Violent Extremism in Bima, Indonesia: Radical Milieu and Peacebuilding Efforts

Abstract

Indonesia has been grappling with violent extremist groups since its independence. Among the many places in the country where violent extremist groups have emerged is Bima in West Nusa Tenggara. Bima has a long history of extremist activities, repeated terrorist offences, and, most importantly, sporadic yet strong extremist communities. Bima is often referred to as a place for terrorist recruitment and a safe haven for terrorist fugitives. Yet, despite its significance in Indonesia’s terrorist network, violent extremism in Bima remains understudied. This article aims to fill this gap by exploring how and why extremism became deeply rooted in Bima. By making use of the “radical milieu” framework developed by Malthaner and Waldmann, we try to answer two main questions: First, how and why has the interaction between Bima’s radical milieu with the local extremist groups escalated and/or de-escalated violent extremism? Second, what are the incentives involved in those interactions which could be useful for strengthening peacebuilding in the future? Based on 35 interviews, including with disengaged extremists, government officials and NGO activists, we argue that extremist groups in Bima have emerged from a social environment that shares similar perspectives with them and, to some extent, is sympathetic to their actions in moral or logistical terms. We further argue that this social environment has both served to escalate and de-escalate violent extremism in Bima.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 “Selain Solo dan Poso, Bima jadi Atensi,” Kabar Harian Bima, 24 Juli 2016, https://kahaba.net/berita-bima/33989/selain-solo-dan-poso-bima-jadi-atensi-pansus-dpr-ri.html [accessed on 12 August 2023].

2 “BNPT Ungkap Lima Provinsi Rawan Penyebaran Ideologi Terorisme”, CNN Indonesia, 28 January 2022, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220128122556-12-752421/bnpt-ungkap-lima-provinsi-rawan-penyebaran-ideologi-terorisme [accessed on 12 August 2023].

3 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New

Cells.” IPAC Report No. 69 (21 January 2021), 10.

4 Ibid, 13.

5 IPAC, “Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists.” IPAC Report No. 35 (31 January

2017), 14.

6 M. Adlin Sila and Greg Fealy, “Counter-terrorism, Civil Society Organisations and Peacebuilding: The Role of Non-State Actors in Deradicalisation in Bima, Indonesia”, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2022): 97–117.

7 IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells”, 8.

8 See Eitan Alimi, “Relational Dynamics in Factional Adoption of Terrorist Tactics: A Comparative Perspective”, Theory and Society, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2011): 95–118; and Eitan Alimi, Lorenzo Bosi, and Chares Demetriou, “Relational Dynamics and Processes of Radicalization: A Comparative Framework”, Mobilisation Vol. 17, No. 1 (2012): 7–26.

9 Stefan Malthaner and Peter Waldmann. 2014. “The Radical Milieu: Conceptualising the Supportive Social.

Environment of Terrorist Groups”, Studies in Conflict &Terrorism, Vol. 37, No. 12 (2014): 983.

10 Joel Busher and Tore Bjørgo, “Restraint in Terrorist Groups and Radical Milieus,” Perspectives on terrorism, Vol.14, No. 6 (2020): 2.

11 Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research”, Journal of Strategic Security Vol. 4, No 4 (2011): 37–62. Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.” American Psychologist 60 (2005): 161–69.

12 Arie W. Kruglanski et al, “The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism,” Political Psychology Vol. 35, No 1 (2014): 69–93. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

13 Simona Trip et al. “Psychological Mechanisms Involved in Radicalization and Extremism. A Rational Emotive

Behavioral Conceptualisation.” Frontiers in Psychology Vol, 10 (2019): 437.

14 Alimi, “Relational Dynamics in Factional Adoption of Terrorist Tactics”. See also Donatella della Porta, “Radicalisation: A Relational Perspective.” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2018): 461–74; Peter Waldmann, “The Radical Milieu: The Under-Investigated Relationship between Terrorists and Sympathetic Communities”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2, No. 9 (2008): 25–27; and Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou, “Relational Dynamics and Processes of Radicalization: A Comparative Framework.”

15 Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 38, No. 11 (2015): 958–75.

16 Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II”; Hafez Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle”.

17 Alimi, “Relational Dynamics in Factional Adoption of Terrorist Tactics”; Donatella, “Radicalisation: A Relational

Perspective”; and Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou, “Relational Dynamics and Processes of Radicalization”.

18 Waldmann, “The Radical Milieu”, 25–27.

19 Malthaner and Waldmann, “The Radical Milieu”.

20 Ibid, 983.

21 Biro Pusat Statistik Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, “Persentase Penduduk Menurut Kabupaten/Kota dan Agama yang Dianut di Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2016,” https://ntb.bps.go.id/.

