The Logic of Rampage Terrorism

Abstract

In popular thinking the archetypal terrorist attack consists of a pre-conceived plan, where terrorists carefully select the location, targets, and timing of their operation. Bombings, hijackings, and targeted assassinations are all tactics that fit with such perceptions. However, increasingly, terrorists have chosen to engage in what can be termed “rampage terrorism”, in which the terrorist is physically present at the attack location, attacks targets of opportunity, and the attack continues for an indefinite period, either until the terrorist is subdued or chooses to end the attack. Examples include stabbing attacks, shootings in crowded areas, and driving vehicles through crowds. This article defines rampage terrorism as a specific subset of terrorist tactics and argues that it possesses unique characteristics that warrant attention. It goes on to illustrate the operational logic and tactical details behind such attacks, by examining five cases of rampage terrorism in depth. The article concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications and points to future research.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank Jacob Ware, attendees of the 2023 U.S. Military Academy at West Point Security Seminar, and reviewers from Studies in Conflict and Terrorism for their feedback. Any remaining errors are the authors own. The views expressed in the article reflect only those of the authors and not any current or former employers, funders or affiliates.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 “A Man Who Killed 8 Bicyclists in Manhattan is Convicted and May Face the Death Penalty,” Associated Press, 27 January 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/01/27/1152043983/new-york-bike-path-terrorist-truck-attack-sayfullo-saipov-guilty.

2 For example: Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing. (Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael C. Horowitz, "The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing," Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 69-84.; Meytal Grimland, Alan Apter, and Ad Kerkhof. "The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing," Crisis 27 no. 3 (2006): 107-118.

3 Robert T. Holden, "The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking." American Journal of Sociology 91 no. 4 (1986): 874-904.; Humphrey G. Dawson, "Civil Aviation, Hijacking and International Terrorism—an Historical and Legal Review," The Aeronautical Journal 91 no. 902 (1987): 51-63.; Henry Steelman, "International Terrorism vis-a-vis Air-Hijacking." Sw. UL Rev. 9 (1977): 85.

4 Gary A. Ackerman, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development of Mortars,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (Spring 2016), 12-34.

5 Patrick T. Brandt and Todd Sandler, "Hostage Taking: Understanding Terrorism Event Dynamics," Journal of Policy Modeling 31, no. 5 (2009): 758-778.; Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, "Hostage Taking: Determinants of Terrorist Logistical and Negotiation Success," Journal of Peace Research 46 no. 6 (2009): 739-756.; Todd Sandler, and John L. Scott. "Terrorist Success in Hostage-taking Incidents: An Empirical Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 no. 1 (1987): 35-53.

6 Miller, Vincent, and Keith J. Hayward. "‘I did my bit’: Terrorism, Tarde and the Vehicle Ramming Attack as an Imitative Event," The British Journal of Criminology 59 no. 1 (2019): 1-23.; Ari Weil, "Terrorist Tactical Diffusion among Lone Actors: Explaining the Spread of Vehicle Ramming Attacks." How Terrorists Learn. Routledge 123-143.

7 Albert J. Mauroni, "Homeland Insecurity: Thinking about CBRN Terrorism," Homeland Security Affairs 6 no. 3 (2010): 1-17.; Wesley S. McCann, "Islamic Extremism and CBRN Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 35, no. 3 (2023): 594-614.; Daniel Koehler and Peter Popella, "Mapping Far-right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment." Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 8 (2020): 1666-1690.

8 The work of Margaret Wilson examines such factors from a psychological perspective. See, for example, Margaret A. Wilson, Angela Scholes, Elizabeth Brocklehurst, “A Behavioural Analysis of Terrorist Action: The Assassination and Bombing Campaigns of ETA between 1980 and 2007,” The British Journal of Criminology 50, no. 4 (July 2010): 690–707, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azq023.

9 Although Quillen maintains a threshold of 25 casualties to qualify as a “mass-casualty” terrorist attack, he contends that the number must be high enough to “genuinely reflect the devastation wrought by such attacks, but low enough to yield a useful sample.” Ackerman and Asal select the higher threshold of 100 casualties as more in line with this prescription. Chris Quillen, “A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25 no. 5 (2002): 280. Gary A. Ackerman and Victor Asal, “Understanding Mass Casualty Terrorism,” Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana (21 February 2010)).

