Real or Imagined Consolidation? The Case of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces

Abstract

Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic) presents an intriguing case study of rebel consolidation, in which pro-regime militias opportunistically seized the reins of a new and rapidly expanding government security institution. The organizational wrapper of the PMF Commission gave an illusory sense of instant consolidation, whereas the formation of the PMF was just the beginning of one of many cycles of armed actor consolidation that came close to overtaking the Iraqi state in 2018–2019. The partial consolidation achieved by the militias within the PMF was largely an organizational, competitive and coercive phenomenon, masquerading as an ideational, cooperative merger. The effort to further consolidate PMF’s control over the Iraqi state became harder as it came close to achieving a near-hegemonic outcome, resulting in a factional field presently characterized as a multipolar distribution of power across militia factions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See Michael Knights, Hamdi Malik, Aymenn al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), March 2020, pp. 21–42. The study provides in-depth analysis of the PMF directorate and staff system, plus its provincial centers. Though impressive looking on a wire diagram, the system is very threadbare at ground level and few of the directorates perform functions that the composite units could not do for themselves, or indeed still do themselves. Being that PMF centralized functions have a slightly theatrical feel (i.e. for show), the PMF can be said to be trying hard to appear as a consolidated system, while actually leaving the composite militias largely autonomous. Only the distribution of payroll is centralized, and even that process is devolved at unit level.

2 The most detailed work on the geographic areas of responsibility in the PMF is Michael Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 7 (August 2019): 1–12. In particular, see the map on page 3. Also see Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, pp. 128–129.

3 The myths and realities of PMF performance in these operations are reviewed in Michael Knights, “Contesting Facts on the Ground in Iraq,” War on the Rocks, August 25, 2016. For a counter-argument, see Cyrus Malik, “Washington’s Sunni Myth and the Civil Wars in Syria and Iraq,” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2016.

4 Michael Knights and Matthew Schweitzer, “Shiite Militias Are Crashing the Mosul Offensive,” Foreign Policy, November 18, 2016.

5 For the legal responsibilities of PMF members and the command and control problems in the PMF, see Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, pp. 79–98 and 101–124, respectively.

6 Ibid.

7 One prominent example is the piece published under the pen name Cyrus Malik, which confidently claimed: “In fact, these units are part of the Iraqi state, coordinate with the Iraqi Security Forces, and answer to the Iraqi prime minister.” See Malik, “Washington’s Sunni Myth.”

8 The background of the Hashd factions are well-described in Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future (Carnegie Middle East Center), April 28, 2017.

9 For a review of the key muqawama factions in Iraq, all of whom have connections to the PMF structure, see the Militia Spotlight profiles page at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/series/militia-spotlight-profiles.

10 This impression is drawn from my interviews with PMF factions and speaking to other PMF researchers, including but not limited to Phillip Smyth, Renad Mansour, Faleh A. Jabar, Hisham al-Hashimi, Fanar Haddad, Aymenn Al-Tamimi, Kirk Sowell, Hamdi Malik, and Inna Rudolf.

11 Interview with Adil Abdalmahdi, Baghdad, 16 June 2019. Previously, I wrote (alongside Malik and al-Tamimi): “the Hashd [PMF] is viewed by many Iraqi Shia leaders as wholly committed to the post-2003 order and led by “the old opposition elements.” The Hashd exists in the minds of many Shia leaders as an insurance policy—a reserve army that protects both against the military collapse of the regular armed forces, as occurred in 2014, and against disloyalty by the regular armed forces toward the post-2003 Shia-led order and nonaggression toward Iran.” See Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, p. 139.

12 All of these executive decrees and other documents are translated in the annexes A-O in Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, pp. 173–203.

13 Ned Parker, Ahmed Rasheed, and Raheem Salman, “Sectarian Strife Threatens Iraq Ahead of Election,” Reuters, April 27, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraqstrife/sectarian-strife-threatens-iraq-ahead-of-election-idUSBREA3Q0FE20140427. Also see Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “From Iraq to Syria: The Story of Mustafa Ali al-Aboudi,” May 31, 2018, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2018/05/from-iraq-to-syria-the-story-of-mustafa-ali-al.

