Failure or Façade? Why Ethnic Organizations Strategically Forgo Policing

Abstract

In-group policing is effective at mitigating conflict because ethnic elites have information needed to identify and punish spoilers within their own communities. Yet, ethnic organizations do not always police those who use unsanctioned violence. Under what conditions will an organization forgo its in-group policing responsibility? Relying on the case of Hezbollah, this article argues that in-group policing in patronage-based societies is a strategic choice. Patronage networks induce compliance by tying it to the provision of goods and services, thereby decreasing the likelihood of violations. When individuals utilize unsanctioned violence, leaders must consider the costs of policing relative to three audiences: 1. Their organization, 2. Their domestic partners, and 3. The international community. Organizations may refrain from policing violators if the costs to their organization’s cohesion and reputation are too high, but will seek ways to lessen criticism by domestic and international audiences.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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8 Fearon and Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Conflict.”

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12 This is likely due to the IPLO’s status as a fringe group and a lack of support among constituents for their activities.

13 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients and Politics: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

14 Although patronage networks are often associated with political parties, they can be organized through other groups including ethnic organizations, religious groups, criminal groups, or even unions. Ethnically based networks that create or coincide with patronage networks can induce compliance through the promise or denial of monetary support or provision of social benefits.

Ward Berenschot, “Patterned Pogroms: Patronage Networks as Infrastructure for Electoral Violence in India and Indonesia,” Journal of Peace Research 57, no. 1 (2020): 171–84, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319889678.

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16 Berenschot, “Patterned Pogroms: Patronage Networks as Infrastructure for Electoral Violence in India and Indonesia,” 174.

17 Interviewee, personal communication, 30 December 2016.

18 Luis Fernando Medina and Susan Stokes, “Monopoly and Monitoring: An Approach to Political Clientelism,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 68–83.

19 Steven Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: University Press, 2004); Steven Lloyd Wilson, “Social Identity, Cross-Cutting Cleavages, and Explaining the Breakdown of Interethnic Cooperation,” Rationality and Society 27, no. 4 (November 1, 2015): 455–68, https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463115605301.

20 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 845–77, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551398.

21 Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Religion, Values, and Behavioral Constraint,” 1995; Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives,” The Journal of Political Economy 100, no. 2 (1992): 271–91.

22 Melani Cammett et al., “Coethnicity Beyond Clientelism: Insights from an Experimental Study of Political Behavior in Lebanon,” Politics and Religion 15, no. 2 (2022): 417–38, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000201.

23 James Habyarimana et al., “Why Does Ethnicity Undermine Public Goods Provision?,” The American Political Science Review 101, no. 4 (2007): 709–725.

24 Alisha C. Holland, “Forbearance,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 2 (2016): 232–46, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000083; Alisha Holland, Forbearance as Redistribution: The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

25 Holland, “Forbearance,” 233.

26 Holland, “Forbearance,” 235.

27 Daniel Byman et al., “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements” (RAND Corporation, 2001), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1405.html.

28 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Schultz, “Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 4 (2008): 479–506, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707313305; Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (2010): 493–515.

29 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790843.

30 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (RAND Corporation, 2001), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1405.html; Stephen Saideman, “Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 1 (2002): 27–50; Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65, no. 4 (2011): 709–44, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000233.

31 Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2010): 1–18; Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations.”

32 Darren G. Hawkins et al., eds., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368.

33 Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (2010): 493–515.

34 “Hariri: What happened in Saudi stays in Saudi,” Aljazeera, November 28, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/28/hariri-what-happened-in-saudi-stays-in-saudi.

35 Lisa Barrington and Angus McDowall, “Lebanon accuses Saudi Arabia of holding its PM hostage, Reuters, November 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1DF17S/.

36 “Lebanon’s Hariri rescinds resignation, drawing line under crisis,” Reuters, December 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1DZ1ER/.

37 Martin Smith and Marcela Gaviria, “The Jihadist,” PBS Frontline, June 1, 2012, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/the-jihadist/.

38 Chaim Kaufmann, “Rational Choice and Progress in the Study of Ethnic Conflict: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 178–207, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410591002554.

39 Michael J Boyle, “Explaining Strategic Violence after Wars,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 (2009): 209–36.

