The Elusive Promise of “Over-the-Horizon” Counterterrorism

Abstract

Amid criticism on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Biden described the future of U.S. counterterrorism as “over-the-horizon.” This term is derived from long-distance radar technology. It implies that security forces will be postured outside a conflict. Once intelligence reveals a plot, they will cross international borders, execute a strike, and prevent the attack. This has been tried before. In the 1980s and 1990s, national security staff advocated for periodic strikes and raids against terrorists. They failed. This article explores these failures. It examines declassified sources to understand risk-benefit calculations by the White House and finds that the juxtaposition of perceived risks associated with a single strike weighed against benefits derived from cumulative strikes makes presidents reluctant to approve over-the-horizon operations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 “Transcript: Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby and General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. Hold a Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, August 30, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2759183/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-and-general-kenneth-f-mckenzie-jr-hold-a/.

2 Mark Landler, “Biden Rattles U.K. With His Afghan Policy,” The New York Times, August 18, 2021, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/18/world/europe/britain-afghanistan-johnson-biden.html; Jonathan Swan and Zachery Basu, “Red Flags for Biden’s Over-the-Horizon Strategy,” Axios, September 12, 2021, https://www.axios.com/2021/09/12/afghanistan-counterterrorism-over-horizon-biden.

3 “Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan,” White House Press Release, August 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-afghanistan/.

4 The National Security Strategy does not use the term “scaled down,” but rather argues that prior counterterrorism efforts, combined with enhanced security measures, make an ongoing military presence in Afghanistan and elsewhere unnecessary. National Security Strategy (Washington DC: The White House, 2022), 30.

5 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009), 724; Bryan C. Pryce, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 43.

6 Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 2 (2016), 203–19; Mohammed Ibrahim Shire, “How do Leadership Decapitation and Targeting Error Affect Suicide Bombings? The Case of Al-Shabaab,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2020), 945–70; and, Asfandyar Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan,” International Security 43, no. 2 (2018), 77.

7 Bryce Loidolt, “Were Drone Strikes Effective? Evaluating the Drone Campaign in Pakistan through Captured Al-Qaeda Documents,” Texas National Security Review, January 2022, https://tnsr.org/2022/01/were-drone-strikes-effective-evaluating-the-drone-campaign-in-pakistan-through-captured-al-qaeda-documents/.

8 Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” 724.

9 Shire, “How do Leadership Decapitation and Targeting Error Affect Suicide Bombings?” 968–70.

10 Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness?” 77.

11 Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes,” 203–19.

12 Ibid., 215–16.

13 Thomas Jocelyn, “Osama Bin Laden’s Files: The Arab Revolutions,” Long War Journal (2015).

14 This letter can be found in Arabic at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/features/bin-laden-s-bookshelf?start=1 and a translation can be found at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2729601-Letter-From-Brother-Atiyah-to-Shaykh-Abi-Al-Zubayr.html; see also Catherine Putz, “Reading Bin Laden’s Letters: Paranoia and the ‘Spy Planes’ Problem,” The Diplomat (2016).

15 Loidolt, “Were Drone Strikes Effective?”

16 Ibid.

17 Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes,” 217–19; and Loidolt, “Were Drone Strikes Effective?”

18 Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013); Paul Cruickshank, Don Rassler and Kristina Hummel, “Twenty Years After 9/11: Reflections from Gen (ret) Joseph Votel,” CTC Sentinel, 14, no. 7 (2021), 6–12.

19 John Brennan, The Efficacy and Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2012).

20 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (2013), 44–54; Sean Murphy, “The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan,” in The War in Afghanistan, A Legal Analysis, ed. Michael N. Schmitt, Vol. 85 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), 110–39.

21 Christian Schaller, “Using Force Against Terrorists ‘Outside Areas of Active Hostilities’ the Obama Approach and the bin Laden Raid Revisited,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 20, no. 2 (2015), 195–227.

22 Ibid; see also Pardiss Kebriaei, “The Distance between Principle and Practice in the Obama Administration’s Targeted Killing Program: A Response to Jeh Johnson,” Yale Law & Policy Review 31, no. 1 (2012), 151–72.