14 Parker, Rasheed, and Salman, “Sectarian Strife,” Reuters, April 27, 2014.

15 Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, pp. 2–3, 7.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 See Annex D for a translation of Executive Order 91 in Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, p. 184.

21 See Annex E for a translation of the Hashd law of November 2016 in Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, p. 185.

22 See Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Hashd Brigade Index, February 2020, available at http://www.aymennjawad.org

23 Ibid.

24 Some Fasail components are supportive of a Velayat-e Faqih system of clerical jurisprudence, looking towards Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali al-Khamenei. Most PMF Shiites, however, are not Velayat-e Faqih devotees, and even if they favor more clerical input into governance, they believe this should be provided by Iraqi clerics or the Iraqi religious establishment.

25 Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq.”

26 To give some examples, Kataib Hezbollah was assessed to have 400 active members in Iraq in 2011, versus 7,500 in 2021. Asaib Ahl al-Haq had under 3,000 members in 2011, but 10,000 by 2021. Kataib Al-Imam Ali (PMF brigade 40) expanded from a tiny Sadrist splinter group to an 8,000-strong PMF mega-brigade with deployments across Iraq. Overall, the Fasail elements of the PMF alone grew from around 4,000 personnel in 2011 to 63,000 in 2019. See Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq,” p. 2.

27 Ibid

28 Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq,” pp. 6–7.

29 Ibid.

30 Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq,” pp. 3–5.

31 Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, pp. 145–146.

32 These include: “Harakat al-Abdal (PMF brigade 39), Saraya al-Jihad (PMF brigade 17), Liwa al-Tafuf (brigade 13) and the less capable Liwa al-Muntadher (brigade 7), Ansar Allah al-Tawfiya (brigade 19), Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda (brigade 28), Kataib Ansar al-Hujja (brigade 29), Quwwat al-Shahid al-Sadr al-Awwal (brigade 25), Quwwat al-Shahid al-Sadr (brigade 35), and Kataib al-Tayyar al-Risali (brigade 31). See Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq,” p. 2.

33 When the PMF was formed in 2014, a number of Shiite Islamist political parties such as the Dawa, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Hikma, and Fadhila used the moment to gather volunteers under their banners within the PMF. Many of these parties had men willing to fight for them before 2014, but they had not been set up as government-paid units previously. These tend to be smaller units inside the PMF. See Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq,” p. 2.

34 The vast majority of PMF personnel are Shiite Arabs, Turkmen, Shabak and Kurds. A minority are Sunni Arabs, Christians, or followers of syncretic religions such as Yezidism and Yarsanism. For a look at one important and obscure PMF component, see Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: The Kaka’i, https://minorityrights.org/minorities/kakai/

35 For two reference works on the Sadrist movement, see Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada Al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq (New York: Scribner, 2008) and Nicholas Krohley, The Death of the Mehdi Army: The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Iraq’s Most Powerful Militia (Oxford University Press, 2015).

36 See Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq,” Institute for the Study of War, December 2012, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ResurgenceofAAH.pdf. Also see Isabel Coles, Ali Nabhan, and Ghassan Adnan, “Iraqi Who Once Killed Americans Is a U.S. Dilemma as He Gains Political Power,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2018.

37 Muqtada al-Sadr has a proven ability to call out large marches, overrun public institutions, and mobilize voter turnout, election after election. See Mohammed Tawfeeq, Alanne Orjoux and Hamdi Alkhshali, “Shiite cleric’s speech sparks protesters to storm Green Zone, Iraqi Parliament,” CNN, May 1, 2016; John Davidson and Ahmed Rasheed, “In Iraq, an old U.S. foe grows his political power,” Reuters, June 29, 2021.

38 Munqith Dagher, “The Holy Shrine Units’ Announcement Will Change the Rules of the Game in Iraq,” Fikra Forum, October 5, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/holy-shrine-units-announcement-will-change-rules-game-iraq.

39 Hamdi Malik, “Pro-Sistani ‘popular mobilization units’ break with pro-Iran militias in Iraq,” Al-Monitor, April 29, 2020.

40 John Davison and Ahmed Rasheed, “Fractures grow among Iraq militias, spell political retreat,” Reuters, April 1, 2020.

41 Hamdi Malik, “Sistani vs. the Militias: The Future of Iraqi Sovereignty,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 14, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sistani-vs-militias-future-iraqi-sovereignty.

