Conventional Insurgents: Understanding al-Shabaab’s Mass Attacks against African Union Bases in Somalia

Abstract

More African Union (AU) peacekeepers have been killed in Somalia than any other modern peace operation. It is likely that over 450 of them were killed during al-Shabaab mass attacks on the AU’s forward operating bases (FOBs) in south-central Somalia, principally between June 2015 and January 2017. Based on a comparative analysis of six such battles, this article identifies the main factors that account for both the peacekeepers’ vulnerabilities and al-Shabaab’s military successes. It concludes by drawing lessons for peace operations beyond Somalia that might face similar threats from insurgents.

Acknowledgments

For their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article, thanks go to Alex Bellamy, Whitney Grespin, and the journal’s anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For details, see Paul D. Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017 (Oxford University Press, 2018).

2 UN Security Council resolution 2628 (2002), para.22.

3 Harun Maruf, “At Least 3,500 AU Soldiers Killed in Somalia since 2007,” Voice of America, April 11, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/exclusive-at-least-3-500-au-soldiers-killed-in-somalia-since-2007/7045982.html

4 For details, see Stig J. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Hurst, 2013); Harun Maruf and Daniel Joseph, Inside Al-Shabaab (Indiana University Press, 2018); Mary Harper, Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al Shabaab (Hurst, 2019).

5 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabaab’s Military Machine (Hiraal Institute, December 2018), https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-Al-Shabab-Military.pdf

6 ATMIS Strategic CONOPS (Unpublished AU document, February 2022), Annex A, para.82.

7 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005), chapter 3.

8 See, for example, Paul D. Williams, “How Peacekeepers Fight: Assessing Combat Effectiveness in United Nations Peace Operations,” Security Studies, 32:1 (2023): 32–65; Fiifi Edu-Afful, Peacekeeping in Nonpermissive Environments (International Peace Institute, March 2023).

9 See, for example, Haidi Willmot, Scott Sheeran, Lisa Sharland, Safety and Security Challenges in UN Peace Operations (International Peace Institute, July 2015); Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (UN doc. December 19, 2017).

10 See, for example, David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (Oxford University Press, 2020); Stephen Biddle, Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias (Princeton University Press, 2021).

11 See, for example, Mateja Peter, “Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma,” Global Governance, 21:3 (2015): 351–370; Cedric de Coning, “Peace Enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations,” Contemporary Security Policy, 38:1 (2017):145–160; Cedric de Coning et al (eds.), UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era (Routledge, 2018).

12 See especially, Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, pp. 193–202.

13 Interviews conducted after 2018 on this topic were considered exempt from IRB review by George Washington University’s Committee on Human Research (IRB#051869).

14 The following summaries of the 2015–17 cases build on the research conducted for Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia.

15 In April 2015, AMISOM had recorded two platoons of 68 BNDF troops in Leego. AMISOM Force Headquarters Position Paper (2015) (AU internal document, 2015), Annex B, Appendix 2.

16 Communication with Western security official, July 27, 2018.

17 “Avenging the Honour of Our Prophet: Storming the Burundian Crusaders’ Base Leego,” video released by Al-Kataib, September 23, 2015.

18 AMISOM SITREP (Unpublished internal document) of June 29, 2015, p. 2.

19 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 198. Compounding the problem was the poor maintenance levels of many AMISOM vehicles.

20 “Avenging the Honour of Our Prophet.”

21 For journalistic accounts see, for example, Siraje Lubwama, “Uganda: New Report Slams UPDF Commanders in Somalia,” The Observer (Kampala), August 5, 2016, https://allafrica.com/stories/201608050596.html; Daniel Kaliniki, “Death in the morning: why AMISOM soldiers had little fighting chance in Janaale,” The East African, September 26, 2016, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Why-East-African-soldiers-fell-to-Al-Shabaab-in-Somalia/2558-3395470-12wbup0z/index.html

22 Kalinaki, “Death in the morning.”

23 Lubwama, “Uganda: New Report Slams UPDF Commanders in Somalia.”

24 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia (UN doc. S/2015/801, October 19, 2015), para.91.

25 Lubwama, “Uganda: New Report Slams UPDF Commanders in Somalia,” and Kalinaki, “Death in the morning.”

26 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 199.

27 “Storming a Ugandan Crusader Base,” Al-Kataib, released November 8, 2015.

