After the Caliphate: Changing Mobilization in the Swedish Salafi-Jihadist Environment following the Fall of ISIS

Abstract

After the fall of the Islamic State’s self-declared Caliphate in Syria and Iraq, understanding how the Salafi-jihadist environments in the West mobilize in new ways has become urgent. This study is based on unique hard-to-reach data from qualitative interviews with returned Swedish ISIS fighters, previous members of the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment, friends and acquaintances of persons engaged in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment, and a former Swedish jihadist recruiter. It explores post-Caliphate mobilization in terms of recruiting new members, keeping old members, and sustaining support from other radicals who are not active members of the Salafi-jihadist environment. Five distinct themes emerged from the interviews that reflect changing “push” and “pull” factors, which in different ways make mobilization in the post-Caliphate period challenging: competition from criminal gangs, increasing fuzziness of the environment, limited ability of external events to mobilize both new and old members, variation in the ease of leaving the Salafi-jihadist environment, and lack of new heroic mobilization narratives. The study concludes that, despite continuing problems in so-called radicalization hubs in Sweden, IS and other jihadist groups now have difficulty mobilizing both old and new members. In particular, changes in pull factors suggest that the current mobilization dynamics point to an environment that is facing challenges.

It has been argued that the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment has increased in size and influence.¹ According to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), it grew from 200 individuals in 2010 to more than 2000 in 2017.² Between 2012 and 2016, about 300 of them traveled to Syria or Iraq to support and fight for various jihadist organizations, mostly to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria³ (ISIS).⁴ In 2016, however, new Swedish legislation made it possible for the authorities to prevent individuals from traveling abroad as travel with the intent to participate in terrorist activities became illegal.⁵ While it was easy for jihadists to cross the border from Turkey to Syria at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey gradually increased the border controls after facing international criticism. This meant that many potential jihadists who had hoped to travel to the conflict zone remained in Sweden. Moreover, jihadist groups’ concerns about spying and hacking, as a result of the increasing monitoring and removal of jihadist propaganda from the internet, made it more difficult to recruit and agitate openly on mainstream social media, e.g. Facebook and Twitter.⁶ Consequently, this prompted the use of more subtle ways of recruiting and communicating on encrypted platforms, e.g. Telegram, to maintain security and privacy.⁷ In 2020, a new Swedish law even criminalized support for terrorist organizations.⁸ As a result, it has been feared that the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment has not only grown but has also become more hidden.⁹

Several empirical studies have been conducted on Swedish jihadists before the collapse of ISIS. Rostami, Sturup, Mondani, Thevselius, Sarnecki, and Edling,¹⁰ as well as Gustafsson and Ranstorp,¹¹ statistically analyzed some of the characteristics of Swedish jihadists in Syria and Iraq, which led to important insights reminiscent of similar studies on jihadists in the Western context. For example, in line with Sageman¹² and Wiktorowicz¹³ who have previously emphasized that radicalization processes often take place in small social groups and are affected by peer pressure and bonding, Rostami et al.¹⁴ found that almost half of the Swedish foreign fighters had at least one relationship (next-of-kin or friend) with another deceased foreign fighter. Similarly, while Basra and Neumann¹⁵ argued that the prevalence of criminal backgrounds amongst European jihadists is remarkable, Rostami et al.¹⁶ found that two thirds of the Swedish jihadists were previously suspected of at least one crime. Several scholars¹⁷ have addressed the so-called crime-terror nexus, and Sturup and Rostami¹⁸ have even argued that the extremist and criminal environments overlap in Sweden. In addition, over 70 percent of the Swedish fighters came from socio-economically vulnerable areas.¹⁹ Thus, in line with Dawson’s²⁰ review of the research field on Western foreign fighters, there was still some variation in their socio-economic backgrounds.

Because of immense access problems in the field of Islamist radicalization and terrorism studies, it has been difficult to generate primary data from firsthand sources, such as active or returned foreign fighters.²¹ However, Nilsson²² has succeeded in conducting several interviews with both former and active Swedish jihadists and identified three new trends when comparing jihadists active in Syria with those who fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia: socialization to global jihad, normalization of jihad, and an increasing use of the doctrine of takfir, i.e. declaring other Muslims as infidels. Moreover, he has studied Swedish jihadists’ motivations with a focus on cognitive dissonance and how fighting affects jihadists such that radicalization continues in the conflict zone.²³ Carlsson, Rostami, Mondani, Sturup, Sarnecki, and Edling²⁴ have also interviewed individuals in Sweden with a history of Islamist extremism and analyzed different stages of engagement in the radical environment: weakening of informal social controls, interaction with individuals in proximity to the group, and meaning-making. Aasgaard,²⁵ as well as Jørgensen and Esholdt,²⁶ has even analyzed Swedish ISIS fighters based on interviews with their family members. Krona²⁷ has explored the varying role of social media in Swedish support for the Islamic State (IS) over the past decade. Finally, Esholdt²⁸ has conducted an online study of the propaganda narratives of a group of ISIS-affiliated Swedish “sisters in deen” (i.e. “sisters in the faith”) on social media, which has provided insights into the female-specific attractions of Salafi-jihadism in the Swedish context.

Despite the limited yet growing body of studies on Swedish Salafi-jihadist foreign fighters and the people around them, there is today little empirical knowledge of possible changes in the Swedish as well as other Western Salafi-jihadist environments after the military collapse of ISIS in the battle of Baghouz in early 2019. There are widespread fears relating to former fighters being motivated by revenge and learning from their experiences in Syria. For example, Hamming²⁹ recently argued that “we will see future Jihadi leaders with experience from the Syrian Jihad. And we will see perpetrators of international terrorist attacks who learned their trade and prepared in Syria’s training camps.” Moreover, Cohen and Kaati³⁰ have argued that jihadist “propaganda will continue to circulate in digital environments.” However, when IS is no longer defined by the boundaries of any territorial entity after the collapse of the self-declared Caliphate in Syria and Iraq,³¹ the dynamics of mobilization have possibly changed to meet the new reality, as have mobilization narratives. Thus, recognizing that the Salafi-jihadist environments have not diminished, understanding how they mobilize in different Western contexts in the post-Caliphate period has become urgent.

This study seeks to fill this gap with unique hard-to-reach data from returned Swedish ISIS fighters, previous members of the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment, friends and acquaintances of persons engaged in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment, and a former Swedish jihadist recruiter. It analyzes post-Caliphate mobilization in terms of recruiting new members, keeping old members, and sustaining support from other radicals who are not active members of the Salafi-jihadist environment. Such mobilization can be analytically described with the help of “push” and “pull” factors. While push factors refer to structural conditions, such as socio-economic circumstances, that drive people toward extremist groups, pull factors capture the aspects that make joining such groups appealing to someone, such as lifestyle, group belonging, and ideology, as well as emotional and material incentives.³²

The study focuses on the mobilization of men because they are either former or potential fighters. Women have played active roles in mobilization for ISIS by using social media to disseminate propaganda, and to mentor and recruit other women especially.³³ Klausen³⁴ has even referred to the online mobilization of ISIS-affiliated women in tactical support roles for ISIS foreign fighters as “the Umm factor.” However, although women play an active role in the mobilization, the “female jihad” is generally considered to differ from its male version, as women are assigned to nonviolent roles and are excluded from the battlefield.³⁵

We first present our method and materials, followed by an analysis of new mobilization dynamics in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment in the post-Caliphate period. We conclude that, despite continuing problems in so-called radicalization hubs³⁶ in Sweden, IS and other jihadist groups now have difficulty mobilizing both old and new members. In particular, changes in pull factors suggest that the current mobilization dynamics point to an environment that is facing challenges.

