Radicalization in the Asia-Pacific Region: Themes and Concepts

This special issue seeks to contribute to the understanding of radicalization in the Asia-Pacific region. It emerges from papers presented at the symposium Radicalization, Extremism and Social Media: The Asia-Pacific Context held at Flinders University in South Australia on 19-23 August 2019. Available research on radicalization in the Asia-Pacific tends to be shaped by the needs and goals of counter-terrorist and countering violent extremism practice.¹ The aim of the symposium was to address a need for explanatory frameworks and empirical studies that could help approach radicalization in relation to the specific contexts in which it unfolds, whence these contexts are characterized by the socio-cultural, situational, and ontological (online-offline) dimensions and different temporalities (historical time, organizational life cycle, individual life, and micro-interactions).

In this special issue, we aim to provide new insights into the diversity of socio-economic, political, ideological, technological and cultural systems, as determining the diversity of causes, mechanisms, and manifestation of radicalization. We also seek to demonstrate the utility of a variety of research paradigms and methodologies, from in-depth qualitative analysis of life histories of prominent leaders of religious radical movements in Indonesia to the use of computational methods and automated analysis tools for the analysis of large data sets as manifestations of the mutual co-radicalization of the supporters and opponents of immigration in Australia. However, South-East Asia and the Pacific is diverse on multiple levels—both within and between countries—and it is beyond the scope of this special issue to provide a comprehensive and in-depth picture of radicalization in all countries within the region.

This special issue contributes to radicalization research via enriching empirical knowledge and suggesting new conceptual frameworks in regards to the possible causes of radicalization at the individual and social levels. Taken together, the papers in this issue demonstrate the value of a critical reexamination of the epistemological significance of social scientific concepts, such as social identity, gender, masculinity, and womanhood for understanding radicalization within different socio-cultural contexts.

This paper outlines a broader theoretical and methodological context for this special issue. It highlights some pertinent needs for research into radicalization in the Asia-Pacific: a need for primary empirical research; a need to adopt context-focused and culture-specific perspectives; a need to overcome paradigmatic dichotomies such as “online vs. offline” processes, or the “demand – supply” divide in online radicalization research; and a need to integrate social theory and advanced computational methods.

By bringing together different epistemological and cultural perspectives, this issue furthers the critical interdisciplinary and intercultural dialogue that is required to deepen cross-cultural understandings and engender delicate and nuanced solutions to complex and ongoing challenges. The papers in this issue provide data and insights to enhance researchers, policy- and decision-makers, and practitioners’ understandings of the complexity of radicalization and the diversity of ways to address this problem, as well as increasing their awareness of the implications of these data and insights. What follows is an outline of the major themes and concepts discussed in the various contributions.

In their paper, Milla et al.² examine the mechanisms of the 3 N Model³ (need, narrative and network) by testing a serial mediation of group identity and ideology via two rival hypotheses according to which need for significance predicts violent extremism. Unlike so called “phase models”⁴ that depict the process of radicalization as transformation of cognition, either as a result of someone’s influence or due to social and personal circumstances,⁵ the 3 N Model seeks to bring together psychological factors related to individuals’ vulnerabilities (the loss of personal significance, and a need for restoring it) and social mechanisms (ideology and collective identity that can be acquired in the process of socialization, and obtaining recognition of one’s role in a group – the “Network” factor). The 3 N Model highlights commonalities of the process of radicalization that are shared by individuals who otherwise have very different profiles and who radicalize on the basis of polar ideologies.⁶ Milla et al. seek to empirically test the direction of psychological mechanisms in the model via analyzing primary data obtained from a survey of 137 terrorism detainees in Indonesia. This study presents a significant contribution to the field both because of the representational data sample, and because it analyses jihadist radicalization in a non-conflict zone. The study’s findings suggest that joining a group (the “Network” factor) facilitates acceptance of the moral justification of violence (“Narrative”): “the need for significance drives violent extremism by motivating some individuals to join groups, which provide ideological support for violence.”⁷ This finding is in tune with a social identity theory that emphasizes the role of group membership and intergroup relations in radicalization processes.⁸ The authors emphasize the practical implications of this finding, specifically: since individuals’ need for significance can be fulfilled via joining a group and sharing the group’s collective identity and ideology, radicalization into violent extremism can be countered via providing alternative groups with alternative ideologies.

