The three colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian nationalist mythmaking of the Ukrainian crisis

Abstract

While the annexation of Crimea boosted Putin's popularity at home, the Donbas insurgency shattered the domestic ideological status quo. The Kremlin's position appeared somehow hesitant, fostering the resentment of Russian nationalist circles that were hoping for a second annexation. In this article, I explore the term Novorossiya as a live mythmaking process orchestrated by different Russian nationalist circles to justify the Donbas insurgency. The powerful pull of Novorossiya rests on its dual meaning in announcing the birth of a New Russia geographically and metaphorically. It is both a promised land to be added to Russia and an anticipation of Russia's own transformation. As such, Novorossiya provides for an exceptional convergence of three underlying ideological paradigms – “red” (Soviet), “white” (Orthodox), and “brown” (Fascist). The Novorossiya storyline validates a new kind of geopolitical adventurism and blurs the boundaries, both territorial and imaginary, of the Russian state.

Keywords:

• Russia
• Ukrainian crisis
• Putin
• Donbas
• nationalism

Acknowledgements

This paper was written as a part of a research project “The Vision of Eurasia,” organized by the Center for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University and supported financially by the Baltic Sea Foundation (Stockholm). A first, short version of the main argument has been published in “Novorossiya, a Launching Pad for Russian Nationalists,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 357. September 2014. I am very grateful to Peter Rollberg, Maria Lipman, Alexander Tarasov, Gerard Toal, and Robert Orttung for their comments on this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

^1. The term first appeared in 2005, propagated by Yuriy Krupnov, a scholar at the Institute for Demography, Migration, and Regional Development who participated in writing Russia's demographic doctrine and is known for his nationalist views. Krupnov's concept of Bol'shaya Rossiya, established in response to an alliance between “Orange” Ukraine and Saakashvili's Georgia, asserted Russia's responsibility as an empire in a regional space where other states are “failing or illegitimate” (APN, January 31, 2005).

^2. Interbridaga (http://interbrigada.org/sample-page/). See also “Limonov's Boys in Novorossiya” (https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/509316380131221505/photo/1).

^3. I thank Alexander Tarasov for providing this information.

^4. See Stepanov's biography at http://ruskline.ru/about/redakciya_rnl/.

^5. See their website at http://www.narodsobor.ru/about/ns/history-movement/11486-narodnyj-sobor.

^6. See the website at http://slavfond.ru/index.php?l = ru&p = about.

^7. See their website at rusarmy.su.

^8. The status of Cossacks has been recognized by the Russian state since 1996–1997, and in 2005 a federal law “On State Service of the Russian Cossacks” enabled them to work for the Interior Ministry, especially the border guards, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Ministry of Defense. Their field of action covers forest conservation; providing assistance during natural disasters, accidents, and other emergencies; and firefighting; educating children and young people in patriotic values; and preparation for military service. In southern Russia, especially in Krasnodar and Rostov-on-Don, Cossack guard formations work not only as border guards but also as municipal police, valorizing their role of guarantors of the city's “law and order.” See Don Info Buro, June 6, 2014; Novaya gazeta, July 18, 2014; Big Rostov, June 9, 2014; and Rostovskiy Moskovskiy Komsomolets, June 18, 2014.

^9. They were instrumentalized by the Tsarist security services, the Okhrana, and supported by the ultra-conservative clergy close to Father Johann Kronstadtsky (1829–1908). The Black Hundreds defended the most reactionary elements of autocracy, opposed any liberalization of the Russian political regime, organized pogroms in the name of a fierce anti-Semitism based on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and were also violently anti-Ukrainian (Rawson 1995).

^10. See the movement's website at http://www.sotnia.ru.

^11. See their website at http://zvio.info/.

^12. See their website at http://srn.rusidea.org.

^13. See their website at http://www.russia-talk.com/rf/nazar-dvi.htm.

^14. Marshall Capital Partners was later accused of “raiding” its competitors. It took a 10% stake in Rostelecom (making it the largest minority shareholder until Malofeyev sold a great part of its shares) and purchased some of the assets of state monopoly SvyazInvest. Malofeyev was briefly a member of the boards of directors of both companies. In 2012, he entered politics and was elected an MP for a small district in the Smolensk region, mostly with the goal of being protected by parliamentary immunity. The most complete biography (in Russian) is at http://comnarcon.com/444. In English, see Arkhipov, Meyer, and Reznik (2014). See also Novaya gazeta, November 21, 2012.

^15. Marshall Capital created the League for Internet Safety in 2011. See the League's website, http://www.ligainternet.ru/.

^16. Originally named the Russian Society of Philanthropy in Defense of Motherhood and Childhood. Malofeyev also co-founded the Gymnasium of St. Basil the Great. See the Foundation's website at http://www.ruscharity.ru/.

^17. See their website at http://falangeurasia.blogspot.com/search/label/Ex%20Borea%20Lux.

^18. The year the videos were made remains contested (see Glavcom, March 8, 2014; Lenta, March 5, 2014; and Novorossia.su, June 7, 2014).

^19. A phone recording released in May 2014 by the Ukrainian Security Services that purportedly shows this to be the case is certainly a forgery: no one can prove it is from 2014 or that Boitsov is actually responding to Barkashov. A video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j18rzilil30#t=22. Barkashov denied it was his voice (see http://vk.com/wall247656085_1400). Barkashov's presence in Donetsk has not been confirmed.

^20. See the movement's Facebook page at https://vk.com/topic-67964475_30103543.

^21. Many of these groups have been advertised on the Eurasianist Falanges website (http://falangeurasia.blogspot.com). On the French participants, see RIA Novosti, August 21, 2014.

^22. See, among others Sautreuil (2014) and War (n.d.).

^23. See their website at http://rusnsn.info/.

^24. See, for instance, the Topwar.ru website, which displays many of them, and the website http://superstrelkov.ru.