Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization

Abstract

The objective of this study is to provide through an in-depth investigation of the Fatah Al-Islam organization, emergence, programs, and external links, and the inner operation of this underground Salafi-jihadi group. By divulging secret confession statements to the public, it has uncovered many of the mysteries that surrounded the evolution and goals of the group. On the other hand, and more important, it has examined the application of certain conventional approaches to the study of terrorist behavior. The findings, based on the biographies of FI terrorists, seem to negate much of the advanced explanation about political violence. Economic destitution, poverty, lack of education, young age, and marital disruption for instances do not determine adherence to the group. Members of the jihadi group of FI stem from a diversified occupational background, not lacking in education, mature, married, and influenced by various motivations, specifically religious dogma.

The author wishes to thank and acknowledge Judge Ghassan Oueidat for his invaluable assistance in the completion of this study.

Notes

*Does not include the number of civilian injuries.

 **FI lost 222 militants in this confrontation, the Lebanese army 168 and 54 civilians of whom 46 were Palestinians.

 ***In contrast to all other attacks this explosion occurred in Damascus.

1. What differentiates “Salafi-jihadists” from other radical Islamists or from traditional Salafis is their adherence to an orthodox, literalist interpretation of Islam and their extreme view on the use of violence and the cause of jihad. They conceive Jihad as a global struggle that knows no borders; it could be directed against anyone, anywhere beyond the country in which they operate and its rulers (see Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy 9(2) (2002), pp. 56–81).

2. See Table 1.The total number of human casualties reported in local and international media and resulting from FI terrorist attacks exceeded 900.

3. Between 1991 and 2008 there have been several armed internal conflicts in Lebanon, the most recent being the 7 May 2008 crisis, but the death toll never exceeded a few tens of victims. FI campaign against the Lebanese state drew the highest number of civilian and military casualties during that period.

4. This group is referred to as “Redemption and fight.” However, the literal translation is the following: Takfir = pronouncing someone kafir. Hijra = migration/separation from society.

5. Are Knudsen, “Islamism in Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” Journal of Refugee Studies 18(2) (2005), pp. 216–234, at p. 228.

6. Other actions by the same group have allegedly included attacks on shops selling alcohol and an attack on a courthouse in Sidon in Southern Lebanon and the killing of four Lebanese judges. In January 2000, members of the group launched an attack against the Russian embassy in Beirut. In Lebanon, several churches and Christian properties have been firebombed with the inception of the U.S. campaign on Afghanistan, rousing scary memories of the civil war, which was partly fought on confessional lines.

7. Local Lebanese press, 13 November 2002 and 7 April 2003.

8. Local Lebanese press, 22 November 2002.

9. Lebanese press, 15 April 2003.

10. As-Safir, 21 August 2007.

11. Fernando Reinares, “Towards a Social Characterization of Jihadist Terrorism in Spain: Implications for Domestic Security and Action Abroad,” Area: International Terrorism, ARI 34/2006.

12. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980), pp. 423–453.

13. Michael Taarnby and Hallunbaek, “Fatah al-Islam: Anthropological Perspectives on Jihadi Culture,” Working Paper 6/2008, The Elcano Royal Institute, published on 2 December 2008. Available at www.realinstitutoelcano.org

14. The confession statements uncover also certain aspects related to the origins, ideology, and political sponsors of the group that sometimes disconfirm already available information.

15. Few Arab Sunni heads of state had expressed their fear of a shii revival following the invasion of Iraq. A shii crescent highlighted efforts by Sunni regimes to strengthen radical Sunni groups to face a shii renaissance across the region.

16. Seymour Hersh, “The Redirection: Is the Administration's New Policy Benefitting Our Enemies in the War on Terrorism?” The New Yorker, 5 March 2007.

17. Bilal Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Salafist Jihadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30 (2007), pp. 825–855, at p. 829.

18. The group became famous after its alleged responsibility for the assassination of four judges in Sidon in 1999.

19. In order to ascertain the identity of the suspects, DNA analysis was performed even on dead bodies. This method proved efficient for instance when the authorities attempted to identify the body of Shaker Absi, FI leader. Through DNA tests and by comparison with that of his detained wife and daughter, it was ascertained that the body in question is not that of Absi.

