The Intersection between Islamic Populism and Radicalism in Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of Aksi Bela Islam Movement

Abstract

This article discusses the role of radical Islamist groups – the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the Salafis - in spearheading the populist Islamist 212 Movement. It examines why they were such effective forces in leading the movement and why their role diminished over time, which contributed to the decline of the movement. Drawing on political process theory and the literature on populism, this article argues that the movement faltered because they could no longer play an instrumental role due to the unsupportive structure of political opportunities, disorganized social movement, less relevant framing, and greater social and political pressure to the social movement.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 On 19 September 1945 a rally organized by Indonesian pro-independence activists was attended by some 300,000 people who come from Jakarta and outskirts cities of Jakarta. The rally aimed to inform people that Indonesia had proclaimed independence on 17 August 1945 and more importantly, the rally was to show that elite and activists were committed to maintain Indonesia independence. The elite, represented by Soekarno, also asked people to follow the elite’s order in their efforts establishing social, legal and political infrastructure to maintain the independence. See Widya Lestari Ningsih, “Rapat Raksasa di Lapangan Ikada: Latar Belakang, Penggagas, dan Tujuan”, Kompas.com, 22 September 2022, https://www.kompas.com/stori/read/2022/09/22/170000379/rapat-raksasa-di-lapangan-ikada-latar-belakang-penggagas-dan-tujuan?page=all, accessed on 4 March 2023.

2 Christine Franciska, “Tujuh juta atau 500.000? Ketika media sosial berdebat soal jumlah peserta aksi 212 di Monas”, bbc.com, December 5, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-38204802, accessed on 4 March 2023.

3 See: Tom Allard & Agustinus Beo Da Costa,”Exclusive - Indonesian Islamist Leader Says Ethnic Chinese Wealth is Next Target”, https://www.reuters.com/, 12 May 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-indonesia-politics-cleric-exclusive-idUSKBN18817N, accessed on 21 September 2023.

4 Greg Fealy, “Bigger Than Ahok: Explaining The 2 December Mass Rally,” Asia Pacific Solidarity Network, December 7, 2016, https://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/index.php/news/2016-12-07/bigger-ahok-explaining-2-december-mass-rally.html, accessed on 10 January 2023.

5 Ian Wilson, “Making Enemies Out of Friends,” New Mandala, 3 November 2016, https://www.newmandala.org/making-enemies-friends/, accessed on 10 January 2023.

6 Ibid.

7 Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, “Islamic Populism and Indonesia’s Illiberal Democracy,” in Thomas Power and Eve Warburton (eds), Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression? (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020): pp. 118-133.

8 Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2018): pp. 314-315.

9 Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs Journal Vol. 91, No. 2 (2018), p. 262.

10 Vedi R. Hadiz, “Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right-Wing Politics in Indonesia” Journal of Contemporary Asia (2018).

11 Greg Fealy, “Jokowi’s repressive pluralism”, East Asia Forum, 27 September 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/09/27/jokowis-repressive-pluralism/, accessed on 22 September 2023.

12 See, among others, Kenneth H. Tucker Jr,” Ideology and Social Movements: The Contributions of Habermas,” Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 59, No. 1 (1989), pp. 30–47. doi:10.1111/j.1475-682x.1989.tb01078.x; and also, A. Metucci, “Challenging Codes: Framing and Ambivalence in the Ideology of Social Movements,” Thesis Eleven, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 131–142. https://doi.org/10.1177/072551369203100110.

13 See Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 [Second Edition] (The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics [Updated and Revised 3^rd Edition] (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Addison Wesley, 1978).

14 Kurt Schock, “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma,” Social Problems Vol. 46, No. 3 (1999), pp. 355-375.

15 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970.

16 Ibid, p. 51.

17 Aseem Hasnain, “Piety over Protest: Cognitive Liberation and Deflected Collective Action in Central India,” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 15, No. 5 (2016), p. 1.

18 David S. Meyer, “Political Opportunity and Nested Institutions,” Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003), p. 19.

19 Ibid p. 20.

20 Ali Thaufan Dwi Saputra & Dedi Sutiadi, “Partisipasi Politik Umat Islam Dalam Aksi Massa 212 dan Implikasinya Terhadap Wajah Islam Indonesia”, Ilmu Ushuluddin Vol. 7, No. 2 (2020), p.135.

21 Muhammad Wahyudi,”Kepemimpinan Non-Muslim: Penafsiran Surat Al-Maidah Ayat 51 dalam Tafsir Al-Azhar dan Tafsir Al-Mishbah”, Progresiva : Jurnal Pemikiran dan Pendidikan Islam, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2018), p. 179.

