Jihadist Ideological Conflict and Local Governance in Mali

Abstract

In West Africa’s Sahel region, franchises of global jihadist groups like Islamic State and al-Qaeda proliferate. So far, the dynamics of jihadist groups in the Sahel have predominantly been studied through analyses of the material and strategic dimensions of the struggle. Curiously, little attention has paid to how religiously-informed worldviews inform their expansion. Drawing on the concept of “epistemic worldviews”, this article explores how local leaders of al-Qaeda and Islamic State franchises frame their fight. It argues that transnational jihadist ideology matters; both for how different jihadist groups compete to mobilize new followers as well as for how they implement new models of jihadist governance. Contributing to ongoing debates about the transnationalization of jihad, the article shows that in the intra-jihadist contestation between the groups in Mali, global jihadist concepts are negotiated, contested, and constituted by the groups as they go along. Thereby global jihadist ideology comes to provide both a cause and an effect of contestations and conflicts between the expanding jihadist groups in the Sahel.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Aïcha Ba for assisting the translation of the original audio files from Arabic and Fulfulde to French and Olivia Hammershøy for assisting the translation from French to English. The authors are also grateful to Luca Raineri and the two anonymous reviewers for providing useful comments to an earlier draft of this article.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Jihadism is a slippery and politically charged concept. The term “jihad” derived from Arabic means to strive or exert and is understood as a struggle or exertion of one’s power in the path of Allah (God) and includes both armed and non-armed forms of practice.

2 These different groups are jihadist in the sense that they consider armed jihad to be a legitimate and instrumentally efficient means to achieve radical political change. See Mark Sedgwick, “Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dangers of Loose Use of an Important Term,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 2 (2015): 34–41.

3 JNIM formed in 2017 under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, a prominent Tuareg notable who established Ansar Dine in 2012. See Troels Burchall Henningsen, “The Crafting of Alliance Cohesion among Insurgents: The Case of al-Qaeda Affiliated Groups in the Sahel Region,” Contemporary Security Policy 42, no. 3 (2021): 371–90, for a further discussion of JNIM alliance formation and cohesion.

4 Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the Global Conflict Between the Islamic State and Al-Qàida Finally Came to West Africa,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 7 (2020): 1–14.

5 Isak Svensson, “Conceptualizing the Religious Dimensions of Armed Conflicts: A Response to ‘Shrouded: Islam, War, and Holy War in Southeast Asia’,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 55, no. 1 (2016): 185–9; Carolyn Chisadza and Manoel Bittencourt, “Globalisation and Conflict: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa,” International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement 10, no. 1 (2018).

6 Mark Juergensmeyer and Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “A Sociotheological Approach to Understanding Religious Violence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence, ed. Michael Jerryson, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Margo Kitts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 620–43.

7 See e.g. Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, “The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel,” African Affairs 112, no. 448 (2013): 498–509; Alexander Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel, Local Politics and Rebel Groups (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

8 Juergensmeyer and Sheikh, “A Sociotheological Approach,” 627.

9 Ferdaous Bouhlel and Yvan Guichaoua, “Norms, Non-Combatants’ Agency and Restraint in Jihadi Violence in Northern Mali,” International Interactions 47, no. 5 (2021): 855–72; Signe-Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, Lars Engberg-Pedersen, and Adam Moe Fejerskov, “Introduction: Global Gender Equality Norms and Heterogeneous Development Organisations,” Progress in Development Studies 18, no. 2 (2018): 77–94.

10 Adib Bencherif, “Unpacking “Glocal” Jihad: From the Birth to the “Sahelisation’ of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 14, no. 3 (2021): 335–53.

11 See Mohammed Hafez, “The Crisis within Jihadism: The Islamic State’s Puritanism vs. al-Qàida’s Populism,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 9 (2020): 40–5.

12 Between 2012 and early 2019, 52 percent of the total violence in Mali occurred in Mopti making it Mali’s most dangerous place. See Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel.

13 Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, “Disentangling the Security Traffic Jam in the Sahel: Constitutive Effects of Contemporary Interventionism,” International Affairs 96, no. 4 (2020): 855–74.

14 See introduction this Issue.

15 Edoardo Baldaro and Yida Seydou Diall, “The End of the Sahelian Exception: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Clash in Central Mali,” The International Spectator 55, no. 4 (2020): 69–83; Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali,” African Security 8, no. 4 (2015): 249–71; Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel; Adam Sandor and Auriélie Campana, “Les groupes djihadistes au Mali, entre violence, recherche de légitimité et politiques locales [Jihadist Groups in Mali, between Violence, Quest for Legitimacy and Local Politics],” Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des études Africaines 53, no. 3 (2019): 415–30.

