The “Lightning” Brigade: Security Force Assistance and the Fight Against al-Shabaab

Abstract

In the fight against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, the Somali National Army has suffered acute personnel, training, funding, and other difficulties that have rendered it ineffective. The U.S.-trained Danab Brigade has proven capable in breaking the ineffectiveness pattern. Drawing on over 20 interviews with Somali officials and service members, this paper analyzes U.S. security force assistance in the case of Somalia. Danab’s sound performance stems from its U.S. training and support, multi-clan ethos, and aggressive tactical style. Danab exemplifies American success in building small, aggressive, mobile partner military forces. The recent U.S. withdrawal from Somalia raises questions about Danab’s continued viability.

Acknowledgements

We give special thanks to our interviewees, without whom we could not complete this project. We are grateful to Bruce Hoffman for his thorough and thoughtful editorial leadership, which made the review, editing, and production process for this paper as smooth and productive as it could have been. We thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. Finally, thank you to Mehvish Khan and Anthony Blacer for efficient editing and production assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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2 “AMISOM Visits Newly Recovered Bariire on an Assessment Mission,” African Union Mission in Somalia, June 15, 2019, https://amisom-au.org/2019/06/amisom-visits-newly-recovered-bariire-on-an-assessment-mission/; Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia Forces Capture Key Al-Shabab Town of Bariire,” Voice of America, August 19, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-forces-capture-key-shabab-town-bariire/3992642.html; Amanda Sperber, “The Danab Brigade: Somalia’s Elite, US-Sponsored Special Ops Force,” Pulitzer Center, August 11, 2020, https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/danab-brigade-somalias-elite-us-sponsored-special-ops-force.

3 Paul D. Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 187–88.

4 Williams, 245–46.

5 Rempfer, “US Troops, Nonprofit Trainers and a ‘Lightning Brigade’ Battle for Somalia.”

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14 This is the term used in, United States Marine Corps, “Small Wars Manual” (Department of the Navy, 1940), 1, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-15%20%20Small%20Wars%20Manual.pdf.

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16 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David B. Carter, “A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups,” International Organization 66, no. 1 (January 2012): 129–51, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000312; David B. Carter, Andrew C. Shaver, and Austin L. Wright, “Places to Hide: Terrain, Ethnicity, and Civil Conflict,” The Journal of Politics 81, no. 4 (2019): 1446–65, https://doi.org/10.1086/704597; Kentaro Hirose, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, “Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Insurgent Violence? Ideology and Insurgent Tactical Choice in Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 1 (January 2017): 47–63, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316675909; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 67–106, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090031; John A. Nagl, Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice (New York: Penguin Books, 2014); David H. Patraeus and James F. Amos, Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006); United States Marine Corps, “Small Wars Manual.”

17 Frank G. Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf.

18 Hoffman, 35–37.

19 This is in contrast to the traditional Western “revolution in military affairs” concept that predicted precision weapons, advanced airpower, and other technological innovations would greatly reduce survivability on the battlefield. Itai Brun, “‘While You’re Busy Making Other Plans’ – The ‘Other RMA,’” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (August 2010): 535–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2010.489708.

20 Stephen Biddle, Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), 1–22, https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691207513/nonstate-warfare.

21 Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,” in Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 43–64; Robert Johnson, The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 249–98.

22 Joseph Krauss, “Taliban Take over Afghanistan: What We Know and What’s Next,” Associated Press, August 16, 2021, sec. Joe Biden, https://apnews.com/article/taliban-takeover-afghanistan-what-to-know-1a74c9cd866866f196c478aba21b60b6.

23 Omar Ashour, How ISIS Fights: Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021); Ahmed S. Hashim, The Caliphate at War: The Ideological, Organisational and Military Innovations of Islamic State (London: Hurst & Company, 2018); Craig Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare” 10, no. 4 (2016): 4–18.

