Casting Shadow: Founders and the Unique Challenges of a Terrorist Group’s First Leadership Change

Abstract

The first transfer of power presents unique challenges to terrorist groups. Four challenges of succession are more manifest the first time a terrorist group undergoes transition: first, a lack of precedent creates greater uncertainty about the group’s ability to survive leadership change; second, where the new leader replaces a mythical founder, there is an inevitable negative comparison to the predecessor; third, the successor must prevent infighting and splintering that results when the glue that held the group together is lost; and fourth, a first successor often has to shift the source of organizational authority from charismatic leadership to a rational-bureaucratic model. This article argues that the shadow of the departing leader and his actions in preparation for power transition affect the magnitude of the challenges his successor faces. Three case studies—al-Qaeda, the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), and the Abu Nidal organization—demonstrate both first succession challenges and the role of founders in shaping these challenges’ magnitude.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Jenna Jordan, Susanna Wing, Thomas Donahue, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Matthew McKeever, Craig Borowiak, the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Sarah Cahn, Chris Conrad, and Ben Deichman-Caswell for remarkable research assistance, and to Aine Carolan for editing.

Disclosure statement

The author is a member of the journal’s editorial board.

Notes

1 Max Weber. Economy and Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 374.

2 Michael Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and Its Consequences for Leadership Targeting),” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no.4 (2014), 666–87; David Hofmann, “The Influence of Charismatic Authority on Operational Strategies and Attack Outcomes of Terrorist Groups,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 2 (2016), 14–44; Haroro Ingram, The Charismatic Leadership Phenomenon in Radical and Militant Islamism (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013).

3 Barak Mendelsohn, “Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Challenges of Succession in Terrorist Organizations,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2020). DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2020.1844673

4 Among the most important works on decapitation: Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 9–46; Bryan Price, Targeting Top Terrorists: Understanding Leadership Removal in Counterterrorism Strategy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019); Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014), 7–38; Jenna Jordan, Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); Patrick Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 47–79; Stephanie Carvin, “The Trouble with Targeted Killing,” Security Studies 21, no. 3 (2012), 529–55; Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?.” The Journal of International Policy Solutions 9, no. 1 (2008), 40–9.

5 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader,” 11–4; Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 43.

6 Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2008), 38–41; Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership, 669.

7 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader,” 15–22.

8 Austin Long, “Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Security Studies 23, no. 3 (2014), 476–79.

9 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 18–9.

10 Lorne Dawson, “Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy and Violent Behaviour in New Religious Movements,” in Cults, Religion & Violence, eds. David Bromley and J.G. Melton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 91.

11 David Hofmann, “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma: A Theoretical Framework for Measuring the Presence of Charismatic Authority in Terrorist Groups,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 9 (2015), 720.

12 Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy,” 43–4; Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 15–8; Jordan, Leadership Decapitation, 40–6.

13 Barak Mendelsohn, “Sovereignty Under Attack: The International Society Meets the al-Qaeda Network,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005), 54–5.

14 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Islamic State’s Appointment of New Leader: Translation and Notes.” Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi’s Blog, October 31, 2019. http://www.aymennjawad.org/2019/10/islamic-state-appointment-of-new-leader

15 Barak Mendelsohn, “Terrorism and Protean Power: How Terrorists Navigate Uncertainty,” in Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics, eds. Peter Katzenstein and Lucia Seybert (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 188–208.

16 Anne Stenersen and Philipp Holtmann, “The Three Functions of UBL’s “Greater Pledge” to Mullah Omar (2001–2006–2014),” Jihadology, January 8, 2015. http://jihadology.net/2015/01/08/guest-post-the-three-functions-of-ublsgreater-pledge-to-mullah-omar-2001-2006-2014.

17 Max Abrahms and Philip Potter, “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015), 311–42; Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, “Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 5 (2017), 830–51.

18 Price, Targeting Top Terrorists, 182.

19 Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership.” This dual task makes it harder for terrorist organizations to replace their leaders than profit-based organizations. See Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 19–22.

20 Ingram and Whiteside argue that the Islamic State intentionally and instrumentally create a myth around their leaders posthumously. See Haroro Ingram and Craig Whiteside, “Caliph Abu Unknown: Succession and Legitimacy in the Islamic State,” War on the Rocks, November 25, 2019.

21 Weber, Economy and Society.

22 Weber, Economy and Society, 342.

23 Ingram, The Charismatic Leadership Phenomenon.

24 Hofmann, “The Influence of Charismatic Authority,” 20–7. Hofmann labels such relationship between leader and followers “charismatic bond.”

