Outbreak: A Comprehensive Analysis of Biological Terrorism^♦

Abstract

Only a few studies on biological terrorism have ever been conducted empirically. Many of these focus on CBRN terrorism as a whole, rather than biological terrorism, specifically. Other accounts utilize a case- or historical analysis instead. This study serves as the most comprehensive empirical assessment of bioterrorism to date by drawing on the Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) Database at START as well as additional databases. The databases were merged to create a database whereby both CBRN and non-CBRN cases were included for both individuals and groups. Several binary logistic regression models (1990-2016) were then executed on biological weapons pursuit. The type of actor and ideology seem to be the most important factors for predicting biological weapons pursuit, although ethnic fractionalization was also negatively correlated with biological weapons pursuit. Governance measures had variable, but negative relationships with pursuit as well. Implications and recommendations are discussed.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

2 .

1 See W. Seth Carus (2000a) “R.I.S.E,” in Toxic Terror : Assessing the Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); W. Seth Carus (2000b) “The Rajneeshees,” in Toxic Terror : Assessing the Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Richard Danzig et al., “Aum Shinrikyo Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Center for a New American Security (2012); Lewis Dunn, “Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005; R. Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2010); Shahzeb Rathore, “Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?,” Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 2 (2016): 4–10, https://doi.org/10.2307/26369585.

2 Deepak K. Bhalla and David B. Warheit, “Biological Agents with Potential for Misuse: A Historical Perspective and Defensive Measures,” Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 199, no. 1 (2004): 71–84, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.taap.2004.03.009.; W Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900,” 1998.; W. Seth Carus, “The History of Biological Weapons Use: What We Know and What We Don’t,” Health Security 13, no. 4 (2015): 219–55, https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2014.0092.; W Carus, “A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21 St Century,” 2017; W. Seth Carus, “A Century of Biological-Weapons Programs (1915–2015): Reviewing the Evidence,” The Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 1–2 (2017): 129–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1385765.

3 Markus K. Binder and Gary A. Ackerman, “Pick Your POICN: Introducing the Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) Database,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2019), 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1577541.

4 Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study.”

5 J. Almosara. “Biotechnology, Genetically Engineered Pathogens.” USAF Air University, Counterproliferation Center, 2010; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases. https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp.; Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Giving Full Measure to Countemeasures (Washington, DC: The National Academy Press, 2004).

6 W. Seth Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900.”

7 Tamar Berger et al., “Toxins as Biological Weapons for Terror—Characteristics, Challenges and Medical Countermeasures: A Mini-Review,” Disaster and Military Medicine 2, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1186/s40696-016-0017-4.

8 Ibid.

9 Virginia I. Roxas Duncan, “Of Beans and Beads: Ricin and Abrin in Bioterrorism and Biocrime,” Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense s2, no. 1 (2011), https://doi.org/10.4172/2157-2526.s2-002.

10 Ibid.

11 Tamar Berger et al., “Toxins as Biological Weapons for Terror—Characteristics, Challenges and Medical Countermeasures: A Mini-Review.” 

12 Edyta Janik et al., “Biological Toxins as the Potential Tools for Bioterrorism,” International Journal of Molecular Sciences 20, no. 5 (2019), https://doi.org/10.3390/ijms20051181.

13 Richard Danzig et al., “Aum Shinrikyo Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,”

14 L. Dunn, “Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?”

15 Ibid, Table 1, 4

16 S. A. Rathore, “Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?”

17 R. Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?”

18 Gavin Cameron, “Nuclear Terrorism Reconsidered,” Current History 99, no. 636 (2000): 154–57, https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2000.99.636.154.

19 R. Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?”

20 Orlando Cenciarelli et al., “Viral Bioterrorism: Learning the Lesson of Ebola Virus in West Africa 2013–2015,” Virus Research 210, no. 210 (2015): 318–26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.virusres.2015.09.002.

21 Author unknown, “Ebola within a Bioterrorism Context”. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foi-responses-released-by-mod-week-commencing-26-january-2015

22 Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey, “Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism,” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx087.