28 Robyn Kriel and Briana Duggan, “Military sources: Al-Shabaab attack in Somalia kills dozens of AU troops,” CNN, September 3, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/03/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-attack/index.html

29 Feisal Omar, “Ugandan soldier executed by Somalia’s al Shabaab militants,” Reuters, January 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-violence/ugandan-soldier-executed-by-somalias-al-shabaab-militants-video-idUSKBN1521M3

30 Lubwama, “Uganda: New Report Slams UPDF Commanders in Somalia.”

31 Kalinaki, “Death in the morning.”

32 Cited in “Al-Shabaab Attack – UPDF Commanders to Face Court Martial,” The Observer (Kampala), September 12, 2015.

33 Lubwama, “Uganda: New Report Slams UPDF Commanders in Somalia” and Kalinaki, “Death in the morning.”

34 For a more detailed analysis see Paul D. Williams, The Battle at El Adde (International Peace Institute, July 2016).

35 On Ceel Cadde: Lessons identified from the pre- and post-attack onto the AMISOM CP (Unpublished AMISOM internal document, January 23, 2016).

36 Interview, Somali official, Djibouti, February 29, 2016.

37 Kenya Ministry of Defence, “The Chief of Defence Force’s Press Statement on Elade Update,” January 21, 2016. Cited in Williams, The Battle at El Adde.

38 Ibid.

39 For example, “The Sheikh Abu-Yahya Al-Libi Raid,” Al-Kataib, released April 10, 2016.

40 An AMISOM assessment concluded “over 150 KDF soldiers were killed and an unknown number of others captured.” On Ceel Cadde, p. 1.

41 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia (UN doc. S/2016/919, October 31, 2016), pp. 169–70.

42 Ibid, p. 70.

43 See remarks by AMISOM SRCC Francisco Madeira, Djibouti, February 27, 2016. Copy in author’s possession. There followed a protracted debate over which country should assume the position of AMISOM Force Commander. Ethiopia offered to do so, but only if it could bring an additional 1,000 Ethiopian troops into the operation and deploy some of its soldiers to Mogadishu. This idea was rejected and instead the Force Commander position went to Djibouti.

44 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 201.

45 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (October 31, 2016), para.23.

46 Communication with AU official, June 11, 2016.

47 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 202; Anwar Muktar, “AMISOM thwarts Al-Shabaab attack on Ethiopian forces at Halgan,” Ethiopian Mission to UN, Geneva, June 17, 2016, http://www.ethiopianmission.ch/2016/06/17/amisom-thwarts-al-shabaab-attack-on-ethiopian-forces-at-halgan/

48 On CCTV News, June 10, 2016, https://youtu.be/GmUzRs2uepQ

49 Jacob Beeders, “What happened at Kulbiyow, Somalia,” Bellingcat, March 21, 2017, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/africa/2017/03/21/happened-kulbiyow-somalia-open-source-investigation/

50 In mid-2015, AMISOM internal maps show 228 Kenyan troops were garrisoned at Kulbiyow but it appears that number was reduced by January 2017.

51 See, for example, AMISOM Force Headquarters Position Paper (2015), Annex B, Appendix 2.

52 As of January 2017, 1,714 Kenyan troops were deployed across six bases in sector 2, with the rest of their troops in sectors 3 and 6 totaling just over 4,000. The Kenyan troop locations in AMISOM sector 2 were [Dhobley (592), Afmadhow (333), Belles Qoqaani (176), Hoosingo (182), Tabda (194), Sarira (237)]; Sector 3 [Bardhere (323), Fafadun (201), Taraka (206), Busaar (174)]; and Sector 6 (Kismayo) [New Airport (396), Old Airport (241), Sea Port (233), Kuday (196), Burgavo (169), Abdalle Birolle (195)]. AMISOM Mission Area Map, January 2017.

53 Beeders, “What Happened in Kulbiyow.”

54 Author’s communication with confidential source, November 23, 2020.

55 Moses Michira, “Kulbiyow battle left 68 patriots dead,” The Standard, January 29, 2017, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001227555/kulbiyow-camp-battle-left-68-patriots-dead

56 Cited in Beeders, “What happened at Kulbiyow.”

57 For a breakdown of events see Beeders, “What happened at Kulbiyow,” and Conway Waddington, “The Kulbiyow Attack Uncovered,” African Defence Review, March 22, 2017, https://www.africandefence.net/analysis-of-competing-claims-about-the-january-2017-al-shabaab-attack-on-the-kdf-base-at-kulbiyow/

58 Some Kenyan descriptions of the battle, including early official claims, are not credible. See, for example, David Goldman, “KDF Kolbiyow Attack, A Story of Valor,” January 28, 2017, https://intelligencebriefs.com/kdf-kolbiyow-attack-a-story-of-valor-bravery-victory-and-horror-for-al-shabaab-terrorist-at-friday-dawn/

59 KDF Tweet on January 27, 2017 pictured in Waddington, “The Kulbiyow Attack Uncovered.”

60 Wangui Ngechu, “Raila claims Tens of KDF Officers Killed in Friday Attack,” Citizen, January 28, 2017, https://www.citizen.digital/news/raila-claims-tens-of-kdf-officers-killed-in-friday-attack-156123/

61 Michira, “Kulbiyow battle left 68 patriots dead.”

62 Communication, confidential source, November 23, 2020. These estimates are based on real-time imagery of the battle. Communication, confidential source, March 29, 2019.

