The Impact of Diasporas on the Tactics of Rebel Groups: The Case of the IRA and Noraid

Abstract

Do diasporas affect rebel tactics in the home country? We argue that diaspora organizations can influence tactics when rebel leaders are divided, and domestic political opportunity structures are restrictive. Drawing on a variety of primary sources, we analyze the influence of the Irish-American group Noraid on the Provisional IRA tactics during four episodes of the Troubles. When the military and political leadership of the Republican movement diverged over tactics, Noraid’s militant stance and support for Gerry Adams incentivized the simultaneous adoption of both violence and cooperation. Over time, the group also helped consolidate Adams’s leadership and overcome an organizational crisis.

When a delegation of Irish-Americans visited Northern Ireland in August 1984, British authorities tried to deny entry to Martin Galvin, the head of the Irish-American diaspora funding organization Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid). Galvin and his delegation nevertheless entered Northern Ireland, and some of the participants were arrested.¹ Why did Britain perceive the Irish-American diaspora as such a threat? Noraid was a known supporter of the Republican movement, but such an antagonistic response from British authorities suggests that the group was perceived as a relevant actor in the conflict.

Scholars have argued that at times, diasporas can act as “peace-makers”, and at other times they can act as “peace-wreckers”, providing a main source of support for rebel groups that can lead to the continuation of insurgencies and armed resistance.² What has received less attention is whether diaspora organizations (DOs) affect the tactics of rebel groups. Do diasporas have an autonomous effect on the direction of a nationalist movement, or do they simply act as sources of support that serve to amplify the tactical choices of rebel group leaders?

We develop a theory of intra-organizational competition proposing that diasporic mobilization can be most consequential when rebel leaders are divided over tactics, and the domestic political opportunity structures are restrictive. We expect that when rebel leaders disagree over tactics, each side will try to leverage diasporic support to strengthen their position, enabling DOs to exert a significant influence on tactical outcomes. When rebel leaders align on the use of armed resistance versus cooperation, we expect that DOs will be able to provide significant support, but they will not necessarily influence the tactical decisions of the group. By focusing on the logic of outbidding, our theory suggests that the agency and impact different DOs have on rebel tactics varies based on organizational dynamics and political context.

The empirical section analyzes the influence of the Irish-American group Noraid on the direction of the Irish Republican movement over the course of four different periods during the Troubles. Our analysis of Noraid’s weekly newspaper shows that the group tolerated armed resistance, while simultaneously calling for peace talks. In line with the overall logic of our intra-organizational competition argument, we see Noraid affect tactical considerations during the periods when the military and political leadership of the Republican movement started adopting divergent tactics. Noraid’s militant stance on armed resistance combined with support for Gerry Adams as a leader can help understand why the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA) wavered so much between contention and cooperation before 1998. Within the larger context of Irish-American diaspora, as the militant voices were eclipsed by the pro-peace camp by the 1990s, Noraid inadvertently helped turn the tables toward cooperation by consolidating support around the leadership of Gerry Adams.

Many scholars have argued that the American diaspora was a significant force for peace in Northern Ireland.³ While this may be the case, between the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, which enshrined cooperation between the Irish and the British governments on matters relating to Northern Ireland, and the Belfast Agreement/Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which brought an end to the violent period in Northern Ireland and set the terms for a power-sharing government, the PIRA frequently wavered between armed resistance and cooperation. The story of how the “pro-peace” diaspora ultimately pulled the IRA toward negotiations has been told, but we know less about the extent to which Irish-American DOs affected the tactics of the IRA before that. The subsequent analysis of Noraid helps us understand how the militant voices in the Irish-American diaspora contributed to the IRA’s dual strategy of the armalite and the ballot box.

Diasporas, Conflict Dynamics and Rebel Group Behavior

Diasporic communities can become key actors during different stages in a conflict. During the conflict phase, diasporas can provide direct military support or promote unity, they can send remittances or advocate for an economic boycott of the enemy. When it comes to conflict termination, diasporas can encourage dialogue and reward actors that seek negotiations, or they can continue to support insurgencies.⁴ Their influence and nature of mobilization depends on a variety of factors, such as ideological preferences, social isolation, political opportunity structures in the host state, levels of violence in the home country, and linkages to secessionist elites.⁵

Diasporas can have divergent effects on conflict because they are rarely unified communities. Like other actors in conflict, diasporas can witness fragmentation and competition among elites that politicize ethnic differences.⁶ Much of the research is shifting toward studying the mobilization efforts and effects of specific diaspora organizations, rather than of diasporic communities on the whole.⁷ This is a critical intervention that invites a closer examination of the internal dynamics within DOs.

Internal organizational dynamics are important to understand for both DOs and for rebel groups in conflict situations. Scholars have shown that fragmentation in rebel organization can have a powerful effect on tactics and on the stance toward the peace process.⁸ Hawks within rebel groups tend to oppose negotiations and act as spoilers.⁹ Fragmented rebel organizations also make it more difficult to reach a “ripe” moment for negotiations, because leaders perceive the context differently, and therefore disagree about the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate and about the willingness to look for a way out.¹⁰ Internal fragmentation can reinforce instrumental interests in exploiting a conflict, create subgroups that are prone to radical agendas, and encourage violence used in the attempt to overcome fragmentation.¹¹

Others suggests that when there is an intense internal competition between the political and the military wing, and the logic of armed struggle is seen as mutually exclusive from the logic of political accommodation, an organization is ripest to switch from active violence to nonviolence, as long as there is an open opportunity structure and leaders support peace.¹² Yet, if the political context is restrictive, and a rebel group has limited options to mobilize and pursue its goals,¹³ the political wing may find it more difficult to push the organization away from violence without risking further fragmentation.¹⁴

Most studies of rebel group fragmentation do not ask whether diasporas affect these organizational dynamics at all. The literature on diasporic mobilization has tended to focus on the effects of diasporas on conflict outcomes or on support for certain groups, but has remained largely silent on whether diasporic mobilization affects the internal dynamics and the tactical decisions of rebel groups in the home country. In the next section, we propose a framework for understanding how diasporas may affect intra-group dynamics, and when they can have the strongest impact on group tactics.

Diaspora Effects on Rebel Tactics

We suggest that the extent to which diasporas affect rebel group tactics depends on the organizational dynamics within the rebel movement and on the domestic political context in the home country. We start from the assumption that political entrepreneurs see diaspora networks as effective instruments to mobilize resources and key constituencies.¹⁵ When the political space closes domestically, it may be particularly beneficial to be able to mobilize abroad.

Our understanding of political opportunities draws on the classic literature on social movement theory, which suggests that certain aspects of the political context can affect a movement’s expectation of success and therefore incentivize collective action. Such opportunities for mobilization arise “when institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, and state capacity for repression declines”.¹⁶ Conversely, when these domestic political opportunities close, we argue that diasporas can provide resources and incentives for mobilization. Leaders may also find it politically expedient to mobilize diasporas for their own support, when they feel their influence waning.

An important line of disagreement within the leadership is over tactics. We suggest that the impact of DOs is strongest when leaders diverge over the use of armed resistance, and when the domestic political context is restrictive. We define leadership convergence and divergence in terms of whether leaders agree on tactics, and more specifically whether they lean toward cooperation and negotiation or toward contention and armed resistance. Convergence is both about leaders seeing eye to eye, and about the military and political wings of an organization sending a unified message to other parties in the conflict. Those signals can be either about the desire to cooperate and enter talks, or about supporting violence. In contrast, when the political and military wing send opposing signals, we consider it an instance of tactical divergence. For instance, divergence occurs when the political wing emphasizes negotiations, and the military wing continues pursuing and endorsing violent tactics.

We expect that when the leadership is unified and leans toward cooperation, DOs that also lean toward cooperation can play a supportive role, whereas those that lean toward contention are sidelined. The more closed the political space is domestically, and the more limited the political opportunity structure, the more we expect DOs that support cooperation to mobilize material and diplomatic support. If leaders unify around contention, we expect DOs that support cooperation to be sidelined, and those that lean toward contention to be used for fundraising, access to weapons/materials, and a public relations campaign of attempting to legitimize armed resistance. The more restrictions and the higher the repression domestically, the more rebel leaders would have to rely on diasporas for support, if mobilization in the diaspora is possible.

We argue that when leaders disagree over tactics, diasporas have the strongest potential to have an impact on the direction and tactics of the organization in the homeland, especially if the domestic political context is restrictive. We expect that rebel leaders will attempt to mobilize the diaspora to gain an advantage. Under these circumstances, diaspora organizations can alter the balance of power within an organization and influence the tactical direction of the rebel group (Table 1).

Table 1. Expected effect of diaspora organizations (DOs).

