Countering the Financing of Terrorists’ Salaries

Abstract

The article aims to analyze and evaluate current trends in the global efforts to suppress a unique field in the financing of terrorism – terrorist salaries. The study seeks to cast new light on the origins and implications of the terrorism economy that deals with salaries, rewards, and other benefits paid to terrorists. The purpose of the new policy to suppress terrorist salaries is to halt terrorism by disrupting the channels of funding and diminishing the economic viability of terrorist activity. The policy to suppress terrorist salaries include diverse consequences: Humanitarian, security, legal, and economic interests, which are contradictory and require a balance between them. The article argues that despite objections, the idea to suppress terrorists’ salaries is established in the global community norms, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror, decisions of the Security Council, and domestic laws of Western countries. These global efforts are a turning point in the current strategies for counter-terrorism financing. This development shows a growing acceptance of the need for new and diverse tools to counter terror financing.

A common argument is that the efforts to suppress terrorist financing are as critical and necessary as the efforts against terrorism itself. Accordingly, countries and international organizations have recently begun increasing their actions against terrorists and those who finance them. Because money is the lifeblood of terrorist organizations, it is essential to identify the financing methods of terrorism and effectively prevent them. Moreover, when terrorism cooperates or is financed by a state, it is easier to act against it.

Imprisoned and released terrorists and their families are granted monthly salaries by the Palestinian Authority (PA).¹ The payment is paid for life and is proportional to the severity of the offense committed: the more severe the crime for which the terrorist was convicted, the higher the salary. In addition, terrorists who were injured during their activity and families of terrorists who were killed receive a monthly salary. According to estimations, the PA pays over 350 million USD annually to terrorists and their families.² The Palestinian Prisoners and Released Prisoners Law (2004) is the central infrastructure for granting these salaries.³ The purpose of the law is to enable economic well-being for every Palestinian prisoner, including those who have been released from prison due to terrorist activity. Similarly, other terrorist organizations pay terrorists monthly salaries and rewards (e.g., Hezbollah, ISIS, and Boko Haram).

Based on the understanding that these salaries serve as an incentive and encouragement to terrorism, several countries, led by the U.S., began in the last years enacting regulations designed to prevent the financing of these terrorists (herein: “the freezing policy”). The new policy aims to suppress the economic incentive for terrorist activity by freezing financial aid to the PA due to salaries to terrorists. In addition, various criminal and civil provisions were enacted regarding Banks that are active in the PA and manage terrorist accounts. The primary assumption underlying this policy is that these salaries encourage the continuation of terrorist activity since the potential offender knows that he and his family have an economic “safety net” for the rest of his life. Under current policy, the potential terrorist is acquitted twice. First, he becomes a folk hero and role model for the younger generation. Second, his family receives a high salary (sometimes six times the average in the place where the terrorist lives).⁴ In addition, after he is released from prison – he is guaranteed to be accepted to work in the PA.

Terrorism has been a significant concern for academic research. Academic literature discusses terrorism from various aspects: the definition of terror, reasons for global terrorism, and the means for combating it.⁵ Other studies focus on terrorism and territory,⁶ terrorism and religion,⁷ terrorism and the media,⁸ women and terrorism,⁹ terrorism and international law,¹⁰ terrorism and human rights, ¹¹ economic aspects of terrorism,¹² and so on.

Regarding the prevention of terrorism financing, the academic literature refers to it from various angles. Gilmore assessed money-laundering networks and their connections to the funding of terrorism.¹³ Other studies dealt with the international convention for the suppression of the financing of terror problems – the offense’s definitions and scope.¹⁴ Additional studies have pointed out that terror organizations operate as criminal organizations, although their motive is not profit. They use money-laundering techniques to conceal the source of the money they raise, the identity of those transferring and receiving money, and its destination.¹⁵ Research addressing terrorism financing showed the relationship between the prohibition of money laundering and the prevention of terrorism financing. It offered insights into the international standards resulting in the identification of clients and the experiences regarding implementing these standards on financial exclusion.¹⁶ Recent studies presented to suppress the financing of terrorism based on analogies with money laundering.¹⁷

The Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law in the USA focused on how terrorist assets pose significant threats to society’s integrity, security, and stability.¹⁸ Roach showed how the United Nations promoted countermeasures but failed to agree on a definition of terrorism or the importance of respecting human rights while combating terrorism.¹⁹ Additionally, Letho mapped how international regulation sought to extend global responsibility beyond the groups of immediate perpetrators to the sources, recruitment, and financing of terrorist activities.²⁰

Moreover, a significant part of the academic literature dealing with the economic aspects of terrorism and prevention of terrorism sometimes focuses on the classic financial resources of terrorism: weapons and explosives, military training costs, hiding apartments, vehicles, communications systems, raw materials (screws, poison, chemical substances), hiring subcontractors (bomb builders, drivers), and more.²¹

Purpose of Study

This study aims to cast new light on the origins and implications of the terrorism economy that deals with rewards, salaries, and benefits paid to terrorists who were caught and imprisoned. Unlike the method of monetary financing of terror events, before they take place, the article focuses on a unique mechanism of benefits that are paid after the terrorist acts, when perpetrators are paid salaries for their terrorist “work,” often for decades after the event.

The main question addressed by the current study is the legitimacy and acceptability of the steps taken in preventing the payment of salaries to terrorists and what can be learned from them. Using the freezing policy enacted to disrupt the salaries paid to Palestinians imprisoned for terrorism as a case study, the article also examines its applicability to other cases where salaries are paid to imprisoned terrorists (such as Hezbollah, ISIS, Boko Haram, and other terrorist organizations).

To address these questions, the paper reviews the theoretical academic literature on the topic and examines documentation in the Israeli archives, verdicts pronounced by the military courts, bills of the Israeli Knesset (parliament), and interviews with retired military judges, former senior officials of the General Security Service, and senior officials in the Ministry of Justice.

Despite the importance of the freezing policy and its ability to reduce terrorist activity, it raises various objections and difficulties. The criticism concerning the policy is based on international law, foreign policy, security, humanitarian and economic interests. The article will discuss the issue’s new policy, motives, justifications, objections, and possible responses to these objections. The article will argue, among others, that the terrorist’s salaries are not just financial subjects. Considering the incentive to commit terror, it should be seen as one of the most pressing issues in the efforts to suppress terror. The freezing policy of the salaries is a turning point in the current strategies for counter-terrorism financing. It teaches that the efforts to suppress terrorism require the deliberate use of varied instruments adjusted to the unique characteristics of the phenomenon.

The article structure will be as follows: the first part presents the global efforts to suppress terror financing. The second part shows the Palestinian terrorist organizations and other terrorist organizations’ policy of paying salaries to imprisoned or injured terrorists and their families. The third part discusses the new freezing policy employed to suppress terrorist salaries. It describes and explains the Taylor Force Act, the new policy adopted by some European countries, and Israel’s latest legal developments. The fourth part discusses the freezing policy objections and critiques and presents possible developments in the efforts to counter terror financing. The conclusions draw tentative broader implications from this case study regarding using the new counter terrorist’s measures in other places.

