Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) from an Insurgent Group to a Local Authority: Emergence, Development and Social Support Base

Abstract

In 2011, the Middle East entered an era of turmoil. Syria has been the scene for evolution of many NSAGs. This study aims to analyze the factors helped one of the prominent violent organizations, HTS, to become one of the main NSAGs outside the Regime control areas, by applying qualitative methodology using two data sources: primarily, semi-structured field interviews, secondarily, related sources of newspapers/research centers’ publications. Findings show that the decisive military factor and ability to build an interest-based relationship with local elites, impose order and security, and provide public services were critical in imposing hegemony and establishing governance.

Acknowledgements

We appreciate for the contributions, time, and patience of the respective anonymous reviewers, editorial board members, and anonymous interviewees for their full support. Without their contributions, the article would not be reached its current quality.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

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8 Brynjar Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” Perspectives on Terrorism. Special Issue on the Islamic State, 9, no.4 (August, 2015): 35-36.

9 Pearlman, and Cunningham, “Nonstate Actors,” 1.

10 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (IDRC - International Development Research Center, 2001), URL: https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/responsibility-protect-report-international-commission-intervention-and-state-sovereignty , Access date: 22.05.2022.

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15 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “Rebels & Legitimacy; An Introduction,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28, no:4-5, (2017): 672, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2017.1322337.

16 UNHCR, Syria emergency.

17 Kasfir, “Rebel Governance,” 22.

18 BBC News, Syrian Nusra Front.

19 Nassar, Rahal, and Clark, “HTS-backed civil authority”.

20 Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” 35-36.

21 David Close, and Gary Prevost. “Introduction: Transitioning from Revolutionary Movements to Political Parties and Making the Revolution ‘Stick’”. In From Revolutionary Movements to Political Parties: Cases From Latin America And Africa. Ed: Kalowatie Deonandan, David Close , Gary Prevost (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007):7-8. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230609778_1.

22 Benedetta Berti, “From Cooperation to Competition: Localization, Militarization and Rebel Co-Governance Arrangements in Syria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (2020):2 DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2020.1776964

23 Berti, “From Cooperation to Competition,” 9-10.

24 Sukanya Podder, “Understanding the Legitimacy of Armed Groups: A Relational Perspective,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28, no:4-5, (2017):687, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2017.1322333.

25 Ibid, 696.

26 Berti, “From Cooperation to Competition,” 3.

27 Podder, “Understanding the Legitimacy”, 694.

28 Berti, “From Cooperation to Competition,” 3.

29 Jerome Drevon, and Patrick Haenni, “How global Jihad relocalises and where it leads : the case of HTS, the former AQ franchise in Syria,” Working Paper, EUI RSC, 2021/08, Middle East Directions (MED), (2021):4, https://hdl.handle.net/1814/69795.

30 Heller, Sam, “The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (2017): 141. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26295963.

31 Ibid, 141-143.

32 Peter Krause, “The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness,” International Security 38, no. 3 (2013): 78-80. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24480557 .

33 Sam, “The Strategic Logic,” 145.

34 Daily Sabah, “Turkey, Russia reach an agreement for a ceasefire in Syria’s Idlib,” Daily Sabah, (March 5, 2020), URL: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-russia-reach-agreement-for-cease-fire-in-syrias-idlib. Access date: 05.06.2021.

35 Ahrar al-Sham-Official Site, البيانات الرسمية | حركة أحرار الشام الإسلامية. (n.d.). Retrieved December 2, 2021, from: https://ahraralsham.net/official-statement/ .

36 Al-Assil, I. “Al-Qaeda Affiliate and Ahrar al-Sham Compete for Control in Idlib”. Middle East Institute, (June 29, 2017), URL: https://www.mei.edu/publications/al-qaeda-affiliate-and-ahrar-al-sham-compete-control-idlib , Access Date: 19.12.2021.

37 Sam, “The Strategic Logic,” 143.

38 Sham Network, (2017, July 22), هيئة تحرير الشام خلقت جميع الظروف قبل توجيه الضربة القاضية لـ “أحرار الشام” .. فماذا فعلت .. ؟؟. Retrieved December 3, 2021 from shorturl.at/arEF4.

39 Daily Sabah, “Turkey, Russia reach an agreement”.

40 Drevon, and Haenni, “How global Jihad relocalises,” 22.

41 Orwa Ajjoub, “HTS is not al-Qaeda, but it is still an authoritarian regime to be reckoned with,” Middle East Institute, (June 24, 2021), URL: https://www.mei.edu/publications/hts-not-al-qaeda-it-still-authoritarian-regime-be-reckoned , Access Date: 02.10.2021.

42 Zaiton, مبادرة لإدارة مدنية للمناطق المحررة في إدلب تحت حراسة عناصر الهيئة - جريدة زيتون. (August 24, 2017), December 4, 2021. Retrieved from: http://www.zaitonmag.com/%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81/

43 Drevon, and Haenni, “How global Jihad relocalises,” 5.

44 Nisreen Al-Zaraee, and Karam Shaar, “The Economics of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,” Middle East Institute, (2021), URL: https://www.mei.edu/publications/economics-hayat-tahrir-al-sham , Access Date: 03.01.2022.

45 Al-Zaraee, and Shaar, “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham”.

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47 Drevon, and Haenni, “How global Jihad relocalises,” 20.

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49 Ajjoub, “HTS and al-Qaeda in Syria”.

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51 Silvia Carenzi, “A Downward Scale Shift? The Case of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” Perspectives on Terrorism 14, no. 6 (2020): 96. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26964728.

52 Considering the semi-structured nature of the interviews, these questions serve as a guide with the flexibility to ask further questions, if needed, during the interviews.