State Accompli: The Political Consolidation of the Islamic State Prior to the Caliphate

Abstract

This study examines the successful consolidation of the Islamic State movement within the Sunni insurgency in Iraq from 2003 to 2014. We rely on insurgent media releases, captured documents, and a declassified U.S. military study of the Sunni insurgency in Anbar to evaluate the Islamic State movement’s complex relationship with its Sunni Arab rivals. We found the group moved through sequential stages of cooperative, competitive, and coercive consolidation to achieve hegemony in the insurgent field. Each phase of transition entailed organizational changes, including mergers, re-branding, and new structures. The movement’s well-developed ideology and state-building project distinguished it from peers whose political agendas were too diffuse to establish lasting coalitions. The tribal Awakening that worked with the Americans to temporarily defeat the Islamic State of Iraq also badly splintered its rivals and failed to prevent the revitalization of the Islamic State movement, setting the foundation for its short-lived caliphate project.

Disclosure Statement

Craig Whiteside is employed with the U.S. government. His views are his own.

Notes

1 Joel Rayburn D., et al. The US Army in the Iraq War, Volume 2: Surge and Withdrawal, 2007–2011 (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2019); Brian Fishman, “Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” CTC West Point, 2009; Martha Cottam, Joe Huseby, Confronting Al Qaeda: The Sunni Awakening and American Strategy in Al Anbar (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Carter Malkasian, Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

2 We define the “Islamic State movement” as the post-2014 Islamic State caliphate and all its forerunners in the post-2003 Sunni insurgency. We restrict our scope here to Iraq, even though the Islamic State governed territory in Syria after 2013. Relatedly, the group governed each territory as distinct entities.

3 Group statements cited in the paper were originally posted on jihadist websites and forums by group spokesmen and were collected and archived by the authors or found in subsequent online archives, except where noted. For the declaration of the caliphate, see Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “This is the Promise of God,” al-Furqan Media, June 29, 2014; for thick description case studies, see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

4 Paul Staniland, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (2012): 16–40; Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

5 Paul Staniland, “Militias, Ideology, and the State.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (August 2015): 770–93.

6 U.S. Department of Defense, “Study of the Insurgency in Anbar Province,” June 2007 (declassified 2015), U.S. Army War College Iraq Papers, Ch 4, 1; Ch 5, 6.

7 Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Islamist Militancy,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (Hurst: Columbia University Press, 2009), 244-266; Muhammad Abu Rumman, “The Politics of Sunni Armed Groups in Iraq,” Carnegie Endowment, 2008.

8 Hegghammer, Jihadi Salafis, 259.

9 Abu Rumman, “The Politics of Sunni Armed Groups.”

10 On political Salafism see: Quintan Wiktorowic, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006), 207–39.

11 Samuel Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 2–4.

12 Partly based on data by Michael Gabbay, “Data Processing for Applications of Dynamics-Based Models to Forecasting,” in Sociocultural Behavior Sensemaking: State of the Art in Understanding the Operational Environment, ed. Jill D. Egeth et al. (McLean, VA: MITRE Corporation, 2014), 245–68.

13 Gade et al., “Networks of Cooperation,” 2075–6.

14 Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1914), 394–434.

15 Darryl Li, The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020).

16 Mohamed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington, DC: USIP, 2007), 35–8.

17 Abdullah al-Gharib, “The Conference Tale,” Global Islamic Media Front, March 2010.

18 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 101–7.

19 Craig Whiteside, “Lying to Win: The Islamic State Media Department’s Role in Deception Efforts,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 1 (2020): 130–41.

20 Gabbay, Data processing, 261; an interesting example is the Islamic Army conducting a joint attack on a Shiite mosque with Kataib al-Qisas al-Adil: “Destruction of a Harmful Mosque in Hayy al-Jihad,” 23 April 2007.

21 Gabbay, “Data Processing,” 260–1.

22 Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, 11.

23 See the Constitution of Iraq (2005), Especially in Articles 7 and 135; Mohammed M. Hafez, “Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 3 (2020): 604–29.