The Global Efforts to Suppress the Financing of Terrorism

It is well known that terrorism is both a local and international phenomenon.²² Therefore, a global perspective is needed to understand the efforts of states and international organizations to suppress terror financing.²³ One of the most significant factors in the existence and development of terrorism is the ability to finance this activity.²⁴ Today, and especially after the September 11, 2001 terror events, it is accepted that the efforts to suppress terror financing are a crucial and necessary part of anti-terror efforts.²⁵ The steps to suppress terror financing became an international mission, uniting countries, international organizations, and civil society. These efforts are part of the preventative approach, which necessitates taking diverse, broad steps to prevent terror.²⁶ These efforts are also closely tied to the globalization of terror, which is reflected in collaboration between local terror groups and international terror organizations, whose actions cross borders and are sometimes supported by governments.²⁷ The stepping up of the efforts to suppress terror financing is also tied to the growing importance of the economic side of terror financing and the branching out of the global financial infrastructure of terror financing.

Nevertheless, what is the meaning of “efforts to suppress terrorism financing”? The classic interpretation of “terror financing” includes activities that support terrorism and have economic value. These include funding the activities (e.g., weapons) and providing territory for the practice or incitement of terrorist organizations. Other types of support, which aren’t necessarily reflected in the indirect transfer of finances, such as avoiding taking steps against terrorist organizations which make terror activities easier, might be considered “financing of terrorism” if we adopt a broad definition.²⁸

The fight over terror financing is complex. Many factors, including the relative ease with which money can be transferred across borders and the difficulty distinguishing between funding legitimate purposes and supporting terrorism, make it challenging to locate the financial channels used for terror financing. Therefore, the efforts to suppress terror financing usually require a high degree of cooperation (legal, intelligence, and military assistance). Furthermore, the UN and other international organizations have been leading in developing an infrastructure for these efforts in recent years. Based on this global policy, countries adopted new laws and policies to suppress terror financing. The U.S., as part of its anti-terror efforts and following the Sept 2011 events, which have been branded as one of the most lethal terrorist attacks, has enacted the USA Patriot Act (2001).²⁹ The act includes unique arrangements against terror financing.³⁰ According to the Patriot Act, the U.S. Treasury Department is authorized to declare organizations as terror-supporting and freeze their assets.³¹

Many European countries followed the USA in taking steps to suppress terror financing by enacting or adding unique regulations on terror financing. The U.K., for instance, enacted the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act.³² Canada passed the Anti-Terrorist Act.³³ Italy enacted the Decree-Law Emergency Measures to Fight against International Terrorism.³⁴ Spain enacted the “Ley de prevenciηn y bloqueo de la financiaciηn del terrorismo.”³⁵ Similar legislation entered into force in Lichtenstein, Bulgaria, and other countries such as Australia, Israel, and India.³⁶ These arrangements are based on the assumption that one of the significant ways to counter terrorism is to fight against its financial infrastructure. Therefore, paying or receiving money concerning terrorist activity is considered a serious criminal offense. Another assumption of this legislation is that funding terrorism cannot be prevented. At most, it is possible to disrupt the channels of terrorism funding and make it difficult for them to operate.³⁷

Similarly, provisions require preventing terrorism funding in all international and regional conventions and UN decisions. Since the late 1980s, international law has been deeply involved in suppressing terror. As part of these efforts, several Conventions were adopted which are relevant to suppressing terror financing. The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (herein: “The Financing Convention”) states that providing finances for terrorism directly or indirectly constitutes a criminal act.³⁸ The Convention adopts the approach of total suppression by “drying” the financial sources which feed the terrorist activity. The Convention also regulates the behavior of non-governmental bodies and the duties of member states to cooperate to create effective regulations for the prevention of terror funding.³⁹ The Convention imposes several significant duties on member states: 1. To declare that certain financial activities are crimes and impose severe punishments. 2. To adopt measures to identify, discover, or seize money used for funding terrorism. 3. To curtail opportunities to commit financial crimes. 4. To report suspicious activities related to terror funding.⁴⁰

The primary disagreement regarding the definition of “terrorism” revolves around the argument that exceptions should be made for “freedom fighters” and groups fighting for their right to self-determination. Either way, the Financing Convention clarifies that its definition of “terrorism” applies to all acts included, regardless of political motivation.⁴¹ The Convention also defines that to establish the crime of funding terrorism, it is not necessary that the finances were used; It is sufficient that the finances were provided or collected with the knowledge that they will be used for terrorist purposes, a priori or post factum.⁴² The Convention also imposes liability on collaborators for the offense of financing terrorism.⁴³

As in the Financing Convention, various regional anti-terrorism conventions impose duties to prevent terrorism funding.⁴⁴ For instance, the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (2002) includes special provisions for suppressing terror financing. Article 5 contains provisions for seizing and confiscating finances, and article 6 includes provisions for the prevention of laundering finances designated for funding terrorism.⁴⁵ This is also what the Arab Convention on the suppression of terrorism states.⁴⁶

In addition, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1373 following the 2001 terror attacks.⁴⁷ The resolution’s uniqueness is that it does not address a specific conflict but generally speaks about the efforts to suppress terrorism. Therefore the relevance of this resolution is not limited to a particular time or place.⁴⁸ The resolution imposes a duty on all member states to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and its funding and to take steps to prevent the funding of terrorism.⁴⁹ The resolution placed an obligation on the member states to cooperate in the fight against the funding of terrorism, defined funding of terrorism as a criminal act, and prohibited transferring money to people who have committed terrorist activities. In addition, the Security Council ordered the member states to ensure that all bodies which participate in the funding of terrorism or support such actions shall be prosecuted.⁵⁰

The strategic action plan adopted by the General Assembly of the UN to combat terrorism reiterates the member states’ resolve to prevent terrorism and counter-terrorist acts, including through an uncompromising fight against the funding of terrorism. It encourages states to prevent the financing of terrorism.⁵¹ Resolution 1373 established a committee comprising representatives of all Security Council member states, whose role would be to oversee the implementation of the resolution. The Counter-Terrorism Committee is continuously active and reports to the Security Council.⁵²

Security Council resolutions have an essential role in global efforts to suppress the funding of terrorism. The Security Council has known disadvantages, the most prominent of which are an inability to reach decisions due to the permanent members’ veto powers and the political considerations directing the states voting. According to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions are binding on all UN member states despite these disadvantages. Therefore, it creates an international regime independent of any state’s consent.⁵³ Thus, in addition to the international conventions, these resolutions are an essential tool in the fight against the funding of terrorism.⁵⁴

The PA’s Policy on Salaries for Terrorists

The PA’s policy of salaries to prisoners, released prisoners, and families of terrorists killed and injured terrorists is founded on the PA’s legislation. Some provisions authorizing these salaries can be found on the PA’s website.⁵⁵ The primary law that regulates the principles for paying salaries is the Prisoners and Released Prisoners Law (2004), No. 19 (herein: the “Prisoners Law”).⁵⁶

The prisoner’s law is part of the PA constitution. Article 12 of the Law states that “every other law inconsistent with this law is void.” Article 2 states the purpose of the Prisoners Law: “Prisoners and Released Prisoners are a fighting sector and an integral part of Palestinian society, whereby this law guarantees a respectable life for them and their families.”⁵⁷

