Between Containment and Degrading: Tracing U.S. Policy toward Africa through Strategic Transformations in AFRICOM’s Counter-Terrorism Approach

Abstract

While the concepts of containment and degrading are distinct in their tactical implications, both have been integral to U.S Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) operational approach since its inception in 2007. This paper aims to elucidate this strategic transformation over the period of 2018 to 2023, employing an evaluative framework that incorporates threat assessment, strategic intent, and a cost-benefit analysis. By scrutinizing AFRICOM’s Situation Reports, this study establishes a correlation between the Flintlock military exercises in West Africa and the establishment of the Danab Special Commando Brigade in Somalia with the overarching containment and degrading strategies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 U.S Department of Defense - 2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, 27 October 2022.

2 Stefan Ganzle, “AFRICOM and US Africa Policy: ‘pentagonizing’ foreign policy or providing a model for joint approaches?” African Security Review, 20, no. 1 (2011): 71.

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9 Stephen Emerson, “Back to the Future: The Evolution of US Counterterrorism Policy in Africa,” Insight on Africa, 6, no. 1 (2014): 47.

10 LTC Joseph Guido, “The American Way of War in Africa: The Case of Niger,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 30, no. 1 (2019): 181.

11 C. William Walldorf, “Overreach In Africa: Rethinking U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” Defense Priorities, 31 (2023): 2. see “From Hard Military Bases to Soft Military Presence: US Military Deployment in Iraq Reassesed,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 6, no. 3 (2012): 85–106, see “Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of “Light” Footprint,” The Intercept, 27 (2020).

12 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Greenbook” (U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, 2017).

13 Okbazghi Yohannes, “The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa After the Cold War: Empty Promises and Retreat,” The Black Scholar, 32, no. 1 (2002): 24.

14 The U.S. National Security Strategy 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ (accessed November 23, 2023). See Costas M. Constantinou and Sam Okoth Opondo, “The Merging of Diplomacy, Defence and Development”, Cooperation and Conflict, 51, no. 3 (2016): 4.

15 J. Brooks Spector, “US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security Challenges,” South African Journal of International Relations, 17, no. 3 (2010): 392. see Stephen Emerson, “The Battle for Africa’s Hearts and Minds”, World Policy Journal, 25, no. 4 (2008/2009): 59.

16 African Lion – United States Africa Command, https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/african-lion.

17 Ibid.

18 Adam Moore and James Walker, “Tracing The US Military’s Presence in Africa,” Geopolitics, 21, no. 3 (2016): 686–716.

19 New America, “Air Strikes, Proxy Warfare, and Civilian Casualties in Libya,” May 26, 2020, https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/airstrikes-proxy-warfare-and-civilian-casualties-libya/key-findings/.

20 Nick Turse, “The U.S. is Waging a Massive Shadow War in Africa, Exclusive Documents Reveal,” Vice, May 18, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en/article/nedy3w/the-u-s-is-waging-a-massive-shadow-war-in-africa-exclusive-documents-reveal.

21 Horace Campbell and Amber Murrey, “Culture-Centric Pre-Emptive Counterinsurgency and US Africa Command: Assessing the Role of the US Social Sciences in US Military Engagements in Africa,” Third World Quarterly, 35, no. 8 (2014): 1459.

22 London Conference Somalia 2017 – Security Pact, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a82170d40f0b62305b926d4/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-pact.pdf.

23 Paul Williams, “Understanding US Policy in Somalia,” Chatham House, July 14, 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/understanding-us-policy-somalia.

24 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “An Operation in Niger Went Fatally Awry. Who is the Army Punishing?” New York Times May 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/world/middleeast/army-niger-members-punished.html.

25 Katherine Zimmerman, “No Competition Without Presence: Should the U.S. Leave Africa?”, PRISM, 9/1 (October 2020): 76.

26 The U.S. National Security Strategy, October 2022, 11.

27 Pentagon: AFRICOM Won’t Boost U.S. Troop Presence on the Continent,”, Inside the Army, February 12, 2007.

28 Nick Turse, “Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim of “Light” Footprint”, The Intercept, February 27, 2020, https://theintercept.com/2020/02/27/africa-us-military-bases-africom/.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, 14, no. 1 (1989): 5–49.

32 Henry Kissinger, “Reflections on Containment,” Foreign Affairs, 73, no. 3 (1994): 113–30. See Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly, 105, no. 3 (1990): 373–95.

33 Shawn Snow, “With limited resources, US military shifts strategy from degrading militants in West Africa to containment”, Army Times, 2020, https://www.armytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/02/11/with-limited-resources-us-military-shifts-strategy-from-degrading-militants-in-west-africa-to-containment/.

34 Andrew O’Neil, “Degrading and Managing Risk: Assesing Australia’s Counter-Terrorist Strategy,” Australian Journal of Political Science, 42, no. 3 (2007): 480.