24 Henri Lauzièr, The Making of Salafism. Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

25 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, “Say: I Am Upon Clear Proof from My Lord,” al-Furqan Media, 13 March 2007.

26 Islamic Army in Iraq, “Weekend on Saturday,” al-Fursan Magazine, 5 August 2005, 10.

27 Abu Rumman, “The Politics of Sunni Armed Groups.”

28 Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, 203; Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi. The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 205.

29 “Statements by most Iraqi Factions cautioning against the Elections,” paldf.net, 7 March 2010.

30 On democracy in the political thought of different strains of the Muslim Brotherhood see Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood. Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).”

31 Dan Murphy, “Jill Carroll’s Captor Claims to be Insurgency Chief,” Christian Science Monitor, 21 August 2006.

32 By 2005 there were 72 groups in Anbar province, see U.S. Department of Defense, “Insurgent Groups in al-Anbar Province,” June 2007 (declassified 2015), U.S. Army War College Iraq Papers.

33 Anbar Insurgency Study, Ch 4, 1.

34 Ibid., 25.

35 Anbar Insurgency Study, Ch 4, 15; Ch 3, 16.

36 Muhanad Seloom, “An Unhappy Return: What the Iraqi Islamic Party Gave Up to Gain Power,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 19 November 2018.

37 Evan Kohlman, “State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq 2006,” GlobalTerrorAlert, December 2006.

38 Abu Ismail al-Muhajir, “Martyr Biographies 12: Umar Hadid,” Mujahidin Shura Council, 2006; Abu Usama al-Iraqi, “Stages in the Jihad of Amir al-Baghdadi,” Global Jihad Network, 12 May 2012.

39 Tawhid and Jihad Group, “Statement Number 5; Greetings and Glad Tidings,” 13 May 2004.

40 Jonathan Schanzer, “Inside the Zarqawi Network, Washington Institute, 2009;” Abul-Walid al-Salafi, “A Complete History of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam,” trans. and ed. Aymenn J. al-Tamimi, 15 December 2015.

41 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, “Join the Caravan,” 4 January 2004.

42 The Associated Press, “Two locals were core of Fallujah insurgency,” NBC News, November 2004.

43 Truls Hallberg Tønnessen, “The Islamic Emirate of Fallujah,” International Studies Association paper, Montreal, 2011.

44 Tawhid and Jihad Group, “Tawhid and Jihad announces its Allegiance to Shaykh Usama Bin Laden,” 17 October 2004.

45 “The Jihadist Groups that announced their Pledges to al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers,” paldf.net, 31 December 2005.

46 As-Salafi, “A Complete History of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam.”

47 Anbar Insurgency Study, Ch 4, 12; Ch 5, 60–3.

48 Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, “Iraqi Vote Draws Big Turnout of Sunnis,” Washington Post, 16 December 2005.

49 Anbar Insurgency Study, Ch 5, 32.

50 Ibid., 5.

51 Ibid., 17.

52 Anonymous, “AQI Situation report,” IZ 060316-01, CTC West Point.

53 Anbar Insurgency Study, Ch 5, 5.

54 Ibid., 50, 54 and 94; William Knarr, The 2005 Sunni Awakening: The Role of the Desert Protectors Program (JSOU Press, 2015), 34.

55 Anbar Insurgency Study, Ch 6, 15, 21, and 25.

56 Craig Whiteside, Ian Rice & Daniele Raineri, “Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2019).

57 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Untitled letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005, CTC West Point.

58 MSC, “Statement on Establishing Mujahidin Shura Council in Iraq,” 15 January 2006. The U.S. picked up intelligence of MSC forming as early as mid-2005, however; see MNF-I, “Insurgent Groups of Anbar Province,” 8.

59 Craig Whiteside, “Lighting the path: The evolution of the Islamic State media enterprise (2003–2016),” ICCT, 2016.

60 Hala Jaber, “Secret American Talks with Insurgents Break Down,” The Times, 10 December 2006; Nibras Kazimi, “Scandal: Khalilzad Negotiating with Killers,” The Talisman Gate, 9 December 2006.

61 al-Gharib, “The Conference Tale;” “AQI Situation Report,” IZ 060316-01.