22 Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in Indonesia” in Norshahril Saat (ed), Islam in Southeast Asia: Negotiating Modernity (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018), p. 144.

23 Saipul Hamdi, “Pilkada Rasa Pilpres: Al-Maidah 51 dan Politisasi Simbol Agama dalam Kontestasi Politik di Pilkada DKI”, Indonesian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Vol. 2, No. 1 (2021), p. 14.

24 Ibid.

25 Indah Mutiara Kami, “MUI Nyatakan Sikap Soal Ucapan Ahok Terkait Al Maidah 51, ini Isinya”, https://news.detik.com, 11 October 2016, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3318150/mui-nyatakan-sikap-soal-ucapan-ahok-terkait-al-maidah-51-ini-isinya, accessed on 22 September 2023.

26 Raynaldo Ghiffari Lubabah, “Saiful Mujani: Sentimen anti-China muncul karena mobilisasi politik,” Merdeka, 29 December 2016, https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/saiful-mujani-sentimen-anti-china-muncul-karena-mobilisasi-politik.html, accessed on 22 February 2023.

27 Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “The Mobilization of Intolerance and Its Trajectories: Indonesian Muslim’s Views of Religious Minorities and Ethnic Chinese”, in Greg Fealy and Ronit Ricci (eds), Contentious Belonging: The Place of Minorities in Indonesia (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019), pp. 163-164.

28 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970, pp. 44-48.

29 Ibid, p. 44.

30 Philips J. Vermonte et. al.,”Gerakan ‘Hibrida’ Aksi Bela Islam: Aktor, Struktur, Motivasi dan Pendanaan”, CSIS Working Paper Series, WPSOL -1 (2020), pp. 6-8.

31 Ibid, p.13.

32 Doug McAdam, “Recruits to Civil Rights Activism” in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (eds), The Social Movement Readers: Cases and Concepts (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p.69.

33 See Reuters/Associated Press, “Aksi 212 di Monas Berakhir Damai,” www.voaindonesia.com, 2 December 2016, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/peserta-aksi-212-capai-200-ribu-orang/3620176.html, accessed on 13 May 2016.

34 “Rizieq Sebut Indonesia Bisa Menyusul 3 Negara Korban Cina,” Nusantaranews.co, 14 December 2016, https://nusantaranews.co/rizieq-sebut-indonesia-bisa-menyusul-3-negara-korban-cina/, accessed on 13 May 2023.

35 Ibnu Maksum, “Ini Dia Strategi China Kuasai Indonesia Melalui Ahok dan Begundalnya,” Suaranasional.com, 17 July 2016, https://suaranasional.com/2016/07/17/ini-dia-strategi-china-kuasai-indonesia-melalui-ahok-dan-begundalnya/, accessed on 13 May 2023.

36 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970, p. 54.

37 Vermonte et. al.,”Gerakan ‘Hibrida’ Aksi Bela Islam, p.4.

38 ”Mengenal Reuni 212, dari Aksi Melawan Ahok hingga Kritik Pemerintah”, Kompas.com, 2 December 2020, https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2020/12/02/17531761/mengenal-reuni-212-dari-aksi-melawan-ahok-hingga-kriitik-pemerintah?page=all., accessed on 6 March 2023.

39 Muhammad Prasetyo, the Attorney General, who served between 2014 and 2019 was affiliated with one of parties that supported Joko Widodo (the National Democratic Party/Nasdem). His successor, who started to serve in 2019, is a former prosecutor, who happens to be the younger brother of a prominent PDIP politician. PDIP is the main supporter of Joko Widodo and Widodo is a cadre of PDIP. Gen. Tito Karnavian, Gen. Idham Azis and Gen. Ari Dono Sukmanto, who served between 2016 and 2021, were all appointed by him. Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo, who started to serve as the chief of the Indonesian police in January 2021, is Joko Widodo’s man. Sigit served as chief of Solo police when Joko Widodo served as the mayor of Solo, Central Java province. Similarly, Commodore Hadi Tjahjanto, who served as the chief of the Indonesian military between 2017 and 2021, was also considered to be his man, as he already knew the Air Force general when the latter served as local airbase near Solo. Hadi Tjahjanto and Listyo Sigit Prabowo are known as part of Solo Gang (officials who served in Solo or near Solo when Joko Widodo was Solo Mayor between 2005 and 2012.