	Military & political wing converge on tactics	Military & political wing adopt divergent tactics
Restrictive domestic context	DOs: important source of support, no effect on tactics	DOs: important source of support & affect internal balance of power and tactics
Permissive domestic context	DOs: secondary source of support, no effect on tactics	DOs: secondary source of support, some impact on tactics if they can affect internal balance of power

To test these propositions, we examine the case of the IRA. In the next section we explain our case selection criteria and methodology in greater detail.

Case Selection and Methodology

In the empirical analysis we examine the case of the IRA to test our theoretical propositions and to explore inductively the ways in which the diaspora may have affected the tactics of the organization. For many outside observers, Northern Ireland is one of the most important contemporary success stories of conflict transformation. The Irish-American diaspora constitutes one of the largest diasporas in the world, known for its close links to the different political movements in the home country.¹⁷ Diasporas, however, are far from unitary actors. The Irish-American diaspora includes organizations of different sizes, and with varied goals, loyalties, and views regarding the efficacy and legitimacy of violence. We chose Noraid as the key DO to investigate, because for a long period during the Troubles, it represented one of the most significant Irish lobbying groups in the United States, with chapters and offices nationwide. Established in 1970, Noraid became “the best known and most important Irish-American republican support group during the course of the Northern Ireland conflict”.¹⁸ Unlike other Irish lobbying groups that emerged during the same period, such as the Irish National Caucus, which focused on human rights, Noraid was a known supporter of the Provisional IRA, and had the reputation of being a fairly militant republican group that was supportive of armed resistance.¹⁹ This allows us to investigate whether it had an impact on the tactics and overall strategy of the IRA. For the purpose of the analysis, Noraid is also an excellent case because it published a weekly newspaper, The Irish People, which presented itself as the voice of Irish Republicanism in America, and served as the main media outlet for the political mobilization of the Irish diaspora.²⁰ Our analysis of Noraid’s tactical preferences and mobilization draws primarily on this source, and we complement this with an investigation of congressional records from each period. In particular, we are interested in testimonies and activities of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee on Irish Affairs, an informal body established by the Irish National Caucus in order to raise concerns to Congress about British policies in Northern Ireland.²¹ New York representative Mario Biaggi, a leader of the committee, was also a longtime associate of Noraid.²²

The IRA as a paramilitary group goes back to 1883, operating in all of Ireland and outside of it. The Sinn Féin, its political party, was founded in 1905.²³ Toward the end of the 1960s, the organization known as ‘the Republican Movement’ split between the Officials and the Provisionals, due to tactical and ideological disagreement. Our focus is on the Provisional IRA, with its political party Sinn Féin.²⁴ The political and military wings share the same goal of uniting Ireland and eliminating British influence, however, their views regarding how to achieve their goal vary at times. The paramilitary group frequently resorted to violence and engaged in clandestine operations, while Sinn Féin focused on political participation and sought inclusion in peace talks. Nonetheless, which tactics each wing endorsed and adopted at any point in time is ultimately an empirical question, and we treat it as such in our analysis. The frequent fluctuation between armed resistance and cooperation is one of the main reasons why the Republican movement makes for an excellent case to examine how DOs interact with intra-organizational dynamics.

Some argue that we cannot easily differentiate between the two wings, because of overlapping leadership and because Sinn Féin is subordinate to the IRA.²⁵ Other scholars treat the two wings as separate organizations.²⁶ Our approach is to treat the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin as the military and political wings of the Republican movement, in line with the views of many other experts and scholars.²⁷ This also corresponds to the way in which many leaders of the movement understood their membership in both the IRA and Sinn Féin. For example, Martin McGuinness was one of Sinn Féin’s most senior members, an elected MP, the former Education Minister, and the deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland following the Troubles. He also served time in prison and admitted to having been a member of the senior leadership of the IRA.²⁸ These two leadership positions were related, yet separate.

In the early 1970s, when the Provisional Republican Movement was officially established, the relationship between the two wings was defined in simple and traditional terms: “the military wing, the IRA, was in charge, and Sinn Féin would obey and be subservient to the army council”.²⁹ As Patterson notes, “the real subordination of the ‘political wing’ to the army meant that ‘real’ membership of the Republican Movement dictated membership of the IRA”.³⁰ However, the new leadership understood that the group can no longer be only a military force, and needed to base itself on anti-imperialism.³¹ As the two wings developed, clandestine activity and political participation placed different constraints and incentives. At times, the leaders of the two wings sent a unified message about their strategy and the most appropriate tactics for resistance, at other times the military and political leadership sent contradictory signals to the other conflict parties.³²

In order to map out this fluctuation in tactics, we created a timeline of the conflict, marking episodes of contention and cooperation for each wing.³³ We identified instances when both wings sent clear signals around the same time or when one of the wings acted contrary to its traditional role – when the Sinn Féin openly supported violence or the IRA actively endorsed cooperation. We build this timeline for the period starting in 1983, when Gerry Adams was elected as leader of Sinn Féin, until 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Limiting the time frame to the Adams leadership of Sinn Féin allows us to control for leadership style or personality, and make sure that diaspora support or influence does not depend on the idiosyncrasies of any particular public figure. We identify 24 distinct episodes, which are included in Table 2.³⁴

Table 2. Episodes of tactical convergence and divergence in the IRA, 1983–1998.

Leadership Convergence – cooperation	Feb. 1985	Sept. 1986	Apr/May 1987	May 1988	Feb/March 1990	Dec. 1990	Aug. 1994	Dec. 1994	July 1997	April 1998
Leadership Convergence – contention	Nov/Dec 1983	Oct. 1984	Sept. 1988
Leadership Divergence	Nov. 1987/Jan 1988	March 1989	Nov. 1989	Jan/Feb 1992	June 1992	Dec. 1992	May/April 1993	Oct. 1993	Feb/March 1994	Jan/Feb 1996	Oct. 1996

From these episodes, we picked four instances for an in-depth analysis: October 1984 (when the leaders united around contention), February 1985 (when both the military and political leadership switched rather drastically toward cooperation), November 1987–January 1988 (when the political wing leaned toward cooperation but the military wing adopted armed resistance), and January–February 1996 (one of the last periods when the military and political wing diverged over tactics). We chose the 1984 and 1985 episodes, because they represent two different types of leadership alignment around tactics, and they represent a dramatic shift from cooperation to contention, providing us with the opportunity to examine whether the diaspora played a role in this switch. To study leadership divergence, we chose two episodes: November 1987–January 1988 was the first time the two wings sent such divergent signals; and January–February 1996 came after the most significant ceasefire during this period (from August 1994 until January 1996). These episodes are critical for understanding if the diaspora played a role in either keeping the political leadership committed to the diplomatic solution, or in pushing the Army Council to end the ceasefire and resume armed actions.

For each episode we use process-tracing and rhetorical analysis to understand the actions of both the DO and the Republican movement, drawing on the archives of the weekly newspaper The Irish People, on Congressional documents, on the archives of An Phoblacht, the Republican Movement’s newspaper in Ireland, as well as on other records of speeches by movement leaders and other significant actors in the conflict.

Examining the Effects of the Irish Diaspora on the Tactics of the IRA

There is a long history of Irish emigration to the United States. Miller notes that “from the early seventeenth century to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921–1922, as many as seven million people emigrated from Ireland to North America”.³⁵ Given the size of Ireland and the demographic makeup of the small island, such a large-scale migration had a significant impact on Irish nationalism and the Northern Ireland conflict.³⁶ Scholars have noted that the majority of Irish immigrants, and in particular Catholic Irish immigrants, have historically identified as “exiles” that remained emotionally deeply connected to Ireland.³⁷ This meant that historically, the Irish-American diaspora has been a significant actor in Irish and Northern Irish politics. While scholars have examined the effects of the diaspora on the conflict in Northern Ireland, we are interested in understanding whether specific DOs have influenced the tactics of the IRA. In the subsequent sections, we analyze Noraid’s role during four episodes of the Troubles.

Noraid and the Question of Armed Resistance: October 1984

In 1984, the IRA was facing an unfavorable domestic political context and the Republican leadership was unified in its support for contention. We expect Noraid to be a significant source of support, but not affect intra-organizational dynamics or tactics. In line with our expectation, we find that Noraid played an important supportive role, but did not influence the choice between violence and cooperation.