The Prisoners Law states that “prisoners” are anyone imprisoned because participates in “the fight against the occupation.” That is involved in terrorist activities against Israeli targets (suicide bombings, abducting civilians, shootings, stabbings of soldiers, etc.). This means that a Palestinian prisoner imprisoned on a criminal background will not receive a monthly salary from the PA.⁵⁸ Article 3 of the Law states that to realize the purpose of the law, “the Palestinian Authority takes all possible measures, as follows: 1. Release of prisoners from the occupation’s prisons; 2. Financing legal aid; 3. Paying salaries to the prisoners and their families; 4. Opportunity to acquire education for the prisoner and his family; 5. Professional training of released prisoners; 6. Ensuring employment for released prisoners.”⁵⁹

The P. A’s mechanism of salaries to terrorists is based on a scale in which the length of the prison term determines the amount paid. Long prison terms, reflecting the relative severity of the crimes, rewarded with higher payments. For instance, a terrorist sentenced to 30 years imprisonment or more, usually in murder cases, is eligible for a basic monthly salary of 3500 USD and other benefits (sometimes, ten times the average salary in the PA).⁶⁰ The equation is explicit: The more serious the criminal offense, the higher the monthly salary.⁶¹

In addition, there are increases in the payments beyond the “basic salary” based on various criteria, such as the number of wives, residence, number of children, etc.⁶² Besides the salaries for imprisoned terrorists, there is payment to the families of terrorists who have been killed (martyrs). These payments are based on various criteria such as family status, number of children, residence, etc.⁶³ In addition, there are salaries for injured terrorists based on the type of impairment sustained, the severity of the handicap, etc.⁶⁴ Additionally, the Prisoners Law states that salaries will be calculated based on the cost of living index.⁶⁵ It is also noted that the payments for terrorist activity will be paid equally to men and women, while women are also eligible for an additional payment for their children.

The regulations of the Prisoners Law include further benefits, such as free tuition in higher education institutions, Health insurance for released prisoners, and 150 USD for buying convenience products in prison (“canteen money”).⁶⁶ In addition, there is eligibility for a one-time release grant, the amount of which corresponds with the length of the prison term. The longer the imprisonment, the higher the grant provided.⁶⁷

In addition to the financial payments made to imprisoned terrorists and their families, there are economic and employment benefits. For instance, released terrorists are eligible for employment in one of the offices of the PA. Each year in prison is worth a year’s seniority in the workplace. In addition, there is eligibility for assistance in tuition fees for the prisoner and his family,⁶⁸ payment for clothing expenditure,⁶⁹ and extended health insurance, including flight to medical treatment in European countries.⁷⁰ In the past, salaries and benefits were paid by the “office for prisoners and released prisoners’ affairs.” The prisoners’ office is a part of the PA government, whose budget is paid in full by the PA. Following international objections, the PA shut down the office in 2014 and opened the “authority for prisoners,” which continued to be funded by the PA.⁷¹ The responsibility for paying salaries was transferred again in 2018 to the Palestinian Treasury to avoid sanctions.

The payment of salaries to terrorists is not unique only to Palestinian terrorist organizations. Similarly, the terrorist organization “Hezbollah” maintains an extensive system of social institutions dealing with health, education, and welfare. Their primary purpose is to serve as a supporting shell for the organization’s military infrastructure. This is out of a desire to allow the terrorists to fight when they know that there is a layer of financial protection for their families. The central institution entrusted with the payment of salaries is the “Social Charity Institution – The Martyr” (from now on: “The Martyr Institution”), which Iran established.⁷² This, subordinate to the Hezbollah Executive Council, received a license from the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior. The Martyr’s Institution pays a monthly salary to the family of a terrorist killed or wounded in military activity. This financial assistance includes buying a house for the martyr’s sons, renovating, and covering old debts.⁷³ In addition, The Martyr Institution helps with wedding expenses, purchasing electrical products for the home, and finding a job for the martyr’s sons, usually in the Hezbollah organization or its affiliates.

As well as the monthly salary and related benefits, the Martyr Institution pays the martyr’s children an education, from elementary school to the end of their academic studies. This assistance also includes private lessons. The institution also pays the costs of the martyr’s family’s medical treatment, including medical examinations, hospitalization, and medicines. According to estimates, the payment of these salaries and benefits is about one hundred million dollars annually, and Iran pays it. ⁷⁴

In addition to the financial support for the martyrs’ families, the Martyr’s Institute also deals with glorifying the names of the martyrs in public and encouraging recruits. This activity includes, for example, the presentation of the martyrs’ belongings in processions, handling of wills, and financing of funeral costs (advertising, refreshments, etc.) Following the Martyr’s Institution in Lebanon, Iran established a network of similar institutions designed to provide financial support to the families of terrorists killed or wounded in other countries in the Middle East. This supports the various militias they operate as their affiliates in these countries. This is how the “Syrian Martyr Institute” was established in Syria; In Yemen, the “Yemeni Martyr Institute” was established; And in Iraq, similar institutions were established for the Shiite militias operated by Iran.⁷⁵

Additionally, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) organization also recruited fighters through salaries and additional benefits. After joining the militants, the terrorists are paid in U.S. dollars instead of Syrian liras. The salary is basic, with married terrorists getting an extra $50. For each child – an additional 35 dollars. And for each parent – an additional 50 dollars. The economic benefits are not limited to a monthly salary for the terrorist and include other payments. For example, ISIS finances the costs of the house, electrical equipment, food, and medical care.⁷⁶ Similar economic incentives (monthly salaries, benefits, medical treatments, etc.) exist in the terrorist organization Boko Haram in Nigeria⁷⁷ and Al-Qaeda.⁷⁸ In addition, organizations such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) used to raise funds (both legally and illegally) to pay salaries to members of the organization and their families who served prison terms. Between 35 and 45 percent of the organization’s members were inmates, so the organization’s expenditure on salaries for these members was a valuable resource.⁷⁹

In sum, salaries and benefits paid to terrorists are contrasted with international and domestic laws. The provisions of the global community (Finance Convention, regional conventions, Security Council resolutions, etc.) forbid paying and receiving payments for committing terrorist acts. Not only does the payment policy violate the law, but since the payment is promised a priori, it advocates terrorism. On this background, the following section analyzes the current policy adopted to suppress the payment of these salaries.

The Global Efforts to Suppress the Payment of Terrorist Salaries

The USA

As part of the global efforts against funding terrorist salaries, the U.S. enacted the Taylor Force Act in 2018 (“Taylor Force Martyr Payment Prevention Act”).⁸⁰ The act was named after Taylor Force, who was murdered in Jaffa by a terrorist in 2016.⁸¹ The Taylor Force Act was designed to halt the economic aid to the PA until it stops paying salaries to terrorists. The Bill was submitted to the Senate by Senators Graham, Coats, and Blunt and received bipartisan support. On August 3, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved the Bill and submitted it to the Senate for approval.⁸² The Bill stated that the U.S. would not transfer financial aid to the PA until it stops paying salaries to terrorists and condemning terrorism publicly and unequivocally.

The Taylor Force Act declares that the PA practice of paying salaries to terrorists is an incentive to commit terror.⁸³ The Act calls on the PA to stop salaries for acts of terrorism and repeal the laws authorizing such payments. The operative significance of the act is freezing the total sums paid out of the annual financial aid given by the U.S. to the PA.⁸⁴ The law states that the funds will be deposited to the PA if it stops paying these salaries. This is a significant economic sanction: almost completely freezing financial aid to the PA, except for several million USD for humanitarian assistance.