10 Cameron Colquhoun, “Inghimasi – The Secret ISIS Tactic Designed for the Digital Age,” Bellingcat, 1 December 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/12/01/inghimasi-secret-isis-tactic-designed-digital-age/.

11 “Leaked Documents Reveal the Secrets of Saudi “ISIS” + Pictures,” Al-Alam News Network, May 7, 2016, https://www.alalam.ir/news/1815660/%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1.

12 The authors were unable to find a direct copy of the issue, but it is described in: Thomas Hegghammer, T. “Inspire 2.” Jihadica, 12 October 2010. https://www.jihadica.com/inspire-2

13 William Whiston, “The Genuine Works of Flavius Josephus the Jewish Historian,” University of Chicago, 1737, https://penelope.uchicago.edu/josephus/index.html

14 “Global Terrorism Database: Data Collection Methodology,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/#:∼:text=%22the%20threatened%20or%20actual%20use,%2C%20coercion%2C%20or%20intimidation.%22. It must be recognized that there is no universal definition of terrorism; however, the majority of extant definitions require some broader societal or ideological motive.

15 John M Harris Jr. and Robin B. Harris, “Rampage Violence Requires a New Type of Research,” American Journal of Public Health 102, no. 6 (June 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3483953/.

16 “Norway’s 22 July 2011 Terror Attack: A Timeline,” Associated Press, 19 July 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-norway-bd6c9d2efd6ce2148c3d85cb79d73af9.

17 Rampage attacks may bear some similarities to suicide terrorism in that the attacker is unlikely to survive, or at least escape the area of attack. Robert A Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003).

18 Gina Cherelus and Erwin Seba, “Dallas Shooting Suspect’s Online Posts Reflect Anger, Frustration,” Reuters, 8 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-johnson/dallas-shooting-suspects-online-posts-reflect-anger-frustration-idUSKCN0ZO2BI; William Arkin, Tracy Connor, and Jim Miklaszewski, “Dallas Shooter Micah Johnson was Army Veteran and ‘Loner’,” NBC News, 8 July 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dallas-police-ambush/dallas-shooter-micah-xavier-johnson-was-army-veteran-n606101.

19 “Timeline of July 7 Dallas Police Ambush,” CBS Texas, 7 July 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/timeline-july-7-dallas-police-ambush/.

20 Natasha Frost, “New Zealand Police Kill ‘Extremist’ Who Stabbed 6 in ISIS-Inspired Attack,” New York Times, 3 September 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/03/world/asia/new-zealand-isis-terrorist-attack.html.

21 “Christchurch Shooting: Gunman Tarrant Wanted to Kill ‘as Many as Possible,’” BBC, 24 August 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53861456.

22 This criterion can become blurry when the class of targets is small (e.g. an attack targeting members of a royal family), but can be adjudicated based on the size of the class, the plausibility of momentum, and the geographic concentration of the targets. For example, an attack targeting any living former Presidents of the United States would not be considered a rampage, because there are only a small number of former Presidents, they typically live spread out across the country, and consequently there is no predefined momentum; once one former President is dead, the attack is effectively over.

23 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p. 481.

24 The operational domain is distinguished here from the broader domain of terrorist strategy, with the latter being concerned with the various actions and decisions that the terrorists make to achieve their broader goals, whereas at the operational level, the terrorists are focused on how to achieve the objectives they desire from the particular attack. Tactics thus serve operational goals, which in turn, over the course of multiple actions of various types, are meant to serve broader strategic goals.

25 Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations,” (Princeton: Princeton University Press: August 2013).

26 Leaderless resistance involves small groups or individuals acting independently in order to achieve a common goal, in order to avoid the situation where the arrest of a single individual puts the entire movement at risk. Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” The Seditionist, no. 12, February 1992, http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm .

27 Paul Gill, “Tactical Innovation and the Provisional Irish Republican Army,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017).