From the perspective of the Republican Movement, several events constituted a restrictive political context. Talks between the Irish and the British governments were advancing toward agreement, but Sinn Féin was not included in the talks, and the IRA feared that the outcome would not be in their favor.³⁸ In May, the New Ireland Forum, during which Irish nationalist parties discussed potential solutions to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, published its report. The report outlined three potential paths for Northern Ireland: joining the Irish Republic, establishing a joint authority by the Republic and Britain, or finding a federal or confederate arrangement. The report also rejected the use of violence for political objectives.³⁹ Both Sinn Féin and the Unionist community rejected these solutions, as did the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Adding insult to injury, during the European Parliament elections in June, the Sinn Féin candidate Danny Morrison lost to the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) candidate John Hume, who had been one of the main figures in the New Ireland Forum. The media coverage focused on the size of Sinn Féin’s defeat, even though the party saw significant electoral gains in the Westminster elections a year earlier, and significant gains in the Irish Republic.⁴⁰

Later in the summer, opposition to the report led to violent clashes. In July, Orange Order demonstrations across the North condemning the report deteriorated into violence, with attacks on security forces, shops, and on Catholic families.⁴¹ A month later, a West Belfast rally also turned bloody, when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the state police force in Northern Ireland, fatally shot a demonstrator with a rubber bullet.⁴² In September, the Republican movement took a significant hit, when Irish security forces caught an arms shipment originating in the United States and meant for PIRA– the largest find of arms since 1973.⁴³

During this period, both the political and the military leadership within the IRA continued to remain supportive of armed resistance, although Gerry Adams recognized that violent tactics might have cost the party the EU elections. In June 1984, he noted that the nationalist voters “may have had misgivings about IRA operations in which civilians were killed or injured”, concluding that “revolutionary force must be controlled and disciplined so that it is clearly seen as a symbol of our people’s resistance”.⁴⁴

The IRA recognized that targeting civilians was politically costly, but it did not consider British politicians in the same category. Both the military and the political leadership of the Republican movement agreed on the continued need and justification for armed resistance against specific ‘legitimate’ targets, such as Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet members.⁴⁵ On 12 October 1984, PIRA attempted to assassinate British Prime Minister Thatcher, together with several members of her Conservative party, during the party’s annual conference, held in Brighton. PIRA placed a bomb in the hotel where the party leaders were staying. Thatcher who was still awake at 2.54 AM when the bomb went off, narrowly escaped, as she had left her bathroom two minutes before the explosion happened. The bathroom was completely destroyed in the explosion, but Thatcher escaped with only minor injuries.⁴⁶ Five people died in the attack, and thirty-four were injured.⁴⁷ The attack was reported as “the most audacious and spectacular attack yet mounted by the IRA”.⁴⁸

Following the attack, PIRA published a message directed at Thatcher and her government saying: “Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once, you will have to be lucky always”.⁴⁹ A week later, they printed a warning in Republican News, which read: "The myth that the British Government is impregnable has been blown, and that alone increases our daring and confidence. There will be future attacks, there will always be attacks in Britain against those responsible for the oppression of our people”.⁵⁰ More significantly, Sinn Féin also came out in support of PIRA and the attack. The day after the attack, a Sinn Féin parliament member announced that the only thing worth regretting was “that it came to a situation where people felt they had to take on violence in order to pursue their political ends”.⁵¹ Gerry Adams was quoted saying that “the bombing was the inevitable result of British occupation of Northern Ireland” and that “such incidents would continue until there was a British withdrawal”.⁵²

Did the diaspora play a role in this support for violence? Our expectation is that in light of the organizational cohesion and closed political context, DOs leaning toward contention would be used to support the Republican cause, but not influence tactical decisions. Our analysis of the weekly editions of The Irish People from September and October of 1984 largely confirms that Noraid was used mainly for supporting the cause and trying to gain political clout in the United States. However, we also find that Noraid cannot be neatly categorized into leaning exclusively toward contention.

Noraid was strongly in favor of a peace process and actively advocated for the IRA to be included in peace talks, while simultaneously being tolerant and even supportive of armed resistance. For instance, Noraid director Martin Galvin is reported to refer to the British as “the real terrorists”, and many stories go to great lengths detailing and condemning the abuses of the British forces in Northern Ireland.⁵³ Each issue of the newspaper also includes letters from political prisoners, and in the 22 September 1984 issue, the prisoner concludes that “the only hope for turning the tide against British occupation is the Republican Movement’s armalite and ballot box strategy”.⁵⁴ After the Brighton bombing, the editorial on the attack concludes: “British colonial history in Ireland and elsewhere consistently demonstrates that the British do not heed the force of the argument, only the argument of force”.⁵⁵

In August 1984, Martin Galvin traveled to Northern Ireland, despite being banned by the U.K. His attendance at the West Belfast rally prompted the RUC to try to arrest him, which led to further escalation that ultimately resulted in the killing of a demonstrator.⁵⁶ Before boarding his flight back to New York, Galvin told an Irish radio reporter: “If I had had a gun at the time, I would hopefully have tried to use it to protect women and children at the rally”.⁵⁷

The Irish American delegation that went with Galvin to Northern Ireland attended the rally with cameras, ready to report on the abuses of the police. Galvin’s mobilization for the Irish cause upon his return was heavily centered on publicizing the abuses of the British forces in Northern Ireland. He appeared on CBS, NBC, ABC News, Cable News Network, Canadian Network; he was interviewed by the New York Daily News and Newsday, and he was a guest on several radio shows. On 25^th August, the Irish diaspora organized the largest demonstration in the United States since 1981, when the death of ten republican prisoner hunger strikers in Northern Ireland led to vigorous mobilization by Noraid.⁵⁸

This mobilization resonated with some American politicians, such as U.S. Representative Mario Biaggi (NY), who urged the House and Senate to pass a resolution prohibiting the British forces from using rubber bullets in Northern Ireland, and who also organized a congressional hearing into the British use of force during the August 12^th rally in Belfast. Biaggi also called on the State Department to file an official protest with the British government over the actions of their security forces, and he recommended that the U.S. government grant visas to Gerry Adams and other Sinn Féin representatives. He also asked Congress to conduct hearings on the whole issue of Ireland, and he demanded that the State Department explain why it does not protect American citizens hurt by the British.⁵⁹

This suggests that during this period, Noraid became a significant source of support for the Republican movement, boosting its international legitimacy. But there is no evidence that the group had an autonomous effect on the direction of the Republican movement, or that it influenced any tactical decisions.

Switching from Armed Resistance to Cooperation: February 1985

Only a few months after the widespread support for armed resistance witnessed in October 1984, the IRA leadership united around cooperation. Can the diaspora explain such a drastic shift in behavior? Given the restrictive political context, we expect Noraid to continue being an important source of support, but given its expressed endorsement of both negotiations and armed resistance, we do not expect it to influence the shift toward cooperation. We find that Noraid was mainly consequential to the extent that it consolidated support for Gerry Adams. In this regard, Noraid did not drive the move away from violence, but it inadvertently encouraged it, even as it continued legitimizing armed resistance. This suggests that when the domestic context is restrictive, diasporic support can make tough decisions, such as a move toward cooperation, more palatable to hardliners.

In October 1984, IRA continued facing a restrictive context. A European Union Commission on Human Rights found the use of plastic bullets during riots by the British Army to be justified.⁶⁰ In November, during the Anglo-Irish summit, Thatcher gave her famous “out, out, out!” speech, referring to the Northern Ireland Forum report and its three proposed solutions for the Northern Ireland conflict. Her comments were seen by the nationalist community as extremely dismissive.⁶¹ In January 1985, Thatcher was pressed to make progress on the Anglo-Irish agreement that would enable greater cooperation between the two governments, and she invited John Hume to meet her in Britain. The SDLP also met with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which had links to loyalist paramilitary groups, and was strongly opposed to the Republican movement. The Sinn Féin was not included in these talks.⁶²

In February 1985, the Provisional IRA (and not the Sinn Féin) approached John Hume requesting a meeting. This was quite a signal from the armed wing, seeing how John Hume was a known pacifist and supporter of peace and dialogue. He was also the leader of the SDLP, a political party that competed with Sinn Féin for the support of the Catholic-nationalist community. Hume had the ears and the respect of both the British and the Irish governments, and was respected by Unionist leaders. He was also well connected to key figures in the Irish American diaspora elite, such as Massachusetts senator Ted Kennedy and New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan.⁶³ Despite facing criticism, Hume agreed to the meeting. The event was very short, as PIRA insisted on video-taping the meeting, and Hume refused.⁶⁴ The fact that PIRA reached out to him was nevertheless a significant step. The armed wing was not only signaling its willingness to dialogue, it was also showing it was not blind to the political context. The movement knew that Hume was the most (if not the only) sympathetic political figure that would be willing to listen to them, and it understood that talking to him would help its public image, especially given the nearing local elections, which would be the first local governmental elections that Sinn Féin would contest.⁶⁵ Gerry Adams also knew that for the IRA to become significant and be included in any negotiations, he had to prove that he could bring PIRA to the table. So he did. He convinced the Army Council to reach out to Hume.⁶⁶