The Taylor Force Act was preceded by U.S. Consolidated Appropriations Act (2016).⁸⁵ Section 7039(b) requires that: “Before the obligation of funds appropriated by this Act under the heading ‘Economic Support Fund’ for assistance for the West Bank and Gaza, the Secretary of State shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such assistance is not provided to or through any individual, private or government entity, that the Secretary knows or has reason to believe advocates, plans, sponsors, engages in or has engaged in, terrorist activity.”⁸⁶ However, the Taylor Force Act set precedence in that it states that paying salaries directly supports terrorism and that to disrupt this terrorist activity, the U.S. stops giving financial aid to the PA.⁸⁷

Europe

Following the Taylor Force Act, several European countries either froze or decreased their financial aid to the PA because they paid salaries to terrorists. The U.K. froze several million dollars in Palestinian aid over salaries for terrorists.⁸⁸ The Department of International Development decision means $30 m is being withheld this year – a third of the total sent assistance to the PA.⁸⁹ In addition, the Dutch Parliament also voted for a 7% reduction in the annual aid to the PA. The 7% reduction reflected the amount transferred by the PA out of its budget for salaries to terrorists, as the Dutch legislators concluded. According to reports, the Netherlands, which until then partially funded the budget of the Ministry of Justice in the PA, claimed that by paying salaries to terrorists, the PA became ineligible for any aid, even if some of the aid money serves legitimate purposes.⁹⁰

Similarly, Australia announced that it is ceasing its direct aid to the PA and will transfer aid only through the UN. The Australian Foreign Minister Bishop explained that Australia unsuccessfully sought confirmation from the PA that the aid would not pay terrorists. Bishop added: “Any assistance provided by the PLO to those convicted of politically motivated violence is an affront to Australian values and undermines the prospect of meaningful peace.”⁹¹ In addition, the Foreign Offices of Germany and Norway imposed economic sanctions on paying salaries.⁹²

There is a reason to believe that some European countries freezing policy is related to the EU’s policy on the issue. The salaries are, prima facie, in contravention of directive 541/2017 of the EU, which deals with funding terrorism.⁹³ According to this directive, Member States of the EU are required to criminalize activities related to terrorism, including funding terrorism.⁹⁴ In 2019, the EU broadened its efforts to suppress funding of terrorism through stricter regulation of economic aid provided by the Member States to Non-Governmental Organizations. The new directive required that money transferred to various NGOs in the PA would not be diverted to terrorist activity and will not indirectly assist in funding terrorism.⁹⁵

Israel

Following the Taylor Force Act and the steps taken by European countries, the Israeli parliament enacted in 2018 a law that directed the “freezing” of finances paid by the PA concerning terrorism out of the funds transferred by Israel (herein: “the Freezing Law”).⁹⁶ According to the law, at the end of each year, the Minister of Defense will submit to the government’s approval a report detailing the total amount of money paid by the PA to terrorists during that year, and this amount will be frozen in the following year out of the tax monies that Israel transfers to the PA.⁹⁷ A similar mechanism exists in the Taylor Force Act, which states that the Secretary of State shall submit to the congressional committees a report including an estimate of the amount expended as salaries for acts of terrorism. Since its enactment, the Freezing Law has applied several times, and hundreds of millions of dollars have been frozen.⁹⁸

In addition to the Freezing Law, another measure was added to fight the terrorists’ salaries. This new devolvement is aimed at PA banks that manage the accounts of terrorists. By force of these laws, the Order on Fighting the Terrorism Funding in the West Bank entered into force in 2020.⁹⁹ The Order states that financial institutions in the PA that transfer salaries to terrorists are committing criminal offenses.¹⁰⁰ The Order says these banks may be shut down, and criminal proceedings may be taken against them. The Order also warns the directors of these banks that they, and their employees, may be criminally and civilly liable if they continue to facilitate the payment of salaries to terrorists.¹⁰¹ The Order is based on the Financing Convention, which imposes personal liability on corporations and their officers involved in funding terrorism.¹⁰² Namely, the fight to suppress the terrorist’s salaries does not end with freezing funds in the hands of the PA, which are used for terrorists’ salaries, but also extends to suppressing the terrorists’ bank accounts. The underlying assumption of this policy is that the efforts to suppress the economic infrastructure of terrorism should take place on levels.

In sum, paying salaries and benefits to terrorists contravenes international law and domestic laws of the EU, and several countries are committed to preventing the funding of terrorism. Many countries, chiefly the U.S., constructed a new policy to disrupt terrorist infrastructure. It can be assumed that when additional countries join the “freezing” policy, the disruption of terror will be more effective. As is well known, the efforts to suppress the funding of terrorism cannot be successful if not all countries cooperate with these efforts.¹⁰³

The Freezing Policy – Risks and Opportunities

The Freezing Policy may Contravene International Law

In previous sections, it was argued that paying salaries to terrorists is illegal. However, it may be argued that the freezing policy is also illegal because it may violate rights recognized by international law, such the property right. International law reflects a series of property rights duties and prohibits property confiscation.¹⁰⁴ The freezing policy can also contravene international agreements between Israel and the PA.¹⁰⁵

On the other hand, the U.S. and European countries transfer aid finances to the PA out of foreign policy considerations. They are under no legal obligation to aid entities that transfer this money (or part of it) to terrorists. Therefore, decreasing or freezing financial aid until the PA ceases to finance terrorist activity is not prohibited. Regarding the Israeli freezing policy, the situation is different since these are tax funds that Israel collects on behalf of the PA by the power of international agreements.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, it can be argued that freezing such funds contravenes international agreements between Israel and the PA.¹⁰⁷ A possible response to this argument is that essential provisions in the agreements between Israel and the PA, especially Article 15 of the Interim Agreement, titled Prevention of Hostile Activity, call the PA not to finance or encourage terrorist activity. In addition, Appendix I of the Agreement includes an explicit commitment by the PA to prevent terrorism.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, in as much as the PA violates the terms of the agreement, Israel has a similar right.

In other words, the freezing policy is needed to suppress terrorist salaries effectively. On the contrary, paying salaries to terrorists contravenes all international and regional conventions. Accordingly, the freezing policy does not violate international law but implements it.¹⁰⁹

The Freezing Policy Destabilizes Security in the Region

Another critique is that the freezing policy may lead to severe economic repercussions for the PA budget, which is already unstable. This may destabilize the security in the region, including fears of a Hamas terrorist organization take-over of the PA.¹¹⁰ The response is that this is the purpose of the freezing policy: to pressure the PA to utilize their resources more appropriately and stop financing terrorists. The policy’s goal is to prevent threats to peace, and once the PA stops financing terrorism, financial aid to the PA will resume.

Another response is that funds transferred for terrorists’ salaries should be stopped regardless of the consequences. From a retributive point of view, this is the right thing to do. Ignoring the payment of salaries erodes western countries’ ability to serve as moral role models in the fight against terrorism. This fight necessitates making a bold distinction between justice and injustice. Moreover, even from a utilitarian point of view, financial aid has not been entirely suppressed, only that part used to finance terrorism. Even under the freezing policy, some aid money continues to be supplied for humanitarian needs such as building hospitals, medical equipment, vaccinations, electricity, etc.