63 Phil Stewart, “US drone strike in Somalia kills over 150 Al Shabab militants, Pentagon says,” Christian Science Monitor, March 7, 2016, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2016/0307/US-drone-strike-in-Somalia-kills-over-150-Al-Shabab-militants-Pentagon-says

64 For example, Brendon J. Cannon, “What’s in it for us? Armed drone strikes and the security of Somalia’s Federal Government,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 31:4 (2020): 773–800; Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabaab’s Military Machine.

65 This total is based on internal AMISOM documents from 2019–2022.

66 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Biden Secretly Limits Counterterrorism Drones Strikes Away from War Zones,” New York Times, March 3, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/us/politics/biden-drones.html

67 Internal ATMIS documents suggest there were two VBIEDs. Fiona Lortan, ATMIS Deputy SRCC, said there were at least three. Cited in Sudarsan Raghavan, “An attack on military base in Somalia shows al-Shabaab’s deadly power,” Washington Post, July 17, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/17/somalia-al-shabab-us-troops/

68 In early 2017, El-Baraf was the location of the Burundian 39th battalion’s headquarters, with about 240 soldiers stationed there. AMISOM Mission Area Map, January 2017.

69 Raghavan, “An attack on military base in Somalia.”

70 Ibid.

71 Harun Maruf and Edward Rewema, “At least 30 Burundian AU soldiers killed in al-Shabaab attack, official says,” Voice of America, May 4, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/at-least-30-burundian-au-soldiers-killed-in-al-shabab-attack-official-says-/6557087.html

72 “Burundi says 10 troops killed in attack on AU base in Somalia,” France24, May 4, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220504-burundi-says-10-troops-killed-in-attack-on-au-base-in-somalia

73 AU press statement, PSC/PR/PS.1081(2022), May 4, 2022, http://peaceau.org/uploads/eng-press-statement-for-the-1081st-psc-meeting-on-al-shabaab-attack-against-atmis-held-on-4-may-2022.pdf

74 Confidential internal ATMIS document.

75 Raghavan, “An attack on military base in Somalia.”

76 Figures from AMISOM Force Headquarters Position Paper (Unpublished AU document, April 2015); AMISOM Troops Strength and Disposition (Unpublished AU document, March 2016); AMISOM Mission Area Map, January 2017 (Unpublished AU document, 2017); AMISOM Operational Readiness Assessment (Unpublished AU document, September 2018); internal ATMIS document, March 2023.

77 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, chapters 5–7.

78 Michael Shurkin, Strengthening Sahelian Counterinsurgency Strategy (ACSS, August 2022), p. 7, https://africacenter.org/publication/strengthening-sahelian-counterinsurgency-strategy/

79 Joint AU-UN Partnership Report of the AMISOM Operational Readiness Assessment (Unpublished document, September 2018), p. 6.

80 Source: Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 9.

81 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 201.

82 “AMISOM augments plans to enhance its Forward Operating Bases,” press release, July 30, 2018, http://amisom-au.org/2018/07/amisom-augments-plans-to-enhance-its-forward-operating-bases/

83 See, for example, images at https://twitter.com/HussienM12/status/1521563150432325637?s=20&t=coFp89b-ree4Dq41H_jGmA and https://twitter.com/Sagal75497460/status/1521372499061223425?s=20&t=coFp89b-ree4Dq41H_jGmA

84 The other expansion operations were Operation Eagle (March 2014), Operation Indian Ocean (August–October 2014), and Operation Ocean Build (November 2014–July 2015).

85 For an overview, see Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, chapters 5 and 6.

86 Letter Dated October 7, 2015 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (UN doc. S/2015/762), para.40–1.

87 Ibid, para.42.

88 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 194.

89 Sadly, one of the main sources of publicly available information on the state of the AU FOBs came from al-Shabaab propaganda videos of their attacks. The videos were usually released within a couple of months of the attack.

90 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, para.21.

91 See UN Security Council resolution 2036, February 22, 2012, Annex.

92 Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, “Crashes underline Uganda’s spotty record with helicopters,” New York Times, August 14, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/world/africa/kenyan-rangers-spot-missing-ugandan-helicopters.html

93 “Ugandan Air Force chief on assessment visit ahead of the start of AMISOM air operations,” AMISOM press release, November 15, 2020, https://amisom-au.org/2020/11/ugandan-air-force-chief-on-assessment-visit-ahead-of-the-start-of-amisom-air-operations/

94 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, p. 152.