Sinn Féin also sent clear signals of cooperation. In November, Adams suggested adopting a strategy of “pan nationalism” during the annual conference of the party. He called for "a firm, united and unambiguous demand from all Irish nationalist parties".⁶⁷ In February 1985, he asked John Hume to establish a united nationalist front with him on a radio interview.⁶⁸

Did Noraid play a role in driving this shift? By February 1985, the group continued to hold the same ambiguous view toward contention as before. For instance, we see criticism of the talks between the SDLP and DUP, which The Irish People claimed were in effect organized by the CIA and MI5, and intentionally excluded Sinn Féin.⁶⁹ In the same issue of the newspaper, a letter from a prisoner in Ireland expressed significant cynicism toward negotiations, justifying the continued use of armed resistance.⁷⁰ In a subsequent editorial, The Irish People also states that: “The implicit fiction was that since the Forum parties would talk Britain out of Ireland, it was unnecessary for the IRA to drive British forces out militarily”.⁷¹ This coverage suggests that overall, Noraid was leaning much more toward contention than cooperation. Nonetheless, this stance did not change the direction of the IRA, or Gerry Adams’s conviction of the need to engage in talks with Hume. Interestingly enough, The Irish People’s coverage of the talks with Hume was much more neutral, as if avoiding taking a clear stance, or commenting on the drastic shift within the IRA. Its main conclusion regarding the talks was:

Once the talks have taken place, the real question will be: has the SDLP learnt its lesson from the positive response which it claims to have received in the past week – namely that Northern nationalists, including SDLP supporters, see nothing wrong in talks with the IRA or with Sinn Féin?⁷²

Contrary to our original expectation, Noraid was not sidelined, even though it may have held more contentious views than the political leadership of the IRA at the time. However, in line with the overall logic of our argument, this larger appeal to the diaspora is understandable given its growing lobbying power, and the fact that it was not attempting to influence the direction of the IRA. Instead, the Irish-American diaspora continued to be a significant source of political support, gaining more and more political clout in the United States. Noraid’s focus was twofold: first, mobilize the Irish-American community to protest Thatcher’s announced visit to the United States and address to Congress planned for February 20^th, and second, mobilize support among Congressmen for inviting Gerry Adams to also address Congress after Thatcher.⁷³ This was a powerful strategy, as it would send a dual message: there was significant American opposition to Britain, and also significant political support in the U.S. Congress for Adams.

Noraid successfully convinced several Congressmen to invite Gerry Adams to address Congress. They also asked for granting him a visa, but that request was denied. Simultaneously, Noraid also collaborated with two other Irish diaspora groups critical of British policy and sympathetic to the republican cause, the Ancient Order of Hibermians and the Irish American Unity Conference, to stage a national demonstration during Thatcher’s visit. These groups organized buses to DC from around the country, and sent a clear message that played on Thatcher’s “out, out, out” speech: “Let us tell Thatcher that censorship by visa denial is out. Her policy of terrorism in Ireland is out. Ultimately, British rule will be out”.⁷⁴

By mobilizing political support around the figure of Gerry Adams, it is possible that Noraid might have also influenced the calculations of the Army Council, and affected its willingness to follow Adams’s lead regarding the talks with Hume. However, this is impossible to prove based on the available evidence. What is clear instead, is that during this period the Irish-American diaspora was a powerful source of support that empowered Gerry Adams, even if not directly influencing the tactics of the movement.

The Role of Noraid during a Period of Tactical Divergence: November 1987–January 1988

Between 1983 and November 1987, the political and military wings of the IRA converged around tactics, either unilaterally supporting cooperation or contention. In November 1987 we see the first clear instance of divergent tactics, with the political wing endorsing cooperation, and the military wing embarking on an extensive campaign of armed resistance. Given this tactical divergence, we expect Noraid to play a significant role during this period and be able to influence tactics, especially given the restrictive domestic political context. What we find is that there is strong evidence to suggest Noraid incentivized the adoption of this dual strategy that relied simultaneously on both negotiations and armed actions.

1987 ended on a rather low point for the Republican movement, especially for the militant voices within the movement. In September 1987, the British government proposed that electoral candidates will be required to “declare opposition to the use of violence for political ends”.⁷⁵ On November 1^st, the French Authorities captured the Eskund, a ship carrying weapons for the Republican movement, given to it by the Libyan president Ghaddafi.⁷⁶ Beyond the loss of weapons and the loss of the element of surprise in the armed struggle, the capturing of the ship was damaging because it led to stronger cooperation between the British and Irish intelligence communities.⁷⁷ The capture also bred mistrust within the Republican leadership, as very few at the highest ranks in the organization had knowledge of the shipment.⁷⁸

In November 1987, Irish Gardai began to look for the Libyan arms in an ‘unprecedented national search’.⁷⁹ They found numerous underground caches and safe houses over several months. The more weapons they found, the less safe the IRA operatives felt, and the angrier Ghaddafi became, eventually canceling additional support he intended to send.⁸⁰ Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 40 Republican activists and 5 Sinn Féin Councilors were arrested in several counties on 24^th November.⁸¹

As if the Eskund capture was not enough of a blow for the military wing, the attack on a war memorial during a commemoration service in Enniskillen on the 8^th of November made things even worse for the Republican movement. The attack had the highest death toll in over five years, killing 11 civilians and injuring over 60, leading to widespread condemnation by Thatcher, President Reagan and even by Adams himself.⁸² While the Republican movement initially tried to blame the high casualty rate on the bomb exploding prematurely, this claim was subsequently refuted.⁸³ The Enniskillin attack was properly executed, but it was the result of a poor decision, made in the context of organizational weakness and low morale.⁸⁴ Some suggest that at the time, the IRA needed to do something extraordinary in order to signal strength.⁸⁵

The attack led to the adoption of even harsher counter-terrorism measures. The British pushed for renewing the ‘Prevention of Terrorism Act,’ which would have meant difficulties in fundraising and in crossing borders for suspects, supporters and known accomplices of terrorists.⁸⁶ The British government even considered outlawing Sinn Féin as a political party.⁸⁷ The Enniskillin debacle also put increased pressure on the Irish government to pass an Extradition Act, which prevented IRA volunteers from finding refuge in the Republic of Ireland.⁸⁸

The Enniskillen attack was an acute issue for the movement. The British had learned from their own mistakes (most notably Bloody Sunday, when on 30 January 1972, the British army shot and killed thirteen unarmed civilians during an anti-interment March in Derry⁸⁹) and killed far less civilians than in the past. The Unionist paramilitaries were also more careful in their target selection, making the Provisional movement the only one killing civilians. Enniskillin was therefore a public relations disaster.⁹⁰ The two most prominent Republican leaders, Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams, started publicly criticizing the IRA. Adams remarked that “the Republican Movement could not withstand another Enniskillen episode”.⁹¹ Sinn Féin therefore had to send a clear signal of peace if it wanted to stay relevant. Entering talks with the SDLP was such a signal.

Aside from the public relations fiasco after Enniskillin, the political wing of the Republican movement fared somewhat better than the military wing, though it too was in a position of relative weakness. In October, Sinn Féin won a by-election for Belfast city council, recuperating some of its electoral loss of June 1987 in the U.K. general elections in which the SDLP increased its vote share at the expense of Sinn Féin.⁹² Nonetheless, since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was signed, the SDLP made electoral gains at the expense of the Sinn Féin in every general election.⁹³

Given this context, the political wing of the IRA had to signal willingness to negotiate and enter talks with the SDLP. But why did the military wing push forward with armed resistance, if it meant hurting the chance of political success? The armed wing may have wanted to signal strength and act before the British military could completely immobilize it, as we pointed out above. The continued support of the diaspora is the other important part of the story. Even after the Enniskillin attack, Noraid continued to justify armed resistance, and American politicians continued to meet with and support Gerry Adams. This not only empowered the military wing to act, but it also signaled that much of the American support for Gerry Adams was not conditional on the IRA’s cessation of violence. In this regard, Noraid’s effect was to encourage and empower the IRA to adopt a dual strategy of both the ballot and the armalite.

