The Sources of Pakistani Attitudes toward Religiously Motivated Terrorism

Abstract

This study is interested in understanding public opinion in Pakistan toward terror attacks. Specifically, this study explores (1) the general picture of attitudes in Pakistan toward terrorism and (2) which individuals are most likely to support terrorism in Pakistan. The study aims to give insights into how pervasive a support base exists for terrorism as a tactic in Pakistan and it seeks to isolate the individual-level traits that account for the variation we see among Pakistani Muslims regarding their level of acceptance of terrorism against Pakistani and Indian targets. The study finds that a large majority of Pakistanis oppose terrorism but terrorism directed at Indian targets is more tolerated than terrorism against Pakistani targets. The study also finds that those who are most supportive of Talibanization in Pakistan are the most supportive of terrorism.

Notes

1. There has been a violent conflict in Baluchistan where Baluchi nationalists have fought for an independent state. This conflict has included terrorist actions. This study does not focus on this form of terrorism.

2. This study is not about attitudes toward militancy in Pakistan but more specifically about attitudes toward the tactic of targeting civilians for a political goal (i.e., terrorism).

3. Shi'as were not the only targets of the Sunni jihadis. Barelvi and Ahmedi Muslims, which are less orthodox and conservative than the Deobandi or Wahhabi forms of Sunni Islam, were also targeted. In fact, the Pakistani government went so far as to declare that Ahemdis were not Muslims to placate its conservative Sunni supporters.

4. Sipah-e-Sahaba changed its name to Millat-e-Islami/Pakistan in 2002 because it was designated a terrorist group in Pakistan. Most people still know it by its former name.

5. Members of these groups have formed a new group, Jaish-e-Omar (Army of Omar) in response to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. This group is thought to have this name in honor of Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of the Taliban.

6. Obviously the urban bias in the sample means that it is not as representative of Pakistani public opinion across the country as one would like. But given the choice between an urban and a rural sample, the urban sample is superior because rural samples tend to have very high non-response rates in Pakistan.

7. It is important to note that most Pakistanis do not believe that jihadi groups based in Pakistan and that operate in Indian Kashmir engage in terrorism, if they offer an opinion. Most Pakistanis simply do not know if these groups intentionally attack civilians in Kashmir or refuse to answer. In the 2007 USIP/WPO survey respondents were asked: As you may know, groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbol Mujahadeen, and Lashkar-e-Taiba have fought in occupied Kashmir in the past. Do you think that when [Jaish-e-Mohammad; Hizbol Mujahadeen; Laskar-e-Taiba] has fought in occupied Kashmir, it has intentionally targeted civilians in attacks, or do you think it has never intentionally targeted civilians? Only 6 percent of respondents said that the three groups had intentionally targeted civilians. Forty to 42 percent of respondents said that the groups had never intentionally targeted civilians. Some 53 to 54 percent of respondents did not know or refused to answer. This high rate of don't know or refused to answer is likely the result of widespread ignorance about these groups and their activities. It is telling that such a small proportion of respondents believe these jihad groups engage in terrorism.

8. While this question is less than optimal at getting at how Pakistanis think about terrorism, it is the best question available in the survey data that can be used. Its primary drawback is that it is a somewhat vague question. It does not elaborate on the civilians to be attacked or the motivations for attacking.

9. The authors ran a very similar model using data from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey that has support for terrorism to defend Islam as its dependent variable. They used very similar independent variables relating to mainstream and extreme religious views. The results of that analysis support the results using the USIP/WPO data. It is found that those with more extreme religious views are more supportive of terrorism to defend Islam.