40 “Begini Peta Kekuatan DPR 2019-2024, Koalisi Jokowi Dominan”, Detik.com, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4728867/begini-peta-kekuatan-dpr-2019-2024-koalisi-jokowi-dominan, accessed on 24 February 2023.

41 “Kilas Balik Kasus Dugaan Pencucian Uang Bachtiar Nasir”, CNNIndonesia.com, 8 May 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190507185855-20-392820/kilas-balik-kasus-dugaan-pencucian-uang-bachtiar-nasir, accessed on 5 March 2023.

42 Nanda Perdana Putra, “Tuntutan Aksi 31 Maret Akan Bermuara pada Satu Isu Ini”, Liputan6.com, 31 March 2017, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/2905026/tuntutan-aksi-31-maret-akan-bermuara-pada-satu-isu-ini, accessed on 5 March 2023.

43 Mutia Yuantisya, “Rizieq Shihab Dinyatakan Bebas Bersyarat untuk 2 Tindak Pidana”, Tempo.co, 20 July 2022, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1613927/rizieq-shihab-dinyatakan-bebas-bersyarat-untuk-2-tindak-pidana, accessed on 5 March 2023.

44 “Pemerintah: 35 Pengurus dan Anggota FPI Terlibat Tindak Pidana Terorisme,” Kompas.com, 30 December 2020, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/30/13095981/pemerintah-35-pengurus-dan-anggota-fpi-terlibat-tindak-pidana-terorisme, accessed on 13 May 2023.

45 “MA Pangkas Hukuman Munarman di Kasus Terorisme Jadi 3 Tahun Penjara”, Kompas.com, 5 December 2022, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/12/05/19242611/ma-pangkas-hukuman-munarman-di-kasus-terorisme-jadi-3-tahun-penjara, accessed on 5 March 2023.

46 Mukhaer Pakkanna,”Aksi Damai dalam Ketidakadilan Ekonomi”, https://www.umm.ac.id/, 6 December 2016, https://www.umm.ac.id/id/opini/aksi-damai-dalam-ketidakadilan-ekonomi.html, accessed on 21 September 2023.

47 Tom Allard & Agustinus Beo Da Costa, “Exclusive - Indonesian Islamist Leader Says Ethnic Chinese Wealth is Next Target”, https://www.reuters.com/, 12 May 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-indonesia-politics-cleric-exclusive-idUSKBN18817N, accessed on 21 September 2023.

48 Dessy Suciati Saputri, “Kongres Ekonomi Umat Dorong Kurangi Kesenjangan”, https://ekonomi.republika.co.id/, 31 March 2017, https://ekonomi.republika.co.id/berita/onol14415/kongres-ekonomi-umat-dorong-kurangi-kesenjangan, accessed on 21 September 2023.

49 Humas [Hubungan Masyarakat/Public Relations], “Kongres Ekonomi Umat ke-2 Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Tahun 2021, di the Sultan Hotel and Residence, Provinsi DKI Jakarta, 10 Desember 2021”, https://setkab.go.id, 10 December 2021, https://setkab.go.id/kongres-ekonomi-umat-ke-2-majelis-ulama-indonesia-mui-tahun-2021-di-the-sultan-hotel-and-residence-provinsi-dki-jakarta-10-desember-2021/, accessed on 22 September 2023.

50 “Rizieq Kembali Serukan Revolusi Akhlak: Negeri Ini Darurat Kebohongan”, CNNIndonesia.com, 20 July 2022, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220720111824-20-823762/rizieq-kembali-serukan-revolusi-akhlak-negeri-ini-darurat-kebohongan, accessed on 5 March 2023.

51 Gili Argenti, “Islam Politik di Indonesia: Transformasi Gerakan Sosial Aksi Bela Islam 212 dari Gerakan Demonstrasi Ke Gerakan Kelembagaan Sosial, Politik dan Ekonomi”, Jurnal Politikom Indonesiana, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2019), p. 18.

52 Vermonte et. al., “Gerakan ‘Hibrida’ Aksi Bela Islam”, p. 4.

53 “Haikal Hassan Dipolisikan Karena Mimpi Bertemu Rasul”, CNNIndonesia.com, 16 December 2020, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20201216072345-12-582676/haikal-hassan-dipolisikan-karena-mimpi-bertemu-rasul, accessed on 5 March 2023.

54 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam and Social Movement Theory: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan”, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2005), p. 144.

55 Ibid.

56 Freeden, M., “Ideology” In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis (1998), viewed 21 September 2023, <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/ideology/v-1>. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-S030-1.

57 Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 42, Number 4 (2001), p. 494.