24 Stig Jarle Hansen, Horn, Sahel, and Rift: Fault-Lines of the African Jihad (London: Oxford University Press, 2019), 99–127.

25 Hansen, 163–85; Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 (London: Hurst & Company, 2013).

26 Dima Adamsky, “Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 1 (December 31, 2009): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903400548; Ido Levy, “Toward Understanding the Actions of the Islamic State and Other Jihadist Groups as Military Doctrine,” Small Wars Journal, January 24, 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/toward-understanding-actions-islamic-state-and-other-jihadist-groups-military-doctrine.

27 Numerous terms have emerged to describe these missions, including advise and assist, train and equip, foreign internal defense, security cooperation, security sector assistance, partner capacity building, and “by, with, and through” operations. This paper uses SFA as a broad catch-all for these concepts. Philip Battaglia and Curtis Taylor, “Security Force Assistance Operations: Defining the Advise and Assist Brigade,” Military Review, July 2010, 2–9; Joseph L. Votel and Eero R. Keravuori, “The By-With-Through Operational Approach,” Joint Forces Quarterly 89 (2018): 40–47.

28 Patrick M. Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 55–73.

29 Mara Karlin, “Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint,” Foreign Affairs, December 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint/.

30 Jennifer Kavanagh et al., “Anticipating Adversary Military Interventions” (RAND Corporation, September 27, 2021), xiv, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA444-1.html.

31 Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 89–142, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745.

32 Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).

33 Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” The RUSI Journal 164, no. 3 (April 16, 2019): 10–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1643258.

34 Mike Nelson, “It Was the Best of COIN, It Was the Worst of COIN: A Tale of Two Surges,” Modern War Institute, June 24, 2021, https://mwi.usma.edu/it-was-the-best-of-coin-it-was-the-worst-of-coin-a-tale-of-two-surges/.

35 Mick Mulroy and Eric Oehlerich, “A Tale of Two Partners: Comparing Two Approaches for Partner Force Operations,” Middle East Institute, January 29, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/tale-two-partners-comparing-two-approaches-partner-force-operations.

36 Michael Knights and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Accidental Allies: The U.S.-SDF Partnership Against the Islamic State (London: I. B. Tauris, 2021).

37 David M. Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service” (Brookings, March 16, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-iraqi-counter-terrorism-service/; David M. Witty, “Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter Terrorism Service,” Policy Focus (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus157-Witty-2.pdf.

38 Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, “From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the ‘War on Terror’ Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia,” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 11 (November 2, 2018): 2044, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186.

39 Paul D. Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 21–22.

40 See, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SO_080609_Agreement%20between%20the%20TFG%20and%20the%20ARS%20-%20Djibouti%20Agreement.pdf

41 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017, 242.

42 Ibid., 4–5, 242.

43 New America, “America’s Counterterrorism Wars,” May 17, 2020, http://newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/.

44 Perry Chiaramonte, “Jihadist Groups across Globe Vying for Terror Spotlight,” Fox News, March 24, 2015, https://www.foxnews.com/world/jihadist-groups-across-globe-vying-for-terror-spotlight; “Who Are Somalia’s al-Shabab?,” BBC News, December 22, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689.

BBC NEWS, 24 september 2010, https://www.bbc.com/somali/war/2010/09/100924_dagaal

28 April 2011, Garbahaarey oo ay dowladda la wareegtay

September 5, 2012, https://hiiraan.com/news/2012/sept/wararka_maanta5-19194.htm

45 Paul D. Williams, “Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a Failure, 2008–2018,” Journal of Strategic Studies 43, no. 3 (April 15, 2020): 370–71, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210.

46 Colin D Robinson and Jahara Matisek, “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia: Bypassing Mogadishu for Local Legitimacy,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 4 (June 6, 2020): 68–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1830711.

47 Nisar Majid et al., “Somalia’s Politics: The Usual Business? A Synthesis Paper of the Conflict Research Programme,” Monograph (London, UK: London School of Economics, June 2021), 30, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110878/.