The Freezing Policy is Ineffective

Another possible argument against the freezing policy is that it is ineffective. In the end, the policy adopted by the U.S., European countries, and Israel is freezing the funds, not fully confiscating them.¹¹¹ The argument is that this mechanism is a sort of “savings account” for the PA. Suppose there is a possibility of these funds being granted to the PA. In that case, the policy is but “lip service” or pretense rather than an effective measure against the financing of terrorism.

A possible response is that the freezing policy constitutes a more balanced and proportionate measure than offsetting the funds. It is also a better fit for the principles of international law. When we examine the application of administrative actions against the financing of terrorism, essential questions are raised regarding the duty to avoid disproportionate violation of rights. The subject encompasses legal and public policy issues and thus requires proportionate measures.¹¹² The appropriate balance between the various interests is adopting a freezing policy rather than fully offsetting the funds. The freezing policy doesn’t aim to enrich the countries. Its purpose is to decrease terrorism.

It can also be argued that the policy is ineffective because it is “full of holes.” To avoid the “freezing” policy, the P. A will adopt new procedures that will enable them to continue paying salaries undetected.¹¹³ For example, one way of circumventing the policy is paying in cash, which is untraceable. Another way is to transfer the money by checks, through third parties, without depositing the funds in the banks. Another way is to pay the salaries through post offices or non-financial institutions (like Currency exchange). For instance, one way to finance terrorism without detection is called Hawala. The Hawala system is a network of “banks” or currency exchange providers that transfers funds. This method makes it difficult for law enforcement to discover the source of the funds.¹¹⁴

The fear of the partial effectiveness of the freezing policy is not unfounded. The PA declared that, despite the policy, it would continue paying salaries and benefits to terrorists. According to publications, the PA intends to establish a new financial institution with no external banking connections. Thus, it will not be subjected to international restrictions on financing terrorism.¹¹⁵ Another method that the PA uses is to designate payments to terrorists as welfare benefits rather than salaries on the severity of their offenses.¹¹⁶ Another technique recently used by the PA to avoid the policy is “employing” all released prisoners directly by the PA and paying them as employees in government offices, not as convicted prisoners. In other words, given the various ways the freezing policy can be circumvented, the full implementation of the policy will not end terror activity. At most, it will disrupt or stall them.

Conclusions

One of the central roles of the global community is to supply appropriate tools for counterterrorism: both against the terrorists and those who finance them. In recent years, the world has considered terror financing as a significant issue. Because money is the lifeblood of terrorist organizations, confronting it in better ways will result in more outcomes. The purpose of the freezing policy is to halt terrorism by disrupting the channels of funding, deterring those involved in financing terrorism, and diminishing the economic viability of terrorist activity. Accordingly, several countries, chiefly the U.S., established a new policy of “freezing” the aid money to the PA until it ceases to pay monthly salaries to imprisoned terrorists and their families. If the payment of salaries is stopped – it would not be unreasonable to assume that this would harm the terrorist’s motivation. That is, the denial of financial benefits to terrorist operatives may lead to a decrease in the motivation of the operatives and damage to the terrorist organization.

The policy of paying salaries to terrorists has significant broad implications: First, the economic consideration in receiving the salaries may be a direct incentive for terrorist incidents, examining cost-benefit considerations before committing a terrorist incident. The potential terrorist knows that he and his family have an economic “safety net” for the rest of his life. Under current policy, the potential terrorist is acquitted twice. First, he becomes a hero and a role model. Second, his family receives a high salary (A much higher salary than the average salary in the society where he lives).

Second, the payment of salaries removes inhibitions and hesitations among potential terrorists. Suppose there is a potential terrorist who is debating whether to carry out a terrorist attack (for example, try to stab a soldier or kidnap him). He fears getting caught and his family will lose the primary breadwinner. In such a situation, the salaries and the economic benefits package for his family for the rest of their lives will encourage him and help him allay his fears, or at the very least, will be another consideration in the execution of the terror event.

Thirdly, the payment of salaries generates Organizational Commitment (OC) toward the terrorist organization to which he belongs.¹¹⁷ Through the salaries and benefits, the terrorist and their family depend on the organization for the rest of their life. The payment of salaries incentivizes and preserves the organization’s goals in the eyes of those dependent on the salary. It makes him invest efforts for the organization’s benefit and preserve his activity in the organization during incarceration and after.¹¹⁸ The terrorist’s dependence on the salary obligates to the terrorist organization’s values, the militant line, and the fundamentalist code of conduct (mostly). Furthermore, by receiving the salaries and benefits, the terrorist renews his commitment to the terrorist organization, and the terrorist organization, in turn, strengthens its image as someone who helps its operatives, thus facilitating the recruitment of additional operatives.

Moreover, this organizational commitment prevents the terrorist from any chance of rehabilitation or return to the beneficiary since he must be committed his whole life to the organization. The salary policy even prevents the terrorist from wanting to acquire a profession while he is in prison since, from the moment of release, he is guaranteed that in addition to the monthly salary, he will be accepted as a senior employee in one of the offices of the PA (when the years in prison accrued to him regarding seniority). In other words, the saying is this: “if you want to receive a salary for yourself and your family – you must remain loyal to the organization for the rest of your life."

Fourth, the ongoing process of salaries for terrorists, especially after release, complicates the released prisoner once again with the law. It imprisons him in an “infinite loop” since receiving the salary due to terrorist activity constitutes a criminal offense. If, after release from prison, the released terrorist gets a salary, he is exposed to further prosecution and punishment.¹¹⁹ In other words, receiving a salary after being released from prison is a “honey trap.” Fifth, the payment formula, which ties the length of imprisonment – which reflects the severity of the crime with the amount paid, is an incentive to commit severe terror attacks. In the current situation, the more severe the offense, the higher the financial reward.¹²⁰

The freezing policy is designed to decrease and disrupt the payment of salaries to terrorists, thereby reducing the incentives for their activity. The new policy sends a message that these salaries are prohibited under international and domestic law and should be stopped. The freezing policy is an integral part of the current trend in the global efforts to fight terror financing and expand the traditional methods of suppressing it. In addition to the conventional measures, such as declaring that various entities or civil establishments are terrorist organizations and forfeiture of funds, the freezing of aid money earmarked as granted assistance to a quasi-state entity that finances terrorism has become a standard acceptable measure. Nevertheless, the freezing policy encounters several difficulties: a contravention of international law, fear of escalating the security stability in the West Bank, and questions regarding the effectiveness of the policy. The article argued that questions regarding the need to avoid disproportionate violation of rights rise when sanctions against terror funding are applied.

The paper argues that the policy of freezing money – withholding funds until such time that the PA will comply with international standards of curtailing terrorist financing – as opposed to seizing the assets with no prospect of making them available, is a valuable strategy even if it will not be able to address the problem in and of itself. The freezing rule is more proportional and balanced than an offset rule. It also more closely follows the provisions of international law than the offset rule. The imposition of administrative sanctions against the funding of terrorism raises questions about the state’s obligations to avoid a disproportional violation of rights, even if it is justified. In this case, the freezing policy reflects the proportionate and appropriate balance of the various interests rather than offsetting the funds. In addition, the freezing policy is more appropriate since the policy’s purpose is not to enrich the state’s funds. Its purpose is a fight against the funding of terrorism. Preventing the expenditure of the finances – regardless of the finances’ fate – serves this purpose.