That Noraid continued to legitimize armed resistance even in the aftermath of the Enniskillen attack becomes evident from an overview of The Irish People during this period. The front page headline of the paper immediately after the Enniskillen attack was “Enniskillen deaths not intended”, and the focus both in the 14^th November and the 21^st November issue was not on the devastation of the attack, but on the apologetic statements from the IRA, and the claim that the bomb exploded prematurely. After publishing the official IRA statement on Enniskillen on 21^st November, the newspaper also stated:

It [Enniskillen] was an appalling tragedy that should never have happened. But what is clear is that the IRA had no intention of injuring civilians, and did not themselves detonate the remote-control bomb. […] the war in the Six Counties which has claimed so many lives is not now and never has been the fault of the Irish people – nationalist, loyalist or republican – but that ultimately Britain is to blame.⁹⁴

A separate article in the same issue makes the legitimization and necessity of armed resistance even more explicit, stating:

Armed resistance to British rule will bring that freedom because it is ultimately the most necessary political weapon against an armed aggressor and the only one the aggressor will heed. The experience of oppressed people all over the world and, most of all, in our own history, proves that. That is the tragic context in which the Enniskillen bombing took place.⁹⁵

As the IRA faced domestic and international condemnation over Enniskillen, it is significant that Noraid not only withheld blame, but also became an outlet for IRA statements, including what was in effect a call to arms:

No-one but the volunteers of the Irish Republican Army are prepared to lay down their lives, prepared to sacrifice their freedom in order to end British interference once and for all.[…] With this in mind we make an unprecedented appeal – given the division suffered by the Republican Movement in 1926 – to the grassroots of Fianna Fail to face up to the challenge of British rule in Ireland. We appeal to this most powerful constituency within the 26 Counties to assert that British politicians – not Irish people – are the root cause of division and conflict in our country.⁹⁶

The December 1987 issues of The Irish People lend significantly more support to the militant side of the IRA than to the voices for cooperation. Beyond sending a signal to the IRA itself, the lobbying efforts of groups like Noraid also managed to secure continued support for Gerry Adams from American politicians. While Adams continued to emphasize the need for a political solution, for the Irish-American diaspora he became the figurehead of the Republican movement, and therefore continued to garner support even from more militant diasporic voices. Given this persistent source of diasporic support, Adams also managed to retain the sympathies of some key American politicians, even in the aftermath of Enniskillen. To be sure, the chairman of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee on Irish Affairs condemned Enniskillen, stating that “the horrific bombing which took place yesterday in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, must be condemned for its savagery, and its indiscriminate nature in terms of its casualties”.⁹⁷ Yet while condemning the IRA violence, Biaggi also emphasized that violence in Northern Ireland is not one-sided, and that British violence must be equally condemned. The Ad Hoc Committee emphasized this position even after Enniskillen, as the IRA violence continued, asking all Presidential candidates to state whether they equally repudiate both “civilian and official violence in Northern Ireland”.⁹⁸ The effects of these positions among the Irish diaspora and politicians supportive of the Irish lobby sent the message that the political wing of the IRA would not be punished for the violence of the military wing. This became very evident when politicians like New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg traveled to Northern Ireland and met with Gerry Adams, even as the State Department put pressure on him not to meet with him, because it would amount to an endorsement of the Enniskillen tragedy.⁹⁹

Noraid’s rhetoric and mobilization, and the continued support for Gerry Adams from American politicians even as the IRA escalated its violence can be seen as empowering the IRA to adopt a dual strategy, allowing (and perhaps even encouraging) the military wing to engage in violence, as the political wing leaned toward cooperation. Noraid did not seek to push either the military or the political wing toward contention, but by consolidating support for Gerry Adams while simultaneously legitimizing armed resistance, the group created an incentive structure that ultimately did affect Republican tactics. While Gerry Adams pushed for a political solution during this period, some of his statements, as well as some of the language used in the Republican newspaper in Northern Ireland, suggest that the IRA was in fact intentionally adopting a dual strategy, with the political wing focusing on cooperation, and the military wing pursuing armed resistance. The two wings sent divergent signals, but the overarching Republican movement perceived these divergent tactics as complementary at the time.

In his 1987 Presidential address, Adams concluded with: “To the British government we say: ‘If you strike at, imprison or kill us, out of our prisons or graves we will still evoke a spirit that will thwart you and mayhaps raise a force that will destroy you. We defy you! Do your worst’. It can never match our best”.¹⁰⁰ In the Republican newspaper An Phoblacht, Hilda MacThomas writes on 24 September 1987 that “force – political, military, or economic – is the only way in which some measure of change can be brought about in the undemocratic Six-County state…”.¹⁰¹ Just like the Noraid newspaper, the December issue of An Phoblacht included both the IRA Christmas statement, which states that “revolutionary armed struggle is the only means of countering the evils of British imperialism”,¹⁰² and the Sinn Féin statement by Adams, in which he concludes that “in 1988 while maintaining a firm opposition to the British presence in our country, we will be as willing as we have been in the past to listen and talk to our political opponents”.¹⁰³

Thinking of tactical divergence as an intentional dual strategy that was empowered and encouraged by the Irish-American diaspora can help explain why between 1988 and 1998 we see more instances of tactical divergence than of leadership convergence over contention or cooperation. In order to understand what changed by 1998, and examine whether the mobilization of the Irish-American diaspora can help us understand the IRA’s convergence toward cooperation in 1998, the next empirical section considers one of the last episodes of tactical divergence, which was in 1996.

The Role of the Diaspora during an Organizational Crisis: January-February 1996

By 1996, the IRA was facing a more positive domestic and international political context than at the end of 1987. Internally, however, the movement was starting to fragment to the point of crisis, and its supporters were divided over the question of continued resistance versus negotiations. Sinn Féin and the IRA sent drastically different signals: while Sinn Féin supported peace talks and was willing to meet with all parties, the IRA Army Council announced in February 1996 the end of the 17 months long ceasefire and the resumption of violence. In announcing the ceasefire on 31^st August 1994, the IRA statement declared they are doing so in “Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic process and underlying our definitive commitment to its success”.¹⁰⁴ However, by February 1996, the movement felt that insignificant progress had been made, putting the blame on the British government. The announcement claimed that “Instead of embracing the peace process, the British government acted in bad faith with Mr. Major and the Unionist leaders squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict”.¹⁰⁵

In this context of leadership divergence over tactics, while diasporas may not be a primary source of support, we would expect that they may be pulled into the intra-organizational competition between the political and military leadership, and therefore be able to affect tactics by influencing the internal balance of power within the IRA leadership. We find that Noraid was influential primarily because within a context of leadership competition, it helped consolidate support around Gerry Adams, even as the group continued to endorse contention. The support for Adams was consequential, even though within the broader Irish-American diaspora, Noraid was starting to be eclipsed by the growing pro-peace movement.

The political context leading up to January-February 1996 was more permissive than in previous periods. Overall, the British were sending mostly positive signals, despite making demands of the Republican movement that it was not imposing on Unionist organizations with regards to decommissioning. Laws were changed which eased the releasing of prisoners, soldiers were sent home, and the Sinn Féin was invited to meetings. The Irish government also sent positive signals, something that rarely happened throughout the conflict. For example, the Irish government canceled a meeting with the British government due to disagreements regarding the demand for Provisional IRA to decommission, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland announced that Sinn Féin had proven it is committed to peace.¹⁰⁶

Despite the improving political context, divisions within the IRA were palpable as early as the spring of 1995, when discontent amongst the rank and file was growing. The peace process was clearly not going anywhere. Opposition to Gerry Adams and his allies grew, and the IRA Executive Council decided to intervene. The Executive Council was a 12-member body of senior and experienced veterans of the military wing, and it was responsible for selecting the members of the Army Council.¹⁰⁷ The Executive Council of 1994–1996 was unhappy that the Army Council did not include it in the negotiations and deliberations that led to the ceasefire.¹⁰⁸ With the British not showing any significant signs of a complete withdrawal from Northern Ireland, or any willingness to progress in the peace negotiations, the number of Executive Council members opposing Adams and his peace strategy grew. By the summer of 1995, 10 out of the 12 members opposed Adams. The council was promoting quite a simple argument – with no movement from the British, the longer the ceasefire lasted, the weaker the movement would become, both military and politically.¹⁰⁹

By September 1995, the tension over continued cooperation escalated within the Republican movement, especially as decommissioning became a salient issue. Despite its observance of the ceasefire at the time, the IRA rejected any notion of decommissioning.¹¹⁰ Sinn Féin was also critical of the decommissioning demand, but it continued to signal support for the peace process. At the end of September, it held a special conference in Dublin to review the peace process, and the delegates concluded that ‘there is no other way’ but to continue with peace.¹¹¹ Sinn Féin sensed the discomfort within the army wing, and needed to send a clear message of cooperation to all parties involved. The message was received well by the newly elected Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble, who called for the convening of a new Northern Ireland Assembly, and declared that he would talk to Sinn Féin.¹¹²

In October, the U.S. ambassador to the U.K. met with delegates from different parties, including UUP, SDLP and Sinn Féin.¹¹³ Adams continuously reiterated Sinn Féin’s commitment to peace and to a democratic and peaceful process: “Sinn Féin will have to assert the supremacy of our strategy, which is a peace strategy… Dialogue is the only vehicle for change…”; “Sinn Féin remains deeply committed to our peace strategy”; “Only today I sent a letter to John Major underlining our commitment to rebuilding the peace process”.¹¹⁴ Even the Irish Taoiseach agreed that Sinn Féin was fully committed to peace, stating that Sinn Féin “has satisfied the conditions of a commitment to exclusively peaceful means” and as such, all-party talks could and should commence.¹¹⁵

