The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia’s Quasi-State Agent of Influence

Abstract

Russia’s Wagner Group has attracted a lot of attention in connection to its actions in Ukraine. The group’s activities in Africa are less publicized. At the same time, Wagner has made substantial inroads in many countries of the African continent. This article focuses on the case studies of Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Mali and analyzes the nature of Wagner’s activities there. I demonstrate that Wagner’s service portfolio is much more extensive than that of traditional private military companies (PMCs) or private security companies (PSCs). The article illuminates Wagner’s influence campaigns that the group has carried out on behalf of the Russian government to advance Russia’s position in strategic competition with the West. Further, the article shows how Wagner’s services have expanded to parallel the many activities traditionally performed by state institutions while allowing the Russian state to deny involvement. I argue that Wagner’s Africa profile qualifies the group to be approached as a quasi-state agent of influence.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Taylar Rajic for research assistance.

Disclosure Statement

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Notes

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3 “Treasury Sanctions the Head of the Wagner Group in Mali,” US Department of Treasury, May 25, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1502.

4 See Allard Duursma and Niklas Nasuhr, “Russia’s Return to Africa in a Historical and Global Context: Anti-Imperialism, Patronage, and Opportunism,” South African Journal of International Relations (2022), doi:10.1080/10220461.2022.2136236; Roger E. Kanet and Dina Moulioukova, “Russia’s Return to Africa: A Renewed Challenge to the West?” Post-Soviet Affairs 38, no. 5 (2022): 427–39; Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Back in Africa: Is the Cold War Returning?” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 4 (2019): 155–70.

5 Candace Rondeaux, Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare (New America, 2019).

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100 “Russia is Plundering Gold in Sudan to Boost Putin’s War Effort in Ukraine,” CNN, July 29, 2022.

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102 See Wassim Nasr, “How the Wagner Group Is Aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel (November/December 2022): 21–30.

103 “Macron Announces France’s Sahel Military Force Will End in Early 2022,” France 24, July 14, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210713-macron-announces-france-s-sahel-military-force-will-end-in-early-2022.

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105 Jean Le Roux, “Pro-Russian Facebook Assets in Mali Coordinated Support for Wagner Group, Anti-Democracy Protests,” Digital Forensic Research Lab, February 17, 2022.

106 Moses Rono, “Mali’s Plan for Russia Mercenaries to Replace French Troops Unsettles Sahel,” BBC News, October 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58751423.

107 Fred Muvunyi, “Was Russia Behind the Coup in Mali?” DW, August 26, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/was-russia-behind-the-coup-in-mali/a-54705282.

108 Telephone Conversation with Interim President of Mali Assimi Goita, Kremlin, August 10, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69139.

109 Telephone Conversation with Interim President of Mali Assimi Goita, Kremlin, October 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69499.

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113 “Mali Prizvalo na Pomoshch Rossiiskuiu ChVK,” Lentra.ru, September 25, 2021, https://lenta.ru/news/2021/09/25/choke/.

114 Wassim Nasr, “How the Wagner Group Is Aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel (November/December 2022): 23.

115 Situation in Mali, UNSC Report of the Secretary-General S/2023/21, January 6, 2023.

116 Jean Le Roux, “Pro-Russian Facebook Assets in Mali Coordinated Support for Wagner Group, Anti-Democracy Protests,” Digital Forensic Research Lab, February 17, 2022.

117 “Macron Warns of ‘Predatory’ Russian Mercenaries in Mali,” France 24, February 17, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220217-macron-warns-of-predatory-russian-mercenaries-in-mali.

118 Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and Russia’s Disinformation in Africa, US Department of State, May 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/wagner-group-yevgeniy-prigozhin-and-russias-disinformation-in-africa/; “Mali: Massacre by Army, Foreign Soldiers,” Human Rights Watch, April 5, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/05/mali-massacre-army-foreign-soldiers.

119 Wagner Group Operations in Africa, ACLED, August 30, 2022, https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/.

120 “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization,” US Department of Treasury, January 26, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220.

121 Sam Mednick, “Violence Soars in Mali in the Year after Russians Arrive,” AP News, January 14, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/politics-mali-government-russia-violence-10ba966bceb2dc732cb170b16258e5a6?utm_source=iterable&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=5947719.

122 “Massacres, Robberies, and No Help to Authorities: A Close Look at One Yyear of PMC Wagner’s ‘Peacekeeping’ in Mali,” Meduza, November 23, 2022, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/11/24/massacres-robberies-and-no-help-to-authorities.

123 “Treasury Sanctions the Head of the Wagner Group in Mali,” US Department of Treasury, May 25, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1502.

124 Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability, US Department of State, December 15, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-26/.

125 Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization, US Department of the Treasury, January 26, 2023, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220.