23 W. Seth Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century.”

24 See sources in footnote 1.

25 See W. Seth Carus articles in footnote 2.

26 Gary Ackerman, “WMD Terrorism Research: Whereto from Here?,” International Studies Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 140–43, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2005.479_3.x.

27 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (1999): 498–504, https://doi.org/10.3201/eid0504.990406.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 3 (2012): 229–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2012.648156.

31 Bruce Hoffman, “‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 4 (1995): 271–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576109508435985.

32 Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychology of WMD Terrorism,” International Studies Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 148–51, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2005.479_6.x.

33 Lewis Dunn, “Next Generation Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons of Mass Effects Terrorism” (Washington, DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2008).

34 David Rapoport, “Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse.” National Security Studies Quarterly 5 (1999); D. Tucker, “What Is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 3 (2001): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550109609688.

35 Jessica Stern, “The Prospect of Domestic Bioterrorism,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (1999): 417–522, https://doi.org/10.3201/eid0504.990410.

36 D. Tucker, “What Is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It?,” 

37 Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550500189895.

38 Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 4 (2007): 273–94, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2007.00051.x.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons.” 

42 Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson, “An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 1 (2013): 226–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849945.

43 Ibid.

44 Daniel Koehler and Peter Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2018): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1500365.

45 Thomas R. Guarrieri and Collin J. Meisel, “Extremists and Unconventional Weapons: Examining the Pursuit of Chemical and Biological Agents,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression (2019), 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2019.1698633.

46 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons,” Journal of Applied Security Research (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2020.1860631

47 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons.” Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.” Terrorism and Political Violence (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1964964

48 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons.”

49 Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.” Terrorism and Political Violence (2021).

50 Ibid; Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study,”

51 See S. Lewallen and P. Courtright, “Epidemiology in Practice: Case-Control Studies.” Community Eye Health 11, no. 28 (1998): 57–58.

52 Markus K. Binder and Gary A. Ackerman, “Pick Your POICN: Introducing the Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) Database.” 

53 Ibid, 5 “its transparent classification of source validity and the inclusion of variables that rate the uncertainty sometimes present within and between sources. For ninety-eight of the core variables, each source attached to a case and the overall event itself, the database includes measures of credibility or uncertainty.”

54 Wesley S. McCann, “Who Said We Were Terrorists? Issues with Terrorism Data and Inclusion Criteria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2020): 1–21 https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2020.1816676.

55 Dongfang Hou, K. Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler. “Introducing Extended Data on Terrorist Groups (EDTG), 1976 to 2016,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no.1 (2020): 199–225.

56 This was derived by excluding all cases involving “weaptype” and “weapsubstype” codes pertaining to chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological agents or weapons. See START codebook for these values.

57 This was determined via a variable created in 2017 by START researchers called “individual”. This denotes whether the actor was in factor “unaffiliated”. See CODEBOOK: INCLUSION CRITERIA AND VARIABLES, October 2019, pp. 6

58 This appendix is available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2021.1964964?needAccess=true&journalCode=ftpv20. It is also available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/09546553.2021.1964964?scroll=top. See also Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”, Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

59 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons,” Journal of Applied Security Research (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2020.1860631; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.” Terrorism and Political Violence (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1964964

60 For example, one group- the ETLO- committed almost two dozen chemical attacks in the later 1990s, killing one person. However, the GTD only has them down for 1 attack and 1 death.

61 See Dongfang Hou, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, “Introducing Extended Data on Terrorist Groups (EDTG), 1970 to 2016,” for a review of using such a construct.

62 Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr, “Polity5 Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2018 Database,” Center for Systemic Peace, 2020.

63 Ibid, 16–17.

64 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

65 Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” 

66 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

67 Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study.” Wealth as measured by income per capita did not explain the use of CBRN weapons by nationalist/separatist or fundamentalist/cult actors.

68 “Indicators Data,” Worldbank.org, 2004, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator. Most of these values were already provided within the ETDG.

69 See Alberto F. Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” SSRN Electronic Journal 8, no. 2 (2002), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.319762.