Neither the USA nor the European countries are divided regarding the cessation of salaries to terrorists. Both wish to stop financial support for terrorism, but they are divided regarding assessing the risk posed by the salaries policy. The USA requires more importance on salaries and enacted binding laws on the subject (Taylor Force Law). On the other hand, European countries try to influence this policy through dialogue and symbolic sanctions designed to exert political pressure. Along with this, the article points to a paradox: since a significant portion of the PA’s budget is money from foreign countries (the United States, Europe, and Israel), and since a part of the PA’s budget is transferred directly to terrorists, then the countries that declare fight against financing terrorism are these who pay it.

The freezing policy has a declarative side and a practical one. The essential message of the policy is that the payment of salaries is not innocent but instead constitutes support for terrorism. Therefore, it is inevitable that the freezing policy will accelerate international, legal, and political pressure to stop these payments. If the PA does not do so, and if the banks in the PA continue letting these payments pass, they may suffer damages not only through the freezing of aid money but also through more severe sanctions.

The freezing policy reflects a global determination to suppress terror financing. It highlights the understanding that collaboration between stakeholders is needed for counter-terrorism financing. Freezing funds and efforts to counter financial institutions where terrorists’ accounts are managed will compel governments to rethink the cost of this practice. At the same time, since there are ways to circumvent these policies, the recent developments show that, at most, it can partially disrupt the channels of terror financing but not completely block them.

The freezing policy is essential in expanding global efforts to stop terrorism financing. The freezing policy reflects an understanding among relevant stakeholders that suppressing the financing of terrorism requires adopting an innovative approach to this phenomenon’s complexity and unique characteristics.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 As is commonly known, Terrorism has many definitions, and there is no consensus regarding the term. In this article, “terrorism” will be defined thus: “Acts of violence or threatened violence by parties that are not countries, directed against civilians, randomly selected and uninvolved in combat, intended to generate ongoing fear toward achieving an ideological objective, including economic, religious or social objectives.” See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 14 (New York: Continuum, 2003), 24–25. Doron Goldbargsht, Global Counter-Terrorist Financing, and Soft Law: Multi-Layered Approaches (Cheltenham, UK: Elgar Publishing, 2020).

2 See, for instance, Yigal Carmon, The Middle East Media Research (6 July 2016).

3 The Prisoners and Released Prisoners Law no. 19, of 27 December 2004, published in the Palestinian Code of Laws, vol. 54, on 23 April 2005.

4 For example, in the case of Issa, the accused admitted that he carried out shooting attacks on a bus but missed them on purpose to be arrested and receive a monthly salary. The defendant stated in court that “the goal I had was to receive the money because of the financial situation I found myself in." 2901/13 the military prosecution vs. Ashraf Issa, The military court in Samaria (10 November 2014).

5 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

6 Stuart Elden, “Territorial Integrity and the War on Terror.” Environment and Planning 37 (2005): 2083–04.

7 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2003).

8 Hoffman, supra note 6.

9 Mia Bloom, “Bombshells: Women and Terror.” Gender Issues 28 (2011): 1–21.

10 Ilias Bantekes, "The International Law of Terrorist Financing,” American Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 315–33.

11 Richard Wilson, Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

12 Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).

13 William Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Council of Europe vol. 599, 2004).

14 Hamed Tofangsaz, “Criminalization of Terrorist Financing: From Theory to Practice,” New Criminal Law Review 21 (2018): 57–140.

15 Anna Geifman, Death Orders - The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia (ABC-CLIO, 2010).

16 Louis De Koker, “Money Laundering Control and Prevention of Financing of Terrorism: Some Thoughts on the Impact of Customer Due Diligence Measures on Financial Exclusion.” Journal of Financial Crime 13, no. 1 (January 2006): 26–50.

17 Armand Kersten, "Financing of Terrorism – A Predicate Offence to Money Laundering?,” In Financing Terrorism. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002): 49–56.

18 Colin King, Clive Walker, and Gurulé Jimmy, The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

19 Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-terrorism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

20 Marja Letho, Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts – Redefinition of the Concept of Terrorism Beyond Violent Act (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2009).

21 Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2011): 461–75.‏ Nicholas Ryder, The Financial War on Terrorism: A Review of Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategies Since 2001 (London: Routledge, 2015). William Vlcek, “Securitizing Money to Counter Terrorist Finance: Some Unintended Consequences for Developing Economies.”  International Studies Perspectives 16 (2015): 406–22. Matthew Levitt, “Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Washington, 2014).

22 Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-terrorism Legislation (Oxford: Blackstone Press, 2009).

23 David Williams, “The United Kingdom Response to International Terrorism,” Indiana International & Contemporary Law Review 13 (2003): 691–93.

24 For example, Anand Kumar, “Terror Financing in Bangladesh.” Strategic Analysis 33, no. 6 (2009): 903–17‏. Stephen Kiser, Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructure (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Graduate School, 2004).

25 The September 11 events highlighted terrorism’s centrality as a political strategy. Tragedies of greater scale do not have such an effect on world order. The psychological impact of terrorism is amplified through media outlets.

26 Ham Shane and Robert Atkinson, “Using Technology to Detect and Prevent Terrorism” (Progressive Policy Initiative, 2002).

27 Ekkart Zimmermann, “Globalization and Terrorism,” European Journal of Political Economy 27 (2011): 152–61.

28 Ilias Bantekas, supra note 11. John Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions (London: Routledge, 2019).

29 Cary Smith and Li-Ching Hung, The Patriot Act: Issues and Controversies (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 2010).

30 The legal framework for suppressing terror financing in the USA is also found in Title III: Anti-money-laundering to prevent terrorism of the Patriot Act (2001).

31 Interdiction of Terrorist Property Working Group. “The Funding of Terror: The Legal Implications of the Financial War on Terror.” The Society for Advanced Legal Studies, London 85 (2002): 68–72.

32 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001(December 14, 2001).

33 Bill C-36, Dec. 2001.

34 Decreto-Legge 18 Ottobre 2001 n.374

35 RCL 2003\1342.

36 For example, the definition of “financing terrorism” appears in Israel legislation: “One who performs a transaction in property with the intention of assisting, advancing or financing the commission of a grave terrorist offense or rewarding its commission, or to assist, advance or financing the activity of a terrorist organization” (Counter-terrorism Law, 2016). Doron Goldbarsht, “Who is the Legislator Anyway? How the FATF’s Global Norms Reshape Australian Counter-Terrorist Financing Laws,” Federal Law Review 45 (2017): 131–38.

37 Nicholas Ryder, supra note 18.

38 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, UN GAOR, (1999). Jimmy Gurulé, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010). Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, “Limping into the Future: The UN 1267 Terrorism Listing Process at the Crossroads,” George Washington. International Law Review 42 (2010): 217.

39 Article 18 of the Convention.

40 Bantekes, supra note 10.

41 Article 6 of the Convention. Jean-Marc Sorel, “Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against its Financing.” European Journal of International Law 14 (2003): 365–78.

42 Article 2(3) of the Convention. Mark Pieth, “Criminalizing the financing of terrorism,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006): 1074–86.

43 Article 5 of the Convention. The importance of the Convention does not rest only on the steps it takes but on its deterrence mechanism. John Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions 82 (London: Routledge, 1989).

44 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, 142–68 (2006). Ved p. Nanda, Terrorism International Law, and International Organizations, in Law in The War on International Terrorism 1, (2005), 14–20.

45 Amaya Ubeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Face of Terrorism: Challenges and Lessons Learned, International Human Rights and Counterterrorism (2019), 499–515.