Method and Materials

Possible changes in the Salafi-jihadist environment can be analyzed with the help of different empirical materials. Thus far, most empirically based studies on ISIS have been based on data in the form of official propaganda magazines,³⁷ unofficial propaganda from ISIS-members’ and/or ISIS-supporters’ open social media accounts,³⁸ as well as encrypted communication platforms such as Telegram.³⁹ Some scholars⁴⁰ have also succeeded in generating data on jihadists from secondhand sources such as relatives or other persons in the social environment around people who have traveled to the conflict zone. However, an analytical focus on recruiting new members, keeping old members, and sustaining support from other radicals who are not active members of the Salafi-jihadist environment requires access to informants privy to such mobilization dynamics. This is increasingly difficult today as the Salafi-jihadist environment has become more hidden. Only a few scholars have previously succeeded in conducting interviews with active or former jihadists either face to face⁴¹ or by using communication platforms such as Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp.⁴²

The results of this study are based on ten interviews with men who have been members of the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment or have social ties to it. The study was conducted in Gothenburg, which is well known to have been a major radicalization hub for jihadist recruitment since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. As noted by Jørgensen and Esholdt,⁴³ and Nilsson,⁴⁴ access to the Salafi-jihadist environment is closely bound up with a long process of engaging in trust-building activities in advance. Thus, the first author used contacts from his previous research on jihadists in Gothenburg as starting points for using the snowball method⁴⁵ to locate new informants. When using this sampling method, currently enrolled informants help recruit new ones for the study, which makes it suitable for sampling hidden populations that are difficult to access when no sampling frame exists.⁴⁶ Snowball sampling may lead to bias if previously interviewed informants only help recruit new ones who have the same perceptions.⁴⁷ To avoid such bias, the first author established several starting points independent of each other when snowball sampling among his contacts. After informed consent was received, the interviews were conducted by the first author in private homes and at cafes and lasted about one hour each. Two of the interviewees were interviewed twice. During the interviews the informants were asked about changes in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment after the fall of ISIS, how it recruits new members, keeps old members, and sustains support from those who are not active members. All characteristics, e.g. names, geographical places, and ethnicity that could make an individual recognizable have been either omitted or altered in the process of transcribing our interview material to protect the identity of our informants.

Five of the informants, Ali, Yahya, Mohsen, Jabir, and Malik, have friends and acquaintances in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment. Because of their proximity to the active members, they all have personal experiences of being subjected to recruitment attempts to violent jihad and are therefore in a position to observe recruitment trends and how the Salafi-jihadist environment relates to the surrounding Muslim community. Kareem is a former jihadist recruiter who has played a significant role in Sweden, inspiring several Swedes to become foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, even for ISIS. Although Kareem considers himself deradicalized today, he is a significant source as a former leading figure who personally knows many of the current members in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment. Two of the informants, Fazl and Awad, have left the Salafi-jihadist environment and have not been to Syria. Finally, two of the informants, Mazen and Hamdi, have returned from ISIS controlled territories and are no longer behaviorally radicalized⁴⁸ with a willingness to travel to some other conflict zone. However, they still have contacts with active members and are in a position to observe general trends in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment’s ability to sustain support from its members and other radicals. We have not interviewed active members of the Salafi-jihadist environment because we judge it is unlikely that they are willing to discuss how they seek to mobilize both old and new members after the fall of ISIS.

The interviews were analyzed thematically⁴⁹ in order to identify different push and pull factors involved in post-Caliphate mobilization. Investigator triangulation, using multiple researchers in the analysis of the data,⁵⁰ was used to increase the credibility of the analysis, as both the first and the second author collaborated on it. The results of our analysis reflect the informants’ observations and perceptions of new trends and phenomena concerning mobilization in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment after the fall of ISIS. Our study has obtained ethical approval from the Swedish Ethical Review Authority (approval number 2021-01245).

Analysis

In the following, we present five distinct themes that emerged from the analysis focusing on new mobilization dynamics in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment: competition from criminal gangs, increasing fuzziness of the environment, limited ability of external events to mobilize both new and old members, variation in the ease of leaving the Salafi-jihadist environment, and lack of new heroic mobilization narratives. These themes reflect the changing push and pull factors of jihadism in the post-Caliphate period, which in different ways challenge mobilization in the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment.

Competition from Criminal Gangs

As previously described, many potential jihadists who had hoped to travel to Syria had to remain in Sweden because of both national and international initiatives that made it increasingly difficult to travel to the conflict zone. According to our informants, the apparent lack of ISIS’s success as a self-declared caliphate eventually affected the Salafi-jihadist environment in Sweden, especially its ability to pull in new members. ISIS had fostered a participatory media culture consisting of collaborative media practices between official and supporter channels.⁵¹ This may have made it easier for the supporters to take over much of the production work on encrypted platforms after ISIS’s collapse, but with fewer social contacts in the offline world, recruitment problems have still increased.

According to Ali, the number of individuals who would have wanted to become jihadists did not decrease after the fall of ISIS, but there was a feeling that the organization had exaggerated its retaliatory capabilities in Europe. A few attacks had taken place, but nothing compared to the expectations among the supporters. Finally, talk of IS became scarce. As Ali said, “many thought that more stuff would happen. And then it got quieter. There were still many who wanted to fight, but you didn’t hear so much talk about Dawlah [i.e. IS] anymore.” He added that the socio-economic situation is still contributing to the creation of potential radicals: “Life is the same as before. Who cares about us here? Nothing new has happened. What are they going to do?” Thus, the local situation, especially in the suburbs, is in Ali’s view still characterized by widespread feelings of not being part of Swedish society, and a perceived lack of achievement in life which “pushes” young men to consider radical alternatives. Indeed, over 70 percent of the Swedish foreign fighters came from socio-economically vulnerable areas.⁵² However, although there is some consensus among scholars that radicalization often involves socio-economic marginalization,⁵³ it is still not a sufficient cause of radicalization as most marginalized individuals do not join jihadist groups. Thus, despite the continuing problems in the vulnerable areas, IS and other jihadist groups now have difficulty mobilizing both old and new members.

Yahya argued that not only did the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment become quieter, but many previous supporters even turned away from IS. When the balance of power in Syria and Iraq turned against ISIS and its forward drive was replaced by a desperate attempt to keep the Caliphate alive, many of the remaining supporters also started to disappear from the Swedish mosques:

After the fall of ISIS, many of those who had supported the Islamic State began to speak out against it. Other old supporters disappeared from mosques. Think of soccer. When things are going well for IFK Göteborg [i.e. a local soccer team], everyone wants to cheer for them, but when they are losing, many forget the team. (Yahya)

As the Salafi-jihadist environment’s ability to pull in new members diminished with ISIS’s waning fortunes, an increasing number of young men who could have been recruited were now instead being pulled in by criminal gangs. Ali explained that the choice between violent Islamists and gangs often depended on one’s social contacts, even if the effect is not deterministic in an environment where the social circles between the criminals and the violent radicals may overlap: “It depends on who you know, but sometimes it is not possible to say why. Someone may know everyone, and it happens often. You know how it is here. Everyone knows a lot of people.”