62 Sam Knight: “Bombing of Shia shrine sparks wave of retaliation,” The Times, 22 February 2006; Anbar Study, Ch 6, 132.

63 Ibid, 29.

64 Haroro Ingram, Craig Whiteside, Charlie Winter, The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 37–54; a captured Zarqawi lieutenant confirmed it was still his strategy in mid-2005 when a shift towards negotiations within the insurgency became visible, Anbar Insurgency Study, Ch 5, 119.

65 Gabbay, “Data Processing,” 263.

66 Craig Whiteside, “Nine Bullets for the Traitors, One for the Enemy: The Slogans and Strategy behind the Islamic State’s Campaign to Defeat the Sunni Awakening (2006–2017),” ICCT-The Hague, 2018.

67 MSC, “Proclamation of Hilf al-Mutayyibin,” 12 October 2006.

68 MSC, “Proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq,” 24 October 2006; Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, “Verily, Judgement Belongs Only to God,” al-Furqan Media, 9 November 2006.

69 Adam Gadahn, “Untitled letter to Usama Bin Laden,” SOCOM-2012-0000004, CTC West Point.

70 MSC, “Proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq,” 24 October 2006.

71 Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi’s Ideological Heirs, Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their Self-Styled Islamic State of Iraq,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, 1 July 2008.

72 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, “Truth Has Come and Falsehood Has Vanished,” al-Furqan Media, 22 December 2006.

73 ISI, “Two Years of the State of Islam,” al-Furqan Media, September 22, 2008; Kohlman, “State of the Sunni Insurgency;” Jaysh al-Mujahidin, “To the Honoured Brothers in al-Furqan,” 30 August 2007; ISI, “Notice by al-Furqan Media,” 3 September 2007.

74 al-Gharib, “The Conference Tale.”

75 Douglas Ollivant, “Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” New America Foundation (2011), 3.

76 Nibras Kazimi, “IAI Jihadists Complete Anti-Shi’a Ideological Migration, Follow Al-Qaeda’s Lead,” Talisman Gate, 1 January 2007.

77 Lydia Khalil, “Leader of 1920 Revolution Brigades Killed by al-Qaeda,” Terrorism Focus 4.9, Jamestown Foundation, 10 April 2007.

78 1920 Revolution Brigades, “Obituary Statement for one of the Leaders of the Brigades,” 27 March 2007.

79 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, “Say: I Am Upon Clear Proof from My Lord,” al-Furqan Media, 13 March 2007.

80 Islamic Army in Iraq, “The Islamic Army’s Response to the Brother Abu Umar’s Speeches,” 5 April 2007.

81 Jihad and Reform Front, “Founding Statement,” 2 May 2007.

82 HAMAS al-Iraq/JAMI, “So Hold Fast to the Rope of God Altogether,” 30 April 2007.

83 Jihad and Change Front, “Statement on the Formation of the Jihad and Change Front,” 6 September 2007.

84 High Council for Jihad and Liberation, “Founding Conference of the High Council for Jihad and Liberation,” 2 October 2007. This was a front for the Ba’athists being led by Saddam Hussein’s former deputy Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri. Apart from JRTN, no widely known insurgent group was part of this body.

85 Jihad and National Salvation Front, “Statement Number One,” 6 December 2007.

86 Splinter group statement lost; see response: Ansar as-Sunnah, “Statement by the Legal and Judicial Office of Ansar as-Sunnah about the Lying Statement of the So-called Shariah Committee,” 8 May 2007.

87 HAMAS al-Iraq, “Statement Number One,” 26 March 2007.

88 The statement dated July 18, 2007 notes “legal deviations,” and “taking part in the politics;” the original statement is lost, but snippets are preserved in Akram Hijazi, “The Differentiation of Jaysh al-Mujahidin: Where to?” July 27, 2008.

89 Splinter group statement lost; see response: Jaysh al-Mujahidin, “Statement of Denial,” 4 May 2007.

90 Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance, “Founding Statement of the Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance,” 11 October 2007.