Rane et al.⁹ seek to explore the “home-grown terrorism”¹⁰ phenomenon, in order to understand why citizens and residents in non-Muslim countries may become radicalized under the influence of ideologies of extremist groups and organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and engage in acts of violence against countries in which they were “born, raised, and educated”.¹¹ To this end they present findings from a national survey of 1034 Muslim Australians, examining the relationship between educational qualifications and Islamist-jihadist interpretations of Islam. According to their findings a minority of respondents identified with indicators of Islamism, while a smaller sub-group identified with those associated with jihadism. Notably, respondents educated in STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) fields were more likely than their HSS (humanities and social science) counterparts to accept ideas associated with Islamism and to a much lesser extent jihadism. At the same time, ideas associated with jihadism were more likely among respondents without a tertiary qualification than among those educated in either HSS or STEM fields.

Given that in the social media age, radicalization processes unfold in online and offline planes, it is necessary to bring these planes of reality together, and show their interrelationships, and dynamics.¹² To this end, Thomas et al.¹³ in their paper present a case study of radicalization at the group level, which unfolds on both these planes. Specifically, the paper examines how offline protests attended by members of the Australian far-right shape online interactions. This was achieved by collecting tweets about the 2019 St Kilda beach rally. Users were manually classified as supporters (n = 104) or opponents of the rally (n = 872). Network analysis demonstrated that interactions between the two groups increased at the time of the rally, while natural language processing showed that both groups became angrier and used more ‘othering’ language during the rally. Thomas et al. also note, though, that there were stark differences in the moral worldviews of the groups, highlighting the different moral positions that underpin engagement with, and opposition to, the far-right agenda.

Duriesmith and Ismail¹⁴ note that men who join militant Islamist networks frame their participation in masculine terms, as protectors, warriors or brothers. But, they suggest, while the role of masculinities in recruitment to jihadi groups has received increased attention, their role in disengaging men from armed groups, and particularly the global south which is the focus of this special edition, has not. The research contribution of this paper then is to explore the role of masculinities in shaping men’s paths out of jihadi networks. Based on life history research with Indonesian former militant Islamists they suggest that men’s pathways out of armed groups are defined by negotiating alternate masculinities, which reposition their gendered role in society from those associated with militancy.

The paper by de Lint and Priano¹⁵ tests the hypothesis that individuals that are subjected to martialization are more likely to hold authoritarian, nationalist and anti-democratic values than other individuals. Using the General Social Survey permitting the operationalization of authoritarianism, nationalism and anti-democracy into 12 dependent variables, they find that individuals with high levels of exposure to martialization show higher probability of preferring a more extreme stance for every single dependent variable modeled for every year included in the analysis. The result suggests that counter-extremism policy must not ignore the overwhelming impact of military experience where “hearts and minds” are shaped.

In contrast to the broader analysis of radicalizations discussed in the above papers, the following three papers are focused specifically on the Indonesian context. In their paper Akmalia et al.¹⁶ examine the roles of the late Abdurrahman Wahid and Syafi’i Maarif in the promotion of moderate Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia. Akamail et al. examine their early influences through family, education and travels abroad, and how these shaped their views and ideas on moderate Islam within Indonesia including through their leadership roles within Indonesia’s largest Muslim organizations, Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The authors then go on to consider the establishment of their namesake institutions, the Wahid Foundation and the Maarif Institute as the ongoing legacy of these two men and their principles and ideas about moderate Islam. Finally, the authors suggest that the inspirational influence of both Wahid and Maarif on the younger generations across Indonesia warrants critical attention due to the radicalization threat.

The paper by Iqbal et al.¹⁷ examines the direct and indirect relationships between indicators of existential anxiety, political efficacy, extrinsic religiosity, and support for violent extremism in young people. The authors recruited two hundred and ten young Indonesians to the study, where all participants then completed an anonymous online survey containing the measures of interest. Their findings suggest that indicators of existential anxiety are related to greater support for violent extremism, but this relationship may be dependent on perceptions of political efficacy and religious orientation. Future research could explore whether support for violent extremism can be reduced by enhancing young people’s sense of control and political efficacy.

Wibisono et al.’s¹⁸ contribution to this collection examined the role of group identification and identity fusion for willingness to engage in religious collective action – both peaceful and violent. To this end, the authors conducted two studies. In the first study involving 239 Indonesian Muslims, they purport that religious identification and identity fusion were positively associated with peaceful collective action. In addition, when the role of identity fusion was controlled, identification was found to be negatively associated with support for violence. In the second study involving 176 Indonesian Muslims, they found that religious identification was positively associated with peaceful collective action. In this second study, however, even though identity fusion was again positively associated with support for violence, identification was not a significant predictor when controlling for identity fusion.