Malik, however, was more skeptical and argued that not everyone wanted to become a jihadist just because of one’s social contacts and added: “Yes, just look at me.” Instead, he argued that although recruits to both groups may experience an apparent lack of socio-economic success, those who choose violent Islamism are individuals looking for more meaning and what Cottee and Hayward⁵⁴ call “existential attractions” in their lives: “All these guys have failed in school, one hundred percent, but some still want to do something big and mean something.” However, Malik added that although even criminal gangs offer a new identity, “in gangs, they do not understand what they are fighting for—killing each other completely unnecessarily.” Mazen, who had returned from Syria, agreed that today the tide has changed as gangs are drawing in mostly young men who are disgruntled with the society and their lives. However, he echoed Roy’s⁵⁵ argument that “what fascinates is pure revolt […] Violence is not a means. It is an end itself”:

Syria was like a viral song kept alive for a while. Young people today join the gangs instead of jihad. Gang culture is more popular among young people, that’s what they see in the neighborhood. It is cooler to be part of a gang because gangs have greater capacity for violence in civilian environments. They did not have that before. Today, people are killed almost completely for no reason. Jihadists could instead offer capacity for violence in Syria. (Mazen)

Thus, the ability of both ISIS and criminal gangs to create opportunities to use violence to express rebellion against society influences their ability get new recruits, seemingly creating a market where demand and supply decide the outcome of social mobility. However, the reality is sometimes more complex. Kareem, a former jihadist recruiter, argued that some individuals are now in both the jihadist and gang environments, often moving back and forth, without a need to prioritize any of them:

There is a mix between them. It’s like they have their loyalty both to Islam—what’s in their heads, Islam then—and also to the gang. So they are like between the gang and between the jihadists. And these environments are close to each other. Because these jihadists talk a lot about sacrifice, martyrdom and weapons and things like that, and in that environment there is a lot of talk about being brothers and shooting and defending your territory. So it’s like the same talk. Both attract […]. Some gang members pray at the mosque. Their view of Islam is skewed. They live a double life. Some even have several accounts online—a Muslim account and his usual gangster account. So when he’s kind of religious, he goes there [i.e. the Muslim account], and when he has “gone psycho,” he can log into the other one, watching porn and watching other things. And when he kind of wants to be a Muslim, he goes to the mosque on Fridays to meet them [i.e. other Muslims] and they have dinner afterwards, talk about Islam, the Day of Judgment and stuff—sometimes quite deep questions. It’s like therapy. (Kareem)

Such overlapping may be strengthened by the similarities between the two environments and their physical closeness, especially after travel to the conflict zone in Syria became difficult and most radicals had to stay in Sweden. Dual identities may also offer some benefits to individuals who feel unstable in their outlook on life. However, being in both environments is not unproblematic. Mazen lamented that one of his friends, who also had returned from ISIS, got involved in drugs and ended up in prison. According to him, the returnees’ social position is not high, as they are not seen as heroes by the new generation of potential radicals any longer. This has furthermore diminished the Salafi-jihadists’ capacity to compete with the gangs in inspiring disgruntled young men when the gangs have become more violent. Mazen explained:

Returning jihadists do not have a high social position in the suburbs where gangs are tougher with a lot of potential for violence. When you come home, you have no authority among young people and the old environment is no longer as lively [as before]. Thoughts weaken, you easily become depressed and sucked into everyday life, or end up in gangs, crime, drugs. (Mazen)

However, the jihadist environment seeks to counter these difficulties. As Kareem argued,

the new strategy now is to influence the gangs and try to make sure that they are loyal to their struggle […] They work for the municipality, for example, as youth recreation leaders, and they have access to resources and networks, and they meet young people every day and they take them to basement mosques. I used to be invited by these municipal workers to these places and lecture to young people, for example. There are also private sessions where these gang members come in, sit there and learn about Islam from, for example, a traditional book that no one can reject, like Arba’in an-Nawawiyyah or Riyad as-Salihin or something like that, but with whose interpretation? Ibn Taymiyyah’s interpretation, and then this Wahabism comes in, and then they have been brought into this environment, so to speak. It still happens that way, and now it’s online. (Kareem)

Even Jabir argued that “some got regular jobs, even working for the municipality, but it doesn’t mean that they have left their old thoughts and beliefs.” However, as Fazil explained, “they are struggling to keep the group alive. No one likes to admit that the project failed. They are still looking for new people, mostly online but also by trying to be creative, looking for new strategies.” This is in line with Ranstorp and Ahlerup’s⁵⁶ argument that there are tendencies to work through municipalities.

In sum, although the push factors remain the same, mobilizing new recruits is difficult as the radical environment’s pull factors have weakened after the fall of the Caliphate, while the pull factors of criminal gangs at the same time have become stronger. This has created a need to find new ways to reach potential recruits.

Increasing Fuzziness of the Environment

The Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment has become fuzzier after the fall of ISIS. This lack of distinction is created not only by the occasional overlapping of the Salafi-jihadist and gang environments, but also by other changing social networks and behavioral patterns. Yahya explained that the old guard of the Salafi-jihadist environment today consists of increasingly “isolated groups that are careful.” It is difficult for them to communicate through social media, and they feel closely followed by the police, which makes them more careful than when ISIS was on the rise. Therefore, “today we do not know who is who, whether they support IS or not,” as Yahya argued. Thus, the increased carefulness has not only led to a drop in the production of easily accessible online propaganda, but has also made it increasingly difficult for other Muslims, even for those who have stood close to the Salafi-jihadist environment, to know all of its members. Previously, everyone knew everyone, and supporters and members of the Salafi-jihadist environment were quite open about their opinions. As Yahya argued, “in the past, people either spoke for IS or were quiet. Today, people are mostly quiet. You do not hear so much anymore.” Most of those who were quiet in the past did not support IS, but today some of them do, which makes it difficult to chart the number of people supporting Salafi-jihadist groups. Although some also started to speak against IS, the increasing quietness, not always knowing what others think, created a feeling of uncertainty in the social relations between many individuals previously surrounding the Salafi-jihadist environment.

A related phenomenon contributing to the new sense of fuzziness is that some, not only those who started to talk against IS but also those who now were quiet, started to draw nearer to other Salafist groups. Yahya argued that as IS is not growing anymore, gangs as well as nonviolent Salafist groups are absorbing those who have previously been members or supporters of violent groups: “Islamist groups are growing but not IS people. Many have left. They have become part of the nonviolent Salafist group.” Sheikh⁵⁷ argued, based on interviews conducted with Danish jihadists during the heyday of ISIS, that “the militant Islamists are quite sceptical towards the mosques, especially mosques that are considered to be ‘moderate’ by mainstream society.” However, it seems that Salafi-jihadists have adequate theological affinity with the nonviolent Salafist worldview. Although its extent is unknown, this development is interesting because it is not clear how such social mobility will affect the nonviolent Salafist groups. Either nonviolent Salafist groups will be able to absorb these individuals without problems, eventually changing their ideas and behavioral patterns, or these individuals will somehow exert influence on the nonviolent Salafist groups. The former option would indicate possible cognitive and behavioral deradicalization. Indeed, Lambert,⁵⁸ who headed the Muslim Contact Unit of the Metropolitan Police and cooperated with local Salafists to counter radicalization in London, argued that such nonviolent Salafist groups can prevent radicalization. The latter option, however, would be a ripple effect of ISIS’s fall, possibly increasing radical undercurrents among nonviolent Salafist groups. Moreover, Kareem argued that when the gang environment, including drugs, is still nearby and alluring, the difficulty of living a strict religious life can also drive some individuals from nonviolent Salafism into jihadism:

That journey can go both ways. In fact, when I think of my old friends who were in a gang, many of them, when they left the gang, they became Salafists. Usually, it suits well. Some of them continued on the path and went on to jihadism and then traveled [to Syria] as well. And some lost faith. They joined gangs and then became religious, and then they lost faith. They stopped praying, they stopped, you know, going to the mosque, and they started smoking and stuff and went back to their old friends and old gang friends and stuff, and they lost their faith. Here comes some form of revival […]. Those who joined the Islamist or Salafist group became cranky, started smoking and partying and stuff, and doing small robberies. And then they became religious again, but they went straight down to Syria, as soon as they became religious. Why? Because they wanted to protect themselves against going back to the old life. Because they are too weak to live in Sweden, and then they feel that the only way is that we do jihad. And then they all went down there [i.e., to Syria]. They were seven people or something like that. (Kareem)

Indeed, the prevalence of criminal backgrounds among Western jihadists has been remarkable.⁵⁹ Although Lambert argued that Salafist groups can work against jihadist recruitment, opting for nonviolent forms of Salafism is, as Kareem argued, not always easy for former gang members, which may contribute to explaining their increased risk of behavioral radicalization.

