e.g., around 900,000 citizens). Around 360,000 of them are of Turkish origin and 315,000 have a Moroccan background. These immigrants mainly live in large cities in the Western part of the country, in Amsterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, and Rotterdam. Their average educational level is still low, the unemployment rate is high, and immigrant youths are overrepresented in rates of dropout and (petty) crime. SCP/WODC/CBS (September 2005), Jaarrapport Integratie 2005, The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatie Centrum (WODC), Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS).

22. F. J. Buijs, F. Demant, and A. Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland [Homegrown Warriors: Radical and Democratic Muslims in the Netherlands] (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

23. De Graaf, De strijd tegen terrorisme.

24. With the lawyer of the Moluccan activists, Henk Droesen, Roermond, 14 March 2008; John Lumalessil and Melie Lumalessil-Metiarij, Vianen, 15 November 2008; the employer of Hansina Uktolseja: Robert Schmidt, Assen, 22 February 2008; BBE-commander (anonymous), The Hague, 11 November 2008; former BVD official (anonymous), 28 January 2009.

25. P. Bootsma, De Molukse acties: Treinkapingen en gijzelingen 1970–1978 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2000); S. Eikelenboom, Niet bang om te sterven. Dertig jaar terrorisme in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2007); D. Engelen, Frontdienst. De BVD in de Koude Oorlog (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007); M. Rasser, “The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970–1978,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28(6), pp. 481–492; E. Rinsampessy, De mogelijke gronden van agressie onder Molukse jongeren. MA Thesis, Utrecht, published as Pattimura Special (2) (1975); A. P. Schmid, J. F. A. De Graaf, F. Bovenkerk, L. M. Bovenkerk-Teerink, and L. Brunt, Zuidmoluks terrorisme, de media en de publieke opinie (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Intermediair, 1982); A. P. Schmid and J. De Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (London/Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); H. Smeets and F. Steijlen, In Nederland gebleven: De geschiedenis van Molukkers 1951–2006 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker/Utrecht: Moluks Historisch Museum, 2006).

26. “Gijzeling ambassadeur van Indonesië,” RA 1970/054-I. Archive of the Ministry of Justice, The Hague, The Netherlands.

27. Cf. Bootsma, De Molukse acties; Smeets and Steijlen, In Nederland gebleven.

28. P. Abels, “Je wilt niet geloven dat zoiets in Nederland kan. Het Nederlandse contraterrorisme beleid sinds 1973,” in I. Duyvesteyn and B. de Graaf, eds., Terroristen en hun bestrijders, vroeger en nu (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), 121–128; See also P. Klerks, Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970–1988 (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 1989).

29. Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, Minister van Justitie, “Antwoord op de vragen ter voorbereiding van een openbare commissievergadering.” Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1973 (zitting 1972–1973), 12.000, no. 14.

30. See, for example, Ministry of General Affairs, “Conclusies van de tweede bespreking over overheidsmaatregelen tegen terreuracties,” 6 November 1972. RA 1972/001. Archive MinJus, The Hague; Klerks, Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970–1988, pp. 50–53; cf. also F. Hoekstra, In dienst van de BVD: Spionage en contraspionage in Nederland (Amsterdam: Boom, 2004), p. 73; Interview Beatrice de Graaf with Frits Hoekstra, Utrecht, 7 October 2008.

31. In December 1975, just after the train hijacking, 41 percent of the population retained some sympathy with the Moluccan cause. In June 1977 (after the second hijacking, and the hostage-taking of 105 school-children) the figure was still 27 percent. NIPO Bericht, Nr. 1852; Cf. A. P. Schmid et al., Zuidmoluks terrorisme, de media en de publieke opinie, p. 61.

32. Cf. E. Rinsampessy, De mogelijke gronden van agressie onder Molukse jongeren, doctoraal dissertation, Utrecht, published as a Pattimura Special (2) (1975); File “Molukkers 1975–1976” (No. 590), Archive Commissaris van de Koningin 1970–1986 (toegangsnummer 1372). Brabants Historisch Informatiecentrum (BHIC), Den Bosch, The Netherlands.