Over the course of November, however, Adams also began to condemn the British demand for IRA decommissioning prior to a peace process. Later that month, the Northern Ireland office published a paper calling for all-party preparatory talks to be held alongside an independent international body that would deal with the decommissioning issue – what would become known as “the twin track process”.¹¹⁶ At the end of the month, the British and Irish governments agreed to launch the twin track process. A few days later, President Clinton visited Northern Ireland, expressing his support, and announcing the establishment of the decommissioning commission headed by George Mitchell.¹¹⁷

In January 1996, Sinn Féin met with both the British and the Irish governments as part of the preparatory talks. Later that month, the Mitchell report concluded that decommissioning should take place during and not before or after talks.¹¹⁸ Sinn Féin accepted the report as a way forward, as did the Irish government and its opposition parties, the SDLP and Alliance parties, the UDP and the PUP. The DUP rejected it, and the UUP expressed its reservations. In early February 1996, Mitchell warned that without meaningful progress in the talks, there could be an IRA split. Less than a week later, the IRA announced the end of the ceasefire.¹¹⁹ The IRA blamed the British Prime Minister and government in the failure of the talks and in dragging their feet.¹²⁰ An hour after their announcement, a bomb went off in London, and a new violent campaign began. As a result, Sinn Féin was excluded from the all-party talks.¹²¹

What followed was an interesting period, in which the Sinn Féin kept pushing to be invited back to the talks, stating its desire for peace, while the IRA also talked of its desire for peace, but used violence, blaming the British government for killing the peace process. As the Army Council saw it, both the British and the Irish governments were not taking Sinn Féin seriously enough. In their efforts to avoid a split in the organization, and to appease the hard liners, who were disappointed with the lack of progress in the talks and the “cooperative way”, the leadership of the Army Council had to allow violence to be picked up again, even if publicly it said it was committed to peace.¹²²

How did we get to this situation? The IRA Executive Council met in January 1996 and decided to assemble an extraordinary General Army Convention (GAC) that would vote on the strategy that should be adopted by the organization.¹²³At that point, the Army Council issued a canvass of rank and file views only to discover that most brigades were unhappy with the situation and believed that the movement was tricked by the British and the Irish governments.¹²⁴ Therefore, fearing the resolution of the GAC and the potential that it would vote to replace Adams, the Army Council announced the end of the ceasefire before a GAC could be convened, on 9^th February 1996. The Army Council’s announcement blamed the British for acting in bad faith and for being driven by ‘selfish party political and sectional interests.’ The announcement also read:

It is with great reluctance that the leadership of the IRA announces that the complete cessation of military operations will end at 6pm on February 9. As we stated on August 31, 1994, the basis for the cessation was to enhance the democratic peace process and to underline our definitive commitment to its success. We also made it clear that we believed that an opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement had been created. The cessation presented an historic challenge for everyone and the IRA commends the leaderships of nationalist Ireland at home and abroad. They rose to the challenge. The British Prime Minister did not.¹²⁵

By ending the ceasefire, the movement avoided a potential split, or at a minimum, a potential leadership change. This decision was influenced by Gerry Adams, who was caught in the middle, and who was astute enough to realize that he was about to lose control over his organization. The dual strategy of violence and pushing for talks was therefore primarily about saving the leadership of Gerry Adams and organizational continuity.

Adams made sure that he would maintain his credibility as a “peacemaker”, especially in front of the Americans. The Canary Wharf explosion of 9^th February shook not only Sinn Féin’s position in the negotiations, but also that of Adams’ personally. Following the explosion, both the Americans and the British began questioning Adams true motivations and real power over the IRA.¹²⁶ Adams knew of his precarious situation and a few hours following the end of the ceasefire and before the explosion, he called the U.S. National Security Council to warn them about some disturbing developments. He was able to portray himself as a frustrated peacemaker that was stuck between his own hardliners and the inflexible British government.¹²⁷ He took a short trip to the U.S. in March to promote his stand as a ‘peacemaker’, despite being limited in access and fundraising by the U.S. government due to the ending of the ceasefire.¹²⁸

To what extent did the Irish-American diaspora affect Gerry Adams’s behavior and the end of the ceasefire? Given the internal competition within the IRA leadership, we would expect that both the militant voices and leaders such as Adams would try to use the diaspora strategically to gain an advantage. Noraid has historically supported both Gerry Adams and the continuation of armed resistance. In January 1995, Noraid’s leader Martin Galvin was removed as the editor of The Irish People after allowing the publication of a letter criticizing the ceasefire.¹²⁹ By early 1996 The Irish People continued to have a militant tone that legitimized armed resistance, but it also explicitly expressed support for Gerry Adams. To the extent that Noraid had an effect on IRA’s dual strategy of both contention and cooperation, it did so by consolidating support around the figure of Gerry Adams. Within the broader Irish-American diaspora, however, by 1996 Noraid was no longer the key source of funding or most important lobbying group for the IRA, and the organization’s efforts were eclipsed by the more pacifist camp and the constitutional nationalists in support of John Hume.¹³⁰

By 1996, the Irish American diaspora managed to gain substantial political support, turning the U.S. into a key player in the peace process. Leaders of Sinn Féin, as well as the leaders of all other parties, would regularly fly to DC during this period to update the American government on progress in the talks. On St. Patrick’s Day in 1995, Gerry Adams met President Bill Clinton at a White House Reception. Adams also received an unconditional visa, which allowed him to raise funds in the United States, though it was rescinded once the ceasefire broke.¹³¹ City Councilwoman Katheryn Freed introduced a resolution in the New York City Council, calling on U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services to drop the deportation proceedings against Irish republicans.¹³²

Noraid had played a significant role in raising support for the Republican cause in the U.S., though it was not the only diaspora group to do so. The Irish National Caucus had emerged as a key Irish lobbying group since the mid 1970s, but unlike Noraid it did not seek to raise support for any particular Irish group, and instead it focused on American foreign policy toward Ireland more broadly, and on the issue of human rights. Another key actor that emerged in the early 1990s was Americans for a New Irish Agenda (ANIA), who lobbied to include Sinn Féin into the peace process, and elicited political support for Gerry Adams, while also pushing the military wing toward several ceasefires.¹³³ ANIA represented a new generation of the Irish lobby, which involved what Cochrane calls “corporate Irish-America”,¹³⁴ and which was able to generate significant monetary and political support for the pro-peace camp. In 1995, Friends of Sinn Féin was formed after Adams visited the United States. Sinn Féin was able to open an office in Washington after the 1994 ceasefire, which allowed it to control its publicity and fundraising efforts in the United States.¹³⁵ Under these circumstances, Noraid was no longer the most important diasporic organization, being eclipsed by more pacifist groups like ANIA, and by the mobilization efforts of politicians like “the four Horsemen” – Edward Kennedy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Speaker Tip O’Neill and New York Governor Hugh Carey.¹³⁶

The extent to which American political elites supported the Republican cause by 1996 is also clearly visible from the reactions to the February bombing in London, after the ceasefire was lifted. Rather than harshly condemning this act of violence, the U.S. Ambassador to Dublin issued a statement saying that Washington has no interest in cutting off talks with Gerry Adams. Even though the relationship had the potential of being jeopardized, and Adams’ unconditional visa was rescinded following the end of the cease-fire, he was still granted a limited entry visa to the USA after personally requesting President Clinton to attend a St. Patrick’s Day event.¹³⁷ Similarly, George Mitchell said “The bombing points out the urgency of moving forward to all-party talks. The solution is more democracy that draws parties in and not out”.¹³⁸ U.S. Senator King also called on the Irish Prime Minister to meet with Gerry Adams, stating “Gerry Adams has proven his commitment to peace. More than any individual, he has worked to preserve the cease-fire and to advance the peace process over the past 17 months”.¹³⁹

Noraid’s response to the bombing makes it clear that it was still tolerant of armed resistance. Rather than condemning the violence, the chairman of Noraid, Paul Doris, issued a press release immediately after the bombing “condemning the British government for months of stalemate that forced the IRA to act”.¹⁴⁰ Despite Noraid’s legitimization of violence, Gerry Adams insisted that the Irish-American diaspora was supportive of cooperation, suggesting that by 1996, Sinn Féin started distancing itself from Noraid. In an article he wrote for The Guardian on 12^th February 1996, he speaks of Irish America as one of the actors who” painstakingly put together a package which persuaded the IRA to call a complete cessation of military operations on the basis that it would lead to an inclusive process of negotiations”.¹⁴¹ In a different article he wrote for The Irish Times on the same day he also said: “The Irish Government of that time [referring to 1994], Sinn Féin, the SDLP and key elements of Irish America were all agreed that inclusive negotiation, without preconditions or vetoes, is the only way to resolve the conflict and secure a lasting peace”.¹⁴² In a press conference Adams gave in August 1995, he also mentions how “Irish America rowed in to support” the dialogue between Hume, Adams and Raynolds.¹⁴³ Reynolds, previous Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) was a key character in the peace process that together with Hume, brought Gerry Adams and the Sinn Féin into the fold.¹⁴⁴

