Maintaining Course or Righting the Ship? Examining Adjustments in Al-Qaeda’s Communicative Approach

Abstract

This article presents a comparison of al-Qaeda’s messaging output between two time periods, the late 1990’s-2001 and 2011–2020, with the purpose of highlighting changes as well as continuities in the movement’s articulated priorities, tactics, and strategies. This comparison will illustrate the degree of flexibility and pragmatism is the movement’s publicized strategy. From this, this article will highlight the extent to which al-Qaeda views its own ideology as immutable or adjustable. This article argues that although the movement has demonstrated a significant degree of adaptability in its messaging approach, it likewise demonstrates strong elements of narrative continuity.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

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2 Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” International Security 33, no. 3 (2008): 46–78.

3 Ranya Ahmed, “Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection,” Journal of Applied Security Research 13, no. 3 (2018): 376–90.

4 M. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Incorporated, 2011).

5 Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama Bin Laden Still Matters.(Book Review),” (2008).

6 Quoted in; “Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 8 (2013): 635–53; See also; Fawaz A. Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2011).

7 Hoffman, “Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future,”; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge,” Hudson Insitute (2018).

8 Sajjan M. Gohel, Deciphering Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda’s Strategic and Ideological Imperatives, vol. 11 (2017), Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda, Bin Laden, terrorist organizations, Islamic State, Jabhat Fateh al- Sham, Taliban, Egypt, Iran.

9 Barak Mendelsohn and Colin Clarke, “Al-Qaeda Is Being Hollowed to Its Core,” War on the Rocks (2021).

10 Katherine Zimmerman, “Al-Qaeda after the Arab Spring: A Decade of Expansion, Losses, and Evolution,” Hudson Institute (2021).

11 A.P.A.D. Morris et al., Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 137; Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

12 W A. Gamson and D S. Meyer, “Framing Poliyical Opportunity,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 279–80; Peter Alexis Gourevitch and P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY:, 1986); Mayer N. Zald, “Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996).

13 David, E. Snow, Steven Worden Rochford, and Robert Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–64.

14 For an overview of collective action frames see; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (2000); For an overview of the coding process used see; Jared. J Wesley, “Qualitative Document Analysis in Political Science,” Paper presented at “From Texts to Political Positions Workshop” Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (2010); Jared J. Wesley, Code Politics : Campaigns and Cultures on the Canadian Prairies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 259.

15 Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans (1998); FBIS, “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994 – January 2004,” (2004): 57.

16 See for example: Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy : Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

17 D. Holbrook, The Al-Qaeda Doctrine: The Framing and Evolution of the Leadership’s Public Discourse (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).00ok

18 Ibid., 80.

19 Nahed Artoul Zehr, The War against Al-Qaeda Religion, Policy, and Counter-Narratives (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 100.

20 “Pakistan interviews Usama Bin Ladin” (1997); FBIS, “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994 - January 2004,” 44.

21 Bin Ladin Interviewed on Jihad Against US (1996); ibid., 29.

22 Osama Bin Laden, Messages to the World : The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence (London, New York: Verso, 2005), 47.

23 Holbrook, The Al-Qaeda Doctrine: The Framing and Evolution of the Leadership’s Public Discourse, 92.

24 Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans (1998); FBIS, “Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994 – January 2004,” 57.

25 Esquire Interview With Bin Laden (1999); ibid., 99.

26 Zehr, The War against Al-Qaeda Religion, Policy, and Counter-Narratives.

27 “Letter from Ubl to ‘Atiyatullah Al-Libi 4,” CTC Sentinel (2013).

28 “Letter to Shaykh Mahmud,” Declassified document available through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence: 2–3.

29 Ibid., 5.

30 “Give the Tribes More Than They Can Handle,” Declassified document available through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; “Letter to Abu Basir,” Declassified document available through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; “Letter from Atiyah to Abu Basir,” Declassified document available through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

31 al-Zawahiri quoted in; Donald Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda’s Response to the Arab Spring,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 6 (2012): 9.

32 Holbrook, The Al-Qaeda Doctrine: The Framing and Evolution of the Leadership’s Public Discourse, 57.

33 D. Holbrook and C. Moore, Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 36.

34 Zimmerman, “Al-Qaeda after the Arab Spring: A Decade of Expansion, Losses, and Evolution.”

35 Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda’s Response to the Arab Spring,” 11.