16 Marcin Styszynski, “ISIS and Al Qaeda: Expanding the Jihadist Discourse,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 6, no. 8 (2014): 9–14. 

17 Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter, “The Islamic State’s Global Insurgency and Its Counterstrategy Implications,” in Evolutions in Counter-Terrorism, Volume II: Contemporary Developments (The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2020), 21–46; Charles Lister, “Al-Qaeda versus ISIS: Competing Jihadist Brands in the Middle East,” Middle East Institute, Counterterrorism Series 3 (2017): 1–25.

18 See Hafez, “Crisis within Jihadism,” 40–1.

19 Telli Betül Karacan, Reframing Islamic State: Trends and Themes in Contemporary Messaging, DIIS report 06 (Copenhagen, Denmark: DIIS – Danish Institute for International Studies, 2020); Ian R. Pelletier, Leif Lundmark, Rachel Gardner, Gina Scott Ligon, and Ramazan Kilinc, “Why ISIS’s Message Resonates: Leveraging Islam, Sociopolitical Catalysts and Adaptive Messaging,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 10 (2016): 871–99.

20 Miron Lakomy, “Recruitment and Incitement to Violence in the Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Comparative Analysis of Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 7 (2021): 565–80.

21 For a review of the literature, Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, “Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 213–26.

22 Adib Bencherif, “From Resilience to Fragmentation: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Jihadist Group Modularity,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 1 (2020): 100–18; Djallil Lounnas, “The Transmutation of Jihadi Organizations in the Sahel and the Regional Security Architecture,” MENARA Future Notes no. 10 (April 2018); Anneli Botha, “Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism,” Institute for Security Studies Monographs 144 (2008); Andrew Lebovich, “The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali,” CTC Sentinel 6, no. 6, (2013): 4–10.

23 Francesco Strazzari, Azawad and the Rights of Passage: The Role of Illicit Trade in the Logic of Armed Group Formation in Northern Mali (Norwegian Center for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), 2015); Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn, eds. Africa’s Insurgents: Navigating an Evolving Landscape (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2017); Luca Raineri and Alice Martini, “ISIS and al-Qaeda as Strategies and Political Imaginaries in Africa: A Comparison between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Civil Wars 19, no. 4 (2017): 425–47.

24 Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari, “State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali,” African Security 8, no. 4 (2015): 249–71.

25 Valeria Rosato, “‘Hybrid Orders’ between Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” African Security 9, no. 2 (2016): 1–26.

26 Luca Raineri, “Explaining the Rise of Jihadism in Africa: The Crucial Case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2020). DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078.

27 Boukary Sangaré, “Le centre du Mali: épicentre du jihadisme?,” Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, GRIP, Note d’analyse, May 20, 2016, https://grip.org/le-centre-du-mali-epicentre-du-djihadisme/; Ousmane Aly Diallo, “Ethnic Clashes, Jihad and Insecurity in Central Mali,” Peace Review 29, no. 3 (2017): 299–306; Tor A. Benjaminsen and Boubacar Ba, “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups? A Political Ecological Explanation,” Journal of Peasant Studies 46, no. 1 (2019): 1–20.

28 Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel.

29 Juergensmeyer and Sheikh, “A Sociotheological Approach”; Mona Kanwal Sheikh and Mark Juergensmeyer, eds., Entering Religious Minds: The Social Study of Worldviews (London: Routledge, 2019).

30 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, “Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 215.

31 The translation from Fulfulde and Arabic to French/English has been done by the authors.

32 See Richard Moorehead, “Structural Chaos: Community and State Management of Common Property in Mali” (PhD diss., University of Sussex, 1991); Trond Vedeld, “Village Politics – Heterogeneity, Leadership, and Collective Action among Fulani of Mali” (PhD diss., Agricultural University of Norway, 1997).

33 ACLED, “Ten Conflicts to Worry about in 2019,” https://www.acleddata.com/2019/02/01/ten-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2019/#unique-identifier (accessed November 25, 2021).

34 After operation Serval ended in 2014, France expanded and regionalized its military operation into operation Barkhane deployed in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.

35 Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel.

36 Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Killings, ‘Disappearances’ in Military Operations: Investigate Alleged Security Force Abuses in Mopti Region,” April 20, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/mali-killings-disappearances-military-operations.

37 Diallo, “Ethnic Clashes, Jihad and Insecurity,” 302.

38 Mathieu Pellerin, “Armed Violence in the Sahara. Are We Moving from Jihadism to Insurgency?,” Études de l’Ifri (2019), https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/violences-armees-sahara-djihadisme-aux-insurrections.