40 Peter T. Leeson, “Cooperation and Conflict: Evidence on Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogenous Groups,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 65, no. 4 (2006): 892–907, 900–1.

41 David A Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict,” in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3–32, 20.

42 Michael J Boyle, “Explaining Strategic Violence after Wars,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 (2009): 209–36.

43 Paul Staniland, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 1 (2012): 16–40, 21.

44 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 8 (2008): 1043–68, 1056.

45 Paul Staniland, Asfandyar Mir, and Sameer Lalwani, “Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier,” Security Studies 27, no. 4 (October 2, 2018): 535–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483160.

46 “Top Car Robber, 3 Others Arrested in Brital,” Naharnet, July 29, 2011, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/11471; “Auto-theft mastermind arrested in Baalbeck’s Brital,” The Daily Star, December 17, 2018.

47 “Report: Car Theft Gangs Sell Vehicles to Assailants to Carry out Bombings in Lebanon, Syria,” Naharnet, February 27, 2014, http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/120419.

48 Oren Barak, The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009).

49 Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 295.

50 It also increased the number of Muslim seats in the Parliament and allotted the country’s Shi’a community greater power within the government, alleviating many of the grievances that had propelled the war. At the same time, reducing the relative power of the Christians created new grievances for that community. The main seats of power are still divided between the most populous religious sects: the Presidency is reserved for Christian Maronites, the Prime Minister is a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament must be held by a Shi’a. While Ta’if called for an end to the confessional system, it offered no clear time line or plan for implementing such a change. Regardless, tensions between communities have continued to simmer.

Judith P. Harik and Hilal Khashan, “Lebanon’s Divisive Democracy: The Parliamentary Elections of 1992,” Arab Studies Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1993): 41–59.

51 Lamia Estatie, “Lebanese Presidential Election Unlikely to Alter Hezbollah’s Syria Calculus,” Middle East Institute, August 7, 2014, http://www.mei.edu/content/at/lebanese-presidential-election-unlikely-alter-hezbollahs-syria-calculus.

52 Christiana Parreira, “The Art of Not Governing: Local Politics in Postwar Lebanon,” ProQuest Dissertations and Theses (PhD diss., United States – California, Stanford University, 2020), https://www.proquest.com/docview/2457279169/abstract/DFE487F815F64B95PQ/1.

53 Sami Atallah and Sami Zoughaib, “A Snapshot of the Parliamentary Election

Results,” Policy Paper (Beirut, Lebanon: The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2019).

54 Hezbollah does face competition in the form of fellow Shia political party and ally Harakat Amal. Although the two compete on joint tickets in parliamentary elections and typically form joint tickets for municipal elections, there

55 Cammett, “Compassionate Communalism.”

56 Interviewee, personal communication, 30 December 2016.

57 Interviewee, personal communication, 8 August 2017.

58 “Ashraf an-Nass,” al-Binaa, https://www.al-binaa.com/archives/article/70013.

59 Lara Deeb and Mona Harb, Leisurely Islam: Negotiating Geography and

Morality in Shi’ite South Beirut, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400848560.

60 Kelly Stedem, “Political Parties and the Provision of Non-State Security in Lebanon,” Middle East Initiative Working Paper 3 (June 2021), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Working_Paper_Stedem%20FINAL.pdf.

61 “Meqdad Military Wing Kidnaps Turkish National, 20 FSA Members, Speaks of ‘Bank of Targets’,” Naharnet, August 15, 2012, https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/50090-meqdad-military-wing-kidnaps-turkish-national-20-fsa-members-speaks-of-bank-of-targets.

62 Radwan Mortada, “Moqdad Clan: The Syrian Vendetta,” Al-Akhbar, August 17, 2012, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11208.

63 Ibid.

64 Nour Samaha, “Kidnappings expose Lebanon weakness,” Aljazeera, August 19, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/2012819847738356.html.

65 “Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah Speech on Al-Quds Day,” ShiaTV.net, August 17, 2012, http://www.shiatv.net/view_video.php?viewkey=3563a3d17a84f9c76373.

66 R. al-Fakih, “Weekend of abductions and killings rattles Bekaa Valley, north,” The Daily Star, August 5, 2013.

67 The kidnappings set off a string of kidnappings by other Hezbollah connected Shi’a, including by the Jaafar family. These kidnappings continued through 2014. “Lebanon: Tit-for-Tat Border Kidnappings,” Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/02/lebanon-tit-tat-border-kidnappings.

