From Mobilization to Annihilation: The Strategic Logics of Bioterrorism

Abstract

This inquiry develops a theoretical framework that explains the strategic logics of bioterrorism. Extremists who pursue or use bioweapons do so to accomplish one of four general strategic objectives: mobilization, intimidation, attrition, or annihilation. With respect to mobilization and intimidation, bioweapons are a relatively poor substitute for conventional weapons—they are more difficult to acquire and deploy and their use is likely to cause a significant public backlash against perpetrators. Extremists pursuing the more maximalist goals of attrition and annihilation, however, have greater incentives to incorporate bioweapons into their arsenals, especially as the technical barriers to developing bioweapons decline.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 United Nations Security Council, Eighth Report of the Special Advisor and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2022).

2 Joby Warrick, “ISIS Planned Chemical Attacks in Europe, New Details on Weapons Program Reveal,” The Washington Post, 11 July 2022.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2010); Phillip C. Bleek, Revisiting Aum Shinrikyo: New Insights into the Most Extensive Non-State Biological Weapons Program to Date (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011).

6 The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: The White House, 2022).

7 United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, “Preventing and Countering Bioterrorism in the Wake of Covid-19,” December 10, 2021.

8 On terrorist signaling see Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49–80; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House 2006); Jakana Thomas, “Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 4 (2014): 804–18; David B. Carter, “Provocation and the Strategy of Terrorist and Guerrilla Attacks,” International Organization 70, no. 1 (2016): 133–73; Megan Farrell, “The Logic of Transnational Outbidding: Pledging Allegiance and the Escalation of Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 57, no. 3 (2020): 437–51; Joseph M. Brown, Force of Words: The Logic of Terrorist Threats (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020); Charles W. Mahoney, “Empty Threats: How Extremist Organizations Bluff in Terrorist Campaigns,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, no. 12 (2020): 1043–63.

9 For more on this point see Jeanne Guilleman, Biological Weapons: From Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

10 Stephen Hummel and F. John Burpo, “A New Age of Bioterror: Anticipating Exploitation of Tunable Biological Agents,” Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel 15, no. 4 (April 2022): 1–6.

11 Gary A. Ackerman, Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries: Identifying the Adversary (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014); Markus K. Binder and Gary A. Ackerman, “Pick Your POICN: Introducing the Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN and Non-State Actors (POICN) Database,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 9 (2021): 730–54.

12 Arpad Palfy, “Weapon System Selection and Mass-Casualty Outcomes,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (2003): 81–95.

13 On the number of casualties caused by a major bioterror incident see Thomas V. Inglesby, “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon,” Journal of the American Medical Association 288, no. 17 (May 2002): 2236–253; Steven S. Arnon, Robert Schechter, Thomas V. Inglesby, Donald A. Henderson, John G. Bartlett, Michael S. Ascher, Edward Eitzen, Anne D. Fine, Jerome Hauer, Marcelle Layton, Scott Lillibridge, Michael T. Osterholm, Tara O’Toole, Gerald Parker, Trish M. Perl, Philip K. Russell, David L. Swerdlow, and Kevin Tonat, “Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management,” Journal of the American Medical Association 285, no. 8 (February 2001): 1059–70; David T. Dennis, “Tularemia as a Biological Weapon,” Journal of the American Medical Association 285, no. 21, (June 2001): 2763–73; B. Lee Ligon, “Plague: A Review of its History and Potential as a Biological Weapon,” Seminars in Pediatric Infectious Diseases 17 (2006): 161–70.

14 World Health Organization, “Biological Weapons,” https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons, (accessed 4 March 2023).

15 Stefan Riedel, “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review,” Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings 17, no. 4 (2004): 400–6; Peter D. Anderson and Gyula Bokor, “Bioterrorism: Pathogens and Weapons,” Journal of Pharmacy Practice 25, no. 5 (2012): 521–9.

16 Vincent Barras and Gilbert Greub, “History of Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism,” Clinical Microbiology and Infection 20, no. 6 (2014): 497–502.

17 W. Seth Carus, A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21^st Century (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017).

18 Among other pathogens, the Soviets experimented with Ebola and Marburg viruses. The Soviet program additionally sought to produce bioagents that could be resistant to vaccines and antibiotics and to manufacture chimeric viruses—novel viruses constructed by combining genetic material from two or more different viruses. See Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

19 Donald A. Henderson, “The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism,” Science 283, no. 26 (1999): 1279–82; Ronald M. Atlas, “Combatting the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism,” BioScience 49, no. 6 (1999): 465–77; Jessica Stern, “The Prospect of Domestic Bioterrorism,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (1999): 517–22.

20 Reuben Ananthan Santhana Dass, “Jihadists Use and Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Study of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons Programs,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 47, no. 5 (2021): 548–82.