28 “New Issue of Magazine Offers Jihadists Terror Tips,” CNN, 12 October 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/10/12/mideast.jihadi.magazine/.

29 “US Vehicle Registration Statistics,” Hedges & Company, accessed 17 June 2023, https://hedgescompany.com/automotive-market-research-statistics/auto-mailing-lists-and-marketing/.

30 Audrey Carlsen and Sahil Chinoy, “How to Buy a Gun in 16 Countries,” New York Times, 6 August 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/02/world/international-gun-laws.html.

31 Though guns can also be readily smuggled from less regulated jurisdictions into more regulated ones.

32 “Small Arms Survey Reveals: More than One Billion Firearms in the World,” Small Arms Survey, accessed 17 June 2023, https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-Press-release-global-firearms-holdings.pdf.

33 Solcyre Burga, “How the AR-15 Rifle Became America’s Most Dangerous Weapon,” TIME, 10 May 2023, https://time.com/6278608/ar-15-rifle-assault-weapons-uvalde/.

34 Patrick Cockburn, “Camp Speicher Massacre: Retracing the Steps of ISIS’s Worst-Ever Atrocity,” The Independent, 6 November 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/camp-speicher-massacre-isis-islamic-state-tikrit-air-academy-iraq-a8040576.html.

35 Alissa J Rubin and Aurelian Breeden, “France Remembers the Nice Attack: We Will Never Find the Words,” The New York Times 15 July 2017.

36 Cora Engelbrecht and Henrik Pryser Libell, “Anders Behring Breivik, Killer in 2011 Norway Massacre, is Denied Parole,” New York Times, 1 February 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/world/europe/anders-behring-breivik-norway-parole.html; .

37 Daniel Byman, et al, “Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 December 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data.

38 Barak Barfi, “The Military Doctrine of the Islamic State and the Limits of Ba’athist Influence,” CTC Sentinel, February 2016, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss211.pdf.

39 Vera Mironova, “From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists: Human Resources of Non-State Armed Groups,” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

40 Tim Lister and Paul Cruickshank, “Intercepted Communications Called Critical in Terror Investigations,” CNN, June 11, 2013, https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/11/us/nsa-data-gathering-impact/index.html.

41 “Vehicle Ramming: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places,” Department of Homeland Security, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Vehicle%20Ramming%20-%20Security%20Awareness%20for%20ST-CP.PDF.

42 Jeffrey W. Lewis, “The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing,” (Naval Institute Press: 15 April 2012).

43 “Marauding Terrorist Attacks: Supplementary Guidance: Lockdown,” National Protective Security Authority, Counter Terrorism Policing, 23 March 2023, https://www.cpni.gov.uk/resources/mta-supplementary-guidance-lockdown-0.

44 Marie Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed: Terrorism and the Anarchist Theory in Late Nineteenth-Century Europe,” Terrorism 4, no. 1-4 (1980), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576108008435483?journalCode=uter19.

45 “Charlottesville: Race and Terror,” VICE News Tonight on HBO, 14 August 2017, https://video.vice.com/en_us/video/charlottesville-race-and-terror-vice-news-tonight-on-hbo/59921b1d2f8d32d808bddfbc.

46 Albert Borowitz, Terrorism for Self-Glorification: The Herostratus Syndrome, (Kent State University Press, 2005).

47 Quillen 2002, Ackerman and Asal 2010.

48 There is the possibility that a rampage campaign, i.e., the capacity to sustain rampage attacks over time could demonstrate the group’s depth of manpower reserves and the willingness of the faithful to sacrifice themselves for the group’s ideology, but this would still not do much to enhance status with respect to tactical prowess.

49 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (2nd ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” The American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (May, 2004): 341-354; Yin, Case Study Research, 2003.

50 This is akin to Seawright and Gerring’s advice to select cases that display diversity, although in their usage, they are referring primarily to causal analysis. Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294-308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077.

