Punctuating the Homogeneity of Institutionalized News: Abusing Prisoners at Abu Ghraib Versus Killing Civilians at Fallujah

Abstract

This article investigates a central assertion of new institutionalist approaches to news—that all things being equal news coverage will tend toward homogeneity—in an analysis of news coverage of events in Fallujah, Iraq, in April 2004. An index of homogeneity is developed borrowing from the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of market concentration in economics. Using this index, it is shown that coverage of Fallujah in the major mainstream American news outlets was relatively homogeneous and in this respect apparently differed from the more diverse reporting on Abu Ghraib. The comparative homogeneity of Fallujah news is explained in part using new institutionalist principles. The author concludes that developing new institutionalist theory requires more precise conceptualization and measurement of its key predictions, such as the expectation that major national media usually cover big stories similarly.

Keywords:

• Fallujah
• journalism
• new institutionalism

Notes

1. For instance, the following is just a partial sampling of major newspapers’ editorial page commentaries that clearly laid the blame for the torture/abuse at the feet of Rumsfeld and other top administration officials around the time President Bush reappointed Rumsfeld as secretary of defense: “Rumsfeld Redux” (December 12, 2004) and “Escaping the Blame for Abu Ghraib” (December 3, 2004), Boston Globe; “Legal Breach: The Government's Attorneys and Abu Ghraib” (December 30, 2004), New York Times; “Excruciating Stain; U.S. Officials’ Adoption of Torture as an Acceptable Tactic in War Will Tarnish This Nation for Generations” (December 8, 2004), Atlanta Journal-Constitution; and “You’re (Not) Fired” (December 8, 2004), Los Angeles Times.

2. For reasons of parsimony and general interest, this article will concentrate on national news of issues, decisions, and events pertinent to the federal government. Local news diversity is another matter that may require different theoretical approaches (Arnold, 2004).

3. See Amnesty International, Iraq: Killings of Civilians in Basra and al Ama’ra (May 11, 2004). Retrieved from http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/MDE140072004ENGLISH/$File/MDE1400704.pdf.

4. Brief introductions to the day's news voiced by the anchor were excluded even if they mentioned Fallujah.

5. “Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq,” by David Barstow et al., New York Times, April 19, 2004, p. A1.

6. “Anti-U.S. Uprising Widens in Iraq,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, April 8, 2004, p. A1.

7. “Fallujah Fighting Halts Briefly for Evacuation, Aid Convoy,” by Pamela Constable, Washington Post, April 10, 2004, p. A11.

8. It is beyond the scope of this article to demonstrate how cultural incongruence probably did affect framing, for example the naming of the narrative the “prisoner abuse scandal,” with each word functioning to moderate what might otherwise be more transgressive and dissonant. An example of a more threatening alternative label might be “American torture policy.” See also Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2005).

9. In fact, the Marine commanders in the field opposed Pentagon orders to launch the Fallujah assault of April 2004 and felt it lacked strategic justification (West, 2005, pp. 5–6, 59–62).

Bennett, W. L., Lawrence, R. G., & Livingston, S. (2005). None Dare Call It Torture: Indexing and the Limits to Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal. Unpublished Manuscript.