23 Ibid.

24 Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Leaders, Advisors, and the Political Origins of Elite Support of War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 10 (2018), 2119.

25 Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy,” International Security 34, no.2 (2009), 120.

26 Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Transformative Choices,” 122.

27 Christian Schaller, “Using Force Against Terrorists,” 195–227; Charlie Savage, “White House Tightens Rules on Counterterrorism Drone Strikes,” The Washington Post, October 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/07/us/politics/drone-strikes-biden-trump.html (accessed October 10, 2023).

28 “Combatting Terrorism,” National Security Decision Directive 138 top secret, declassified April 15, 2005, Ronald Reagan Library (April 03, 1984).

29 Ibid., 3.

30 This viewpoint was reflected in numerous classified assessments, see The Abu Nidal Terror Network: Organization, State Sponsors and Commercial Enterprise, a Research Paper Secret, declassified September 1, 2016 (Virginia: Central Intelligence Agency, [1987b]), Ronald Reagan Library; James Stark, “NSPG Meeting: Acting Against Libyan Support for International Terrorism,” Memorandum for John M. Poindexter Top Secret, declassified September 19, 2017, Oliver North Collection, folder “Terrorist Targets: Libya (9)” Ronald Reagan Library (January 04, 1986); “U.S. Exercises Right of Self-Defense Against Libyan Terrorism,” Vol. 86 U.S. State Department Bulletin, 1986c, Ronald Reagan Library.

31 The Abu Nidal Terror Network: Organization, State Sponsors, and Commercial Enterprise, np.

32 The Abu Nidal Network: A Reference Aid Secret, declassified November 24, 2008 (Virginia: Central Intelligence Agency, 1985a), Ronald Reagan Library; “Terrorist Attack at Rome International Airport,” diplomatic cable, Secret, declassified October 28, 2005, Donald Fortier Collection, folder “Terrorism and Libya (2 of 6)” Ronald Reagan Library (December 30, 1985).

33 Michael Moss, “Getting to El Dorado Canyon: The Reagan Administration’s 1986 Decision to Bomb Libya,” American Intelligence Journal 28, no. 2 (2010), 45–7.

34 Rodney McDaniel, “American Public Opinion and Terrorism,” memorandum for John M. Poindexter, Donald Fortier Collection, folder “Terrorism and Libya (2 of 6)” Ronald Reagan Library (November 25, 1985).

35 The Abu Nidal Terror Network: Organization, State Sponsors, and Commercial Enterprise, np.

36 Ibid.

37 “Terrorist Attack at Rome International Airport”; “Response to Libyan Terrorism: Cable from Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher,” Top Secret, declassified April 13, 2006, Craig P. Coy Collection, folder “Terrorism Meeting with British (Box 2)” (WHORM: Alpha Files, Ronald Reagan Library, May 1986).

38 “Cable from Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher.”

39 “Libya’s Gulf Claim: 13 Year Dispute with the U.S.,” New York Times, March 25, 1986a.

40 “Warning Order for CINCEUR - Operation Prairie Fire,” Top Secret, declassified October 27, 2005, Donald Fortier Collection, folder “Terrorism and Libya (1 of 6)” Ronald Reagan Library (December 28, 1985).

41 “Libya’s Gulf Claim.”

42 Moss, “Getting to El Dorado Canyon,” 45.

43 David B. Cohen and Chris J. Dolan, “Revisiting El Dorado Canyon: Terrorism, the Reagan Administration, and the 1986 Bombing of Libya,” White House Studies 5, no. 2 (2005), 154–70.