22 Interview with Zulkarnain, 19 October 2018.

23 Interview with Makka, 11 December 2018.

24 Support for political Islam is reflected in views such as: Islamic law or sharia should be implemented throughout Indonesia; regions in Indonesia should be allowed to implement Islamic law at the local level; blasphemy against Islam should be punished more severely; or when participating in general elections, it is imperative for Muslim to choose a Muslim leader.

25 David Bourchier, “Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 49, No. 5 (2019): 691–712.

26 Interview with Abdul Hakim, 12 February 2019.

27 Solahudin, Dari NII ke JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011).

28 R.Z. Leirissa, PRRI, Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia tanpa Komunis (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1991).

29 Asvi Warman Adam, “Terorisme Generasi Pertama”, introduction to Arifin Suryo Nugroho, Tragedi Cikini: Percobaan Pembunuhan Presiden Soekarno (Jakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2013), xiv.

30 Audrey Kahin, Dari Pemberontakan ke Integrasi: Sumatera Barat dan Politik Indonesia 1926-1998 (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2010).

31 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy

Bombing”, Asia Report No. 92 (22 February 2005).

32 Solahudin, Dari NII ke JI.

33 Uqbah attended JI-linked schools Darus Syahadah in Boyolali and Ma’had Aly in Solo, both in Central Java, where he met JI senior figure Lutfi Hadairoh alias Ubaid. In 2010, both were arrested for financing the Aceh training camp. It was also due to Ubaid’s advice that Uqbah decided to fight against ISIS teachings in Bima after his release in 2014.

34 Trial dossiers of Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah alias Alex, 2 April 2018. Unless we mention otherwise, all our information on Iskandar is based on this source.

35 Interview with Iskandar, 17 September 2022.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Purwoko, K. “Polisi Amankan 13 Orang Akibat Ledakan di Ponpes Umar bin Khattab”, Republika, 13 July 2011 [Accessed on 28 October 2022].

39 See IPAC, “Support for ‘Islamic State’ in Indonesian Prisons”, IPAC Report No. 15 (19 January 2015). See also.

Kirsten E. Schulze and Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local

Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia.” Asian Security, Vol. 30, No. 6 (2018): 1–18.

40 IPAC, “The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells”, 10.

41 Court document of Muhammad alias Abu Silmi alias Abu Abdurrahman alias Abu Khodijah bin Zaidon, No. 1076/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt.Utr, 23 November 2020.

42 See testimony of Kurniawan alias Kurnia bin H. Hamzah, document of North Jakarta District Court, No.1390/Pid.Sus/2017/PN.Jkt Utr, 2 April 2018.

43 Interview with Ummu Fathanah [pseudonym], 16 October 2018.

44 Pro-ISIS charities provide a monthly stipend of around Rp. 200,000 (USD 13) for families of detained or killed extremists. Court document of Salman alias Nasi Kuning, No. 239/Pid/Sus/2015/PN.Jkt.Tim, 15 July 2015.

45 Interview with Ummu Nuraini, the wife of Bahtiar who was shot death in 2013, 8 December 2020.

46 Interview with Hakim, 12 February 2019.

47 Interview with Mustakim, December 2020.

48 Interview with Abdul Hakim, 12 February 2019.

49 Malthaner and Waldmann, “The Radical Milieu”, 991.

50 Jokowi chose Maruf because the two Islamic parties in his coalition disagreed with Jokowi’s choice and threatened to leave the coalition. This could potentially lead to the loss of votes from NU and the possibility of a new axis emerging in the 2019 elections; something he wanted to avoid. The selection of Maruf Amin was the safest option as Amin had no ambition to run in the next elections. See: IPAC. 2019. “Anti-Ahok to Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign”. IPAC Report No. 55. 15 March 2019.

51 Greg Fealy, “Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally.” Indonesia at Melbourne, 7 December

2016, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/ [accessed 13 January 2021].

52 Bourchier, “Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia”, 18.

53 Interview with Asikin, 12 February 2019.

54 Interview with Mustakim, December 2020.

55 Busher and Bjørgo, “Restraint in Terrorist Groups and Radical Milieus”, 3.

56 In 2022, Security apparatuses killed the last leaders of MIT and declared that MIT had been wiped out. However, a 2023 IPAC report shows that the potential for violent extremism is still present despite weakening. See: IPAC. 2023.” Militant in Poso: Down but Not Out”, IPAC Report No. 86, 27 June 2023.

57 Interview with Sandi, 9 February 2019.

58 Interview with Zulkarnaen, 12 February 2019.

59 Interview with Ustad Gunawan, 11 December 2018.

60 Interview with Ummu Tetty, 17 October 2018.

61 Julie Chernov Hwang, Rizal Panggabean, and Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, “The Disengagement of Jihadis in Poso, Indonesia.” Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No 4 (2013), 754–77. See also Julie Chernov Hwang, Why terrorists quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2018).

62 Interview with Iskandar, 17 September 2022.

63 Busher and Bjørgo, “Restraint in Terrorist Groups and Radical Milieus”, 5.