91 Unlike PCIR, JRF and JCF were formed based on ideological proximity, and the same thing is visible for the JAMI/HAMAS al-Iraq alliance, Gabbay, “Data Processing,” 256–61; Jaysh al-Mujahidin al-Murabitin formed as response to PCIR as per Kataib Jihad al-Murabitin, “Founding Statement,” 26 February 2010.

92 In May HAMAS al-Iraq mourned the death of twenty members killed by ISI in Fallujah, adding that thirty members of the Islamic Army in Iraq and twelve of Jaysh al-Mujahidin had also been killed: HAMAS al-Iraq, “Statement No. 14,” 20 May 2007.

93 Ned Parker, “Abu Abed: Ruthless, Shadowy – and a U.S. Ally in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 22 December 2007.

94 MNF-I, “Interview with FSEC Member Fish,” 8 April 2008, U.S. Army War College Iraq Papers.

95 Al-Gharib, “The Conference Tale”; Abd al-Halim al-Baghdadi, “Jaysh al-Mujahidin on the Scales of God’s Law,” Nukhba Media, 2012, 3.

96 Ansar al-Islam, “Book of Truth 1,” Ansar Media, 15 July 2008, 12–13.

97 Anonymous, “Report about the Twelve Members of Jaysh al-Mujahidin,” SOCOM-2010-0000002, CTC West Point.

98 Wikalat Haqq, “In a First Media Appearance: Ustaz Adil az-Zahawi, the Official Spokesman of Jaysh ar-Rashidin,” February 10, 2007; Gabbay, “Data Processing,” 263.

99 1920 Revolution Brigades, “A Factual Statement,” 1 January 2008.

100 ISI, “The Clear Word on the Reality of the 1920 Revolution Brigades,” 22 September 2007.

101 MNF-I, “1920s Revolutionary Brigade,” presentation, 2008 (declassified 2015), U.S. Army War College Iraq papers.

102 Jaysh al-Mujahidin and Jaysh al-Fatihin, “Statement by the Leadership Office of Jaysh al-Mujahidin,” 2 July 2008; MNF-I, “Interview with FSEC Member Dickinson,” October 9, 2008, U.S. Army War College Iraq Papers, 3.

103 Jaysh al-Mujahidin, “Servants of God, Differentiate,” 2008, 3.

104 Ollivant, “New Orthodoxy.”

105 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (Pantheon, 2012), 408.

106 Author interview with former Awakening member from Jurf ah-Sakhr (Babil), 2016; Michael Knights, “The Status and Future of the Awakening Movements,” The Washington Institute, 15 June 2009.

107 Nick Kramer, “Waking Up to the Truth about the Awakening Movement,” War on the Rocks, 23 November 2016.

108 Samantha L. Quigley, “Military Has Met SOFA Deadline, Top U.S. General in Iraq Says,” Army.mil, 29 June 2009.

109 Jihad and Change Front, Asaib al-Iraq al-Jihadiyya, Jaysh al-Mujahidin al-Murabitin, Jaysh Ahmad b. Hanbal, “Special Joint Statement: Declaration of Confidence and Authorization,” 1 June 2009.

110 Jaysh Muhammad, “Pledge Document,” June 8, 2009; HCJL, “Agreement on Founding the Jihad and Liberation and National Salvation Front,” 3 November 2009.

111 ISI, “Statement by the Ministry for Legal Affairs of the Islamic State of Iraq to the Islamic Community,” 25 April 2010.

112 Abu Muhammad al-Iraqi, “Condolatory Statement Regarding the Martyrdom of the Two Elders by Jaysh Abi Bakr as-Siddiq as-Salafi,” 25 April 2010.

113 One AQI “facilitator” ran three distinct “associate” groups behind AQI’s criminal enterprises in Zaidon, Anbar, see “Anbar Insurgency Study,” Ch 6, 6; deceased IS movement spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani was both an early Zarqawi lieutenant and leader of the “Secret Islamic Army,” which he later brought into the fold; he is referenced by name in MNF-I, “Insurgent Groups of Anbar Province,” 10.