44 Moss, “Getting to El Dorado Canyon,” 47.

45 Mattia Toaldo, The Origins of the US War on Terror: Lebanon, Libya and American Intervention in the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2013), 134–9; James R. Stark, “Tab C: Military Actions Paper from Secretary Weinberger,” Memorandum to John M. Poindexter, Top Secret, declassified September 14, 2017, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorist Targets: Libya (9)” Ronald Reagan Library (January 04, 1986). Interestingly, this decision-making follows pattern with Elizabeth Saunders’ thesis that Republican presidents try to appease dovish advisors and vis versa. See, Elizabeth Saunders, “Leaders, Advisors and the Political Origins of Elite Support of War,” 2120.

46 John M. Poindexter, “Tab B, Annex, Acting Against Libyan Support for Terrorism,” Draft National Security Decision Directive, Top Secret, declassified October 20, 2005, Donald Fortier collection, folder “Terrorism and Libya (3)” Ronald Reagan Library (January 07, 1986).

47 Ibid., 8.

48 Moss, “Getting to El Dorado Canyon,” 47.

49 Toaldo, The Origins of the US War on Terror, 142.

50 Joseph Stanik, El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared War with Qaddafi (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 109.

51 Moss, “Getting to El Dorado Canyon,” 47.

52 “Report to Congress on U.S. Military Action in Libya: Letter from President Reagan to Thomas P. O’Neill,” ID#: 366588, CO089, Secret, declassified July 18, 1998 (WHORM Subject File: Libya, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ronald Reagan Library, April 16, 1986).

53 Concerns on the risk-to-force as well as civilian casualties are reflected in “USSR and Libya: Soviet Role with SA-5s,” President’s Daily Intelligence Briefing, Top Secret, declassified October 27, 2005, Donald Fortier Collection, folder “Terrorism and Libya (1)” Ronald Reagan Library (January 08, 1986e).

54 Stanik, El Dorado Canyon, 29.

55 “U.S. Exercises Right of Self-Defense Against Libyan Terrorism,” State Department Bulletin, Vol. 86 (Washington DC: State Department, 1986c).

56 “USSR and Libya: Soviet Role with SA-5s.”

57 Stark, “NSPG Meeting: Acting Against Libyan Support for International Terrorism.”

58 Stanik, El Dorado Canyon, 111.

59 Stark, “NSPG Meeting: Acting Against Libyan Support for International Terrorism.”

60 Moss, “Getting to El Dorado Canyon,” 48; see also, “Report to Congress on U.S. Military Action in Libya.”

61 Matthew Plew, “Remembering Operation El Dorado Canyon: 30th Anniversary,” States News Service April 14, 2016; Todd R. Phinney, Airpower Versus Terrorism: Three Case Studies (Montgomery: Air University Press, 2007), 117.

62 “Report to Congress on U.S. Military Action in Libya.”

63 Phinney, Airpower Versus Terrorism, 18.

64 Christopher J. Fuller, See it/Shoot it: The Secret History of the CIA’s Drone Program (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 99.

65 Ibid., 100.

66 Plew, “Remembering Operation El Dorado Canyon.”

67 Phinney, Airpower Versus Terrorism, 15.

68 “Terrorism: NSIC September Polls,” Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya II” Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (September 19, 1986).

69 “Expulsions of Libyan Diplomats,” State Department Cable, Secret, declassified January 9, 2017, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya” Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (May 23, 1986).

70 “Libyan-Soviet Cooperation: A View from Tripoli,” An Intelligence Assessment (Virginia: Central Intelligence Agency, August 1986), Top Secret, declassified July 3, 2018, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya II” Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (August 1986).

71“ U.S. exercises right of self-defense,” 5.

72 Donald Fortier, “Talking Points for John M. Poindexter,” Top Secret, declassified February 20, 2017, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorist Targets: Libya (10)” (undated).

73 “Next Steps to Combat Terrorism in the Middle East,” draft memorandum from Oliver North, Robert Earl and Craig Coy to Admiral Poindexter, Top Secret, declassified April 13, 2006, Craig Coy collection, folder “Libya Strike Follow-up 3 of 3” Ronald Reagan Library (October 1, 1986).