In conclusion, the fuzziness of the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment after the fall of ISIS is not only related to the overlapping of the Salafi-jihadist and gang environments; it is also related to some Salafi-jihadists drawing nearer the Salafist environment, and the fact that the Salafi-jihadist environment has become quieter. Although some individuals may find dual identities comfortable, the increased fuzziness of the Salafi-jihadist environment challenges its ability to mobilize new members.

Limited Ability of External Events to Mobilize Both New and Old Members

External events can possibly be a pull factor with the ability to mobilize both old and new members. Although IS had lost its territorial presence in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban take-over of Afghanistan showed the members and supporters of the Salafi-jihadist environment that there were still grounds for believing that force could be used to establish what they perceive as legitimate Shariah rule. Ali explained that this has mobilized and given new hope to some individuals: “Yes, you think it’s good when something happens, that you do not lose hope. It did not look so good, but now things are happening again.”

However, the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment’s relationship to the Taliban is complex. The Taliban declared a local emirate and their aims are not global, as opposed to those of al-Qaeda and IS. According to our informants, this caused some second thoughts about how to react to the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Others were still excited about the increased activity of IS in Afghanistan and elsewhere, which holds the potential for IS to live on, not only as a virtual online caliphate but as a physical caliphate with territorial presence. In the past, al-Qaeda could use Taliban controlled areas as a refuge, but today there is a troubling split in the jihadist movement. Malik argued that just as the jihadist movement had been emboldened by the defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops in 2021 also created a learning effect:

Sure, many like the idea of governing the country with Shariah again, but it’s a problem that they [i.e. the Taliban] have talked to the Americans, you know, in Qatar—and they are fighting IS. So, it is good and bad with the Taliban. You don’t know what to do with them. I think there are many who now get the idea that it is possible to have a caliphate and defeat the Americans, but it is still IS that they see as the best alternative. (Malik)

In a similar vein, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda since the death of Osama bin Laden, had previously argued that “the jihad battles in Afghanistan destroyed the myth of a (superpower) in the minds of the Muslim mujahideen [i.e. jihadist] young men.”⁶⁰ However, Mazen argued that the Taliban are different from IS not only in terms of having more local aims but also regarding the role of foreign fighters:

You will not go to the Taliban, because they will not treat you like a hero. They have enough competent men themselves. Ordinary Muslims can express joy for the Emirate in Afghanistan if Shariah law is applied there, but the Taliban do not need people from the suburbs. No one will go there. (Mazen)

Although the Taliban control territory and seek to establish their version of Shariah rule, they have, according to Mazen, little need for foreign fighters and do not fulfill the psychological needs of young men disgruntled with their lives, looking for new identities and roles. Afghanistan would be a good location for performing hijrah (i.e. moving to what one perceives as an Islamic country), but Mazen further explained that “IS has made takfir on the Taliban,” which makes it increasingly difficult for many young jihadists to consider moving to Afghanistan. The success of IS in Syria and Iraq made its ideas increasingly appealing in several conflict zones, which gave rise to franchises in several places, for example, in West Africa, Sinai, and Afghanistan. Although IS started as a franchise of al-Qaeda, Byman⁶¹ wrote that it “has eclipsed al-Qaeda in size and strength; it has also outpaced its former master in spawning affiliates, establishing ever-larger numbers of franchises and supporters throughout the Muslim world.” He also argued that the United States and its allies should take advantage of “the tensions that will probably arise between ISIS’ leadership in Iraq and Syria and its more remote branches. Al-Qaeda’s affiliates eventually became a burden for its core, demanding resources, ignoring its directives, and tarring its name by conducting unpopular attacks.” However, there are clear differences between al-Qaeda and IS. Al-Qaeda polarized the relationships between the West and the Muslim world, and thus anything that was perceived as excessive violence against Muslims would be tantamount to attacking the in-group. IS polarized instead the Muslim world, pitting IS supporters against other Muslims who were, however, not seen as real Muslims (i.e. the takfir phenomenon). Thus, even attacks against other Muslims have been unproblematic for IS and its supporters because of the prolific use of takfir.

Mohsen argued that IS’s inspirational effect increased when it succeeded in controlling more territory in Syria and Iraq, despite its different methods: “It’s really important that Dawlah got bigger and bigger. They moved forward and did what no one else could do. Many of them [i.e. potential recruits] thought that this was what was needed and joined.” Even Mazen agreed that “IS had the greatest forward spirit.” Moreover, IS was, according to Mohsen, quick to declare a caliphate in Syria and Iraq, which further inspired potential recruits: “Yes, it also played a big role. The others did not do it [i.e. declare a caliphate], and why wait if you are winning. You then also get many guys who want to come to jihad.”

In sum, external events from other jihadist groups such as the recent Taliban take-over of Afghanistan have had little effect on the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment’s ability to mobilize. Although the take-over showed that jihad can be successful, IS had excommunicated the Taliban. Moreover, the Taliban had little need for foreign fighters and did not fulfill the psychological needs of young men looking for new identities.

Variation in the Ease of Leaving the Salafi-jihadist Environment

Leaving a radical group can be the result of a combination of psychological, emotional, relational, and strategic factors.⁶² However, as Horgan⁶³ argues, disillusionment with the group often precedes disengagement from it, which was also the case with those of our informants who had been members of the Salafi-jihadist environment. However, how easy or difficult it is to leave the environment affects its ability to mobilize by retaining old members. With the military collapse of ISIS in 2019, the inspirational effect of ISIS controlling territory—a major pull factor—diminished dramatically. This also led to some individuals leaving or becoming less active in the Salafi-jihadist environment. Mohsen explained: “Some began to get weaker in their faith, they kind of may have been dependent on that it [i.e. the physical Caliphate] must be there—something they can see and go to.”

Mohsen also argued that one should see the Salafi-jihadist environment as a sect rather than a social group with normal social interaction: “All radicals knew each other. They visited each other in different mosques. But it is not a community, it is a sect.” This means that there are factors that make exiting the environment both easy and complicated. Leaving is easy when the group believes that there is a reason to exclude a member. Sometimes a person is excluded against his own will, but it is also possible to actively seek exclusion. According to Mazen, the most common reason for being excluded is the need to protect the group against deviant ideas and behaviors, or what he called keeping the sect clean: “They exclude you for the slightest deviation. They want to keep the sect clean. They do not want to keep deviants and have no problem excluding anyone.”

Efforts to keep the sect clean can be driven by ideology but they can also be based on leadership dynamics as some individuals have invested their prestige in certain beliefs and behaviors. This possible ease with which members can be excluded, combined with the difficulty of competing with gangs to inspire a new generation of jihadists, means that the Salafi-jihadist environment has had difficulty growing after the unifying effect of ISIS diminished.