36 Holbrook and Moore, Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader, 126.

37 Ibid., 125.

38 Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda’s Response to the Arab Spring.”

39 Ayman al-Zawahiri quoted in; ibid., 12; IntelCenter, Intelcenter Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Tempest Publishing, 2008).

40 Nelly Lahoud, “Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Reaction to Revolution in the Middle East,” CTC Sentiel 4, no. 4 (2011).

41 Holbrook and Moore, Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader, 43.

42 Ibid., 55.

43 Roel Meijer, “Introduction,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 19.

44 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of Pen and Sword from Unjust Allegations of Feebleness and Weakness,” Federation of American Scientists (2008): 39–40; See also; Holbrook, The Al-Qaeda Doctrine: The Framing and Evolution of the Leadership’s Public Discourse, 91; Jack Barclay, “Al-Tatarrus: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for Killing Muslim Civilians,” Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 34 (2010); Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, Fault Lines in Global Jihad : Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures (Florence, SC: Routledge, 2011), 35–38; S. Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (Penguin Books Limited, 2017), 84–85.

45 Holbrook and Moore, Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader, 54.

46 Ibid., 66.

47 Ibid., 69.

48 Ibid., 69–70.

49 Ibid., 69.

50 IntelCenter, Intelcenter Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri; Donald Holbrook, “Alienating the Grassroots: Looking Back at Al Qaeda’s Communicative Approach toward Muslim Audiences," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 11 (2013): 883–98.

51 “Alienating the Grassroots: Looking Back at Al Qaeda’s Communicative Approach toward Muslim Audiences.”

52 Ibid.

53 IntelCenter, Intelcenter Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

54 Holbrook and Moore, Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader, 53.

55 Ibid., 112.

56 Thomas McCabe, “The Strategic Failures of Al Qaeda,” Parameters 40, no. 1 (2010): 60–71; Andrew Phillips, “How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 64–84; Mohamed Hafez, “The Curse of Cain: Why Fratricidal Jihadis Fail to Learn from Their Mistakes,” CTC Senitel 10, no. 10 (2017).

57 McCabe, “The Strategic Failures of Al Qaeda.”; Phillips, “How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq.”; Hafez, “The Curse of Cain: Why Fratricidal Jihadis Fail to Learn from Their Mistakes.”

58 IntelCenter, Intelcenter Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

59 Quoted in; Holbrook, The Al-Qaeda Doctrine: The Framing and Evolution of the Leadership’s Public Discourse, 90.

60 “Letter about matter on the Islamic Maghreb” and “Letter dtd 07 August 2010” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/bin-laden-s-bookshelf?start=1.

61 Mark Hosenball, “Al Qaeda Leaders Made Plans for Peace Deal with Mauritania: Documents,” Reuters (3 March 2016).

62 Abdelmalek Droukdel has since been killed in a 2020 French CT operation

63 “Dear Brother Shaykh Mahmud”; “Letter to Shaykh Mahmud”; “Letter to Abu-Musa b Abd-al-Wadud” Intelligence, “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf”.

64 “Letter to Abu Basir” ibid., 2.

65 For example, bin Laden would noted similar concerns in a letter directed to its affiliate in Somalia, al-Shabaab; “Letter dtd 07 August 2010” ibid.

66 bin Laden quoted in; Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge.”

67 Holbrook and Moore, Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader, 54.

68 Ibid., 53–53.

69 Ibid., 111.

70 Ibid., 53.

71 Letter to Shakyh MahmudIntelligence, “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf” 2.

72 Ibid.

73 Holbrook and Moore, Al-Qaeda 2.0: A Critical Reader, 52.

74 Ibid., 106.

75 Ibid., 240.

76 Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge.”

77 Gohel, Deciphering Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda’s Strategic and Ideological Imperatives, 11, 56–57.

78 Jami Forbes, “Does Al-QàIda’s Increasing Media Outreach Signal Revitalization?” CTC Senitel 12, no. 1 (2019).

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 As-Sahab Media, “One Ummah,” no. 3 (September 2020): 28.

82 Ibid., 26-31.

83 Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda.

84 Daniel Byman and Asfandyar Mir, “Assessing Al-Qaeda: A Debate,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2022): 4.