46 Arab League, “Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.” 22 April 1998. UNODC. Retrieved from November 5, 2015.

47 Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001). The resolution adopted some of the provisions of the Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism.

48 For a distinction between Security Council resolutions and recommendations, see Bruno Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2002): 455–59.

49 S.C. Res. 1373, UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th Mtg(2001).

50 Jose Alvarez, “The Security Council’s War on Terrorism: Problems and Policy Options,” In Review of The Security Council by Member States (Oxford: OUP, 2003): 119, 121.

51 Eric Rosand, “Security Council Resolution 1373, and the Counter-Terrorism Committee: The Cornerstone of the United Nations Contribution to the Fight Against Terrorism,” In Legal Instruments in The Fight Against International Terrorism – A Transatlantic Dialogue (Brill Nijhoff Publishers, 2004): 603–06.

52 Kennedy Graham, “The Security Council, and Counterterrorism Global and Regional Approaches to an Elusive Public Good,” Terrorism & Political Violence 17 (2005): 37, 50.

53 The UN Security Council’s resolutions are binding on all Member States of the UN (Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter).

54 Curtis A. Ward, “Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security Council,” Journal of Conflict and Security 8 (2003): 289, 298–305.

55 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing Terrorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and their Families,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (2018): 5–32. https://jcpa.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Kuperwasser_Salaries_Hebrew_web_covers_28may2017.pdf

56 Official records of the Palestinian Authority, Vol. 54, on April 23, 2005. The policy of salaries for terrorists was practiced even before the Prisoners Law of 2004 when the salaries were paid through various associations of the PLO. It can be argued that the Prisoners’ Law was enacted in 2004 for three main reasons: First, it was designed to overcome large-scale fraud from the PA’s funds. Secondly, it is related to the death of the PA’s first leader, Yasser Arafat, who, according to the claims, approved every financial transfer in his handwriting. In its absence, a need arose to regulate the payment of salaries from a regulatory point of view. Thirdly, the attempt by the new leader of the PA, Abu Mazen, to regulate the issue by law and thereby distance himself from rumors about bribery of officials in the case of salary payments. Fourth, the occurrence of the second intifada (2000–2005) that occurred at the same time created hundreds of prisoners. See also Ronen Bergman, The Permission (Tel Aviv: Yediot books, 2008).

57 Article 2 of the Palestinian Prisoners Law. The original word that the Prisoners Law used was “ratb” –(راتب) salary. However, after some of the countries providing economic support to the PA had expressed reservations, the wording was changed to “aid” مصروف شهري) for the Prisoners. http://cda.gov.ps/index.php/ar/alhayia-2/2017-05-24-19-28-28/791-79.

58 Section 4 of Palestinian Government Resolution No. 21 (2010) stipulates that a prisoner will lose his rights if considered a criminal prisoner.

59 See the report published at https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2302/palestinian-authority-terrorist-salaries.

60 For comparison, the unemployment rate in recent years reached about 25 percent, and in Gaza, about 50 percent.

61 Financially Rewarding Terrorism in the West Bank. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20651/html/CHRG-114hhrg20651.html. (Also called “pay for slay”). For example, an offender who commits a terrorist act sufficient to land him in prison for thirty years will earn $40,000 a year for the rest of his life. Given that the per capita GDP in the West Bank is $2,800, there is an economic incentive to become a terrorist. The Washington Post’s analysis showed that in 2017, $160 million was paid to 13,000 beneficiaries of “prisoner salaries” ($12,307 per person), and $183 million was paid to 33,700 families in about in “martyr salaries” ($5,430 per family). Glenn Kessler, “Does the Palestinian Authority pays $350 million a year to ‘terrorists and their families’?” Washington Post (14 March 2018).

62 There is an additional payment for prisoners who are residents of Israel based on the cost of living in Israel.

63 Article 17 of the law encourages terrorists living in East Jerusalem with Israeli citizenship to carry out attacks by promising an Increased salary.

64 Ibid. Article 18.

65 Ibid. Article 7.

66 Ibid. Articles 33 and 37.

67 For instance, a prisoner sentenced to over 25 years is eligible for a grant of tens of thousands of dollars, called “a dignified life grant.”

68 Ibid. Article.

69 Ibid. Article 6.

70 Ibid. Article 8(2).

71 https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/he/Announcements/Pages/nbctfDownloads.aspx. Following this activity, the “authority on prisoners’ affairs” was declared a terrorist organization by Israel and USA. Following internal Palestinian incidents, the PA is de facto divided into two: the Gaza Strip is controlled by the terror organization Hamas. Fatah and PA President Abbas control the West Bank.

72 Shimon Shapira, Hezbollah – Between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: The United Kibbutz Books, 2006): 147.

73 Bakit-Allah magazine, Issue 326, November 2018.

74 Ibid., (30 September 2013).

75 Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, “Hezbollah’s Martyr Institute” (14 March 2019).

76 Jeremy Bender, “An ISIS Defector Explained a Key Reason People Continue Joining the Group,” Insider (18 November 2015).

77 Martin Ewi and Uyo Salifu, “Money talk: A key reason youths join Boko Haram,” Institute for Security Studies (98 Policy Brief, February 2017).

78 Uri Friedman, “A Human Resources History of Al Qaeda,” The Atlantic (31 May 2011)

79 Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 21 (1998): 331–61.

80 Taylor Force Act 22 USC § 2346.

81 Taylor Force was an American officer who fought in Iraq. On March 6, 2016, he went on a stroll in Jaffa port, where a terrorist stabbed him. His parents had a central role in the bipartisan lobby supporting the promotion of the act. Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 69 Americans have been murdered by Palestinian terrorists.

82 A few Senators initially did not support the Bill because some financial aid was necessary to prevent overtaking the PA by Hamas. Still, they later supported it after a few changes were made. The compromise stated that some issues would remain within the financial aid, like hospitals and vaccinations for children. Michael Barbero, “Pass the Taylor Force Act to combat terrorism,” The Hill (14 March 2017).

83 Itamar Marcus & Nan Zilberdik, “Palestinian Authority Paying Salaries to Terrorists with US Money,” Gatestone Inst. Int’l Pol’y Council (28 July 2011)

84 Eric Shawn, “Bill in Congress would pressure Palestinian gov’t to cut off terror-tied payments,” Fox News (30 April 2017). Thane Rosenbaum, “Palestinians are rewarding terrorists. The US should stop enabling them,” Washington Post (28 April 2017). See also the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (ATCA), which exposed the PA to terrorism lawsuits.

85 The US Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016—Assistance for the West Bank and Gaza. In February 2021, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price announced that the US intended to restore some Palestinian humanitarian aid. The legal policy is still in place, but the US will consider assisting the PA on specific humanitarian issues.

86 Article 7030 states that “before obligating economic support funds under this Act for the West Bank and Gaza, to take appropriate steps to ensure that such assistance is not provided to or through any individual or entity that advocates or engages in terrorist activity.”

87 At the same time, the US has decreased its financial support for UNRWA following the organization’s conduct. “US ends aid to Palestinian refugee agency UNRWA” (September 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45377336.

88 TheTower.org staff, “UK Suspends $30 Million in Aid to PA Over Payment of Terrorist Salaries,” The Tower, (10 July 2016). UK Parliament, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2016-10-25/50220. At the same time, President Biden’s administration has recently begun returning some of the funds cut to UNRWA. These funds are intended for UNRWA and not for terrorists’ salaries. “Biden Administration to Restore $235m in US Aid to Palestinians,” BBC News (7 April 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56665199.