When asked about why the Salafi-jihadist environment should be seen as a sect, Mazen argued that the social relationships created inside the environment are different from ordinary friendships. Although the social relationships are based on a common project that limits the freedom of expression, there is higher level of intensity of feelings among the members inside the group, which is a force that contributes to keeping them onboard:

These are temporary relationships [based on a common project], not ordinary friendships. At the same time, you are afraid to say what you think. You do not always want to leave them because you get love. There is a lot of love, brotherhood, very intense feelings, nothing ordinary like with other Muslims. (Mazen)

Members show extra love as they feel that the group is small and has a special mission. They also depend on each other to confirm that their actions are right. Thus, it is not only the ideology but even more so the intensity of social feelings that keeps the group together. Part of the process is unwillingness to say what one thinks if it deviates from the group that strives for harmony or conformity. This can also lead to groupthink, that is, a situation where “concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive in-group that it tends to override a realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action.”⁶⁴ According to Janis,⁶⁵ a symptom of groupthink is that “members of a group adopt a soft line of criticism, even in their own thinking.” Moreover, “the more amiability and esprit de corps among the members of an in-group of policymakers, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink.”⁶⁶ However, in the radical group, groupthink is taken to an extreme, as there is no room even for soft criticism and the members are exceedingly amiable toward one another. Such groupthink can lead the group to adopt naive beliefs and to make decisions that are not based on a realistic appraisal of other alternatives or the likely consequences of their actions.

Moreover, according to our informants, the intensity of feelings inside the groups is easily transformed into equally intense feelings of hostility and otherness when someone is excluded, often leading to takfir—excommunication—as members want to keep their special group clean. Thus, members not only show extra strong feelings toward each other, but are at the same time very easily excluded for their actions or words. Thus, it is in principle relatively easy to leave if one wants to do so. As Mazen explained, “leaving is easy. You just say something deviant.”

However, there are also social dynamics and feelings that make exit difficult. Hamdi argued that a strong feeling of a special brotherhood keeps many individuals inside the radical group: “You know, you are brothers. What’s there to do? You don’t have to go anywhere. It’s enough to be where you are. You’re with brothers.” He also argued that the close social ties and the knowledge one has about the others would not make the other members of the group react positively to someone leaving. However, even if those who leave are easily declared apostates, neither Mazen nor Hamdi reported that there would have been threats of physical violence, which seems to reflect the Salafi-jihadist environments’ decreasing capacity for violence in the West. Fazl and Awad had also left without problems. Hamdi said that it is also possible to become gradually less active in the environment: “No, it’s not so easy. You know so much about the others and they probably don’t like anyone going and talking, but of course, you can just try to meet less so maybe you will eventually get out.”

To counter such tendencies, some members of the environment seem to try to prevent losing members by actively keeping in touch with each other, which can be perceived as a natural expression of the intense feelings that members show toward one another. Mohsen argued that “you mostly just hang out with each other. If they don’t hear from someone, the others come and wonder what is going on. In any case, they try to have some control.” Thus, social pressures coupled with intense feelings reduce the risk of members considering leaving the radical environment. For individual members, it is often difficult to see the difference between strong friendship ties, expressed as intense feelings, and social pressures, as the latter can be framed as friendly activity and caring. Mazen and Hamdi had clearly different experiences, but Fazl said that “what happens then really depends on whether you leave because of a conflict or just because you want to leave. If it’s not a conflict, they try to convince you to stay.” Moreover, Kareem further explained how the difficulty of leaving varies depending on the group and one’s position in it:

It depends on what type of group it is, what kind of Salafist it is. If someone started slipping out, then he was considered muntaqish [i.e. affected]. We used to say that he got lost. He’s gone crazy. People sometimes tried to talk, give advice, like “come back, you are wrong, it is haram [i.e. forbidden], you are deceived!” You see him as a person who just got lost, but if you are a person who sits on sensitive information, then you will be beaten. (Kareem)

Kareem told a story about a jihadist sheikh whom he had been helping translate from Arabic to Swedish. Someone asked the sheikh a question about what the others in the group should do to a guy who was squealing. Kareem said that even he was surprised by the answer: “He [i.e. the sheikh] said, if he does not listen to the warnings, kidnap him, lock him in a room, break both his arms and legs and let him sit there until he makes tawbah [i.e. repents].” However, contacts with gangs do not elicit the same harsh reaction. Gangs are, according to Kareem, considered less of a threat than traditional nonviolent forms of Islam, as there can be natural mobility between the jihadist groups and the gangs. This affects jihadist groups’ reaction to individuals willing to leave and makes them more likely to approach gangs:

It’s hard to leave as a hardcore [jihadist]. What they do instead is that they do not leave, they go crazy, they go back to the gangs. It’s easier. Because if you leave and become an ordinary Muslim, it’s “no, no, no!” But if you leave and become a gang member, shoot people, do drugs, then it will be [a milder reaction]: “May Allah guide him.” If you go to ordinary Muslims, then you are a murderer, an apostate, a heretic. Then your blood is halal [i.e. permissible]. [If someone joins a gang,] at least they know he can come back to us. (Kareem)

Thus, individuals willing to leave can be excluded if they have insignificant roles and express deviant opinions. Others may face threats and violence or at least social pressure. As people get older and face new competing social obligations, however, such social pressures can diminish. According to our informants, young unmarried men may be very dependent on each other socially, but when they get married and have children, old friends may meet less often because family obligations take more of their time. In the end, the strong feelings created among the group members may not match the feelings created by the new family ties, which contributes to disengagement from the radical group, but not necessarily to deradicalization.

In sum, the variation in the difficulty of leaving the Salafi-jihadist environment also affects its ability to mobilize by retaining old members. The feeling of a brotherhood makes exit difficult. Even social pressures and possible threats can keep members inside the environment. However, especially members that do not have sensitive information can find ways to leave.

Lack of New Heroic Mobilization Narratives

Some young men who were disgruntled by the society were mobilized by their grievance to search for a new identity and meaning in the heyday of ISIS.⁶⁷ They were pulled to Syria by Salafi-jihadist groups that gave them a new identity and the role of heroes defending the lives of their Muslim brothers and the honor of their Muslim sisters.⁶⁸ While the socio-economic situation in the suburbs remains the same, the pull factors in the form of mobilization narratives are now changing after the fall of IS’s self-declared Caliphate in Syria and Iraq.

Especially in Gothenburg, where the interviews were conducted, recruiters for several jihadist groups, such as ISIS and the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, were active during the war in Syria. After the fall of ISIS, its position became less prominent in the minds of potential recruits as other jihadist groups still held territory in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham especially, led by the old Jabhat al-Nusra leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, enjoyed a leading position in jihadist-controlled areas in Syria. Ali set his hopes on these groups, arguing that “there are other groups. Some support brothers in Idlib. Jihad is not over yet.” Thus, the seemingly unstoppable and apocalyptic success of ISIS as a mobilization narrative⁶⁹ for attracting new recruits has become weaker, which has increased the appeal of other jihadist groups. Moreover, the standard mobilization narrative, helping brothers and sisters in Syria,⁷⁰ which seeks to gather support for the remaining jihadist groups in Turkish controlled regions of Syria, is not very effective either. Mazen explained that ISIS now seemed to him like “a saga that ended,” and this feeling of letdown and disenchantment had affected many old recruiters who were now facing competition from the gangs with more money and guns, offering a better chance for violent rebellion: “Not even old recruiters see it as worth the effort to try to convince someone of jihad. They have nothing to offer. Instead, the gang pulls in young guys.” Thus, unless they have isolated themselves or moved on to other Salafist groups, “many of the old guard have been secularized, lost hope.”