These statements suggest that Adams explicitly tried to leverage diasporic support during periods of leadership fragmentation, and he was especially interested in maintaining the backing of the pro-peace corporate diaspora, even as the IRA pursued a double strategy of both contention and cooperation. In light of this, it is significant that the response of the Irish-American diaspora after the end of the ceasefire in February 1996 is simply to consolidate support around Gerry Adams and condemn the British. Even in The Irish People, the front page story of February 17 that covers the end of the ceasefire explicitly discounts allegations of fragmentations, and reiterates Gerry Adams’s role:

Speculation has run high in some media reports that the position of Adams is being threatened by a rift with so-called hardliners within the IRA, but high level Sinn Féin spokespersons condemned such reports, pointing out that there is no split within the Republican movement and that without Gerry Adams there can be no talks. In a telephone interview from Belfast, Sinn Féin press spokesperson Gerry McGuigan called for the peace process to continue despite the ending of the ceasefire, adding that the bombing ‘came out of the blue and caught everyone by surprise. But what we need to emphasize now is that this situation can only be resolved through talks, and if you don’t have Gerry Adams, you don’t have talks’.¹⁴⁵

By adopting a similar rhetoric to the one used by Adams following the end of the ceasefire, putting the onus for the violence on the British government while stressing the movement’s commitment to dialogue, the broader Irish-American diaspora played a key role during this period in ensuring Sinn Féin remained committed to negotiations and solidifying Adams’ position within the organization. Noraid itself did not drive the Republican movement in a new direction, but during a moment of intra-organizational crisis, the group helped consolidate support around Gerry Adams, even as the Republican leader was beginning to distance himself from the more militant voices in the diaspora. For Noraid, Adams remained the symbol and the figurehead of the Republican movement, so if nothing else, it was politically expedient to continue to express support for him. The fact that even the more militant voices in the diaspora continued to rally behind Gerry Adams was significant, especially as the broader Irish-American diaspora was shifting decisively in favor of the pro-negotiations faction. Gerry Adams was able to use diaspora support to strengthen his position within the movement.

Conclusion

By 1998, when the Good Friday Agreement was signed, the Irish-American diaspora became widely seen by actors inside and outside Northern Ireland as a critical player pushing for negotiations, and the main reason why the United States became so involved in the peace process. Our analysis has shown that the Irish-American diaspora was not always a voice for peace. By focusing on Noraid and examining its impact during different episodes in the 1980s and in 1996, we have shown that DOs also incentivized the simultaneous pursuit of negotiations and armed resistance. The extent of Noraid’s influence, however, depended on internal dynamics within the IRA.

When the Republican movement was unified and the leaders aligned over tactics, Noraid served primarily as a source of financial and political support. When the political and military leadership adopted divergent tactics, Noraid empowered this dual strategy by legitimizing violence and lobbying that American support for Gerry Adams not be conditional on the cessation of violence. When the Republican movement became severely divided, the Irish-American diaspora became a significant source of support for the contested leadership of Gerry Adams, even as groups like Noraid continued to simultaneously legitimize armed resistance. In a moment of organizational crisis and competition over leadership, the wider Irish diaspora empowered the pro-peace camp, and more militant groups like Noraid also helped strengthen support for the leader who was ultimately capable of consolidating the movement around negotiations and cooperation, rather than violence.

The extent to which the findings of our case study can be generalized to other conflicts remains an empirical question. Rather than proposing universal conclusions, we hope our analysis raises important questions about the effects of DOs on rebel groups, and inspires more research on the organizational effects of diasporic mobilization. While our study has shown that DOs can affect the balance of power between different leadership factions inside rebel groups in the home country, future research could examine more systematically whether certain characteristics make leaders more receptive to or appealing to diasporas, or whether any organizational characteristics make groups more prone to diasporic influence. Our analysis also suggests that in conflicts that include diasporic mobilization, the study of organizational fragmentation and leadership in armed groups should move beyond the domestic context, and consider the potential influence of constituencies and supporters abroad.

Acknowledgements

We thank the participants of the roundtable “The role of diaspora before, during, and after conflict”, held at Queen’s University Belfast in April 2022 and hosted by the Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflicts. We also thank the participants and audience of the “Understanding Violence in Deeply Divided Societies” panel held at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in 2021 (online). Lastly, we thank Eric Dunford, Timofey Agarin, and Adrien Guelke for their useful insights and comments on previous drafts of this article.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 P. Johnson, “Noraid Member Arrested during Internment Riots/Ulster,” The Guardian (London), 10 August 1984b.

2 Paul Stares and Paul B Stares, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2007).

3 R. J. Briand, “Bush, Clinton, Irish America and the Irish Peace Process,” The Political Quarterly 73, no. 2 (2002): 172–80; Adrian Guelke, “The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” International Affairs 72, no. 3 (1 July 1996): 521–36; Timothy White and Emily Pausa, “When Did the Irish-American Diaspora Make a Difference? Influencing US Diplomacy toward Northern Ireland,” Studi Irlandesi. A Journal of Irish Studies 9, no. 9 (2019): 329–46; Feargal Cochrane, “Irish-America, the End of the IRA’s Armed Struggle and the Utility of ‘Soft Power’,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 2 (2007): 215–31; Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain, “Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 8 (13 August 2009): 681–704.

4 Jacob Bercovitch, “A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution,” in Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?, ed. Paul Stares and Paul B. Stares (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2007); Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001); Sarah Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 3 (2004): 405–26.

5 Terrence Lyons and Peter G. Mandaville, Politics from Afar (Columbia University Press, 2012); Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Maria Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 433–53; Denise Natali, “Kurdish Interventions in the Iraq War,” in Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers, ed. Paul Stares and Paul B. Stares (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2007); Christine Fair, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace,” in Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?, ed. Paul Stares and Paul B. Stares (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2007).

6 Hockenos, Homeland Calling; Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization.”

7 Dennis Dijkzeul and Margit Fauser, eds., Diaspora Organizations in International Affairs (Milton, UK: Routledge, 2020).

8 Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton University Press, 2013); Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Arie Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (New York: Routledge, 2008); Ronit Berger, “Dynamics Contexts of Conflict: Complicated Actors and Settings in Northern Ireland,” in Overcoming Intractable Conflicts: New Approaches to Constructive Transformations, ed. Miriam Elman et al. (London: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 2019).

9 Dean G. Pruitt, “Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict,” American Behavioral Scientist 50, no. 11 (2007): 1532.

10 Colin Walch, “Rethinking Ripeness Theory: Explaining Progress and Failure in Civil War Negotiations in the Philippines and Colombia,” International Negotiation 21, no. 1 (2016): 75–103.

11 Wendy Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process,” International Security 33, no. 3 (1 January 2009): 79–109.

12 Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

13 David S. Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity," American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 6 (1996): 1628–60.

14 Berger, “Dynamics Contexts of Conflict.”

15 Lyons and Mandaville, Politics from Afar, 2.

16 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 71.

17 White and Pausa, “When Did the Irish-American Diaspora Make a Difference? Influencing US Diplomacy toward Northern Ireland”; Guelke, “The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process.”

18 Brian Hanley, “The Politics of Noraid,” Irish Political Studies 19, no. 1 (1 March 2004): 1.

19 Cochrane, “Irish-America.”

20 Hanley, “The Politics of Noraid.”

21 Guelke, “The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 527.

22 Hanley, “The Politics of Noraid,” 10.

23 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (Dublin: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995).

24 Brandan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein. 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999); Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Mcmillan, 2008).

25 A. Richards, “Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the Peace Process and Democracy,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 72–89; Peter Taylor, The Provos: the IRA and Sinn Fein (London: A&C Black, 2014).

26 Peter Krause, Rebel Power: Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win (Cornell University Press, 2017).

27 Coogan, The IRA; O’Brien, The Long War; Berti, Armed Political Organizations; Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2002).

28 The Irish Times, “McGuinness Admits Bloody Sunday IRA Membership,” 2 May 2001.

29 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 79.

30 Henry Patterson, The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA. 2nd ed. (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1997), 99.

31 Ibid.

32 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA; Coogan, The IRA.

33 These episodes are based around key organizational behaviors and not key moments in the conflict. We only included episodes where organizational behaviors demonstrated a clear shift in tactics from the preceding period.