39 Sandor and Campana, “Les groupes djihadistes au Mali.”

40 See: Hafez, “The Crisis within Jihadism,” 41.

41 See intro this issue.

42 Bencherif, “Unpacking “Glocal” Jihad.”

43 Benjaminsen and Ba, “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups?.”

44 Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel, 155.

45 Benjaminsen and Ba, “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups?”; Céderic Jourde, Marie Brossier, and Modibo Ghaly Cissé, “Prédation et violence au Mali: élites statutaires peules et logiques de domination dans la région de Mopti”, Revue canadienne des études africaines 53, no. 3 (2019): 431–45.

46 Since the 1990s both Iyad ag Ghali and Kouffa have been members of conservative transnational religious networks like the Saudi Da’wa and the Pakistani Jama’at al Tabligh, which inspired them ideologically. Kouffa also joined Ansar Dine during 2011–2013 and was one of the main architects behind the battle for Konna in 2013, which triggered the French military intervention.

47 Thurston, Jihadist of North Africa, 184–5.

48 Audio message by Kouffa in response to Fulani elites’ call for dialogue, August 2017.

49 International Crisis Group (ICG), Speaking with the ‘Bad Guys’: Toward Dialogue with Central Mali’s Jihadists (Dakar/Brussels: Africa Report 279, 2019).

50 Interview, Malian researcher, Bamako 2019.

51 Audio message by Abou Mahmoud, January 2020.

52 Ibid.

53 Kouffa’s reply to ISGS, audio recording, April 2020.

54 Bencherif, “Unpacking “glocal” jihad.”

55 See Vedeld, “Village Politics.”

56 Matthew D. Turner, “Conflict, Environmental Change and Social Institutions in Dryland Africa: Limitations of the Community Resource Management Approach,” Society and Natural Resources 12, no. 7 (1999): 643–57; Tor A. Benjaminsen and Boubacar Ba, “Farmer–Herder Conflicts, Pastoral Marginalisation and Corruption: A Case Study from the Inland Niger Delta of Mali,” Geographical Journal 175 (2009): 71–81.

57 Jourde et al., “Prédation et violence au Mali.”

58 Benjaminsen and Ba, “Farmer–Herder Conflicts.”

59 Benjaminsen and Ba, “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups?”; Jourde et al., “Prédation et violence au Mali.”

60 See also: Raineri and Strazzari. “State, Secession, and jihad”; Troels Burchall Henningsen, “The Crafting of Alliance Cohesion among Insurgents: The Case of al-Qaeda Affiliated Groups in the Sahel Region,” Contemporary Security Policy (2021). doi: 10.1080/13523260.2021.1876455.

61 The jowros made a memorandum based on Tarik (documents written in Arabic) which granted them the right to exploit the pastoral resources of the delta and to charge the Tolo (an access tax) from the allochthonous herders from the Seno, Tioki and Wuwarbé who come to the delta each dry season to exploit the bourgoutières. The jowro were asked not to exceed the amount of 500,000 Fcfa for the payment of Tolo in areas called rundé (a pastoral space). They were also asked not to pay the dappè (a fee paid when the animals arrive in a pastoral area and exploit it).

62 Audio recording of message from Amadou Kouffa to ISGS, 24 April 2020.

63 Audio recording of message by ISGS representative, January 2020.

64 Jourde et al., “Prédation et violence au Mali”; Benjaminsen and Ba, “Why Do Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups?.”

65 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Speaking with the ‘Bad Guys’.”

66 See Jami Forbes, “Revisiting the Mali al-Qàida Playbook: How the Group Is Advancing on Its Goals in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 9 (2018): 18–21.

67 Interview Malian academic, Bamako, February 2020.

68 Andrew Lebovich, “Sacred Struggles: How Islam Shapes Politics in Mali. European Council on Foreign Relations,” European Council on Foreign Relations (November, 2019), https://ecfr.eu/publication/secular_stagnation_malis_relationship_religion/.

69 Telephone interview with Mopti-based NGO worker, Bamako, October 2019.

70 Ibid.

71 Audio message by Abou Mahmoud, March 2020.

72 Audio recording of message by Abou Mahmoud, March 2020.

73 Telephone interview with Mopti-based NGO, Bamako, November 2019.

74 Audio recording of message by Abou Mahmoud, March 2020.

75 In Mali Muslims have been present since the eleventh century and the region has been centre of several Islamic empires and states established through a succession of Sufi jihads in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, contestation of violent jihadist movements comes from various sides, including the religious community in Mali (See Lebovich, “Sacred Struggles” for a discussion of Islam and politics in Mali.).