48 Colin D. Robinson, “The Somali National Army: An Assessment,” Defense & Security Analysis 35, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 213, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600805.

49 Ibid., 215.

50 “Somalia Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Resolution 2317 (2016)” (United Nations Security Council, November 8, 2017), 137–38, https://www.undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2017/924.

51 Ibid., 214.

52 Robinson and Matisek, “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia,” 73–74.

53 Interview with a former Presidential Guard officer, July 2021.

54 Interview with a former Presidential Guard officer, December 2020; Williams, “Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a Failure, 2008–2018,” 370.

55 Interview with a former Presidential Guard officer, July 2021.

56 Williams, “Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a Failure, 2008–2018,” 379-380.

57 Interview with a former SNA officer, July 2020.

58 Interview with a former SNA officer, July 2020.

59 Bronwyn E. Burton and Paul D. Williams, “Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013” (Joint Special Operations University, September 2014), https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU14-5_BrutonWilliams_AMISOM_FINAL.pdf.

60 Ibid.

61 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008),” March 10, 2010, https://www.undocs.org/S/2010/91.

62 Hansen, Horn, Sahel, and Rift: Fault-Lines of the African Jihad, 179–80.

63 Ibid., 367.

64 See, https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/

65 Maxamed Xaaji Xuseen, “Wararka Maanta: Arbaco, Sept 5 , 2012-Dagaal Culus Oo Degmada Garbahaarey Ku Dhexmaray Ciidammada Dowladda Somalia Iyo Xoogagga Xarakada Al-Shabaab,” Hiiraan Online, September 5, 2012, https://hiiraan.com/news/2012/sept/wararka_maanta5-19194.htm.

66 “Dagaal Hiiraan ku dhexmaray al-Shabaab iyo ciidanka dowladda,” BBC, September 24, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/somali/war/2010/09/100924_dagaal.

67 See, Ibid.; “Garbahaarey oo ay dowladda la wareegtay,” BBC, April 28, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/somali/war/2011/04/110428_somalia.

68 Interview with a former SNA officer, (28,8,2020)

69 Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 49-53.

70 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 77-78.

71 Ibid., 101–102.

72 Ibid., 178–180.

73 Paul D. Williams, “Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU’s Largest Peace Operation?” (International Peace Institute, January 11, 2017), https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/.

74 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 213-214.

75 Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012, 49–50.

76 Jenna Stern, “Reducing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Ten Years After the Zeid Report,” Policy Brief (Stimson, February 2015), https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Policy-Brief-Sexual-Abuse-Feb-2015-WEB_0.pdf.

77 Kyle Rempfer, “AFRICOM Accused of More Civilian Deaths, Will Begin New CIVCAS Report,” Military Times, April 1, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/04/01/africom-accused-of-more-civilian-deaths-will-begin-new-civcas-report/.

78 Interview with a former SNA officer, September, 2020

79 Interviews with Danab officers, May 2020-January 2021.

80 Interview with former Danab officer, 2020.

81 Cara Anna, “‘Why Now?’ Dismay as US Considers Troop Pullout from Somalia,” Associated Press, November 26, 2020, sec. International News, https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-elections-africa-somalia-kenya-6fad3fe2b14858274daf34a29a78dbe7.

82 Cara Anna, “US Military Says Troop Withdrawal from Somalia Is Complete,” Military Times, January 17, 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/01/17/us-military-says-troop-withdrawal-from-somalia-is-complete/.

83 “Al-Shabab Claims Killing 12 Somali Soldiers From ‘U.S.-Trained Special Forces’ Near Baledogle Airport Base, Somalia,” Middle East Media Research Institute, accessed November 30, 2020, https://www.memri.org/jttm/al-shabab-claims-killing-12-somali-soldiers-us-trained-special-forces-near-baledogle-airport.