25 Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership,” 669–70.

26 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

27 Stephan Aust, Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

28 Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership,” 671.

29 Jordan, Leadership Decapitation, 170.

30 Price, Targeting Top Terrorists, 78–80.

31 Though Price found no statistically significant difference in the mortality of organizations when the leader dies or arrested. See Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 44.

32 Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” 31–2.

33 “Turkey Kurds: PKK Chief Ocalan Calls for Ceasefire,” BBC, March 21, 2013.

34 For example, see Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within,” The New Yorker, June 2, 2008.

35 Audrey Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14–34.

36 Ali Soufan, Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of Bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), 19 and 45.

37 Brian Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 163; Soufan, Anatomy of Terror, 47.

38 Montasser Al-Zayyat, The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man (London: Pluto Press, 2004).

39 Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 37–41.

40 Soufan, Anatomy of Terror, 163–4 and 202; Fishman, The Master Plan, 163.

41 World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” February 23, 1998. https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm

42 Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2015), 280–1; Soufan, Anatomy of Terror, 90.

43 Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” The Atlantic Monthly 294, no. 2 (2004), 55–70.

44 Al-Qaeda’s General Command, “Statement on the Succession of Sheikh bin Laden and the Command of al-Qaeda,” SITE Intelligence Group, June 16, 2011.

45 When al-Qaeda’s Central Command announced al-Zawahiri’s nomination, it noted that his selection was the “best form of gratitude” to bin Laden. Al-Qaeda’s General Command, “Statement on the Succession of Sheikh bin Laden.”

46 Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Haya’at Tahrir al-Sham and Hurras al-Din Reach a New Accord,” Long War Journal, February 15, 2019.

47 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “The Noble Knight Dismounted,” SITE Intelligence Group, June 8, 2011.

48 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “We Shall Fight You Until There Is No More Persecution,” SITE Intelligence Group, October 4, 2017; Al-Zawahiri, “The Noble Knight Dismounted.”

49 For example, see Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Days with the Imam: First Installment,” SITE Intelligence Group, November 15, 2011.

50 For example, Hamza Bin Laden Hamza, “Usama: The Fighter Against Invaders and the Inciter of Rebellion Against Tyrants,” SITE Intelligence Group, November 7, 2017.

51 The Abbottabad Documents, Combating Terrorism Center, SOCOM-2012-0000019.

52 Adrian Levy, and Catherine Scott-Clark, The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 233–4.

53 Fawaz Gerges, The Rise and Fall of al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 144.

54 Barak Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

55 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for Jihad,” al-Shahab, September 14, 2013. https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2013/09/dr-ayman-al-e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22general-guidelines-for-the-work-of-a-jihc481dc4ab22-en.pdf

56 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “How to Confront America,” SITE Intelligence Group, September 11, 2018.

57 Nelly Lahoud et. al., Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? (West Point, NJ: CTC, 2012), 12

58 Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise.

59 Levy and Scott-Clark, The Exile, 479.

60 Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, “And Give Glad Tidings to the Believers,” SITE Intelligence Group, April 8, 2013.

61 Al-Qaeda’s General Command, “Statement Regarding the Relationship of the Group of Qaedat Al-Jihad with the Group of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,” SITE Intelligence Group, February 3, 2014.

62 The Abbottabad Documents, SOCOM-2012-0000016.

63 Soufan, Anatomy of Terror, 203.

64 Al-Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for Jihad.”

65 Charles Lister, “The Syria Effect: Al-Qaeda Fractures,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 25 (2020), 55–7.

66 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “How al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 21 (2017), 57–61.

67 Barak Mendelsohn, Jihadism Constrained: The Limits of Transnational Jihadism and What It Means for Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019), 96.

68 Daniel Masterson, “In the Shining Path of Mariategui, Mao Tse-tung, or Presidente Gonzalo? Peru’s Sendero Luminoso in Historical Perspective,” in Revolution and Revolutionaries: Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, Daniel Castro, ed. (Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 171–89.

69 James Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 63; Cynthia McClintock, “The Decimation of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, Cynthia J. Arnson, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 225; James Ron, “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 5 (2011), 569.

70 The numbers are not uniform across studies. Compare, Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 18–20; and David Scott Palmer, “Introduction: History, Politics, and Shining Path in Peru,” in The Shining Path of Peru, David Scott Palmer, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 2.

71 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 19.

72 “Peru Shining Path Leader Comrade Artemio Captured,” BBC, February 13, 2012.