In the final contribution to this special edition, Resnyansky et al.¹⁹ consider the radicalization of women in Southeast Asia, focusing on Indonesia and Malaysia. Analyzing recent research in terms of gender-related categorization in terrorism, extremism and radicalization research they note a number of conflicting claims emerging from concepts such as ‘female terrorist’ and ‘militant feminism’ for understanding women’s engagement in violent extremist movements. In the face of these conflicting claims the authors argue that understanding of the radicalization in women in Southeast Asia requires socio-culturally specific gender-related concepts, concepts that are missing from much extant research in the area given the broadly liberal political theoretical framework that has informed it, including the Western liberal political theory focus on a kind of abstract individuality of persons. Seeking to understand the ‘reasons behind the reasons’, they apply the philosophical framework of communitarianism to analysis of the 2018 family suicide bombings in Surabaya and Sidoarjo, Indonesia. They suggest that communitarianism is much more helpful for our understanding here insofar as communitarians argue that peoples’ identities are in fact partially constituted by their social relations and responsibilities within distinct cultural communities. More specifically, the communitarian framework is useful for understanding the radicalization of women in Southeast Asia given their role in the family unit within their particular communities. Finally, this paper argues for a fundamental and critical reassessment of the usefulness of applying individual-centered Western traditions of political thought to societies that have more communally-oriented traditions, cultural norms and values.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Kumar Ramakrishna, “The Growth of ISIS Extremism in Southeast Asia: Its Ideological and Cognitive Features—and Possible Policy Responses,” New England Journal of Public Policy 29, no. 1 (2017): 6.

2 Mirra Noor Milla, Whinda Yustisia, Muhammad Abdan Shadiqi, Haykal Hafizul Arifin, “Mechanisms of 3N Model of Radicalization: Testing the Mediation by Group Identity and Ideology of the Relationship between Need for Significance and Violent Extremism,” this volume.

3 Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, and Rohan Gunaratna, “The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism,” Political Psychology 35 (2014): 69–93; Arie W. Kruglanski, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, and Rohan Gunaratna, The Three Pillars of Radicalization: Needs, Narratives, and Networks (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

4 Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009).

5 See, e.g., Borum’s four-phase model of radicalisation in: Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 37–62.

6 Arie W. Kruglanski, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, and Rohan Gunaratna, The Three Pillars of Radicalization: Needs, Narratives, and Networks (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

7 Milla et al., this volume.

8 Bertjan Doosje, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arjan De Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, and Allard R. Feddes, “Terrorism, Radicalization and De-radicalization,” Current Opinion in Psychology 11 (2016): 79–84.

9 Halim Rane, Shane Satterley and Riyad H. Rahimullah, “Education and Islamist Jihadism: A Survey of Muslim Australians”, this volume.

10 Manni Crone and Martin Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 521–36; Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 958–75.

11 Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33.

12 Ines Von Behr, Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism (RAND Corporation, 2013), https://apo.org.au/node/36281.

13 Emma F. Thomas, Nathan Leggett, David Kernot, Lewis Mitchell, Saranzaya Magsarjav, and Nathan Weber^{,, “}Reclaim the beach: How Offline Events Shape Online Interactions and Networks amongst those Who Support and Oppose Right-Wing Protest”, this volume.

14 David Duriesmith and Noor Huda Ismail, ^“Masculinities and Disengagement from Jihadi Networks: The Case of Indonesian Militant Islamists”, this volume.

15 Willem de Lint*, Rodrigo Praino “Does Martialization Contribute to Australia’s Right Wing Extremism? Implications of an Analysis of the General Social Survey”, this volume.

16 Wahyudi Akmaliah, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Sukendar^{, “}Making Moderate Islam in Indonesia”, this volume.

17 Muhammad Iqbal, Kerry S. O’Brien and Ana-Maria Bliuc, “The Relationship Between Existential Anxiety, Political Efficacy, Extrinsic Religiosity and Support for Violent Extremism in Indonesia”, this volume.

18 Susilo Wibisono, Winnifred R. Louis and Jolanda Jetten, “Willingness to Engage in Religious Collective Action: The Role of Group Identification and Identity Fusion”, this volume.

19 Lucy Resnyansky, Claire Smith, Craig Taylor, Priyambudi Sulistianto, George Merryman, and Mujahiduddin, “Reasons Behind Reasons: A Communitarian Reading of Women’s Radicalisation and Family Bombings in Southeast Asia”, this volume.