68 Justin Salhani, “After the abduction: how clans negotiate,” Now Lebanon, March 29, 2013, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/after-the-abduction-how-clans-negotiate; Nour Samaha, “Kidnappings expose Lebanon weakness,” Aljazeera, August 29, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/2012819847738356.html; http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/11208.

69 Rodger Shanahan, The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties, and Clerics, Paperback ed. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

70 Fearon and Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.”

71 Ibid, 730.

72 Lebanese pilgrims ‘kidnapped’ in Syria (2012, May 23). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/5/23/lebanese-pilgrims-kidnapped-in-syria.

73 “Syria captive rift: Iran defiant, Hezbollah silent,” DeseretNews, August 9, 2012, https://www.deseret.com/2012/8/9/20429026/syria-captive-rift-iran-defiant-hezbollah-silent/.

74 The pilgrims were not released until October 2013.

75 Notably, hostage Hussein Omar was released by the Syrian rebels as a “goodwill gesture” just over a week after the Moqdad kidnapping spree; M. Karouny, “Syrian Rebels Set Free a Kidnapped Lebanese,” WBUR, August 25, 2012, https://www.wbur.org/news/2012/08/25/syrian-rebelslebanese.

76 Author recollection.

77 Lokman Slim, “Shouhadaa Wanted! When Fighting Terror Produces ever more Radicals and Sectarianism,” Shia Watch, July 24, 2014, http://www.shiawatch.com/public/uploads/files/Shouhadaa%20Wanted!%20[ShiaWatch-31L].pdf.

78 The organization had previously denied sending fighters to Syria. A key factor in forcing the admission was the overwhelming evidence of funerals for young, Shi’a men. Hazem al-Amin, “Lebanon’s silent Hezbollah funerals,” Al-Arabiya, April 21 2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/04/21/Lebanon-s-silent-Hezbollah-funerals.html.

79 An estimated 18 Hezbollah fighters were buried prior to April 2013, the earliest in August 2012. Hisham Ashkar, “Infographic: Hezbollah fighters killed in Syria,” al-Akhbar, May 31, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19226.

80 Rich Gladstone and Anne Barnard, “U.S. Accuses Hezbollah of Aiding Syria’s Crackdown”, The New York Times, August 10, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/world/middleeast/us-officials-say-hezbollah-helps-syrias-military.html.

81 Author recollection; Hezbollah may have been correct in its original calculations of the costs of admitting participation in the Syrian civil conflict. The organization since found itself the target of several rocket and bombing attacks. At least three separate bombings targeting Hezbollah strongholds followed in 2013 and another six attacks in 2014. Moreover, the timing of the EU’s decision to blacklist, a mere two months after Nasrallah’s speech admitting participation, also suggests that the international community was looking to express its displeasure with the organization’s decision to participate in the war in a concrete way.

82 Ali Hashem, “Hezbollah Leader ‘Will Not Let Syria Fall,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2013, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2013/05/hassan-nasrallah-speech-hezbollah-syria.html.

83 Sulome Anderson, “The Syrian War Is Creating a Massive Kidnapping Crisis in Lebanon,” The Atlantic, September 6, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/the-syrian-war-is-creating-a-massive-kidnapping-crisis-in-lebanon/279414/.

84 “Rival Lebanese politicians agree to Syria dissociation,” June 11, 2012, al-Akhbar, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/8338.

85 Angel Krasimirov, “Bulgaria says clear signs Hezbollah behind Burgas bombing,” Reuters, July 18, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-hezbollah-idUSBRE96H0XI20130718.

86 This divide is a false dichotomy. Hezbollah is a singular, unified organization headed by current Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Directly beneath him sits a seven person Shura council that oversees five councils including: 1. the political assembly, 2. the jihad assembly, 3. the parliamentary assembly, 4. the executive assembly, and 5. the judicial assembly. Although each of these councils oversees specific activities, most of the important decision-making processes occur within the Shura Council.

87 Justyna Pawlak and Adrian Croft, “EU adds Hezbollah’s military wing to terrorism list,” Reuters, July 22, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-hezbollah-idUSBRE96K0DA20130722.

88 James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 253–73.