51 They were also selected because they were all relatively data rich. Steven van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

52 “Mr. D.” TIME, 1984, https://web.archive.org/web/20090515032021/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,926509,00.html. Lee Moller, Rampage: Canadian Mass Murder and Spree Killing. Toronto, CA: (Toronto, CA: Dundurn Press, 2013): 261-269. https://books.google.com/books?id=WFPAvt5iDnoC&printsec=frontcover&vq=Lortie&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=Lortie&f=false. “Lawmakers Mark 35th Anniversary of Deadly 1984 Quebec Legislature Shooting,” Global News, 2019, https://globalnews.ca/news/5255401/lawmakers-mark-35th-anniversary-of-deadly-1984-quebec-legislature-attack/.

53 Moller. p. 262. Wolfram Bergande, “The Père-version of the Political in the Case of Denis Lorite.” The Sinthome, no. 15. (2014). p. 3. http://www.lacan.com/symptom15/?p=4.

54 Global News; CBC News.

55 Moller, p. 262. Wolfram.

56 Moller, p. 263.

57 Ibid, 264.

58 TIME. “Mr. D.”.

59 TIME. “Mr. D.”; Moller, p. 262 – 264.

60 TIME. “Mr. D Moller, p. 262-264.

61 Moller, p. 264.

62 Moller, p. 263. TIME. “Mr. D.”; “Il y a 20 ans, la fusillade de l’Assemblée nationale,” Radio Canada, 8 May 2004, https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/172886/lortie-assemblee-20-ans.

63 Global News.

64 Moller, p. 263.

65 Radio Canada; Global News; “Dramatic video: 30th Anniversary of National Assembly shootings,” CBC News, 2014, https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/2455154232.

66 CBC News.

67 CBC News.

68 Ontario Legislative Library, “Interview: René Jalbert.” Canadian Parliamentary Review 7, no. 3. (1984), http://www.revparl.ca/english/issue.asp?art=603&param=110; TIME. “Mr. D.”; CBC News; Global News.

69 Ontario Legislative Library; Global News.

70 CBC News.

71 Radio Canada (2004); Global News.

72 Moller, p. 264.

73 “ISIS Leader Encourages Lone Wolf Attacks on Civilians in Europe and US,” Associated Press in Cairo, 22 May 2016, .https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/22/isis-leader-civilian-lone-wolf-attacks-us-europe

74 Evan Perez, Pamela Brown and Steve Almasy, “Orlando Shooting: Killer’s Behavior had Long Been an Issue,” CNN, June 17, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/17/us/orlando-shooter-omar-mateen/index.html.

75 Perez, Brown, and Almasy, 2016.

76 Bart Jenson, “Weapons Gunman used in Orlando Shooting are High-capacity, Common,” USA Today, 14 June 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/06/14/guns-used-kill-49-orlando-high-capacity-common-weapons/85887260/.

77 Perez, Brown, and Almasy, 2016.

78 New evidence shows the Pulse nightclub shooting was not about anti-LGBTQ hate.

79 Frank Straub, et al, “Rescue, Response, and Resilience: a Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub,” Department of Justice: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2017, https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/ric/Publications/cops-w0857-pub.pdf.

80 Unless otherwise indicated, all the information in this section is derived from the COPS Report.

81 It was reported that Mateen shot people lying on the ground without regard for whether they were living or dead; the average number of bullet wounds in those who died was 4.5 each (COPS).

82 Rebecca Shabad, "FBI Director Comey: "Highly Confident" Orlando Shooter Radicalized Through Internet,” CBS News, 13 June 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-comey-highly-confident-orlando-shooter-radicalized-through-internet, (.https://web.archive.org/web/20160614075936/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-comey-highly-confident-orlando-shooter-radicalizedthrough-internet/

83 COPS report.

84 COPS Report.

85 Gina Cherelus and Erwin Seba, “Dallas Shooting Suspect’s Online Posts Reflect Anger, Frustration,” Reuters, 8 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-johnson/dallas-shooting-suspects-online-posts-reflect-anger-frustration-idUSKCN0ZO2BI; William Arkin, Tracy Connor, and Jim Miklaszewski, “Dallas Shooter Micah Johnson was Army Veteran and ‘Loner’,” NBC News, 8 July 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dallas-police-ambush/dallas-shooter-micah-xavier-johnson-was-army-veteran-n606101.