However, even if the old mobilization narrative of helping brother and sisters in Syria cannot be used anymore, it does not mean that radical Islam has become completely irrelevant when the gangs become more prevalent and even some of the returnees from Syria go back to crime. Mazen explained:

Islamic consciousness is like riding bike. It’s still there. Some gang members are Muslims and pray. The gangs have become the new IS. Somehow Islam has become more popular today, but it is a mixture of ideas, rap, gangs, and Islam. But it is a tame version of Islam. Before, you were either a Muslim or a rapper with a gang. Today you can be both. (Mazen)

The relationship between rap and jihadist culture is nothing new as jihadist rap has been argued to have contributed to “jihadi cool” and the pull of Western jihadist subcultures.⁷¹ However, after the fall of ISIS and increasing competition from the gangs, the jihadist consciousness appears to have become weaker and overshadowed by the other components of some radicals’ identity. Therefore, it does not seem to be strong enough to draw radicals to jihad. It is there mainly to fill in the gaps where gang violence and rap fail to provide meaning. It is a version of Islam that does not connect violence with any higher purpose by becoming a foreign fighter but seeks some security and stability in religious observance when facing the world of arbitrary gang violence, as Mazen argued. However, not even mosques always provide safe havens. Malik said that sometimes “the guys pray jumuah [i.e. congregational Friday prayers] with bulletproof wests on. Once there was even a gang shooting at a mosque.” The mix of two identities is acceptable to both the Salafi-jihadist and gang environments because they have the society as their “common enemy,” as Kareem explained.

There was also some recognition among our informants that the mobilization narratives that aim to keep old members inside the Salafi-jihadist environment must be changed to prevent the loss of more members. Fazl said with a critical tone that “they do not have much to offer anymore. More people will leave if they do not come up with something new soon. When the Caliphate disappeared, it was like the energy vanished.” Mazen further argued that the internet will offer new opportunities that can be exploited for new forms of jihad:

I believe that the jihadists of the future will consist of highly skilled hackers who will use AI [i.e. artificial intelligence] systems that will hack other nations, organizations and companies’ systems. There will be a much more aggressive online warfare. The power to create chaos through the internet is much greater, like if you can upset systems and cause billions in costs, then you are much more competent in your warfare — you are as dangerous as an army. It’s like taking the artery right away. You have someone who is an expert at cutting arteries, and that’s what happens when big nations get too big! (Mazen)

However, what narratives may emerge or accompany such attacks remains to be seen. So far, the environment’s ability to adapt to the challenges of ISIS losing its territories and the fading away of the idea of the Caliphate spearheading apocalyptic events has been limited. The fall was simply too long and retreating from the promise of an apocalyptic narrative would not be convincing, even when not everyone still believes in it. Moreover, groupthink makes it difficult for existing members of the Salafi-jihadist environment to adapt the narrative so that it would correspond with the existing reality.

What remains is the general sense of polarization in relation to the rest of the Muslim community and the continuing experience of alienation in the suburbs. The goal of establishing an alternative society governed by Shariah rules also continues to inspire those who have not opted for the gangs. Some hope that IS will arise again; “just waiting for a new opportunity somewhere,” as Kareem said. Although the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan gave many a reason to keep up the hope that the jihadist project can be successful, the traditional mobilization narrative did not match the events in Afghanistan. Moreover, these developments did not offer a new appealing mobilization narrative that could compete with the gangs. The irony of the situation is that the gangs, according to our informants, do not offer any heroic narrative or a higher purpose, just unrestricted violence, sometimes for the sake of violence itself or for money and power. This perhaps means that, for a future jihadist group to be able to compete with the gangs, it must match IS’s ability to satisfy potential recruits’ desire for deeper meaning and the money and power that the gangs can offer. Even if large amounts of money flowed into Syria, this is today beyond the ability of any existing jihadist group.

Conclusion

The Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment has been argued to have increased in size and influence.⁷² According to the Swedish Security Services (SÄPO), the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment increased from 200 individuals in 2010 to more than 2000 in 2017.⁷³ However, the preliminary results of this study suggest that the prospects of the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment growing are bleak today, despite supporters’ strong presence on encrypted social media platforms. The push factors created by the old socio-economic situation remain the same, but changes in pull factors suggest that the current mobilization dynamics point to an environment that is facing challenges. Indeed, a review of studies on push and pull factors shows that pull factors have been portrayed as the main factors of radicalization.⁷⁴ The traditional mobilization narrative of helping out other Muslims is not working anymore and, lacking the old inspirational effect of the IS juggernaut, the environment is unable to compete with the criminal gangs pulling most of the disaffected youth to them.

There have also been fears that the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment has become more hidden.⁷⁵ Our study can help to nuance this by shedding light on how the environment has become hidden in three distinct ways. First, the remnants of the old guard have become more careful, as they have moved to encrypted media platforms. Second, some members of the environment seek to find new alternative recruitment channels, perhaps even through their work in municipalities. Third, small parts of the environment are possibly being absorbed by nonviolent Salafist groups, which poses new analytical challenges concerning future trends in both deradicalization and radicalization.

Although small parts of the environment may be absorbed by nonviolent Salafist groups, many remaining members are still connected to a global network of IS activists. Moreover, even if the Salafi-jihadist environment has trouble recruiting new members and its capacity for violence in the domestic context is lower than that of the criminal gangs, it does not entirely remove the risk of violent attacks emanating from the environment. The IS brand continues to inspire enough individuals, both as part of a network and as lone wolf actors, and frustration with a lack of success may spur them into action, as evidenced by the frequent foiling by Western security services of domestic terrorist plots. However, as Hegghammer⁷⁶ argued, jihadists prefer foreign fighting. Thus, a minority may launch attacks at home after being radicalized or returning home from foreign battlefields, but most foreign fighters do not return for domestic operations. The apparent lack of success of these plots is a testament to a considerably lower operational capability or willingness than what was expected by both many supporters of IS and the Swedish and other Western authorities during ISIS’s heyday. For example, former FBI Director James Comey feared in 2014 that the jihadists are “learning the worst kinds of techniques and tactics, and making the worst kinds of relationships,” and later bring home “those skills and relationships.”⁷⁷ Even the Swedish Security Service’s (SÄPO) chief counter-terrorism analyst, Jonathan Peste, feared that returning jihadists would pose a serious threat after returning home.⁷⁸

Indeed, the number of actors willing to use violence today, when it increasingly seems to serve retaliatory aims after the collapse of ISIS, is lower than when the organization still had some territorial presence in Syria and Iraq or the memory of it was still fresh in supporters’ minds. The idea of a caliphate has difficulty living on without a state, and the idea of defending fellow Muslims with violence makes less sense in countries where even hardcore Salafists are free to practice their religion. This is the dilemma facing the members of the Salafi-jihadist environments in the West—even returnees from ISIS controlled territories. Without a new mobilization narrative, the Salafi-jihadist environment will have difficulty competing with the allure of the criminal gangs and the capabilities of law enforcement authorities, as well as countering the prospect of some members even being absorbed by nonviolent Salafist groups. It is, however, likely that incidents will occur that will be “perceived by Islamic extremists as offensive, and they will use these as a pretext to make new converts to Islamism.”⁷⁹ Indeed, the jihadist environment has been flexible in adapting its ideas and strategies to changing circumstances.⁸⁰

Some of the results of this study may be more generalizable than others. For example, the Swedish Salafi-jihadist environment’s difficulty competing with criminal gangs is likely affected by the increasing levels of gang violence in Sweden.⁸¹ Thus, there may be local differences in the challenges facing Salafi-jihadist environments in the West. However, other factors, such as the lack of a new mobilization narrative and the limited ability of external events to mobilize old and new recruits, likely apply to several contexts. Thus, although the focus of this study is on Sweden, we believe our results can contribute to an understanding of the future of the Salafi-jihadist movement in the West in general.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work is funded by the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare (FORTE) under grant number 2020-00474.

