Consolidation of Nonstate Armed Actors in Fragmented Conflicts: Introducing an Emerging Research Program

Abstract

How do armed groups consolidate power in conflict landscapes packed with rival factions, paramilitary militias, and local warlords? Extant scholarship has studied the causes and consequences of rebel fragmentation, but the reverse process in which power that is dispersed among many armed actors becomes concentrated among a handful of factions is underexplored. In this special issue, we bring together eight case studies to illustrate at least three pathways to militant consolidation. Cooperative consolidation involves organizations growing consensually through alliance formation and mergers. Competitive consolidation entails a gradual process of increasing political and military power by outcompeting rival groups for fighters, popular support, and international sponsors. Coercive consolidation occurs when militant organizations violently eliminate rivals. This framing article considers several factors that may explain the choice of consolidation mode, including the role of territorial control, permeability of group boundaries, and state sponsorship. By investigating this under-examined aspect of civil conflict, we forge fundamentally new theoretical ground in the study of internal wars and weakly-governed societies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Acknowledgments

Support for this research was provided by the Minerva Research Initiative under Army Research Office grant number W911NF-19-1-0291. Earlier versions of this article were presented in 2021 at the Research Connections workshop at the Naval Postgraduate School and the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. The authors would like to thank Rachel Sigman for her valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this article.

Notes

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2 Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 9.

3 Monica Duffy Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 7–36. Although it should be noted that victorious rebels often produce authoritarian post-conflict orders. See Terrence Lyons, “The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian Politics,” Comparative Politics 48, no. 2 (2016): 167–84.

4 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2010); Reed M. Wood and Jacob D. Kathman, “Competing for the Crown: Inter-Rebel Competition and Civilian Targeting in Civil War,” Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1 (2015): 167–79.

5 Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare, 12.

6 Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare, 10.

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8 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour, “A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 265–83.

9 Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare, 168.

10 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

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12 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Adria Lawrence, “Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings against Colonial Rule,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 88–122; Theodore McLauchlin and Wendy Pearlman, “Out-group Conflict, In-Group Unity? Exploring the Effect of Repression on Intramovement Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (2012): 41–66.

13 Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (2012): 94–117.

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21 Krause, Rebel Power, 11.

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23 It is important to distinguish between mergers and coalitions. The former involves greater integration of armed groups, making it possible for a single hegemonic organization to emerge out of a fragmented militant field. Coalitions on the other hand reserve some degree of autonomy for each armed actor in an alliance and thus may not be geared toward consolidation. Nonetheless, we expect some coalitions to serve as precursors to organizational mergers, especially when armed groups are placed under a single command and control structure.

24 The three factions are South West Africa People’s Organization, South West Africa National Union, and the National Unity Democratic Organisation. See Zeigler, “Competitive Alliances,” 27.

25 The five factions were the Popular Liberation Forces, People’s Revolutionary Army, Armed Forces of National Resistance, Central American Revolutionary Workers Party, and Armed Forces of Liberation.

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35 These variables align well with the dominant approaches to civil conflict. Rationalist theories emphasize rebel power and resources derived from territorial control and state sponsorship. Constructivist approaches highlight the importance of social identities and the framing of ethnic divisions in civil wars. Additionally, since we are considering how consolidation dynamics emerge within a set of armed actors, these three variables apply across all groups in the conflict as opposed to idiosyncratic factors such as leadership quality or organizational capacity that may apply to only some of the armed actors in the conflict.

36 Michael A. Rubin, “Rebel Territorial Control and Civilian Collective Action in Civil War: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 2–3 (2020): 463.

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38 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support,” 727.

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40 Fjelde and Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels.”

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43 Rubin, “Rebel Territorial Control,” 466.

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45 Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative Politics 42, no. 3 (2010): 333–50; Luke Abbs, Govinda Clayton, and Andrew Thomson, “The Ties that Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-Government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 5 (2020): 903–32.

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47 Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare, 136.

48 Nicholai Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Understanding Rebel Governance through Liberia’s Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 10.

49 Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare, 136.

50 Salehyan, “The Delegation of War.”

51 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support.”

52 Belgin San-Akca, States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

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54 Zeigler, “Competitive Alliances,” 27; Quint Hoekstra, “Helping the Contras: The Effectiveness of U.S. Support for Foreign Rebels During the Nicaraguan Contra War (1979-1990),” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 44, no. 6 (2021): 525.

55 Idean Salehyan, David Siroky, and Reed M. Wood, “External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities,” International Organization 68, no. 3 (2014): 633–61.

56 Milos Popovic, “Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors,” International Interactions 44, no. 4 (2018): 749–76.

57 Neil Devotta. “When Individuals, States, and Systems Collide: India’s Foreign Policy towards Sri Lanka,” in India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 32–61.

58 Wolfram Lacher and Alaa al-Idrissi, “Capital of Militias: Tripoli’s Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State,” SANA Briefing Paper (2018): 1–19.

59 Fjelde and Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels;” Pischedda, Conflict Among Rebels; and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, “On-Side Fighting in Civil War: The Logic of Mortal Alignment in Syria,” Rationality and Society 32, no. 4 (2020): 402–60.

60 Nam Kyu Kim, “Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 2 (2018): 289–317.

61 Gade, Hafez, and Gabbay, “Fratricide in Rebel Movements;” and Schulhofer-Wohl, “On-Side Fighting.”

62 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Reed M. Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 601–14.

63 Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson, “The Rise of Rebel Contenders: Barriers to Entry and Fragmentation in Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 5 (2018): 551–65.