20. The confession statements included details pertaining to each of the suspects’ role in perpetrating terrorist actions or providing logistic support for the purpose of determining their criminal intent or responsibility which is not the intention of the present study. The author made use of the data that was found pertinent to the objective of the study.

21. Statistical analysis of the data was performed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) in order to determine commonalities within the social variables. Even when the number of observations is limited or lower than the total number of cases the results yielded specific patterns or trends that can be interpreted and discussed. In any case the results are significantly representative.

22. Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs 86(3) (May–June 2007), pp. 24–33, at p. 27.

23. Justine A. Rosenthal, “Jigsaw Jihadism: Controlling Religious Terrorism,” The National Interest 87 (January–February 2007), pp. 61–67, p. 64.

24. Saab and Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Salafist Jihadism,” p. 842.

25. Toni Trad, Tanzim Fatah al-Islam Mashrouh Huzima fi Lubnan (Fatah Al-Islam Movement A Defeated Project in Lebanon), printed in Lebanon by Antoine Jalkh Printing Establishment (2008), pp. 54–55.

26. Abu Salim Taha confession statement.

27. Souad Mekehennet and Michael Moss, “In Lebanon a New Face of Jihad Vows Attacks on US,” The New York Times, 16 March 2007, p. A1 (L).

28. This information was revealed to the investigative judge by Abu Salim Taha.

29. Abu Salim Taha's testimony.

30. Zuhair Howari, “Fatah al Islam fi Lubnan: Al Mukhaiam Al Falastini ala Safih Sakhen” (“Fatah Al-Islam in Lebanon: The Palestinian Camp on a Hotbed”), in Al Harakat Al Islamiat fi Lubanan (Islamic Movements in Lebanon), Al Markaz Al Arabi Li-al Maalumat, pp. 204–220.

31. Judicial Statement prepared by judge Ghassan Oueidat.

32. Anne-Sophie Novel, “Chaker Al-Abssi raconté par son frère,” Economie et Terrorisme, Mardi 5 juin 2007.

33. Mekehennet and Moss, “In Lebanon a new face of Jihad vows attacks on US,” p. A1.

34. Ibid.

35. As will be shown later in the study the breakdown by nationality of FI membership reveals that its composition is multinational.

36. Nicholas Blanford, “New Fight Rips at a Fragile Lebanon,” The Christian Science Monitor, 22 May 2007, p. 1.

37. Claire Moucharafieh, Interview with Bernard Rougier, “Fatah al-Islam, une nébuleuse tentaculaire déterritorialisée.” Available at www.france-palestine.org, 9 May 2008.

38. Judge Oueidat's judicial statement.

39. Ibid.

40. Abu Salim Taha's confession statement.

41. According to Judge Oueidat the connection between FI and the Syrian regime has never been ascertained by evidence.

42. In November 2008, Syrian television aired the purported confessions of 10 radicals for their role in the bombing. They were all members of the Fatah al-Islam group and among them was Wafa Abssi, daughter of Fatah al-Islam leader Shaker al-Abssi.

43. Paul Khalifeh, “Un épais mystère entoure Fatah al-Islam,” RFI, 21 May 2007.

44. Under a 1969 Arab accord, the Lebanese army may not enter the Palestinian refugee camps.

45. This organigram was prepared by Judge Oueidat based on the confession statements of the various FI members in custody.

46. Trad, Tanzim Fatah al-Islam Mashrouh Huzima fi Lubnan, pp. 56–57.

47. Ibid.

48. It remains unclear how FI managed to initiate these verdicts. Fatawa are generally issued by a scholar, not by councils, unless it is a council of scholars. Also, “shura councils” in these kinds of groups are generally advisory/governing bodies.

49. Al Safir, 4 September 2007.

50. Taarnby and Hallunbaek, “Fatah al-Islam,” p. 4.

51. Judge Oueidat's judicial statement.

52. Ferry Biederman, Andrew England, and Rula Khalaf, “Into the Battle: A New Threat Emerges in War-Scattered Lebanon,” The Financial Times, 4 June 2007, p. 11.