21 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, 1970–2020, www.start.umd.edu/gtd; Binder and Ackerman, “Pick Your POICN,” 730-754. Most terrorist incidents are carried out using firearms or explosives, for more on terrorist weapon selection see Gabriel Kohler-Derrick and Daniel James Milton, “Choose Your Weapon: The Impact of Strategic Considerations on Terrorist Group Weapon Selection,” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 5 (2019): 909–28.

22 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database.

23 The POICN database includes executed attacks as well as failed terrorist CBRN incidents ranging from proto-plot to attempted attacks.

24 Mark S. Collett, “Impact of Synthetic Genomics on the Threat of Bioterrorism with Viral Agents,” in Synthetic Genomics: Risks and Benefits for Science and Society, ed. Michelle S. Garfinkel, Drew Endy, Gerald L. Epstein, and Robert M. Friedman (La Jolla, CA: J. Craig Venter Institute, 2007); Hummel and Burpo, “A New Age of Bioterror.”

25 United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism,” https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/cct/chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-terrorism (accessed 19 June 2023); The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan.

26 Jamie Yassif, “Preventing Catastrophic Bioterrorism: Guarding Against Exploitation of the Life Sciences and Biotechnology,” Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel 15, no. 5 (May 2022): 27–31.

27 Todd Sandler, “The Analytic Study of Terrorism: Taking Stock,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 257–71; Charles W. Mahoney, “More Data, New Problems: Audiences, Ahistoricity, and Selection Bias in Terrorism and Insurgency Research,” International Studies Review 20, no. 4 (2018): 589–614.

28 Jeffrey R. Ryan, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats (New York: Elsevier, 2016).

29 In 1996, for example, pastries intentionally contaminated with shigella bacteria caused 12 workers to become sick at a U.S. laboratory. See Shellie A. Kolavic, Akiko Kimura, Shauna L. Simons, Laurence Slutsker, Suzanne Barth, and Charles E. Haley, “An Outbreak of Shigella Dysenteriae Type 2 Among Laboratory Workers Due to Intentional Food Contamination,” JAMA 278, no. 5 (1997): 396–8.

30 For more on agroterrorism see Peter Chalk, Agroterrorism: What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004); Tamara M. Crutchley, Joel B. Rodgers, Heustis P. Whiteside Jr., Marty Vanier, and Thomas E. Terndrup, “Agroterrorism: Where Are We in the Ongoing War on Terrorism?” Journal of Food Protection 70, no. 3 (2007): 791–804; Lesley Seebeck, “Responding to Systemic Crisis: The Case of Agroterrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 8 (2007): 691–721; Jim Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006).

31 United States Centers for Disease Control, “Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases,” https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp (accessed 5 March 2023).

32 Ibid.

33 Yelena Bieberman, “The Technologies and International Politics of Genetic Warfare,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 15, no. 3 (Fall 2021): 7–33.

34 Erik K. Noji, “The Real Risk of Bioterrorism,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 2, no. 2 (2001): 33–44.

35 C. J. Peters, Richard Spertzel, and William Patrick, “Aerosol Technology and Biological Weapons,” in Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities, ed. Stacey L. Knobler, Adel A. F. Mahmoud, and Leslie A. Pray (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2002), 66–77.

36 Ibid.

37 Dennis, “Tularemia as a Biological Weapon.”

38 Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.

39 Gary Ackerman and Michelle Jacome, “WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat,” PRISM 7, no. 3 (2013): 22–36.

40 Richard J. Danzig, A Policymaker’s Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2009); Inglesby, “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon.”; Arnon, “Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon,” Dennis, “Tularemia as a Biological Weapon.”; Ligon, “Plague: A Review of its History and Potential as a Biological Weapon.”

41 Donald A. Henderson, “Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 4, no. 3 (1998): 488–92; Stephen Hummel and F. John Burpo, Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (West Point, NY: Combatting Terrorism Center, 2020).

42 John P. Caves Jr. and W. Seth Carus, The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2014).

43 Ackerman and Jacome, “WMD Terrorism.”

44 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.”

45 For more on provocation see Carter, “Provocation and the Strategy of Terrorist and Guerrilla Attacks.”

46 On outbidding see Farrell, “The Logic of Transnational Outbidding.”; Mark Berlin and Steven Rangazas, “Restrained Insurgents: Why Competition Between Armed Groups Doesn’t Always Produce Outbidding,” Texas National Security Review 6, no. 4 (2023): 11–36.

47 Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil Wars,” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (2015): 1115–28.

48 Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in International Terrorism and World Security, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (London: Croon Hel, 1975), 15.

49 Sarah M. T. Polo and Bélen González, “The Power of Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 13 (2020): 2029–60.

50 Rory Scothorne, “The Story of Anthrax Island and Operations Dark Harvest,” The New Statesman, 22 March 2022.

51 W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2001).

52 Ibid.

53 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.”

54 Rafael Llorca-Vivero, “Terrorism and International Tourism: New Evidence,” Defence and Peace Economics 19, no. 2 (2008): 169–88.

