Foreign Fighters and Transnational Jihad in Syria

ABSTRACT

Foreign fighters arrive in Syria from across the Muslim world, yet the configuration of their countries of origin remains a puzzle. Examining alternative explanations for joining transnational jihad, the article draws insights from the cases of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, two major countries of foreign fighters' origin, compared with Egypt, from where limited figures of volunteers have joined the Syrian war. The article shows that the sources of volunteering fighters may be well understood in combined terms of religious sentiments and national politics. Foreign fighters come largely from Muslim countries where restrained state–Islamists relations channel Islamic grievances to transnational arenas.

Notes

1. Adopting David Malet's definition, I relate to foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflict.” In this article, I refer specifically to volunteering combatants who are non-Syrian nationals and join Islamist groups fighting in the Syrian civil war based on sectarian affinity, generally under the banner of “jihad.” David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 9.

2. Fawas A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 80–82.

3. Jamie Crawford and Laura Koran, “U.S. Officials: Foreigners Flock to Fight for ISIS,” CNN, 11 February 2015. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/10/politics/isis-foreign-fighters-combat/ (accessed 30 June 2016).

4. Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” The Soufan Group (TSG) 2014. Available at http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf (accessed 24 June 2015).

5. See for example Gerges's description of the network of jihadi cells rebuilt by Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan between 1986 and 1989, and their role in recruiting and radicalizing Muslim fighters for the cause of jihad. Gerges, The Far Enemy, pp. 84–89.

6. Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) 2015. Available at http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/ (accessed 7 June 2015).

7. Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” The Soufan Group (TSG) 2014.

8. See also Alex P. Schmid, “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates: Conceptual and Data Issues,” International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) Policy Brief 2015, Available at https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighter-Estimates-Conceptual-and-Data-Issues-October20152.pdf (accessed 29 November 2016).

9. On mixed-methods in comparative analysis see Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review 99(3) (2005), pp. 435–452.

10. See David Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27(3) (2015), pp. 454–473; Schmid, “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter Estimates,” pp. 3–5.

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38. This article briefly references but does not focus on another major distinction within the Muslim world, between “moderate” and “radical” Islamists. Rather, it focuses on Islamist movements of various types, which ignite Islamic sentiments and promote Islamic agendas in their home countries; these sentiments and agendas can potentially be transformed into transnationalist jihadi inclinations.

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51. Teitelbaum, “Holier than Thou.”

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58. Haim Malka and Margo Balboni, “Tunisia: Radicalism Abroad and at Home: Fighters in History and Today,” The Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2016. Available at http://foreignfighters.csis.org/tunisia/tunisian-fighters-in-history.html (accessed 30 November 2016).

59. Haim Malka and Margo Balboni, “Tunisia: Radicalism Abroad and at Home: Domestic Context After the Revolution,” The Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2016. Available at http://foreignfighters.csis.org/tunisia/domestic-context.html (accessed 30 November 2016).

60. The Tunisian National Dialogue quartet was awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for helping the country's transition to democracy when the country “was on the brink of civil war.”

61. Teitelbaum, “Holier than Thou,” p. xvii.

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75. See, for example, Mohammed Masbah, “Moroccan Fighters in Syria,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2014. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?=show&article=55313&soler_hillite=Syria (accessed September 10, 2015).

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