Notes

1 Linus Gustafsson and Magnus Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. An Analysis of Open-Source Intelligence and Statistical Data.” Swedish Defence University, 2017, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1110355/FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed 30 January 2020), 43.

2 Sveriges Television, “Säpo: Tusentals radikala islamister i Sverige” [“Säpo: Thousands of Radical Islamists in Sweden”], 16 June 2017, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/sapo-tusentals-radikala-islamister-i-sverige (accessed 10 May 2022); Sveriges Radio, ”3000 extremister i Sverige” [“3000 Extremists in Sweden”], 3 July 2017, https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/6731295 (accessed 10 May 2022).

3 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” 5.

4 In the following text we will use the abbreviation ISIS to specifically refer to Islamic State’s (IS) provinces in Syria and Iraq, whereas we will use the abbreviation IS when referring to Islamic State more generally as an organization that will continue operating in different countries after the collapse of ISIS.

5 Sveriges Television, ”Nu förbjuds terrorresor,” [Terrorist Travel is Now Banned] 31 March 2016, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/nu-forbjuds-terrorresor (accessed 10 May 2022).

6 Mia Bloom, Hicham Tiflati, and John Horgan, “Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Telegram,” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 6 (2017): 1242–54, 242.

7 Ibid.

8 Sveriges Radio, ”Nu blir det olagligt att samarbeta med en terrororganisation” [“Now It Becomes Illegal to Cooperate with a Terrorist Organization”], 23 January 2020, https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/7391383 (accessed 10 May 2022).

9 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” 43.

10 Amir Rostami, Joakim Sturup, Hernan Mondani, Pia Thevselius, Jerzy Sarnecki, and Christofer Edling, “The Swedish Mujahideen: An Exploratory Study of 41 Swedish Foreign Fighters Deceased in Iraq and Syria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, no. 5 (2020): 382–95.

11 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.”

12 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

13 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

14 Rostami et al., ”The Swedish Mujahideen.”

15 Rajan Basra and Peter R. Neumann, “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016): 25–40.

16 Rostami et al. “The Swedish Mujahideen.”

17 e.g., Marius Linge, Sveinung Sandberg, and Sébastien Tutenges, “Confluences of Street Culture and Jihadism: The Spatial, Bodily, and Narrative Dimensions of Radicalization,” Terrorism and Political Violence (published online 22 March 2022, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2022.2042269); Rajan Basra, Peter R. Naumann, and Claudia Brunner, “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus.” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2016, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf (accessed 10 May 2022).

18 Joakim Sturup och Amir Rostami, ”Organiserad antagonism: Överlappningen mellan våldsbejakande extremism och organiserad brottslighet” [”Organized Antagonism: The Overlap between Violent Extremism and Organized Crime”]. In: Christofer Edling och Amir Rostami (ed.), ”Våldsbejakande extremism: En forskarantologi” [”Violent Extremism: A Research Anthology”], SOU 2017:67.” Regeringskansliet [Swedish Government Offices], 2017”, https://www.iffs.se/publikationer/ovrigt/organiserad-antagonism/ (accessed 10 May 2022).

19 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.”

20 Lorne L. Dawson, “A Comparative Analysis of the Data on Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Who Went and Why?” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2021, https://icct.nl/publication/a-comparative-analysis-of-the-data-on-western-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-who-went-and-why/ (accessed 10 May 2022).

21 Marco Nilsson, “Interviewing Jihadists: On the Importance of Drinking Tea and Other Methodological Considerations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 4, no. 6 (2018): 419–32; Kathrine Elmose Jørgensen and Henriette Frees Esholdt, “‘She Is a Woman, She Is an Unbeliever—You Should not Meet with Her’: An Ethnographic Account of Accessing Salafi-Jihadist Environments as Non-Muslim Female Researchers,” Journal of Qualitative Criminal Justice and Criminology 10, no. 3 (2021): 1–30; Henriette Frees Esholdt and Kathrine Elmose Jørgensen, “Emotional Trails in Terrorism Research: Running Risks When Accessing Salafi-Jihadist Foreign Fighter Returnees and Their Social Milieu,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (published online 11 August 2021, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2021.1962500).

22 Marco Nilsson, “Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad: Interview Evidence from Swedish Jihadists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 5 (2015): 343–58.

23 Marco Nilsson, “Jihadiship: From Radical Behavior to Radical Beliefs,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 3 (2021): 181–97; Marco Nilsson, “Motivations for Jihad and Cognitive Dissonance: A Qualitative Analysis of Former Swedish Jihadists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 45, no. 1 (2022): 92–110.

24 Christoffer Carlsson, Amir Rostami, Hernan Mondani, Joakim Sturup, Jerzy Sarnecki, and Christofer Edling, “A Life-Course Analysis of Engagement in Violent Extremist Groups,” The British Journal of Criminology 60, no. 1 (2020): 74–92.

25 Andrea Aasgaard, “Scandinavia’s Daughters in the Syrian Civil War: What Can We Learn from Their Family Members’ Lived Experiences?,” Journal for Deradicalization 13 (2017): 243–75.

26 Jørgensen and Esholdt, “‘She Is a Woman, She Is an Unbeliever—You Should not Meet with Her.’”

27 Michael Krona, “Swedish “Media Jihad”: The Active Role of Swedish Terrorists and Supporters in Islamic State Media.” In: Magnus Ranstorp, Linda Ahlerup, and Filip Ahlin (ed.), Salafi-Jihadism and Digital Media: The Nordic and International Context (London: Routledge, 2022), 45–65.

28 Henriette Frees Esholdt, “The Attractions of Salafi-Jihadism as a Gendered Counterculture: Propaganda Narratives from the Swedish Online ‘Sisters in Deen’,” in Salafi-Jihadism and Digital Media: The Nordic and International Context, ed. Magnus Ranstorp, Linda Ahlerup, and Filip Ahlin (London: Routledge, 2022), 66–91.

29 Tore Refslund Hamming, “Global Jihadism after the Syria War,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 3 (2019): 1–16.

30 Katie Cohen and Lisa Kaati, “Digital Jihad: Propaganda from the Islamic State.” Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 2018, file:///C:/Users/soc-hf_/Downloads/FOIR4645%20(1).pdf (accessed 10 May 2022).

31 Michael Krona and Rosemary Pennington, The Media World of ISIS (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019), 266–7.

32 Metteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, Ekin Ilbahar, and Greg Barton, “The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization into Violent Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, no. 10 (2020): 854–85, 856–8.

33 Laura Huey, Rachel Inch and Hillary Peladeau, ”’@me If You Need a Shoutout’: Exploring Women’s Roles in Islamic State Twitter Networks,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 5 (2019): 445–63, 450; Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 1, (2015): 1–22; Elizabeth Pearson, “Online as the New Frontline: Affect, Gender, and ISIS-Take-Down on Social Media,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41 no. 11 (2018): 850–74, 852; Saltman and Smith, “‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon.” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015, https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf (accessed 10 May 2022), 5–6; Laura Huey and Eric Witmer, “#IS_Fangirl: Exploring a New Role for Women in Terrorism,” Journal of Terrorism Research 7, no. 1 (2016): 1–10, 1.

34 Klausen,“Tweeting the Jihad,” 15–16.

35 Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): 780–802.

36 cf., Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marore and Eva Entenmann, “Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West.” The International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2017, https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf (accessed 10 May 2022), 83.