33. Charge and interrogation reports of the train hijackers. Arrondissementsrechtbank Assen, 1970–1979, plaatsingsnummer 0860, inv.nr. 132, 133, 161. Het Drents Archief, Assen, The Netherlands; Bootsma, De Molukse acties, p. 63, 79–82.

34. Demant et al., Teruggang en uittreding, p. 38.

35. See interview, Beatrice de Graaf with John Lumalessil and Melie Lumalessil-Metiarij, Vianen, 15 November 2008.

36. Charge and interrogation reports of the Moluccan hijackers in 1975 and 1977. Arrondissementsrechtbank Assen, 1970–1979, pl.nr. 0860, inv.nr. 132, 133, 161. Het Drents Archief, Assen; Cf. interview, Beatrice de Graaf with John Lumalessil and Melie Lumalessil-Metiarij.

37. Demant et al., Teruggang en uittreding, p. 123.

38. Ibid., p. 146.

39. Idem.

40. This insight also can be implicitly drawn from Bootsma, De Molukse acties; Smeets and Steijlen, In Nederland Gebleven. However, in these studies the importance of timing of counterterrorism measures (the fact that integrative measures had hardly any effect until 1977, but bore results only after the raid on the train) is not discussed.

41. See Smeets and Steijlen, In Nederland gebleven, pp. 242–280.

42. Demant et al., Teruggang en uittreding, p. 123.

43. Ibid., p. 124.

44. Cf. Eikelenboom, Niet bang om te sterven, pp. 13–87.

45. “Vals Alarm,” NRC Weekblad, 6 June 2009; see also L. Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30(7) (2007), pp. 579–592.

46. M. J. Borgers, De vlucht naar voren (oratie) (Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2007); T. Roos, “Terrorisme en strafrecht in Nederland,” in S. Harchaoui, ed., Hedendaags radicalisme. Verklaringen & aanpak (Apeldoorn/Antwerpen: Het Spinhuis, 2006), pp. 81–113; cf. also B. de Graaf and B. de Graaff, “Counterterrorism in the Netherlands: The ‘Dutch approach,’” in Jon Moran and Mark Phythian, eds., Intelligence, Security and Policing Post-9/11: The UK's Response to the War on Terror (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 183–202.

47. Framework Decision of the Council of Europe, 13 June 2002 (2002/475/JBZ) on combating terrorism, in Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, 22 June 2002, L164/3.

48. General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD), Annual Report 2007 (The Hague: AIVD, 2008); General Intelligence and Security Service, Radicale dawa in verandering: De opkomst van islamitisch neoradicalisme in Nederland (The Hague: AIVD, 2007).

49. Cf. “Campagne ‘Nederland tegen terrorisme’ legt nadruk op voorkomen radicalisering,” press release NCTb, 19 November 2007; “Minder privacy, makkelijker straffen,” NRC Handelsblad, 8 September 2007; E. Bakker, “Contraterrorismebeleid: Mag het een onsje minder?” Internationale Spectator 62(2) (2008), pp. 61–62.

50. “Zalm: We zijn in oorlog! Regering: terrorisme met wortel en tak uitroeien,” Algemeen Dagblad, 6 November 2004; “Terroristen met dubbele nationaliteit raken Nederlands paspoort kwijt. Kabinet verklaart de oorlog aan terreur,” Het Parool, 6 November 2004. “Overheid wil meer armslag: anti-terreurmaatregelen,” Trouw, 6 November 2004.

51. Cf. F. J. Buijs, “Waarom het islamitisch extremisme tot introspectie dwingt,” Socialisme en Democratie 60(1/2) (2005), pp. 55–62.

52. Cf. Kamervragen Geert Wilders, Sietse Fritsma, Raymond de Roon (PVV), “Aanpak Marokkaanse straatterroristen,” 19 October 2007. HTK, Kamervragen 2008–2009, vraagnr. 2080909420.