53. Fatah al-Islam's Plot: 9/11-Style Lebanon Attack, Naharnet, Beirut, 3 June 2007.

54. N. Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the ‘Human Bombs,’” The New Yorker (2001) 77, p. 36; A. Pedahzur, A. Perliger, and L. Weinberg, “Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists,” Deviant Behavior 24 (2003), pp. 405–423; M. Sageman. Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

55. J. D. Fearon and D. D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97 (2003), pp. 75–90; J. Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco, 2004).

56. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks; Stern, Terror in the Name of God.

57. Vali Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shii Revival in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly 27(3) (2004), pp. 7–24.

58. R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002); D. Gupta, A. Merari, M. Crenshaw, and M. McCauley, “Selfish Selflessness?” The Chronicle of Higher Education 48(32) (2002), p. B4.

59. B. Barber and J. Olsen, “Adolescent Willingness to Engage in Political Conflict: Lessons from the Gaza Strip,” in J. Victoroff, ed., Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism (IOS Press, 2006), pp. 203–226.

60. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 53.

61. Knudsen, “Islamism in Diaspora,” p. 230, concludes that the rise of Islamic sentiments in the camps is fueled by social and political discontent, secular versus Islamist rivalry, nationalist sentiments toward Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the Islamist revival in Lebanon.

62. Few observers remark that Impoverishment does not explain alone the rapid growth of radical Sunni movements; government and political backing was needed. See for instance Charles Harb, “Comment and Debate: Blowback in Lebanon: The Islamists at the Center of the Fighting were Built Up by Pro-Government Forces for Sectarian Reasons,” The Guardian, 24 May 2007, p. 32 and Ferry Biedermann, Andrew England, and Roula Khalaf, “Into the Battle: A New Threat Emerges in War-Scattered Lebanon,” The Financial Times, 4 June 2007, p. 11.

63. Saab and Ranstrop, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Salafist Jihadism,” p. 830.

64. It should be noted that due to government restraints, Palestinians must obtain work permits and the law specifies more than 70 jobs to be carried out exclusively by Lebanese citizens. As a result, Palestinians are forced to work illegally and do unskilled jobs; mostly they work in small shops, usually within the camps, or do building or agricultural work (seasonal work).

65. “Age Tiltness, A Socio-Economic Profile of the Nahr El Bared and Beddawi Refugee Camps of Lebanon,” Fafo-Paper (2007), p. 16.

66. Interview with C. N. Edwards, “The Mind of a Terrorist,” The Forensic Examiner (May–June 2003), pp. 22–27.

67. E. Bueno de Mesquita, “The Correlates of Public Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World,” United States Institute of Peace Working Paper (2007). Available at www.usio.org; A. T. Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004), pp. 619–637.

68. R.J. Sampson and W.B. Groves, “Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology  94, pp. 774–802; Joseph Donnermeyer, Patrick Jobes, and Elaine Barclay, “Social Disorganization, Conflict and Crime in Four Rural Australian Communities.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Rural Sociological Society, Santa Clara, California, August 2, 2007.

69. Pedahzur et al., “Altruism and Fatalism;” B. Ganov, “Suicide Terrorism: An Overview,” (2000). Available at www.ict.org.il/.

70. See Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 79.

71. See Jeff Victoroff, “The Terrorist Mind,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(1) (2005), pp. 3–42.

72. Many Islamist factions use especially Nahr el-Bared and Ayn al-Hilwa camps for their illegal activities (see Knudsen, “Islamism in Diaspora,” p. 228).

73. Confession statement to Lebanese police.

74. A. Bravo and C. Dias, “An Empirical Analysis of Terrorism: Deprivation, Islamism and Geopolitical Factors,” Defence and Peace Economics 17(4) (2006), pp. 329–341; Q. Li and D. Shaub, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist Incidents: A Pooled Tine-Series Cross Sectional Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (2004), pp. 230–258; A. Abadie, Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University, KSG Working Papers, 04–043, 2004).

75. D. Cook, “The Implications of Martyrdom Operations for Contemporary Islam,” Journal of Religious Ethics 32 (2004), pp. 129–151, p. 149.

76. It literally means one who engages in jihad.