89 In recent years, there has been public debate in England over using English taxpayer money to fund terrorism. Jonny Paul, “Palestinian Prisoners are Handed Millions in British Aid with Some Being Paid More than Average UK Worker,” Daily Mail UK (29 October, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2224621/Palestinian-prisoners-handed-32millions-British-aid-paid-average-UK-worker.html.

90 JTA and Chnaan Lifshitz, “Netherlands Cuts Aid to Palestinian Authority Over Terrorist Salaries,” Haaretz (21 November 2019), https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/netherlands-cuts-aid-to-palestinian-authority-over-terrorist-salaries-1.8158809. See also https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-23432-478.html. (The Netherlands suspended the payment of funds to specific Palestinian departments due to an investigation). Elisha Ben Kimon, “EU Deliberates Funding for PA as Terror Victim’s Family Speaks Out,” (12 January 2023). https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkkglq6cj.

91 “Australia Ends Direct Aid to Palestinian Authority” (2 July 2018). https://www.dw.com/en/australia-ends-direct-aid-to-palestinian-authority/a-44491742. See: also https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/media-release/reallocation-aid-palestinian-authority.

92 The Norwegian Foreign Minister expressed “serious concern” about the payment of these salaries and their effect on the peace and security in the region. Noga Tarnopolsky, “European Crackdown on Use of Funds Donated to Palestinian Authority,” The Media Line, 16.5.2016, http://www.themedialine.org/featured/european-crackdown-on-use-of-funds-donated-to-palestinian-authority/. Germany’s Foreign Ministry acknowledged that its aid money to the PA is likely being used to provide funds to terrorists) See “PA Likely Pays Terrorists and Their Families, Germany Admits,” The Tower (7 September 2016), http://www.thetower.org/3888-palestinian-.authority-likely-pays-terrorists-and-their-families-germany-admits.

93 EU Directive 2017/541 states: “The EU has criminalized many terror-related activities, including directing or participating in activities of terror organizations, glorifying acts of terror, recruiting for terror and terror financing, within all EU countries.”

94 Article 11 (“Terrorist financing”) states: “The Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that providing or collecting funds, by any means.”

95 For an explanation of the change in the aid policy to NGOs suspected as related to funding terrorism, see EU representative Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff’s Letter, 30 March 2020.

96 Laws of the State of Israel, no. 2730, (8 July 2018).

97 Under Appendix V to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (28 September 1995), Israel undertook to transfer to the PA 75 percent of the total tax to be collected from Palestinian workers working in Israel.

98 See notice by the Ministerial Committee on National Security of 17 February 2019: https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/spoke_cabinet170219. The drafters of the law debated the question of the funds: whether they would be offset in whole or whether they would be frozen until the PA stopped paying the salaries. It was decided that, like the Taylor Force Act, the funds would be suspended until the PA stopped funding terrorism.

99 IDF Order 1827, http://www.militarycourtwatch.org/files/server/1827.pdf.

100 The Security Order (amendment no. 67) (no. 1827) (2020).

101 Ibid, articles 3 and 10.

102 According to some claims, the “Cairo-Amman” Bank froze the accounts of some terrorists. Other PA banks started taking similar steps for fear of being sued in civil courts and prosecuted in criminal proceedings. Maurice Hirsch, “PA Banks Refuse to Accept Salaries for Terrorists,” Palestinian Media Watch (6 July 2020).

103 Nico Krisch, “The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods,” American Journal of International Law 108 (2014): 1–40.

104 John Sprankling, The International Law of Property (Oxford: OUP, 2014).

105 Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

106 According to Appendix V of the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995, Israel is obligated to transfer 75% of the overall income tax collected from Palestinians working in Israel to the PA.

107 On 13 September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, and on 4 May 1994, they signed the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area agreement (“Cairo Agreement”). The PA was established and was given government powers. These agreements combined the Palestinian economy with the Israeli economy through tariffs, Israeli control of the PA’s borders, and the arrangement of relations between Israel and the PA in primary areas: customs, taxes, labor, and tourism. Michael Paradis, “The Biggest Peace: The Structure of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Politics of Separation,” Fordham International Law Journal 26 (2003): 1265, 1285.

108 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. The agreement states that the PA commits to countering terrorism.

109 Mark B. Baker, “Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter)," Houston Journal of International Law 10 (1987): 25–49.

110 In the Palestinian Legislative Authority elections in 2006, Hamas won an overwhelming majority of 42.9% of the vote, while Fatah won only 33% of the seats. Reasons for the rise of Hamas include corruption in PA, government Inefficiency and population support for continued Hamas-led terrorism. Following that, the Quartet for Middle East Affairs set conditions that non-compliance with Hamas would halt the flow of donations to the PA. Although Fatah officially acknowledged the election results, it worked to thwart Hamas and its government through the security forces and frequent strikes. Following these struggles, Hamas took over Gaza in 2007 through terrorist actions. There is fear that it will take over the West Bank too. Moran Yarchi and Ami Ayalon, “Fighting Over the Image: the Israeli − Palestinian Conflict in the Gaza Strip,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 46, (2020): 1–14.

111 The Taylor-Force Act states in Article 4(2): “Funds withheld pursuant to this section may be made available for assistance for the West Bank and Gaza that directly benefits the PA upon a certification by the Secretary of State that the PA has met the conditions.”

112 Nicholas Emilio, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law – A Comparative Study (Kluwer, 1996).

113 In the words of the Palestinian PM: “We seek solutions that will protect the prisoners’ money on the one hand and the banks on the other hand.” El-Hiyat El-Jadidah (15 February 2020).

114 Melvin Soudjin, “Hawala and Money Laundering: Potential Use of Red Flags for Persons Offering Hawala Services,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 21 (2015): 257–74.

115 In justifying this policy, the Palestinian PM said that “the banks are financial institutions which are a lever for the national economy. We must protect them from the extortion of the occupation.” Wafa (the PA’s news agency), (1 June 2020).

116 Terrorist organizations try to disguise their terror activity. For instance, Hamas has an infrastructure of Dawa (دعوة) through which donations from across the globe are transferred to non-profits which in turn transfer some of the funds to terrorist activity. Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).‏

117 Charles O’Reilly and Jennifer Chatman, “Organizational Commitment and Psychological Attachment: The Effects of Compliance, Identification, and Internalization on Prosocial Behavior,” 71 Journal of Applied Psychology (1986): 492–99.

118 Lyman Porter, Richard Steers, Richard Mowday, Paul Boulian, “Organizational Commitment, Job Satisfaction, and Turnover Among Psychiatric Technicians,” Journal of Applied Psychology 59, (1974): 603–09.

119 For example, dozens of terrorists who were released from prison and returned to commit terrorism were prosecuted in the military courts in the west bank for receiving illicit funds from terrorist organizations. See 1793–15 The military prosecution v. Zahadi Aliyan (Nevo publishing, The Military Court of Appeals, 31 December 2015).

120 Sometimes, the situation can be so absurd that the convicted terrorist requests that his punishment be worse to increase the monthly salary. This usually happens in the punishment range of slightly less than five years since there is a significant increase in the amount paid at this level of punishment.