Looking for Individual-Level Evidence for the Ethnic Security Dilemma Revisited: A Study of Balochistan

Abstract

We look for micro-level evidence of the security dilemma in Pakistan’s Balochistan province using data derived from a 2011/2012, nationally representative survey of 16,279 Pakistanis as well as 2017 Pakistani census data. Using mixed effects generalized linear model for a binary dependent variable to identify determinants of individual perceptions of insecurity, we find that respondents who distrust the government are significantly more likely to feel insecure. Respondents in districts with greater in-group shares are significantly less insecure while those residing in districts with greater out-group share feel more insecure. We find modest evidence that cross-cutting cleavages can mitigate perceived insecurity.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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11 This is the most appropriate census as the last census was published in 1998.

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23 Ibid.

24 Gary J. Bass. The Blood Telegram. Random House India, 2013.

25 Adeel Khan. “Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation,” Asian Survey, 49, no. 6 (2009): 1071–1091.

26 Rabia Aslam. “Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan,” Contemporary South Asia 19, no.2 (2011): 129–203.; Adeel Khan. “Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation,” Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 1071–1091; and Gulshan Majeed, and Rehana Saeed Hashmi. “Baloch Resistance during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Era: Causes and Consequences.” South Asian Studies 29.1 (2020).

27 Rabia Aslam. “Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of Balochistan,” Contemporary South Asia 19, no.2 (2011): 129–203; and Adeel Khan, “Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation,” Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 1071–1091.

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30 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (n.d.a).

31 “Mother Tongue by Pakistani District – 2017 Census,” Wikimedia Commons, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mother_Tongue_by_Pakistani_District_-_2017_Census.svg (accessed March 2, 2024).

32 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, n.d.b. “Labour Force Statistics, Labour Force Participation Rates and Un-Employment Rates by Age, Sex and Area 2020-21,” https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/labour-force-statistics.

33 Literacy derived from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, n.d.c. “Population (10 years and above) by literacy, sex, age group and rural/urban,” https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/final-results-census-2017-0.

34 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, n.d.e. “Housing units by ownership, source of drinking water, lighting, cooking fuel used and rural/urban,” https://www.pbs.gov.pk/node/3374;.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, n.d.f. “Housing Units By Tenure, Kitchen, Bathroom, Latrine Facilities And Rural/Urban,” https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/final-results-census-2017-0.

38 Ibid.

39 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, n.d.g. “Moderate or Severe Food insecurity using Food insecurity Experience scale Module,”

https://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//pslm/publications/pslm_district_2019-20/tables/9.1.pdf

40 Social Policy and Development Center, 2021, “Review of Social Development in Pakistan: 2020,” https://www.spdc.org.pk/publications/social-dimensions-of-the-sustainable-development-goals.

41 Ibid.

42 Farhan Hanif Siddiqi. The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements. (New York: Routledge, 2012).

43 Katharine Houreld. ‘China and Pakistan launch economic corridor plan worth $46 billion’, Reuters, last modified 20 April 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-chinaidUSKBN0NA12T20150420; and Jonathan E. Hillman, and Maesea McCalpin. “The China-Pakistan economic corridor at five” (2020). https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-five.

44 Muhammad Akbar Notezai. “Will Balochistan Blow Up China’s Belt and Road.” Foreign Policy (2019). https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/30/will-balochistan-blow-up-chinas-belt-and-road/; and Gulalai Ismail and Alvin Camba, “China’s BRI Is Aggravating Ethnic Tensions in the Global South,” The Diplomat, last modified 29 May 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/chinas-bri-is-aggravating-ethnic-tensions-in-the-global-south/.

45 Sahi Aoun. “Punjabis or collaborators?” The News on Sunday, last modified November 2, 2014. https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/557376-punjabis-or-collaborators-murders-in-balochistan; and Hoshang Noraiee. “The Baloch nationalism in Pakistan: Articulation of the ethnic separatism after the end of the Cold War.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 72–85.