95 Ibid, pp. 8, 16–17.

96 Djibouti Declaration, Djibouti, February 28, 2016, https://www.un.int/djibouti/news/summit-troop-and-police-contributing-countries-african-union-mission-somalia-amisom

97 The details of this battle are contained in UK Armed Forces, Report on RSLAF Recce to AMISOM Sector 2 from 7–9 May 2012 (unpublished document, May 21, 2012). For the official Kenyan account, see Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya’s Military Experience in Somalia (Nairobi: Ministry of Defence, 2014), pp. 175–87.

98 Bancroft Situational Report February 2013. Copy in author’s possession.

99 Ibid.

100 Operations Order 08/2014 – Operation Ocean Build (AU unpublished document, November 2014), p. 15.

101 On the sources of this mistrust, see Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, pp. 88–89.

102 Ibid, pp. 147–148.

103 Ibid, chapter 5–7.

104 See Maruf and Joseph, Inside Al-Shabaab and Harper, Everything You Have Told Me Is True.

105 See, for example, V. Schaap and C. Werner, “The business of fear in boomtown Mogadishu,” Der Spiegel, October 27, 2017, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-business-and-violence-driving-the-boom-in-mogadishu-a-1174243.html; Jay Bahadur, Terror and Taxes: Inside al-Shabaab’s revenue collection machine (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, December 2022), https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/al-shabaab-tax/

106 For details see, Matt Bryden, The Decline and Fall of Al-Shabaab? Think Again (Sahan Report, April

2015), www.sahan.eu/wp-content/uploads/Bryden-Decline-and-Fall-of-Al-Shabaab.pdf; IGAD, Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat (IGAD Security Sector Program and Sahan Foundation, March 2016), https://igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/4-igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat/file; Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabaab’s Military Machine.

107 See Jason Hartwig, “Composite Warfare and Civil War Outcome,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 32:6 (2020): 1268–1290; Biddle, Nonstate Warfare.

108 On the concept of sanctuary and its use by other African insurgencies, see Joseph Guido, Terrorist Sanctuary in the Sahara: A Case Study (US Army War College Press, 2017), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/403

109 ATMIS Strategic CONOPS (AU unpublished doc. draft February 2022), Annex A, para.95.

110 For some insights into al-Shabaab’s bush training grounds, see Jamal Osman, “Exclusive: inside an al-Shabaab training camp,” Channel 4 News, December 16, 2013, https://www.channel4.com/news/al-shabaab-somalia-kenya-westgate-al-qaeda

111 AMISOM Force Headquarters Position Paper (2015), p. 4.

112 Ibid, p. 22. See also Annex A, p. 9.

113 Operations Order 01/2015 – Operation Juba Corridor (AU unpublished document, 2015), Annex B, p. 1.

114 Ibid, Annex B, p. 9.

115 These tactics were also successful against Somali National Army FOBs, but these are not my focus here.

116 See Jason Burke, “Al-Shabaab attack kills dozens of Ugandan soldiers in Somalia,” The Guardian, April 1, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/01/al-shabaab-attack-kills-ugandan-soldiers-in-somalia

117 Sector 1 Report (Unpublished AMISOM document, April 2, 2018).

118 Ibid.

119 Mohammed I. Shire and Abdi Hersi, “Brothers in Arms: The Phenomenon of Complex Suicide Attacks,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 34:2 (2022): 263–284.

120 Jason Warner and Ellen Chapin, Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of al-Shabaab (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018), https://ctc.usma.edu/targeted-terror-suicide-bombers-al-shabaab/

121 Note that the El Adde attack was timed shortly after a Kenyan troop rotation.

122 Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia, pp. 88–89.

123 On the concept of “decision advantage” see Jennifer E. Sims, Decision Advantage: Intelligence in International Politics from the Spanish Armada to Cyberwar (Oxford University Press, 2022).

124 Figures are drawn from internal ATMIS security reports for 2022–23.

125 Internal ATMIS document, March 2023.

126 See Williams, “How Peacekeepers Fight.”

127 See “Mali: Around 20 UN peacekeepers injured in major attack on MINUSMA base,” UN press release, February 10, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1084342

128 The AU repeatedly recognized the need for such standards but clearly failed to consistently implement them. See ATMIS Strategic CONOPS, Annex E, para.24.

129 Airwars data on “US Forces in Somalia,” https://airwars.org/conflict/us-forces-in-somalia/