53. Buijs et al., Strijders van eigen bodem, p. 65.

54. Ibid., p. 66.

55. “Verdachten terreur zelden veroordeeld,” NRC Handelsblad, 6 June 2009.

56. Gemeente Amsterdam, Amsterdam tegen radicalisering (Amsterdam: Platform Amsterdam Samen, 2007).

57. M. Meines, “Radicalisation and its Prevention from the Dutch Perspective,” in NCTb, ed., Radicalisation in Broader Perspective (The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007), pp. 34–39.

58. R. Willemse, R. (2007), “Terrorism and Radicalisation: A Study in the Dutch Context,” in NCTb, ed., Radicalisation in Broader Perspective (The Hague: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2007), pp. 23–33.

59. See B. de Graaff, “Hoe breed? Contraterrorisme- en radicaliseringsbeleid onder de loep,” in J. Donselaar and P. R. Rodrigues, eds., Monitor Racisme & Extremisme; achtste rapportage (Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting/Amsterdam University Press, 2009), pp. 125–140, at 135–136; Cf. R. Matthew and G. Shamboaugh, “The Pendulum Effect: Explaining Shifts in the Democratic Response to Terrorism,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy no. 5 (2005), pp. 223–233.

60. Cf. among others A. Olgun, “Nuance keert terug in Nederland,” NRC Handelsblad, 13 February 2008; “Bijna 3000 digitale knuffels voor PVV-voorman Wilders,” Metro, 30 January 2008; B. Heijne, “Waarom ik Geert Wilders dankbaar ben,” NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2008; “De overheid is een gevaar voor onze privacy,” NRC Handelsblad, 6 February 2008.

61. “‘Terreurverdachten’ eisen excuses politie,” NOVA, 16 March 2009.

62. General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2006 (The Hague: Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2007); Cf. also AIVD, Radicale dawa in verandering: De opkomst van islamitisch neoradicalisme in Nederland (The Hague: Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2007) [in Dutch].

63. General Intelligence and Security Service (2007), Annual Report 2006, p. 19, 26, 30.

64. General Intelligence and Security Service (2009), Annual Report 2008, p. 17, 20–22.

65. NCTb, Terrorismebestrijding op lokaal niveau: Handreiking (The Hague: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2006), p. 59.

66. See for an exploration of the complex connection between radicalization, political violence, and the role of “injustice frames”: Della Porta, Social Movement and Political Violence, pp. 59–61; Cf. for an account of the effects of official “disruptive” measures on Islamic radicalization: J. Groen and A. Kranenberg, Strijdsters van Allah: Radicale moslima's en het Hofstadnetwerk (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 2006).

67. Demant et al., Teruggang en uittreding, p. 153.

68. Ibid., p. 148.

69. See for a discussion on foreign experiences with deradicalization programs: F. Demant, W. Wagenaar, and J. Van Donselaar, Racism & Extremism Monitor: Deradicalisation in Practice (Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting/Amsterdam University Press, 2009); F. Demant, M. Slootman, F. Buijs, and J. Tillie, “Deradicalisation of Right-Wing Radicals and Islamic Radicals,” in Donselaar and Rodrigues, eds., Monitor Racisme & Extremisme; achtste rapportage (Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting/Amsterdam University Press, 2009), pp. 255–277.

70. “PvdA eist dat Verhagen zich uitspreekt over Gaza,” Trouw, 28 December 2008.

71. “Webdiscussie over Fitna: ‘De angst regeert vooral bij Geert,’” NRC Handelsblad, 28 March 2008.

72. Cf. B. de Graaf, “En wat als ze niets hadden gezegd?” NRC Handelsblad, 23 March 2009.

73. Cf. M. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

74. See R. Alonso, “Leaving Terrorism behind in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: Reassessing Anti-Terrorist Policies and the “Peace processes,” in T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (Oxford/New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 88–112.

75. See also M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 176; R. Gunaratna, “Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward,” in J. O. Ellis III, ed., Terrorism: What's Coming; the Mutating Threat; Senior Fellows Report (Oklahoma City: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism [MIPT], 2007), pp. 63–73.