46 The Baloch rehearse a similar narrative about the Chinese workers who are building infrastructure in Balochistan, centered around the deep-sea port at Gwadar. The Baloch believe the Chinese workers are the tip of a spear of Chinese colonists who are working collusively with the deep state, which they read as “Punjabi,” to rob Balochistan of its resources while the ‘owners’ of these resources enjoy none of the benefits. While there is surely logic to this master narrative of Chinese-Deep State-Punjabi collusion, the workers there are not imperial masterminds. Because the Chinese fear the situation in Balochistan and because they have habits that are deeply offensive to locals, such as pork consumption, they live in enclaves with Chinese-provided security working closely with Pakistani security forces. All of this reinforces the fundamental suspicions of the Baloch.

47 C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, “The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 34, no. 1 (2011): 63–94.

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53 John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1951); Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951); Robert Jervis. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30.2 (1978): 167–214; and Charles L. Glaser. “The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics 50.1 (1997): 171–201.

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55 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), 154–155.

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57 Robert Jervis. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30.2 (1978): 169.

58 Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35(1993): 27–47.

59 Ibid.

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63 David Horowitz. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Stuart, J. Kaufman ‘Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War’, International Security 21, no. 2 (1996b): 108–138; and S. Tang, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict. Review of International Studies, 37, no. 2 (2011): 511–536.

64 Stuart J. Kaufman, ‘Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War’, International Security 21, no. 2 (1996b): 51.

65 Brian L. Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and State Securities in the Third World,” in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States. Boulder, ed. Brian L. Job (CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 11–35.

66 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

67 Stephen M. Saideman et al. “Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998.” comparative political studies 35.1 (2002): 103–129; David Horowitz. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press.

68 Stephen M. Saideman, et al. “Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998.” Comparative Political Studies 35.1 (2002):103–129.

69 Ibid.

70 Stuart J. Kaufman. “An ‘International’ Theory of Inter-Ethnic War.” Review of International Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 149–171.

71 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY, 1991); and Jack Snyder, Nationalism and the Crisis of the post-Soviet state. Survival, 35, no. 1 (1993): 5–26.

72 Syed Irfan Raza, 2015. “Senators say CPEC turned into ‘China-Punjab’ corridor, The Dawn, last modified November 24, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1221849; Raffaello Pantucci, 2022. “How Pakistan’s new prime minister completes a favorable picture for China in the region,” South China Morning Post. Last modified April 19, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3174734/how-pakistans-new-prime-minister-completes-favourable-picture-china; and Murad Ali. “China–Pakistan economic corridor: prospects and challenges.” Contemporary South Asia 28.1 (2020): 100–112.

73 C.C. Fair, R. Littman, N. Malhotra, and J.N. Shapiro, Relative Poverty, Perceived Violence, and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan. Political Science Research and Methods 6, no. 1 (2018): 57–81.

74 Ibid.

75 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. n.d.b. “Final Results of Census-2017: Table 11 – Population by Mother Tongue, Sex and Rural/Urban,” https://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//population_census/census_2017_tables/balochistan/Table11p.pdf.

76 Therefore, if an interviewee feels safe in their city/village, we assumed that the response to whether you feel insecurity is no, and thus recorded zero in the dataset. Similarly, if the answer to “do you feel safe in your city/village” is no, then we assume the interviewee feel insecurity, so it is recorded one in the dataset.

77 The survey also asks the question “do you feel safe outside your city/village. We decide not to include this variable in our paper because as we know little about what “outside the village or city” means to the respondent or what characterizes these imagined localities. For example, some localities may have attributes that make the respondent feel more secure while others may have the opposite effect.

78 Accordingly, if a respondent does not believe the rule of law is operative, we coded it one in the data set, and zero otherwise.

79 AO. Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index. American Economic Review 54, no. 5 (1964):761–62.

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81 K. Baldwin, J.D. Huber, Economic Versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provisions. American Political Science Review 104, no. 4 (2010):644–62; and J. Estebana and D. Ray, Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization. American Economic Review 101, no. 4 (2011): 1345–74.

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83 K, Demset, I. Ortuno-Ortin, S. Weber, Linguistic Diversity and Redistribution. Journal of the European Economic Association 7, no. 6 (2009): 1291–318; G. Ostby, Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict. Journal of Peace Resolution 45 (2008): 143–62; and Renal-Querol M, Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 5–29.