73 Jordan, Leadership Decapitation, 130–7.

74 United States Embassy in Peru, “Sendero-Watchers Worried by Guerrillas’ Growing Strength,” June 17, 1994; United States Embassy in Peru, “Where is Sendero Luminoso: Down but Not Out,” February 18, 1994.

75 Jordan, Leadership Decapitation, 134–42.

76 Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Erica Illingworth, “Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 28, no. 6 (2017), 1017.

77 Jo-Marie Burt and Jose López Ricci, “Shining Path After Guzmán,” NACLA Report on the Americans 28, no. 3 (1994), 7.

78 Jordan, Leadership Decapitation, 34.

79 Carlos Ivan Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 26–28.

80 United States Embassy in Peru, “Where is Sendero Luminoso;” Jordan, Leadership Decapitation, 137–48.

81 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 28–32.

82 United States Embassy in Peru, “Sendero-Watchers Worried.”

83 Degregori, How Difficult It Is to Be God, 35

84 Anthony Faiola, “Shining Path Rebel Leader Is Captured in Peru.” Washington Post, July 15, 1999.

85 United States Embassy in Peru, “Where is Sendero Luminoso.”

86 United States Defense, Intelligence Agency, “Shining Path Column Conducting Operations in the Vicinity of Huánuco, PE[Ru]–Retransmitted Report,” Confidential Intelligence Information Report. July 17, 1998; Jordan, Leadership Decapitation, 138–9.

87 Marina Miron, First-Party COIN: Approaches of Choice in Peru, Turkey and Sri Lanka in Strategic Perspective, Ph.D. Dissertation (Canberra: The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 2019), 78–9.

88 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 19.

89 Matti Steinberg, “The Radical Worldview of the Abu-Nidal Faction,” The Jerusalem Quarterly 48 (1998), 88–104.

90 Elena Mastors and Rhea Siers, “Lessons from the Demise of the Abu Nidal Organization,” International Journal of Terrorism and Political Hotspots 12, no. 2–3 (2017): 119–29; “Obituary: Abu Nidal,” The Economist, August 24, 2002.

91 Youssef Ibrahim, “Arabs Say Deadly Power Struggle Has Split Abu Nidal Terror Group,” New York Times, November 28, 1998.

92 Yossi Melman, The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu-Nidal (New York: Adama Books, 1986), 53

93 Serge Schemann, “Abu Nidal, Palestinian Terrorist Leader, Is Reported Dead,” Washington Post, August 20, 2002.

94 Reuven Paz, “Abu Nidal: Coming in from the Cold?,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), January 16, 2002. www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=777#gsc.tab=0; Mastors and Siers, “Lessons from the Demise,” 122–5.

95 Kameel Nasr, Arab and Israeli Terrorism: the Causes and Effects of Political Violence, 1936–1993 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 1997), 202; Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: a Gun for Hire (London: Arrow, 1993), 294–9; Carl Anthony Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” Terrorism 14, no. 1 (1991), 61.

96 Ewen Macaskill and Richard Nelsson, “Mystery Death of Abu Nidal, Once the World’s Most Wanted Terrorist,” The Guardian, August 19, 2002.

97 Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” 61–2.

98 Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” 61.

99 Jonathan Randal, “Abu Nidal Battle Dissidents,” Washington Post, June 10, 1990.

100 Ibrahim, “Arabs Say Deadly Power Struggle Has Split Abu Nidal Terror Group”; Seale, Abu Nidal, 288.

101 Ibrahim, “Arabs Say Deadly Power Struggle Has Split Abu Nidal Terror Group.”

102 Nasr, Arab and Israeli Terrorism, 207.

103 Seale, Abu Nidal, 319–20.

104 Randal, “Abu Nidal Battle Dissidents.”

105 John Worman, “Abu Nidal: Chameleon of Change, A.K.A. Terrorism’s Free Agent,” Global Security Studies 4, no. 1 (2013), 62–3; Yoram Schweitzer, “Abu Nidal - The Sooner the Better,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, IDC Herzliya, August 25, 1998. https://www.ict.org.il/Article/747/AbuNidal-TheSoonertheBetter.

106 Steinberg, “The Radical Worldview of the Abu-Nidal Faction.”

107 Ibrahim, “Arabs Say Deadly Power Struggle Has Split Abu Nidal Terror Group.”

108 This is not to say that how a first successor faces these succession challenges is the sole determinant of how the group will fare. First, we cannot assume that organizational success and a leader’s success are interchangeable. Second, organizational outcomes are overdetermined.