Financing of Non-State Armed Groups in the Middle East: Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a Case Study

Abstract

This paper aims to identify the causes, dynamics, and characteristics of the Iraqi Shia militia’s funding method for political and military operations. The Iraqi post-2003 institutional features of political participation and the economic system created an atmosphere where the clergy’s political position was highly esteemed. The legitimacy of one sect over another, discriminatory practices, and active participation in the repression of one sect can be seen as another chance for the state cultivates a struggle for rigid resources. The paper’s central theme is to determine how the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) get financialized for their activity and identify/examine how these PMF can collect money. First, we start with a historical review of the Iraqi state formation/building post-2003, then look at the Iraqi state and assess its form and condition post-2003. In the second part, we identify the reasons behind the rising of ISIS and PMF. The third part, the most significant part of the paper, includes categorizing and classifying Iraqi Shia armed groups’ complex, multilayer, and intertwined financial sources. Finally, each of these financial sources will be discussed and examined.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

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