Coping with Hamas’s Psychological Warfare during the Gaza War

Abstract

The Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 was based on a ground invasion of thousands of armed terrorists into Israeli communities and army camps, but it was also the beginning of a well-planned traumatizing psychological invasion that has lasted for many months since that terrible day of mass slaughter. Hamas, one of the most experienced terrorist organizations in the arena of propaganda and psychological warfare, sought to combine physical warfare with a psychological campaign that would harm the morale of Israelis, their cohesion, desire to fight and sacrifice, confidence in the political and military leadership, and mental resilience. Continuing our previous series of studies on the media-oriented conduct of Hamas, in this study we focused on its psychological campaign during the war. The article reveals how Hamas planned its psychological operations, from the cameras used to videotape the massacre and stream it to online social media to the use of hostages and their ceremonial, mass-mediated release. The article examines some of the countermeasures that can be used to fend off psychological attacks and attempts by Israel to minimize Hamas’s success in traumatizing the home front.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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