34 This timeline is based on the analysis of the IRA by Ronit Berger Hobson in the forthcoming book “Transforming Conflict: The Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ From Contention to Cooperation (McGill-Queen’s University Press, forthcoming).

35 A. Miller Kerby, Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America, 1815-1920 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), 3.

36 Andrew Bielenberg, The Irish Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2014).

37 Miller Kerby, Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America, 1815-1920, 3–6.

38 Peter John McLoughlin, "‘The First Major Step in the Peace Process’? Exploring the Impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on Irish Republican Thinking," Irish Political Studies 29, no. 1 (2014): 116–33.

39 Martin Melaugh, CAIN – A Chronology of the Conflict. Retrieved from CAIN – Conflict Archive on the Internet: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/otherlem/chron/ch81.htm

40 Adrian Guelke and Jim Smyth, “The Ballot Bomb: Terrorism and the Electoral Process in Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 2 (1 June 1992): 113.

41 Sydney Elliott and William D. Flackes, Conflict in Northern Ireland – An Encyclopedia (Belfast, Northern Ireland: The Blackstaff Press Limited, 1999).

42 Ibid.

43 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA.

44 An Phoblacht,”Interview with Adams,” 21 June 1984.

45 Ioana Emy Matesan and Ronit Berger, “Blunders and Blame: How Armed Non-State Actors React to Their Mistakes,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 5 (4 May 2017): 376–98.

46 New York Times, “Police Thinks IRA acted Weeks Ago,” 14 October 1984.

47 Stewart Tendler, "IRA Squad Guilty of Bombs Plot/Brighton Bombing Trial," The Times, 12 June 1986.

48 Christ Moncrieff, "Brighton Anniversary: Day the IRA Tried to Kill Our Cabinet," Birmingham Post, 11 October 2004.

49 “Bomb Ours, Says IRA,” The Guardian, 13 October 1984.

50 Vera Frankl, “Terror Campaign Will Be Renewed, IRA Warns UK,” The Globe and Mail, 19 October 1984.

51 Sinn Fein Stands by Bombing,” The Express, 5 October 2005.

52 “Bomb Ours, Says IRA,” The Guardian, 13 October 1984.

53 The Irish People, 1 September 1984, 1.

54 The Irish People, 22 September 1984, 12.

55 The Irish People, 20 October 1984, 4.

56 The Irish People, 1 September 1984, 1.

57 Ibid., 7.

58 Ibid., 7; Hanley, “The Politics of Noraid,” 3; Stephen Hopkins, “‘Our Whole History Has Been Ruined!’ The 1981 Hunger Strike and the Politics of Republican Commemoration and Memory,” Irish Political Studies 31, no. 1 (2 January 2016): 46–7.

59 The Irish People, 15 September 1984.

60 MeLaugh, CAIN.

61 Ibid.

62 McLoughlin, “The First Major Step in the Peace Process.”

63 John Dumbrell, ‘“Hope and History”: The US and Peace in Northern Ireland,” in A Farewell to Arms?: From “Long War” to Long Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

64 Elliott and Flackes, Conflict in Northern Ireland.

65 MeLaugh, CAIN.

66 Moloney A Secret History of the IRA.

67 Gerry Adams, “Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (Annual Conference) Presidential Address” (August 1984).

68 Moloney A Secret History of the IRA.

69 The Irish People, 19 January 1985.

70 Ibid., 12.

71 The Irish People, 26 January 1985, 4.

72 The Irish People, 23 February 1985, 2.

73 The Irish People, 26 January 1985, 4.

74 The Irish People, 26 January 1874, 4.

75 Elliott and Flackes, Conflict in Northern Ireland.

76 Ibid.

77 O’Brien, The Long War.

78 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA.

79 O’Brien, The Long War, 143.

80 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA.

81 Elliott and Flacks, Conflict in Northern Ireland; Art Mac Eoin, “Remembering the Past Nationwide Wave of Repression,” An Phoblacht, 29 November 2001.

82 Matesan and Berger, “Blunders and Blame.”

83 “Enniskillen bombing called ‘disastrous error’,” United Press International, 19 November 1987; "Police: IRA Planted Bomb in Town Near Enniskillen That Didn't Explode,” The Associated Press, 11 November 1987.

84 Matesan and Berger, “Blunders and Blame,” 387.

85 Robin Young, “Silence, Outrage and the Agony: Remembrance Day,” The Times, 9 November 1987.

86 Phillip Webster and John Cooney, “Thatcher Steps Up Pressure on Extradition: Irish Debate Anti-IRA Moves as the People of Enniskillen Mourn their Dead,” The Times, 11 November 1987.

87 Seamus Milne, “The Day in Politics: Thatcher Considers Sinn Fein Ban – Question Time,” The Guardian, 11 November 1987.

88 Matesan and Berger, “Blunders and Blame.”

89 Robert W. White, “From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army,” American Journal of Sociology 94, no. 6 (May 1989): 1284, https://doi.org/10.1086/229155.

90 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 342.

91 O’Brien, The Long War, 142.

92 John McGarry. "The Anglo‐Irish Agreement and the Prospects for Power Sharing in Northern Ireland," The Political Quarterly 59, no. 2 (1988): 236–50.

93 Guelke and Smyth, “The Ballot Bomb,” 115.

94 The Irish People, 21 November 1987, 8.

95 Ibid, 9.

96 The Irish People, 5 December 1987, 5.

97 Congressional Record, 9 November 1987.

98 The Irish People, 9 January 1988, 2.

99 The Irish People, 16 January 1988, 1.

100 The Irish People, 14 November 1987, 9.

101 Hilda MacThomas, “Lenihan and King Play the US Publicity Card – Irish-American Pressure Works,” An Phoblacht, 24 September 1987.

102 P. O'Neill, “Peace with Justice Is Still the Aim,” An Phoblacht, 31 December 1987, 1.

103 Gerry Adams, “Sinn Fein Undeterred in Struggle for Freedom, Justice & Peace,” An Phoblacht, 31 December 1987, 2.

104 P. O’Neill, Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ceasefire Statement, 31 August 1994.

105 P. O’Neill, Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ending the Ceasefire Statement, 9^th February 1996.

106 MeLaugh, CAIN.

107 John Horgan and Max Taylor, "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure," Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3 (1997): 1–32.

108 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA.

109 Ibid.

110 Melaugh, CAIN.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Gerry Adams, Irish Times, 30 October 1995; 24 November 1995; and 30 November 1995.

115 Melaugh, CAIN.

116 Ibid.

117 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA.

118 George Mitchell, John de Chastelain, and Harry Holkeri, The Mitchell Report, 22 Janury 1996.

119 O’Brien, The Long War.

120 Steven J. Brams and Jesse M. Togman, “Cooperation through Threats: The Nortern Ireland Case,” PS: Political Science and Politics (1998): 32–9.

121 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process.

122 M. Smith. Fighting for Ireland?: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement (Routledge, 2002).

123 Moloney, The Secret History of the IRA.

124 Ibid, 439.

125 P. O'Neill, “Ending the Cease-Fire,” 9 February 1996.

126 Moloney, The Secret History of the IRA.

127 Ibid, 441.

128 Adam Nossiter, “I.R.A Official Begins Visit to the U.S. With Modest Schedule,” The New York Times, 13 March 1996.

129 Guelke, “The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 526.

130 J. Briand, “Bush, Clinton, Irish America and the Irish Peace Process,” The Political Quarterly 73, no. 2 (2002).

131 Timothy J. Lynch, "The Gerry Adams Visa in Anglo-American Relations," Irish Studies in International Affairs 14, no. 1 (2003): 33–44.

132 The Irish People, 20 January 1996.

133 Guelke, “The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process.”

134 Cochrane, “Irish-America, the End of the IRA’s Armed Struggle and the Utility of ‘Soft Power’.”

135 Cochrane, 221–22.

136 Briand, “Bush, Clinton”; T. White and E. Pausa, “When Did the Irish-American Diaspora Make a Difference? Influencing US Diplomacy toward Northern Ireland,” Studi Irlandesi. A Journal of Irish Studies 9, no. 9 (2019): 329–46.

137 John F. Harris, “Clinton Approves Visa for St. Patrick’s Day Visit by Sinn Fein Leader Gerry Adams,” The Washington Post, 2 March 1996.

138 The Irish People, 17 February 1996.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

141 (Adams, 1996a) Gerry Adams, “Permanent Peace Depends Upon a Negotiated Settlement,” The Guardian, 12 February 1996.

142 Gerry Adams, “Seekers after Peace Must Redouble Their Efforts,” The Irish Times, 12 February 1996.

143 Gerry Adams, Press conference, 31 August 1995. Belfast: Sinn Fein.

144 Roger MacGinty, "American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process," Journal of Conflict Studies 17, no. 2 (1997): 31–50.

145 The Irish People, 17 February 1996.