114 Kataib Jihad al-Murabitin, “Founding Statement,” 26 February 2010; Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya fil-Iraq, “Announcing al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya fil-Iraq,” 24 February 2010; Correction and Renewal Movement of the Islamic Army in Iraq, “Statement by the Military Leadership of the Islamic Army in Iraq, 2 September 2010.

115 Islamic State of Iraq. “Strategy to Improve the Political Position of the Islamic State,” 2009; Craig Whiteside and Anas Elallame, “Accidental Ethnographers: the Islamic State’s Tribal Engagement Experiment,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 31, no. 2 (2020): 219–40.

116 Craig Whiteside, “The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 754.

117 Craig Whiteside, “A case for terrorism as genocide in an era of weakened states,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 8, no. 3 (2015): 241.

118 Joseph Logan, “Last U.S. troops leave Iraq, ending war,” Reuters, 18 December 2011.

119 Martin Chulov, “Baghdad car bomb attack rips through Iraq’s already failing hopes,” The Guardian, 22 December 2011; ISI, “Statement on the Thursday Raid,” 27 December 2011.

120 PBS, “The Jihadist: Abu Muhammad al-Jolani,” Frontline, February 2021.

121 Jack Healy and Michael R. Gordon, “A Moderate Official at Risk in a Fracturing Iraq,” The New York Times, 30 December 2011.

122 Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraq raid on Sunni protest sparks clashes, 44 killed,” Reuters, 23 April 2013.

123 Factions of the Iraqi Resistance, “Statement regarding the Killings and Assault of the Government and the Sectarian Militias against our People in Hawija,” 23 April 2013.

124 Kamal Namaa, “Fighting erupts as Iraq police break up Sunni protest camp,” Reuters, 30 December 2013.

125 Healy and Gordon, “A Moderate Official at Risk in a Fracturing Iraq.”

126 Aymenn J. al-Tamimi, “Naqshbandi Army (JRTN) Activist Front Groups,” 18 August 2014.

127 ISI, “Statement on the first wave of Operation Breaking the Walls,” 24 July 2012.

128 Aaron Zelin, Your Sons are at your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 178.

129 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “And give Good Tidings to the Believers,” al-Furqan Media, 9 April 2013; Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, “Speech on the Situation of Sham,” al-Manara al-Bayda Media, 10 April 2013.

130 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “Remaining in Iraq and Sham,” al-Furqan Media, 14 June 2013.

131 Ansar al-Islam, “Official Media Statement by the Media Wing of Ansar al-Islam in the Mosul Region,” 1 June 2013.

132 Suadad al-Salhy, “Fuelled by Syria war, al Qaeda bursts back to life in Iraq,” Reuters, 4 January 2014.

133 As-Salafi, “A Complete History of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam.”

134 Joel Wings, “Rise of the Islamic State and the Fading Away of the Rest of the Iraqi Insurgency: Interview with Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi,” Musings on Iraq, 4 May 2015.

135 Aymenn J. al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State (IS) and Pledges of Allegiance: The Case of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam,” 28 November 2014.

136 Aymenn J. al-Tamimi, “The Naqshbandi Army’s Current Situation in Iraq,” December 26, 2014; JRTN, “Statement by the Military Spokesman of JRTN Regarding Combat Operations of the Army against the Terrorist Organization within the City of Mosul,” 17 October 2016.

137 Ingram et al., The ISIS Reader, 272–92.

138 Haroro Ingram and Craig Whiteside, “Don’t Kill the Caliph: Islamic State and the Pitfalls of Leadership Decapitation,” War on the Rocks, 2 June 2016.

139 Anonymous, “The Mujahid Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Furqan: Commander of the Media Battle and the Guardian on the Frontlines of Creed,” al-Naba 285, 6 May 2021, 3–4.

140 Joel Wing, “Columbia University Charts Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad,” Musings on Iraq blog, 19 November 2009.

141 Nadeem Elias Khan, “The Rise of the Islamic State during the Sunni Insurgency,” DAVO Conference Paper, 2021.

142 Haroro Ingram, Craig Whiteside, Charlie Winter, “The Routinization of the Islamic State’s Global Enterprise,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, April 2021.