84 John Vandiver, “US Helps Somali Commando Force Grow from Battalion to Brigade,” Stars and Stripes, March 22, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/us-helps-somali-commando-force-grow-from-battalion-to-brigade-1.573794.

85 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020.

86 This number has likely dropped over the course of 2021 due to an uptick of al-Shabaab attacks on Danab units. Compare with Robinson’s recent estimation of 850 total Danab soldiers, Robinson, “Rebuilding Armies in Southern Somalia,” 330.

87 Lt. Col. Ahmed Abdullaahi Nuur “Beeryare” serves as Danab and Battalion 4 commander. Interviews with Danab officers, July-October 2021.

88 Interviews with Danab officers, May 2020-January 2021.

89 Interview with an SNA officer familiar with Danab operations, January 2021.

90 Mohammed Dhaysane, “Ambush in Somalia Kills at Least 5 Military Officials,” Anadolu, December 9, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ambush-in-somalia-kills-at-least-5-military-officials/2071496; Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “At Least 10 Killed in Central Somalia Bombing Claimed by al Shabaab,” Reuters, December 19, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-blast-idINKBN28T07P.

91 Interview with a Puntland official, July 2021; Michael M. Phillips, “Caught in a Political Crossfire, U.S.-Trained Somali Commandos Suspend Fight Against Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2021, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/caught-in-a-political-crossfire-u-s-trained-somali-commandos-suspend-fight-against-islamic-state-11639145293.

92 Rempfer, “US Troops, Nonprofit Trainers and a ‘Lightning Brigade’ Battle for Somalia”; Williams, “Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a Failure, 2008–2018,” 374.

93 Interview with a former Danab officer, 2020. Rempfer, “US Troops, Nonprofit Trainers and a ‘Lightning Brigade’ Battle for Somalia”; See, https://www.bancroftglobal.org/personnel/. Bancroft’s staff includes individuals with extensive experience in the American and other militaries and military institutes.

94 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020; Interview with a Danab officer January 2021.

95 Rempfer, “US Troops, Nonprofit Trainers and a ‘Lightning Brigade’ Battle for Somalia”; Williams, “Building the Somali National Army,” 374.

96 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020; Interview with an SNA officer familiar with Danab operations, January 2021.

97 Christina Goldbaum, “Exclusive: Massive Military Base Buildup Suggests the U.S. Shadow War in Somalia Is Only Getting Bigger,” Vice, May 3, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en/article/xw7nw3/somalia-is-looking-like-another-full-blown-us-war.

98 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020; Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020.

99 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020.

100 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020.

101 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020.

102 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020.

103 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020.

104 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020.

105 The commander of Battalion 6 died in the operation. Interview with a Danab officer, October 2021; “Somalia: Government Forces Launch Military Operation to Retake Town of Guriel Oct. 23,” Garda, accessed October 24, 2021, https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/537806/somalia-government-forces-launch-military-operation-to-retake-town-of-guriel-oct-23.

106 Ibid.

107 Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Somali Government Troops Vacate Some Bases in Row over Salaries,” Reuters, March 20, 2019, sec. Aerospace & Defense, https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-security-idUSL8N21747D; Abdi Sheikh, “Hundreds of Somali Soldiers Protest in Mogadishu over Unpaid Wages,” Reuters, March 12, 2017, sec. reboot-live, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-protests-idUSKBN16J0YF.

108 Robinson, “The Somali National Army: An Assessment,” 214.

109 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020; Reuters Staff, “FACTBOX - Clan Structure Key to Understanding Somalia,” Reuters, December 5, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL05364051.

110 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020.

111 Interview with a former Danab officer, 2020.

112 Ibid.

113 Interviews current and former with Danab officers, May 2020-January 2021.

114 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020.

115 Interviews with current and former Danab officers, May 2020-January 2021.

116 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020.