74 John M. Goshko, “U.S. Employee Shot in North Yemen,” The Washington Post, April 26, 1986; and “Terrorist Attacks Since 15 April,” attachment to draft memorandum from Oliver North, Robert Earl and Craig Coy to Admiral Poindexter, Top Secret, declassified April 13, 2006, Craig Coy collection, folder “Libya Strike Follow-up 3 of 3” Ronald Reagan Library (1 October 1986).

75 “Terrorist Attacks Since 15 April;” and, “Assessment of the GoT’s Handling of the Attempted Libyan Bombing of an American Facility In Ankara,” diplomatic cable, Secret, declassified January 4, 2017, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya” Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (June 5, 1986).

76 Ibid.

77 Office of Public Affairs, “Former Senior Libyan Intelligence Officer and Bomb-Maker for the Muamar Qaddafi Regime Charged for the December 21, 1988 Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103,” Press Release Number 20-1377, December 21, 2020.

78 This memo was in Oliver North’s archived files. He commented in the margins “why does she have access? Need to know?” See, “Libya Target Priorities,” Top Secret, declassified March 22, 2017, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya” Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (2 May 1986).

79 Fuller, See it/Shoot it, 101.

80 “Prospects for West European Assistance in Further US Military Moves Against Libyan Terrorism,” An Intelligence Assessment Secret, declassified May 18, 2017, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya, Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (May 1, 1986).

81 Ibid.

82 “[Redacted Subject Line],” diplomatic cable from U.S. embassy in London to Secretary of State, Confidential, declassified January 18, 2016, Craig Coy collection, folder “Terrorism Meeting with the British, May 28, 1986” RAC Box 2 Ronald Reagan Library (May 28, 1986).

83 “Press Opposition To U.S. Strike Against Libya Mirrored Public Attitudes In Britain And Germany, But Not In France,” Research Memorandum, United States Information Agency, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya” Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (October 7, 1986).

84 “Western Europe-United States: Differences over Policy toward Libya Highlight Deeper Splits within the Alliance,” An Intelligence Assessment, Secret, declassified March 28, 2017, Oliver North collection, folder “Terrorism: Libya II” Box 105 Ronald Reagan Library (July 22, 1986).

85 Fuller, See it/Shoot it, 97–101.

86 Montasser al-Zayyat, The road to al-Qaeda: the story of bin Laden’s right-hand man, trans. Ahmed Fekry (Sterling, VA, 2004); Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I know: an oral history ofal-Qaeda’s leader (New York, NY, 2006); Steve Coll, Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York, NY, 2004); Fawaz A. Gerges, The far enemy: why jihad went global (Cambridge, 2005); and, R. Kim Cragin, “Early History of al-Qa”ida,” The Historical Journal 51, no. 4 (2008), 1047–67.

87 Clint Watts, “The Three Versions of Al-Qaeda: A Primer,” FPRI Footnotes (December 01, 2013); Amanda Bower, “Terrorist Hits and Misses: A Chronology of Mayhem,” TIME Magazine, November 12, 2001.

88 Phinney, Airpower Versus Terrorism; and Mark E. Kosnick, “The Military Response to Terrorism,” Naval War College Review 53, no. 2 (January 01, 2000), 13–39.

89 “World Trade Center Bombing Suspect Apprehended in Pakistan,” Department of Justice Press Release Number 078, February 08, 1995b; David B. Ottaway and Steven Coll, “Retracing the Steps of a Terror Suspect,” The Washington Post, June 05, 1995.

90 “World Trade Center Bombing Suspect Apprehended.”

91 “Famous Cases and Criminals: Osama Bin Laden,” Federal Bureau of Investigations https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/osama-bin-laden (accessed January 24, 2023); Ottaway and Coll, “Retracing the Steps of a Terror Suspect.”

92 Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: Statements by Osama Bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005).

93 Daniel Byman, “Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of an Interview with Thomas Pickering Conducted by Team,” 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the Record, Top Secret, declassification date not provided, National Archives ID 2610535, December 22, 2003.

94 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 116.

95 Richard Clarke, “Principals Committee Meeting: Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Embassies in Africa,” Top Secret, declassified February 27, 2017, Clinton Presidential Records 2104-0845-M (August 08, 1998).