37 e.g., Jan Christoffer Andersen and Sveinung Sandberg, “Islamic State Propaganda: Between social movement framing and subcultural provocation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 7 (2018): 1506–26; Charlie Winter, Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto on Women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade (London: Quilliam, 2015); Julia Musial “‘My Muslim Sister, Indeed You are a Mujahidah:’ Narratives in the Propaganda of the Islamic State to Address and Radicalize Western Women. An Exemplary Analysis of the Online Magazine Dabiq,” Journal of Deradicalization 17, no. 9 (2016): 39–100.

38 e.g., Huey, Inch, and Peladeau, “‘@me If You Need Shoutout;’” Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad;” Pearson, “Online as the New Frontline;” Esholdt, “The Attractions of Salafi-Jihadism as a Gendered Counterculture.”

39 Bloom, Tiflati, and Horgan, “Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Telegram.”

40 e.g., Elizabeth Pearson and Emily Winterbotham, “Women, Gender, and Daesh Radicalization,” The RUSI Journal 162, no. 3 (2017): 60–72; Aasgaard, “Scandinavia’s Daughters in the Syrian Civil War;” Jørgensen and Esholdt, “‘She Is a Woman, She Is an Unbeliever – You Should not Meet with Her.’” Kathrine Elmose Jørgensen, “‘I Don’t Justify Anything Regarding My Son:’ Danish Foreign Fighters’ Initial Attraction and Reaffirmed Commitment to Islamic State and Al Qaeda—Testimonies from Five Relatives,” Terrorism and Political Violence (published online 31 May 2022, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2022.2045964).

41 Nilsson, “Jihadiship: From Radical Behavior to Radical Beliefs;” Nilsson, “Motivations for Jihad and Cognitive Dissonance;” Nilsson, “Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad;” Nilsson, “Interviewing Jihadists;” Jakob Sheikh, ”’I Just Said It. The State:’ Examining the Motivations for Danish Foreign Fighting in Syria,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 6 (2016): 59–67; Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate (McLean: Advances Press, 2016).

42 Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, ”Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations of Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2017): 191–210.

43 Jørgensen and Esholdt, “‘She Is a Woman, She Is an Unbeliever—You Should not Meet with Her.’”

44 Nilsson, “Interviewing Jihadists.”

45 Raymond M. Lee, Doing Research on Sensitive Topics (London: Sage Publications, 1993).

46 Ibid., 63–9.

47 Mikael Hjerm, Simon Lindgren, and Marco Nilsson, Introduktion till samhällsvetenskaplig analys [Introduction to Social Science Analysis] (Malmö: Gleerups, 2012), 153.

48 On the differences between behavioral and cognitive radicalization see e.g., Peter R. Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 873–93.

49 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,” Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, no. 2 (2006): 77–101.

50 Norman K. Denzin, Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).

51 Michael Krona, “Collaborative Media Practices and Interconnected Digital Strategies of Islamic State (IS) and Pro-IS Supporter Networks on Telegram,” International Journal of Communication 14, no. 1 (2020): 1888–910.

52 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.”

53 e.g., Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005); Fabien Truong, Radicalized Loyalties: Becoming Muslim in the West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Edwin Bakker and Rik Coolsaet, “Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001–2009),” in: Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge. European and American Experiences, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2011); Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized – New Jihadists and the Threat of the West (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016).

54 Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, “Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 12 (2011): 963–86.

55 Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5.

56 Magnus Ranstorp and Linda Ahlerup, ”Salafism och salafistisk jihadism 2.0: Påverkan mot och utmaningar för det svenska demokratiska samhället” [“Salafism and Salafist Jihadism 2.0: Impact on and Challenges for the Swedish Democratic Society”]. Swedish Defence University, 2022, https://www.fhs.se/download/18.3189106718029a6af301898c/1650451919209/Salafism%20och%20salafistisk%20jihadism%202.0.pdf (accessed 10 May 2022).

57 Sheikh, ”’I Just Said It. The State,’” 62.

58 Robert Lambert, “Competing Counter-Radicalisation Models in the UK,” in: Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge. European and American Experiences, ed. Rik Coolsaet (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2011).

59 Basra and Neumann, “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures.”

60 Laura Mansfield, His Own Words: A Translation of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2008), 38.

61 Daniel Byman, “ISIS Goes Global,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 2 (2016): 76–85.

62 Julie Chernov Hwang, “The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists: Understanding the Pathways,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 2 (2017): 277–95.

63 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical Extremist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009).

64 Irving L. Janis, “Groupthink,” Psychology Today 5, no. 6 (1971): 84–90, 84.

65 Ibid., 84.

66 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 9.

67 Nilsson, “Jihadiship: From Radical Behavior to Radical Beliefs;” Rik Coolsaet, “Facing the Fourth Foreign Fighters Wave: What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic State? Insights from the Belgian Case.” Royal Institute for International Relations, 2015, https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/02/egmont.papers.81_online-versie.pdf?type=pdf (accessed 10 May 2022); Edwin Bakker and Roel de Bont, “Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 837–57.

68 Several scholars have given examples of a need to help out Muslims in need as a motivational factor for joining ISIS. See, for example, Dawson and Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations of Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” 5; Sheikh, “‘I Just Said It. The State.’”

69 Nilsson, “Jihadiship: From Radical Behavior to Radical Beliefs.”

70 Nilsson, “Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad;” Linus Gustafsson, “Swedish Jihadists on Social Media,” in: Salafi-Jihadism and Digital Media: The Nordic and International Context, ed. Magnus Ranstorp, Linda Ahlerup, and Filip Ahlin (London: Routledge, 2022), 20–44.

71 Sune Qvotrup Jensen, Jeppe Fuglsang Larsen, and Sveinung Sandberg, “Rap, Islam and Jihadi Cool: The Attractions of the Western Jihadi Subculture.” Crime, Media, Culture (published online 23 June 2021, DOI: 10.1177/17416590211025573).

72 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” 43.

73 Sveriges Television, “Säpo: Tusentals radikala islamister i Sverige” [“Säpo: Thousands of Radical Islamists in Sweden”]; Sveriges Radio, ”3000 extremister i Sverige” [“3000 Extremists in Sweden”].

74 Vergani, Iqbal, Ilbahar and Barton, ”The Three Ps of Radicalization,” 860.

75 Gustafsson and Ranstorp, “Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” 43.

76 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 1–15.

77 Laura Yuen, “FBI chief: Americans Fighting in Syria Not Just a Mpls. Problem.” MPR News, 17 June 2014, https://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/06/17/fbi-chief-syria-fight (accessed 10 May 2022).

78 Frida Svensson and Andreas Örwall Loven, “Förbud mot terrorträning får stöd” [“Ban on Terrorist Training Receives Support”]. Svenska Dagbladet 14 August 2014, https://www.svd.se/a/33e8b72c-2893-36d3-8454-54b32d346052/forbud-mot-terrortraning-far-stod?metering=offer-abroad (accessed 10 May 2022).

79 The Norwegian Police Security Service, “National Threat Assessment 2021.” The Norwegian Police Security Service, 2021, https://www.pst.no/globalassets/artikler/trusselvurderinger/nasjonal-trusselvurdering-2021/download-the-national-threat-assessment-2021-in-english.pdf (accessed 10 May 2020).

80 Nilsson, “Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad.”

81 Brottsförebyggande Rådet, ”Dödligt skjutvapenvåld i Sverige och andra europeiska länder: En jämförande studie av nivåer, trender och våldsmetoder” [”Fatal Firearm Violence in Sweden and Other European Countries: A Comparative Study of Levels, Trends and Methods of Violence”]. Brottsförebyggande Rådet, 2021, https://bra.se/download/18.1f8c9903175f8b2aa70c9a1/1629181100220/2021_8_Dodligt_skjutvapenvald_i_Sverige_och_andra_europeiska_lander.pdf (accessed 6 July 2022).