55 Eric Bock, “2001 Anthrax Attacks Revealed Need to Develop Countermeasures Against Biological Threats,” NIH Record, 13 May 2022.

56 Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.

57 ISIS’ 2014 efforts to weaponize botulinum—discussed at this inquiry’s outset—and to use botulinum in terrorist attacks in Europe was likely an effort to intimidate civilians in foreign countries. Because ISIS’ ability to conduct attacks outside its core geographical area of operations in Iraq and Syria is limited, in Europe the organization opted to focus on carrying out complex, large-scale terrorist plots in order to maximize the effect of a small number of attacks.

58 Kristen E. Schulze, “The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia,” Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel 11, no. 6 (June/July 2018): 1–7.

59 CNN Indonesia, “Police: Wedding Bomb in Cirebon,” 15 October 2019.

60 Edyta Janik, Michal Ceremuga, Joanna Saluk-Bijak, and Michal Bijak, “Biological Toxins as the Potential Tools of Bioterrorism,” International Journal of Molecular Sciences 20, no. 5 (2019): 181.

61 Ibid.

62 Robert A. Norton, “Abrin—Another Poison Being Experimented with by Terrorists,” Food Safety Magazine, 21 January 2020.

63 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database.

64 Schulze, “The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia.”

65 Ibid.

66 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.”; Pape, Dying to Win.

67 Arthur M. Friedlander, “Anthrax,” in Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities, ed. Stacey L. Knobler, Adel A. F. Mahmoud, and Leslie A. Pray (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2002), 47–50; Peters, Spertzel, and Patrick, “Aerosol Technology and Biological Weapons.”

68 René Pita and Rohan Gunaratna, “Revisiting Al-Qa’ida’s Anthrax Program,” Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel 2, no. 5 (2009): 10–13.

69 Dass, “Jihadists Use and Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

70 Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat.

71 Ibid.

72 United Nations Office of Counterterrorism, “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism.”; The White House, National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan.

73 Heather S. Gregg, “Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 2 (2014): 36–51.

74 Robert Jay, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1999).

75 Manfred S. Green, James LeDuc, Daniel Cohen, and David R. Franz, “Confronting the Threat of Bioterrorism: Realities, Challenges, and Defensive Strategies,” The Lancet 19, no. 1 (2019): e2–e13.

76 Ralph Baric, “Synthetic Viral Genomics,” in Synthetic Genomics: Risks and Benefits for Science and Society, ed. Michelle S. Garfinkel, Drew Endy, Gerald L. Epstein, and Robert M. Friedman (La Jolla, CA: J. Craig Venter Institute, 2007); Hummel and Burpo, “A New Age of Bioterror.”

77 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2018).

78 Baric, “Synthetic Viral Genomics.” Hummel and Burpo, “A New Age of Bioterror.”; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology.

79 Baric, “Synthetic Viral Genomics.” 65.

80 Ibid.

81 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology.

82 Ibid., 18.

83 Ibid.

84 One exception is smallpox, which was eradicated in 1979 via a global vaccination program and today only exists in a small number of laboratories and research institutes.

85 Jocelyn Kaiser, “Controversial Experiments that Could Make Bird Flu More Risky Poised to Resume,” Science, 8 February 2019; Hilary Marshall, “Scientists Inadvertently Create Lethal Mousepox Virus,” Trends in Immunology 22, no. 3 (2001): 125.

86 Hummel and Burpo, Small Groups, Big Weapons.

87 Gregory D. Koblentz and Rocco Casagrande, “Biology is Dangerously Outpacing Policy,” The New York Times, 20 February 2023.

88 Jocelyn Kaiser, “Growing Number of High Security Pathogen Labs Around World Raises Concern,” Science, 17 March 2023.

89 Kings College London and The George Mason Schar School of Policy and Government, Global Biolabs Report 2023, https://www.globalbiolabs.org/.

90 Ibid.

91 Kai Kupferschmidt, “How Canadian Researchers Reconstituted an Extinct Poxvirus for $100,000 Using Mail-Order DNA,” Science, 6 July 2017.

92 Filippa Lentzos, Gregory D. Koblentz, and Joseph Rodgers, “The Urgent Need for Overhaul of Global Biorisk Management,” Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel 15, no. 4 (2022): 23–9.

93 Hummel and Burpo, Small Groups, Big Weapons, 3–8.

94 Henderson, “Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat.”

95 Frances Stead Sellers, “The Pandemic Cost 7 Million Lives, but Talks to Prevent a Repeat Stall,” The Washington Post, 21 April 2004.

96 Sheryl Gay Stlolberg, “Two Decades After 9-11 Inquiry, a Similar Plan for Covid Stalls in Congress,” The New York Times, 12 December 2022.

97 Jon Cohen, “Anywhere But Here,” Science, 18 August 2022.