42 For detailed work on these forces, see Erica Gaston, “Sunni Tribal Forces,” Global Public Policy Institute, August 30, 2017, https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/30/sunni-tribal-forces.

43 See the detailed section on TMF-U.S. relations in Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, p. 38.

44 Omar al-Nidawi, “The Growing Economic and Political Role of Iraq’s PMF,” Middle East Institute, May 21,

2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/growing-economic-and-political-role-iraqs-pmf.

45 In 2019, comparative figures show the PMF with 2.097 trillion Iraqi dinars ($2.16 billion) of funding versus 22.525 trillion Iraqi dinars ($18.93 billion) of non-PMF spending on security, including 11.703 trillion Iraqi dinars ($9.83 billion) for the Ministry of Interior and 6.05 trillion Iraqi dinars ($5.08 billion) for the Ministry of Defense. See Robert Tollast, Yesar Al-Maleki, and Harry Istepanian, “Iraq’s 2019 Draft Budget Law: A Turning Point in Iraq’s Reconstruction?” Iraq Energy Institute, October 29, 2018; al-Nidawi, “The Growing Economic and Political Role.”

46 This was a key finding from the PMF experts and observers canvassed for Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained; and for Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq.” True consolidation was about to accelerate in 2020–2021 under a Muhandis-dominated PMF central administration mainly comprised of Fasail and Badr commanders.

47 Ibid. Muhandis was discussing ideas such as a reduction of the number of PMF staff directorates; consolidation of the 59 or so brigades into as few as 30 more standardized units; removal of unit nomenclature providing ties to individual armed groups and factions; and intermixing of units by running fighters through individual (not unit) training.

48 My interviews with Iraqi politicians across the political spectrum.

49 This was a prevalent theme in protestor messaging, most clearly communicated by Iraqi protestors attacking posters showing PMF leaders like Muhandis, and also Soleimani, tearing them down, hitting their shoes on the faces of these leaders, and burning posters. See Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Joseph Krauss, “Protests in Iraq reveal a long-simmering anger at Iran,” Associated Press, November 6, 2019.

50 Michael Knights, “Exposing and Sanctioning Human Rights Violations by Iraqi Militias,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 22, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/exposing-and-sanctioning-human-rights-violations-iraqi-militias.

51 Ibid.

52 Michael Knights, “Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Other Proxies in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 10 (2020): 1–22.

53 Malik, “Pro-Sistani.”

54 These factors are discussed in the section on Kataib Hezbollah in Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army,” pp. 6, 8–9.

55 Michael Knights, “Kadhimi as Commander-in-Chief: First Steps in Iraqi Security Sector Reform,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 19, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kadhimi-commander-chief-first-steps-iraqi-security-sector-reform; and Knights, “Testing Iraq’s Ability to Crack Down on Anti-U.S. Terrorism,” June 26, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/testing-iraqs-ability-crack-down-anti-us-terrorism.

56 Michael Knights, Crispin Smith, Hamdi Malik, “Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8 (October 2021): 7.

57 Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi (also known as Abu Hussein, Abu Zalata, Abu Zeid) is the Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General and the Commander of KH Special Operations. See Knights, Smith, Malik, “Discordance,” p. 9.

58 Sheikh Jassim al-Majedi (Abu Kadhim) covers administration, including Kataib Hezbollah offices of veteran affairs, martyrs and families, and healthcare. Knights, “Back into the Shadows?” p. 9. Also see Knights, Smith, Malik, “Discordance,” p. 9.

59 Knights, “Back into the Shadows?” p. 9.

60 In Knights, Smith, Malik, “Discordance,” p. 10, we wrote “Amidst the KH leadership crisis, Abu Hussein’s faction within KH broke into the PMF administration department on August 7, 2021, and forced staff to hand over a full electronic register of all official and unofficial members of the PMF, with the stated motive of proving that AAH was being given more paid billets than KH.”

61 For a granular example of one saga of Fasail infighting over strategy, see Hamdi Malik, “The Tuna and Noodles Saga: Findings from a War of Words Between Militias,” Militia Spotlight, Washington Institute, March 3, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tuna-and-noodles-saga-findings-war-words-between-militias. For a detailed view of the phenomenon, see Knights, Smith, Malik, “Discordance,” pp. 3–4 and 8–9.