84 L.G. Steele, L. Abdelaaty, Ethnic Diversity and Attitudes Toward Refugees. Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies 45, no. 11 (2019): 1833–56; and G. Ostby, Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict. Journal of Peace Resolution 45 (2008):143–62.

85 Liza G. Steele, Amie Bostic, Scoot M. Lynch, Abdelaaty Lamis, Measuring Ethnic Diversity. Annual Review of Sociology 48 (2022): 43–62.

86 Rudd Koopmans; Merlin Schaeffer, Relational diversity and neighbourhood cohesion: unpacking variety, balance, and in-group size. Social Science Research 53 (2015): 162–76.

87 Ibid.

88 Alternatively, we could have used one measure of ethnic diversity and either separated the majority population from the minority population or used interactions. We decided against this because Koopmans and Schaeffer (2013, 2015) find stronger relationships when employing relational diversity measures over using interactions or dividing the population.

89 The complement of the HHI is referred in literature as ELF (Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization). There are many problems with using ELF as a measure of fractionalization (see Steele et al, 2022). In an effort to come up with better measures, Koopmans and Schaeffer (2013, 2015) come up with a measure of relational HHI (or RHHI), and Relational Out-Group Entropy. These measures are preferred over the traditional calculations of ELF because it measures the variety, balance, and disparities among the population subgroups (Koopmans and Schaeffer, 2013, 2015; Steele et al, 2022).

90 Rudd Koopmans; Merlin Schaeffer, Relational diversity and neighborhood cohesion: unpacking variety, balance, and in-group size. Social Science Research 53 (2015): 162–76.

91 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. n.d.b. “Final Results of Census-2017: Table 11 – Population by Mother Tongue, Sex and Rural/Urban,” https://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//population_census/census_2017_tables/balochistan/Table11p.pdf.

92 We use the number of Attacks in each tehsil as a control variable to measure violence. We gathered data on violence from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) security database, https://www.pakpips.com/about-pips-database. We calculated the number of attacks, the total number of individuals killed, and the total number of individuals injured 2009–2011 in every tehsil in Balochistan. See Appendix C, Table C7 for the number of attacks, injured, and killed in each tehsil. These three measures are highly correlated (see Appendix B, Table B3) so we opted to use just the number of attacks in each tehsil as a control.

93 Guo and Zhao, 2000; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002.

94 We calculate the marginal effects by taking the difference in the predicted probabilities at the maximum values (1) minus the predicted probability at the minimum values (0) while holding all other variables constant at their median. We decided on doing it in this manner instead of looking at a one standard deviation change because our three independent variables of interest have the same minimum and maximum values which allows us to compare the marginal effects to see which variable is the most influential in predicting insecurity.

95 In the graphs, we calculate the predicted probabilities by varying our two most influential independent variables—group shares and distrust in government—holding all other variables at their median.

96 The results remain almost unchanged (in sign and sig) for all the different alphas.

97 The measures of group shares are highly correlated so we did not include them in the same model (see Appendix B, Table B2 for correlation matrix of all group share measures).

98 This is true as long as the ICC is not zero (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). The ICC is calculated using an approximation for binomial models using the following formula: $\frac{r^2+{\sigma }^2}{r^2}$, where $r^2$ is the tehsil level variance component and ${\sigma }^2$ is the individual (or respondent) variance component. The multilevel logit is similar to this formula, except the level-1 variance (or the individual level variance in this case) is equal to $\frac{{\pi }^2}{3}$ (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Gelman and Hill 2007; Luke, 2004).

99 Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 2 (2010): 3–57; Roger Brubaker. Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); James Fearon. “Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, ed. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006); David Laitin. Nations, States and Violence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007); John E. Mueller. “The Banality of ‘Ethnic’ War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 42–70; John E. Mueller. The Remnants of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); and Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 15–37.

Additional information

Funding

Exploratory work for this project was subsidized through a modest sub-contract from Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University funded by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. IBSS-1416900. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.