Multi-level voting and party competition in vertically simultaneous elections: the case of Ukraine

Abstract

Vertically simultaneous elections to state-wide and regional legislatures provide us with a naturally occurring experiment in which to examine regionalism and multi-level voting. We examine the 2006 vertically and horizontally simultaneous state-wide and regional elections in Ukraine to determine how the internal dynamics of regionalism within a state account for the dissimilarity of voting behavior across electoral levels. Drawing on the party competition literature, we demonstrate that variations in both supply (parties) and demand (voters) produce considerable dissimilarity between regional and state results, with lower levels of consolidation and greater fractionalization at the regional level. We show that political cleavages operate differently across levels, that regional distinctiveness rather than regional authority better predicts first order-ness in regional elections, and that voters display varying tolerance for polarization at the regional and state level.

Keywords:

• multi-level voting
• second-order theory
• regionalism
• Ukraine
• simultaneous elections
• party competition
• regional parties

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

^1. Throughout, we refer to the regional level as the meso-level, between the state and municipal or local level. We use regional and substate interchangeably.

^2. Here regional elections mean the elections to the Parliament of Crimea, to Kyiv and Sevastopil city assemblies, and to regional assemblies in 24 oblasts of Ukraine.

^3. We distinguish between two issues: the extent to which individual voters express similar preferences across electoral levels; and the decision-making calculus of voters, whether, for example, they evaluate the issues, leaders, parties, and policies specific to the level for which they are casting a ballot. Reaching the same voting decision can of course be arrived at through different processes. Individuals can vote according to state factors in both elections and support the same parties or might choose different parties if there are variations in the supply of options at different electoral levels. Alternatively, individuals might evaluate each election on its own terms and find themselves drawn to similar or to different parties. The two issues – similarity of preference outcomes (votes cast) and the similarity of the decision-making process (voter motivations) – are therefore distinct.

^4. Massetti (2009) notes, for example, that there are approximately 30 regionalist parties that are significant players in regional party systems.

^5. In this paper, we refer to political cleavages that were salient during the particular electoral campaign, rather than to the classic understanding of sociological cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

^6. According to the Law on Local Self-Government in Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada 2001a), which governs regional assemblies, legislatures can set tax rates over estate property and parking. In all but Crimea, taxes levied are sent to the center, which then redistributes these to the oblasts. Each regional assembly therefore has discretionary power over the distribution of regional spending returned from the center. They have little institutional influence over constitutional debates and no right to protect minority languages in their region. At the time of the 2006 elections, the Crimean parliament has more authority, with primary legislative power, and the ability to form a government with a prime minster, albeit one appointed by the Crimean parliament with the consent of the Ukrainian president.

^7. According to the Law on Political Parties in the Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada 2001b), all parties should maintain a state-wide program of social development (Article 2), and prove their public support in at least two-thirds of the districts in at least two-thirds of the regions (Article 10).

^8. Specifically, the Law on Elections of Deputies in Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada 2004) allows the same party to stand as part of a bloc with other parties for one election (parliamentary or regional) and as a stand-alone party at the other electoral level.

^9. A rare exception to this trend includes the most recent studies of regional elections in Russia (Ross 2011a, 2011b) that link party competition at regional elections with the state-wide democratic record and encourage us to investigate voting behavior at regional elections in other post-communist states.

^10. For exceptions in the case of Russia, see Gel'man and Golosov (1998), Golosov (1999), and Moraski and Reisinger (2003).

^11. During the 2006 electoral campaign, government and pro-government parties and blocs coalesced into the Orange team (Copsey 2006; Katchanovski 2006; Hesli 2007; see also Mykhnenko and Swain 2010). Mainly national democrats (Way 2005), these were represented by state-wide parties and blocs such as the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Our Ukraine Bloc, by small and new blocs of parties such as Pora-PRP and the Kostenko-Plyushch Bloc, as well as a small and established party Rukh. The opposition camp was mainly represented by the Party of Regions. Its leader Viktor Yanukovych lost the 2004 presidency, but the party still had parliamentary representation in 2005–2006. Parties of the Ukrainian left (the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Vitrenko Bloc) are classified as state-wide small parties. The largest state-wide parties and blocs therefore included the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Our Ukraine Bloc, and the Party of Regions.