62 Knights, Smith, Malik, “Discordance,” p. 7.

63 Zana Gulmohamad, “Munathamat Badr, from an armed wing to a ruling actor,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, February 2021.

64 See Michael Eisenstadt, Operating in the Gray Zone: Countering Iran’s Asymmetric Way of War (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2020): 162.

65 Ibid.

66 See Michael Knights, “Iraq’s Bekaa Valley,” Foreign Affairs, March 16, 2015. See also Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014.

67 See Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, p. 69 and p. 151.

68 Lebanese Hezbollah advisor operations are described in Knights, Malik, al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, p. 68 and pp. 132–135. Also see Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah’s Regional Activities in Support of Iran’s Proxy Networks,” Middle East Institute, July 26, 2021, p. 34.

69 Michael Knights, “Soleimani Is Dead: The Road Ahead for Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 1 (2020): 6–7.

70 Michael Knights, Crispin Smith, Hamdi Malik, “Discordance,” p. 7.

71 Knights, “The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 11–12 (2010): 2.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid. Also see Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army.”

74 For a discussion of these dynamics, see Knights, Smith, Malik, “Discordance,” p. 7.

75 An example of this phenomenon would be Badr’s “principality” in Diyala, where the Badr PMF outrank and outnumber non-Badr security forces. For a summary of Badr’s long involvement in Diyala, see Knights, “Iraq’s Bekaa Valley,” and George, “Breaking Badr.”

76 I noted in 2019: “Kata’ib Hezbollah has carved out an exclusive principality in Jurf as-Sakr, 40 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. This area was liberated in late 2014, when it was celebrated as the first major liberation undertaken by the PMF. Since then, KH has strongly consolidated a ‘no-go’ zone in which displaced Sunni residents cannot return and where only KH forces operate, complete with private prisons (holding well over 1,000 illegal detainees). In March 2019, Iraqi air traffic control was instructed by KH to prevent U.S. drone overflights of Jurf as-Sakr… According to Iraqi government contacts, KH has even acquired land use rights from the government, making its areas private property.” See Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army,” p. 4.

77 See Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army.”

78 A vast array of revenue-extraction methods is described in Knights, Malik, and al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, pp. 112–118. Further detailing of these types is provided in Renad Mansour, “Networks of power: The Popular Mobilization Forces and the State in Iraq,” Chatham House Research Paper, February 25, 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-02-25-networks-of-power-mansour.pdf.

79 Ibid.

80 Knights, Malik, and al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, pp. 42–43, 129; Thanassis Cambanis, “Social Engineering in Samarra: An Iraqi Shia Militia Experiments with Nationalism in a Sunni City,” New Century Foundation, May 2019, https://tcf.org/content/report/social-engineering-samarra/?agreed=1.

81 Local groups are listed in Knights, Malik, and al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained, p. 129.

82 Douglas A. Ollivant and Erica Gaston, U.S.-Iran Proxy Competition in Iraq, New America, February 2020, p. 17, https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/U.S.-Iran_Proxy_Competition_in_Iraq_FINAL_XZulx1C.pdf.

83 This was a key finding from the PMF experts and observers canvassed in Knights, Malik, and al-Tamimi, Honored, Not Contained.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid., pp. 55–61.

90 Examples include PMF brigade 13 (Liwa al-Tafuf) and PMF brigade 20 (Liwa al-Taff). See Hashd Brigade Index, by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, http://www.aymennjawad.org.

91 On Muhandis’s wooing of northern Iraqi micro-minorities in Iraq, see Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army,” p. 5.

92 Knights, “Soleimani Is Dead.”

93 Hamdi Malik, “Pro-Sistani.”

94 TMF and Atabat, plus some party militias have not called for U.S. withdrawal. Muqtada al-Sadr has muted his criticism, leaving space for trainers and advisors to remain. See Michael Knights, “Moqtada al-Sadr and the International Coalition: Common Ground and Fault Lines,” Fikra Forum, Washington Institute, April 27, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/moqtada-al-sadr-and-international-coalition-common-ground-and-fault-lines.

95 Associated Press, “Pro-Iran candidates are the biggest losers in Iraq’s election,” October 11, 2021.