70 See Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “Determinants of the Demise of Terrorist Organizations,” Southern Economic Journal 79, no. 4 (2013): 774–92, https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2012.269.

71 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

72 John Gallup, Andrew Mellinger, and Jeffrey Sachs, “Geography Datasets,” 2010.

73 See discussion in Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “Determinants of the Demise of Terrorist Organizations.” 

74 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

75 Dongfang Hou, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, “Introducing Extended Data on Terrorist Groups (EDTG), 1970 to 2016.”

76 For example, North America (NA) cannot be included in models with GDP or individuals as they are too highly correlated. This is likely because a vast majority of individual actors are from the US, and thus, GDP is moderated by this reality. The same is true, although to a lesser extent, for other western nations (e.g. Europe).

77 Thomas R. Guarrieri and Collin J. Meisel, “Extremists and Unconventional Weapons: Examining the Pursuit of Chemical and Biological Agents.”

78 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

79 Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study.”

80 Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons.”

81 Ibid.

82 Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study.”

83 Todd Sandler, Terrorism : What Everyone Needs to Know (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).

84 The same findings were established in both Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

85 Thomas R. Guarrieri and Collin J. Meisel, “Extremists and Unconventional Weapons: Examining the Pursuit of Chemical and Biological Agents.”; Daniel Koehler and Peter Popella, “Mapping Far-Right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment”; Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study.”

86 Gary Ackerman, and Anastasia Kouloganes, "Single-Issue Terrorism." In Erica Chenoweth et al., The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2019).

87 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

88 See Methodological Appendix.

89 Results not reported here, but across the various measures listed in the Methods section, religious actors- especially Islamic ones- were the most active and lethal.

90 Alberto F. Alesina et al., “Fractionalization.”

91 Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “Determinants of the Demise of Terrorist Organizations.”

92 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

93 See criticisms in Wesley S. McCann, “Who Said We Were Terrorists? Issues with Terrorism Data and Inclusion Criteria.”

94 Virginia I Roxas Duncan, “Of Beans and Beads: Ricin and Abrin in Bioterrorism and Biocrime.”

95 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Aflatoxin.” https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/hsb/chemicals/aflatoxin.htm

96 Wesley S. McCann, “Who Said We Were Terrorists? Issues with Terrorism Data and Inclusion Criteria.”

97 A. Menrath et al., “Survey of Systems for Comparative Ranking of Agents That Pose a Bioterroristic Threat,” Zoonoses and Public Health 61, no. 3 (2013): 157–66, https://doi.org/10.1111/zph.12065., 163

98 Ibid, 163–164

99 Ibid., Table 1

D Tian and T Zheng, “Comparison and Analysis of Biological Agent Category Lists Based On Biosafety and Biodefense,” PLoS ONE 9, no. 6 (2014): 101163, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0101163.t001.

100 Katharina Tomuzia et al., “Development of a Comparative Risk Ranking System for Agents Posing a Bioterrorism Threat to Human or Animal Populations,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 11, no. S1 (2013): S3–16, https://doi.org/10.1089/bsp.2012.0070.

101 Mary Zalesny, Paul Whitney, and Amanda White, “A Conceptual Model to Identify Intent to Use Chemical-Biological Weapons,” Journal of Strategic Security 10, no. 3 (2017): 54–86, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.3.1612.

102 Manfred S Green et al., “Confronting the Threat of Bioterrorism: Realities, Challenges, and Defensive Strategies.”

103 Jeremy Sobel, Ali S Khan, and David L Swerdlow, “Threat of a Biological Terrorist Attack on the US Food Supply: The CDC Perspective,” The Lancet 359, no. 9309 (2002): 874–80, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(02)07947-3.

104 Ibid.

105 Mahendra Pal et al., “An Overview on Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism,” American Journal of Biomedical Research 5, no. 2 (2017): 24–34, https://doi.org/10.12691/ajbr-5-2-2.