^12. The Community of Hungarian Culture in Zakarpattya, and Democratic Party of Hungarians in Ukraine.

^13. For example, Svoboda and The Russian Bloc Party.

^14. For example, the Chernovetskiy Bloc and the Civic Activists of Kyiv.

^15. Yakymenko (2008) notes that Ukrainian voters pay attention to party manifestos while casting their ballot: The party manifestos and the activities of political parties and blocs is very important for 60.2% of voters and relatively important for 26.5% of voters. This is further supported by a more recent study showing that voters are affected by party manifestos, ideas, and suggestions (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2012). In his 2008 report, Yakymenko claims that the differences between parties are small on issues such as the rule of law and respect for human rights, but he later (Yakymenko 2011) clarifies that parties offer meaningful differences, particularly with respect to language policy and foreign policy, two of the items we have evaluated. This later view is supported by research both before and after the 2006 elections (Romanyuk and Shveda 2005; see also the UNIAN news item (2012) on research by Dr Oleksandr Vyshnyak).

^16. Dissimilarity = , where x_is is performance in state elections and x_ir is performance in regional elections.

^17. In one particular region the presence of regional parties complicates our understanding of the similarity of voting preferences. In Crimea, the Party of Regions did not run as a separate political party in the regional elections, but teamed with the Russian Bloc (party) to run as the Yanukovich Bloc. Voters seeking to exercise uniform political preferences would therefore have had to cast a ballot for different political actors. Also in Crimea, Rukh ran as a separate party in regional elections but as part of the Our Ukraine Bloc in state-level parliamentary elections. For the analysis that follows, we treat the Yanukovich Bloc as the equivalent of the Party of Regions and Rukh as the equivalent of Our Ukraine Bloc for the regional elections in Crimea. Once we turn to clusters these issues disappear.

^18. ENPs = , where p_i is the proportion of valid votes earned by a political party. See also Golosov (2010) for an alternative formula.

^19. The survey was conducted during the period 31 May–18 June 2007. The sample size is 10,956. The survey was conducted in 403 locations (212 urban and 191 rural ones). The theoretical error of the sample, disregarding design effect, is no more than 1.0%.

^20. We rely on language use as well as native language. See Kulyk (2008) on the significance of this distinction.

^21. There are statistically significant differences (p < 0.10) in dissimilarity scores for those regions where regional parties compete and those where they do not.

^22. Collinearity disagnostics, as well as correlations among the variables, suggest it would be problematic to include all four in a regression equation. For this reason we have chosen the two variables that do not present collinearity problems (in this case tolerance levels less than 0.2, a variance inflation factor greater than 5) (Hair et al. 2006). We are also subscribing to best practice on the ratio of predictors to sample size (Van Voorhis and Morgan 2007).

^23. Neutrality in foreign affairs means avoiding membership in international military blocs and prioritizing the interests of national business rather than fostering membership in international economic unions.

^24. According to the 1996 Constitution, Ukrainian is the only official state language, and it is impossible to introduce a second state language without constitutional changes. Nevertheless, calls to introduce Russian as the second state language were frequent during electoral campaigns.

^25. Attitudes toward history not only reflect preferences for public policies in education (such as the teaching of and research in history), but also reflect identity politics (Rodgers 2006). Interpretations of history played a crucial role in the nation-building project of President Viktor Yushchenko (Motyl 2010). Here attitudes toward history include those toward World War II (WWII) and the Holodomor (the Great Famine) of 1932–1933 in Ukraine. For example, both the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Patriotic Army participated in WWII, but were on opposing sides. Contemporary public opinion is divided on the extent to which one or the other defended or betrayed Ukraine (Motyl 2010).

^26. Rukh campaigned on its own in Crimea in regional elections.

^27. The Party of Industry and Business of Ukraine won seats in the Lvivska regional assembly on its own.

^28. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists joined the Our Ukraine Bloc in the parliamentary elections.

^29. Campaigned individually in Sevastopil'.