86 Gina Cherelus and Erwin Seba, “Dallas Shooting Suspect’s Online Posts Reflect Anger, Frustration,” Reuters, 8 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-johnson/dallas-shooting-suspects-online-posts-reflect-anger-frustration-idUSKCN0ZO2BI.

87 “Dallas Police Shed Light on Gunman’s Possible Motives,” ABC News, 8 July 2016, https://abcnews.go.com/US/video/dallas-police-shed-light-gunmans-motives-40431927.

88 “Timeline of July 7 Dallas Police Ambush,” CBS Texas, 7 July 2017, https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/timeline-july-7-dallas-police-ambush/.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Manny Fernandez, Richard Perez-Pena, and Jonah Engel Bromwich, “Five Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says,” New York Times, 8 July 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html.

94 Claire Z. Cardona, “Father of Slain Dallas Officer Sues Black Lives Matter,” The Dallas Morning News, 9 November 2016, https://www.police1.com/officer-shootings/articles/father-of-slain-dallas-officer-sues-black-lives-matter-0bDATClXbm7nRcqf/.

95 “Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-3109-S: Zamarripa vs. Farrakhan,” CaseText, 6 July 2018, https://casetext.com/case/zamarripa-v-farrakhan.

96 Christian McPhate, “It was Just Another Texas Gun Deal, Except the Buyer was Cop Killer Micah Johnson,” Dallas Observer, 26 July 2016, https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/it-was-just-another-texas-gun-deal-except-the-buyer-was-cop-killer-micah-johnson-8513404.

97 “Global Firearms Holdings,” Small Arms Survey, 29 March 2020, https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/global-firearms-holdings.

98 Daniel Politi, “Dallas Shooter Had Plans for Larger Attack, Says Police Chief,” Slate, 10 July 2016, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/07/dallas-shooter-micah-xavier-johnson-had-plans-for-larger-attack.html.

99 Richard Fausset, Manny Fernandez, and Alan Blinder, “Micah Johnson, Gunman in Dallas, Honed Military Skills to a Deadly Conclusion,” New York Times, 9 July 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/us/dallas-quiet-after-police-shooting-but-protests-flare-elsewhere.html.

100 Todd L. Davis and Scott Friedman, “Lone Gunman Laughed, Sang During Standoff: Sources,” Associated Press, 8 July 2016, https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/dallas-police-identify-gunman-in-dallas-protest-shootings/2021576/.

101 “Video of Gunman Firing at Police,” ABC News, July 12, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnOzAgIusMk.

102 “Nice: Eight Guilty Over the Deadly Bastille Day Lorry Attack,” BBC, 13 December 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63954860.

103 Ibid. Nicolas Vaux-Montgany, “8 in France Convicted of Roles in Bastille Day Truck Attack,” Associated Press, 13 December 2022, https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-france-prisons-paris-nice-f95c0d8162ef04ab8bebad610675516a.

104 Sam Jones, Angelique Chrisafis, and Caroline Davies, “Nice Truck Attack: Islamic State Claims Responsibility,” The Guardian, 16 July 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-nice-truck-attack.

105 “The Nice Attacker’s Road to Terror,” France 24, 18 July 2016, https://www.france24.com/en/20160718-nice-attackers-road-terror-Mohamed-Lahouaiej-Bouhlel.

106 Ibid.

107 William Horobin and Stacy Meichtry, “Attacker in Nice Showed Online Fascination with Islamic State,” Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/french-police-step-up-investigation-into-bastille-day-truck-attack-1468847127.

108 Ibid.

109 “the Mile-Long Site Where a Truck Hit Hundreds in Nice, France,” Washington Post, 14 July 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/bastille-day-truck-attack-nice-france/; “A Look at the Nice Attacker’s Deadly Path,” ABC News, 15 July 2016, https://abcnews.go.com/International/nice-attackers-deadly-path/story?id=40605382.

110 “Timeline: the Bastille Day Attack in Nice,” Reuters, 17 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-nice-timeline/timeline-the-bastille-day-attack-in-nice-idUSKCN0ZX0GA.