96 Ibid.

97 Russel Watson, John Barry, Gregory Vistica, Michael Hirsh, Christopher Dickey, Mark Dennis, Steve Levine, and Gregory Beals, “Our target was terror,” Newsweek, August 31, 1998. A photo of this compound was released by the U.S. military. It can be found at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/spiesfly/phot-06.html (accessed February 17, 2023).

98 National Commission, 116; and “Statement No. 6” in the Appendix.

99 Ibid.

100 Bonnie Jenkins, “Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of an Interview with General Anthony Zinni (retired) Conducted by Team,” 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the Record, Top Secret, declassified February 27, 2017, National Archives ID 04019766 (January 29, 2004).

101 Ibid.

102 Sandy Berger, “Memorandum for the President: Taliban Guarantees regarding Usama Bin Laden,” Secret, declassified February 27, 2017, Clinton Presidential Records, 2104-0845-M (August 26, 1998); National Commission, 116–17.

103 National Commission, 117.

104 Jenkins, “Interview with General Anthony Zinni.”

105 Sandy Berger, “Memorandum for the President: Your Query on the Accuracy of Our Targeting of the al-Shifa Plant,” Secret, declassified October 25, 2012, Clinton Presidential Records, AO/Box Number 3578 (April 17, 2000).

106 Ibid.

107 Jenkins, “Interview with General Anthony Zinni.”

108 Watson et al., “Our Target was Terror,” 24.

109 Jenkins, “Interview with General Anthony Zinni.”

110 “U.S. Military Actions: Fact Sheet/Qs and As,” Clinton Presidential Records, AO/Box Number 520000 (August 21, 1998).

111 National Commission, pg. 116; and “Statement No. 6” in the Appendix.

112 “U.S. Military Actions: Fact Sheet/Qs and As.”

113 Ibid.

114 Watson et al., “Our Target was Terror,” 24; National Commission, 116.

115 Ibid.

116 Kosnick, “The Military Response to Terrorism,” 28–9.

117 “Reported activities of extremist Arabs and Pakistanis since August 20 U.S. strikes on Khost terrorist camps,” diplomatic cable, Confidential, declassified July 21, 2006, Clinton Presidential Records (September 9, 1998).

118 Keating Holland, “Most Americans support Sudan, Afghanistan strikes,” CNN, August 21, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/21/strike.poll/ (accessed 23 October 2023).

119 Berger, “Memorandum for the President: your query on the accuracy of our targeting of the al-Shifa Plant.”

120 Berger, “Memorandum for the President: Taliban Guarantees regarding Usama Bin Laden.”

121 Ibid.

122 Steven Simon, “Paper for SRB: UBL Update,” Secret, declassified on October 27, 2017, Clinton Presidential Records, 2104-0845-M (September 10, 1998).

123 Ibid.

124 “Osama bin Laden: Taliban Seeks New Proposal for Resolving bin Laden Problem,” diplomatic cable, Secret, declassified March 10, 2004, Clinton Presidential Records (November 28, 1998).

125 National Commission, Appendix, Statement No. 6.

126 Richard A. Clarke, “Update on Project: Memorandum for Sandy Berger,” Top Secret, declassified September 22, 2011, Clinton Presidential Records, AO Box 520000 (September 7, 1998).

127 Ibid.

128 Richard A. Clarke, “Any Word?” email to Marc Hurwitz, Top Secret, declassified September 9, 2019, Clinton Presidential Records, AO Box 520000 (September 7, 1998).

129 Jenkins, “Interview with General Anthony Zinni.”

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Richard A. Clarke, “For Sandy,” Secret, declassified September 21, 2015 Clinton Presidential Records, AO Box 520000 (January 11, 2000).

133 Samual Berger, “Improving Intelligence Collection Against Usama bin Laden,” memorandum for the president, Top Secret, declassified on July 8, 2008, Clinton Presidential Records, AO Box 52000 (August 20, 2000).