117 Interview with a former Danab officer, January 2021.

118 Interviews with Danab officers, May 2020-January 2021.

119 See, Charles T. Cleveland, James B. Linder, and Ronald Dempsey, “Special Operations Doctrine: Is It Needed?,” Prism 6, no. 3 (December 7, 2016): 5–20.

120 Interviews with Danab officers, May 2020-January 2021.

121 See Ahmed S. Hashim, The Caliphate at War: The Ideological, Organisational and Military Innovations of Islamic State (London: Hurst & Company, 2018), 217; and Mary Grace Lucas, “ISIS Nearly Made It to Baghdad Airport, Dempsey Says,” CNN, October 13, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/12/politics/isis-baghdad-martin-dempsey/index.html.

122 Witty, “Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter Terrorism Service.”

123 The phrase is attributed to Michael Knights, https://twitter.com/AlexAlmeida2020/status/1407402165296144387.

124 Interview with a former Gorgor officer, May 2020.

125 Colin Robinson, “Rising Politicization Risks Splitting Somali National Army,” Global Observatory, March 17, 2021, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/03/rising-politicization-risks-splitting-somali-national-army/.

126 Ibid.

127 For example, Sharif Hassan and Susannah George, “Afghan Forces Rescue More than 60 Hostages from Taliban Prison in Night Raid,” Washington Post, January 29, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan-forces-rescue-more-than-60-hostages-from-taliban-prison-in-night-raid/2020/01/29/86ae33f6-42b8-11ea-b5fc-eefa848cde99_story.html.

128 Interview with a former Danab officer, December 2020.

129 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020

130 Interview with an SNA officer familiar with Danab operations, January 2021.

131 See, https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1418924006103830550; Interview with a Danab officer, October 2021.

132 Interview with a former Danab officer, May 2020.

133 Hevidar Ahmed and Rebwar Qasim, “Iraq’s Golden Division May Liberate Mosul, but at What Cost?,” Rudaw, December 24, 2016, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/24122016.

134 Declan Walsh, “Suicide Bomber in Somalia Hits Prime Minister’s Rally,” New York Times, December 18, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/18/world/africa/somalia-prime-minister-bombing.html.

135 See, https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1451958340834181121.

136 Interviews with Danab officers, July-October, 2021.

137 Interview with Danab officer, October 2021.

138 John Vandiver, “AFRICOM Chief Meets with Somali ‘Lightning Brigade’ in Contested Region,” Stars and Stripes, August 2, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/2021-08-02/africom-townsend-somalia-danab-2411642.html.

139 For further information on Amniyaat operations outside al-Shabaab territories see, Ido Levy and Abdi Yusuf, “How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money? Terrorist Funding and Innovation in the Case of al-Shabaab,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, June 17, 2019, 8–10, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1628622.

140 “Al-Shabab Claims Killing 12 Somali Soldiers From ‘U.S.-Trained Special Forces’ Near Baledogle Airport Base, Somalia,” Middle East Media Research Institute, accessed November 30, 2020, https://www.memri.org/jttm/al-shabab-claims-killing-12-somali-soldiers-us-trained-special-forces-near-baledogle-airport.

141 “Somalia: Jihadists Attack US Training Base at Baledogle,” BBC News, September 30, 2019, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49879607.

142 Abdi Yusuf, “Al-Shabaab Using Political Entryism into the Somalia Parliamentary & Presidential Elections,” AfricaNexus, November 8, 2020, https://africanexus.org/somalia/al-shabaab-using-political-entryism-into-the-somalia-parliamentary-presidential-elections/.

143 Katherine Zimmerman, “Why the US Should Spend 0.3 Percent of Its Defense Budget to Prevent an African Debacle,” Military Times, March 12, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/03/12/why-the-us-should-spend-03-percent-of-its-defense-budget-to-prevent-an-african-debacle/.

144 Pending the replacement of Battalion 6 commander Maj. Abduladiif Ahmed Culusow ‘Feefle,’ who died taking part in an operation on October 23, 2021. See, https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1451958340834181121.