106 J. Tucker, “Biological threat assessment: Is the cure worse than the disease?” Arms Control Today 348 (2004): 13–19.

107 Ibid. For example, Tucker discusses how the US government failed to disclose three separate ventures in their confidence building measures (CBMs) declarations which were used to strengthen the BWC and were seen as the gold standard for others to follow.

108 Anshula Sharma et al., “Next Generation Agents (Synthetic Agents): Emerging Threats and Challenges in Detection, Protection, and Decontamination,” Handbook on Biological Warfare Preparedness (2020): 217–56, https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-812026-2.00012-8, 248

109 Deepak K Bhalla and David B Warheit, “Biological Agents with Potential for Misuse: A Historical Perspective and Defensive Measures.”; Steven Block, “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons,” American Scientist 89, no. 1 (2001): 28, https://doi.org/10.1511/2001.1.28.; Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons”; S. Pullinger, “Fighting Biological Warfare: The Convention against Biological Weapons Badly Needs a Verification Protocol.” Bmj: British Medical Journal 320, no. 7242 (2000): 1089–1090.

110 J.P. Caves and W. Seth Carus, “The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030.” Occasional Paper 10 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2014).

111 Ibid.

112 S/RES/1540 (2004)

113 S/RES/2325 (2016)

114 Lewis Dunn, “Next Generation Weapons of Mass Destruction and Weapons of Mass Effects Terrorism,” xviii

115 Ali Kemal Erenler, Murat Güzel, and Ahmet Baydin, “How Prepared Are We for Possible Bioterrorist Attacks: An Approach from Emergency Medicine Perspective.”.

116 Michael Ainscough, “Next Generation Bioweapons: The Technology Of Genetic Engineering Applied To Biowarfare And Bioterrorism,” United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 2002).

117 See Benoit Gilquin et al., “A Proteomics Assay to Detect Eight CBRN-Relevant Toxins in Food,” PROTEOMICS 17, no. 1–2 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1002/pmic.201600357.

118 Mahdi Balali-Mood, Mohammad Moshiri, and Leila Etemad, “Medical Aspects of Bio-Terrorism,” Toxicon 69 (2013): 131–42, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.toxicon.2013.01.005.

119 G. Jonah A. Rainey and John A. T. Young, “Antitoxins: Novel Strategies to Target Agents of Bioterrorism,” Nature Reviews Microbiology 2, no. 9 (2004): 721–26, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrmicro977.

120 Peter D. Anderson, “Bioterrorism: Toxins as Weapons,” Journal of Pharmacy Practice 25, no. 2 (2012): 121–29, https://doi.org/10.1177/0897190012442351.

121 This can be gleaned from the POICN data by tabulating delivery mechanism with agent.

122 Ali Kemal Erenler, Murat Güzel, and Ahmet Baydin, “How Prepared Are We for Possible Bioterrorist Attacks: An Approach from Emergency Medicine Perspective,” The Scientific World Journal 2018 (2018): 1–4, https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/7849863.

123 See Konstantin Chumakov et al., “Vaccination against Polio Should Not Be Stopped,” Nature Reviews Microbiology 5, no. 12 (2007): 952–958, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrmicro1769.; Manfred S Green et al., “Confronting the Threat of Bioterrorism: Realities, Challenges, and Defensive Strategies,” The Lancet Infectious Diseases 19, no. 1 (2019): e2–e13, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(18)30298-6.

124 Ronald M. Atlas, “Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism,” BioScience 49, no. 6 (1999): 465–77, https://doi.org/10.2307/1313554.

125 Wesley S. McCann, “The Siege: Religious-Inspired Terrorism and CBRN Weapons”; Wesley S. McCann, “Islamic Extremism and CBRN Weapons.”

126 Wesley s. McCann, “CBRN Terrorism Interdictions (1990-2016) and Areas for Future Inquiry”, Perspectives on Terrorism (2021).

127 Lewis Dunn, “Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?

128 R. Mowatt-Larsen, “Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat: Hype or reality?”

129 POICN Case # T200701150001

130 Gary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson, “Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and Potential Impacts,” Perspectives on Terrorism 14, no. 3 (2020).