111 "Attentat de Nice: le Camion Utilse ‘a Forcé le Passage en Montant Sur le Trottoir," Euopre1, 16 July 2016, https://www.europe1.fr/faits-divers/attentat-de-nice-le-camion-utilise-a-force-le-passage-en-montant-sur-le-trottoir-2801200.

112 “Nice Attack: in Pictures,” BBC, 15 July 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801161.

113 Reuters, “Timeline: the Bastille Day Attack in Nice.”

114 Ibid.

115 Grégoire Biseau; Sylvain Mouillard; Willy Le Devin; Ismaël Halissat (20 July 2016). "Sécurité à Nice. 370 mètres de questions," liberation.fr. Archived from the original on 23 July 2016.

116 "Bastille Day attack: ‘Hysterical crowds were running from death'," The Guardian, 15 July 2016. Retrieved 24 July 2016.

117 Nicolas Vaux-Montgany, “8 in France Convicted of Roles in Bastille Day Truck Attack,” Associated Press, December 13, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-france-prisons-paris-nice-f95c0d8162ef04ab8bebad610675516a.

118 Ibid.

119 “Vehicles as Weapons of Terror,” Counter-Extremism Project, accessed 17 June 2023, https://www.counterextremism.com/vehicles-as-weapons-of-terror.

120 Nicolas Vaux-Montgany, “8 in France Convicted of Roles in Bastille Day Truck Attack.”

121 “French Court Sentences Eight for 2016 Truck Attack in Nice,” al-Jazeera, 13 December 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/13/french-court-convicts-eight-suspects-in-2016-nice-truck-attack; Nicolas Vaux-Montgany, “8 in France Convicted of Roles in Bastille Day Truck Attack,” Associated Press, 13 December 2022, https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-france-prisons-paris-nice-f95c0d8162ef04ab8bebad610675516a.

122 “The Nice Attacker’s Road to Terror,” France 24, 18 July 2016, https://www.france24.com/en/20160718-nice-attackers-road-terror-Mohamed-Lahouaiej-Bouhlell.

123 “Global Terrorism Database,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, accessed 17 June 2023, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201511130008.

124 Reuters, “Timeline: The Bastille Day Attack in Nice.”

125 “David Zounmenou, et al, “Letter Dated 6 June 2019 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, S/2019/469, 7 June 2019, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/136/10/pdf/N1913610.pdf.

126 Zounmenou, “Letter Dated 6 June 2019 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council.”

127 “DR Congo: No Justice for 2018 Yumbi Massacres,” Human Rights Watch, 19 December 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/19/dr-congo-no-justice-2018-yumbi-massacres; Zounmenou 2019

128 Summary derived from: Zounmenou 2019

129 Zounmenou, Letter Dated 6 June 2019 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council.”.

130 Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: No Justice for 2018 Yumbi Massacres.”.

131 Ibid.

132 Zounmenou, “Letter Dated 6 June 2019 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council.”.

133 Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: No Justice for 2018 Yumbi Massacres.”.

134 Ibid.

135 Scott Shane, “The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki,” The New York Times, 27 August 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html.

136 Catherine E. Shoichet and Gary Tuchman, “Chattanooga Shooting: 4 Marines Killed, a Dead Suspect and Questions of Motive,” CNN, 17 July 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/16/us/tennessee-naval-reserve-shooting/index.html; Scott Shane, “The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki,” The New York Times, 27 August 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.htmll.

137 Michael Ramsden, “Targeting Killing and International Human Rights Law: the Case of Anwar al-Awlaki,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 2 (July 2011) https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article-abstract/16/2/385/895164; Lindsay Kwoka, “Trial by Sniper: the Legality of Targeted Killing in the War on Terror,” Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 1 (October 2011) https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=jcl.

138 Scott Shane, “The Enduring Influence of Anwar Al-Awlaki,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 7 (2016), https://ctc.usma.edu/the-enduring-influence-of-anwar-al-awlaki-in-the-age-of-the-islamic-state/.

139 Ahmet Yalya, “The Reina Nightclub Attack and the Islamic State Threat to Turkey.” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 3 (2017).