35 Charles Gati, “What Containment Meant”, Foreign Policy, 7 (1972): 22–40.

36 Jodok Troy, “The Containment of the Islamic State: A Realist Case to Engage a Hybrid Actor,” Contemporary Security Policy, 41, no. 3 (2019): 2.

37 Jenna Jordan and Lawrence Rubin, “An Isıs Containment Doctrine,” The National Interest, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-containment-doctrine-16588?page=0%2C1.

38 National Institute of Justice, “Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence,” NIJ Resarch, 1995, https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/threat-assessment-approach-prevent-targeted-violence.

39 Walldorf, “Overreach In Africa,” 2.

40 Gorm Rye Olsen, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy: the USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali,” European Security, 23, no. 3 (2014): 299.

41 Ibid., 6.

42 Mark Berlin and Stephen Rangazas, “Restrained Insurgents: Why Competition Between Armed Groups Doesn’t Always Produce Outbidding,” Texas National Security Review, 6, no. 4 (2023): 11–36.

43 Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27–35.

44 US AFRICOM 2021 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 22 April 2021, https://www.africom.mil/document/33691/usafricom-statement-for-record-hasc-20-apr-2021-gen-townsendpdf.

45 Nathaniel Allen, “Assesing a Decade of U.S. Military Strategy in Africa,” Orbis, 62, vol. 4 (2015): 656.

46 Ibid., 11.

47 Zimmerman, “No Competition Without Presence,” 70.

48 Allen, “Assesing a Decade,” 6.

49 US AFRICOM 2018 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 6 March 2018, https://www.africom.mil/document/30467/u-s-africa-command-2018-posture-statement.

50 Ibid., 10.

51 US AFRICOM 2019 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 7 February 2019, https://www.africom.mil/document/31480/u-s-africa-command-2019-posture-statement.

52 Ibid., 22.

53 Ibid., 27.

54 Ibid., 25.

55 US AFRICOM 2020 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 2020, https://www.africom.mil/document/32925/2020-posture-statement-to-congress.

56 US AFRICOM 2021 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 2021, 12.

57 US AFRICOM 2022 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 2022, https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2022-posture-statement-to-congress.

58 US AFRICOM 2023 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 2023, https://www.africom.mil/document/35173/africom-cleared-fy24-sasc-posture-hearing-16-mar-2023pdf.

59 US AFRICOM 2018 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 18.

60 US AFRICOM 2020 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 5.

61 ‘US AFRICOM 2022 Posture Statement to Congress’ AFRICOM, 6.

62 US AFRICOM 2018 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 3. See United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2018-2027, US Africa Command, https://www.africom.mil/document/33088/us-africa-command-theater-strategy-2018-2027p (accessed November 22).

63 Ibid., 5.

64 The 2018 US National Security Strategy, 19 January 2018.

65 “US will not completely withdraw forces from Africa-Pentagon chief”, Reuters, January 31, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-africa-military/u-s-will-not-completely-withdrawforces-from-africa-pentagon-chief-idUSKBN1ZT2EP/.

66 “Threat from African Militant Islamist Groups Expanding, Diversifying”, Africa Center for Strategic Studies January 18, 2020, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/threat-from-african-militant-islamist-groups-expanding-diversifying/#:∼:text=Threat%20from%20African%20Militant%20Islamist%20Groups%20Expanding%2C%20Diversifying&text=Militant%20Islamist%20groups%20in%20Africa,diversification%20of%20threat%20from%20Somalia.

67 Ibid.

68 “Digital Press Briefing on Exercise Flintlock in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire”, U.S Department of State, March 13, 2023, https://www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-on-exercise-flintlock-in-ghana-and-cote-divoire-2/.

69 Sam Mednic, “US military launches annual Flintlock exercise in Africa,” Military Times, March 12, 2023, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/03/12/us-military-launches-annual-flintlock-exercise-in-africa/.

70 Oluwaseun Tella, “AFRICOM: Hard or Soft Power İnitiative?” African Security Review, 25, no. 4 (2016): 399.

71 Robert Munson, “Do We Want to “Kill People and Break Things” in Africa: A Historian’s Thoughts on Africa Command,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2, no. 1 (2008): 97–110.

72 Katharine Houreld, “U.S. Troops Are Back in Somalia and Scrambling to Help its Special Forces,” Washington Post, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/10/somalia-war-shabab-danab-military/.

73 Colin D. Robinson and Jahara Matisek, “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia,” The RUSI Journal, 165, no. 4 (2020): 72.

74 Ibid., 72. see Aisha Ahmad, “The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia,” International Security, 39, no. 3 (2014): 89–117.

75 Ibid., 73.

76 US AFRICOM 2020 Posture Statement to Congress, AFRICOM, 13.